From: Nicolas Dichtel nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com

[ Upstream commit 94a72b3f024fc7e9ab640897a1e38583a470659d ]

NLM_F_MULTI must be used only when a NLMSG_DONE message is sent at the end. In fact, NLMSG_DONE is sent only at the end of a dump.

Libraries like libnl will wait forever for NLMSG_DONE.

Fixes: 949f1e39a617 ("bridge: mdb: notify on router port add and del") CC: Nikolay Aleksandrov nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/bridge/br_mdb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/bridge/br_mdb.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_mdb.c @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int nlmsg_populate_rtr_fill(struc struct nlmsghdr *nlh; struct nlattr *nest;

- nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, type, sizeof(*bpm), NLM_F_MULTI); + nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, type, sizeof(*bpm), 0); if (!nlh) return -EMSGSIZE;

From: Christophe JAILLET christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr

[ Upstream commit d23dbc479a8e813db4161a695d67da0e36557846 ]

The '.exit' functions from 'pernet_operations' structure should be marked as __net_exit, not __net_init.

Fixes: d862e5461423 ("net: ipv6: Implement /proc/net/icmp6.") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/ipv6/ping.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ping.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ping.c @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static int __net_init ping_v6_proc_init_ return ping_proc_register(net, &ping_v6_seq_afinfo); }

-static void __net_init ping_v6_proc_exit_net(struct net *net) +static void __net_exit ping_v6_proc_exit_net(struct net *net) { return ping_proc_unregister(net, &ping_v6_seq_afinfo); }

From: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan subashab@codeaurora.org

[ Upstream commit 10cc514f451a0f239aa34f91bc9dc954a9397840 ]

In event of failure during register_netdevice, free_netdev is invoked immediately. free_netdev assumes that all the netdevice refcounts have been dropped prior to it being called and as a result frees and clears out the refcount pointer.

However, this is not necessarily true as some of the operations in the NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier handlers queue RCU callbacks for invocation after a grace period. The IPv4 callback in_dev_rcu_put tries to access the refcount after free_netdev is called which leads to a null de-reference-

44837.761523: <6> Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000004a88287000 44837.761651: <2> pc : in_dev_finish_destroy+0x4c/0xc8 44837.761654: <2> lr : in_dev_finish_destroy+0x2c/0xc8 44837.762393: <2> Call trace: 44837.762398: <2> in_dev_finish_destroy+0x4c/0xc8 44837.762404: <2> in_dev_rcu_put+0x24/0x30 44837.762412: <2> rcu_nocb_kthread+0x43c/0x468 44837.762418: <2> kthread+0x118/0x128 44837.762424: <2> ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c

Fix this by waiting for the completion of the call_rcu() in case of register_netdevice errors.

Fixes: 93ee31f14f6f ("[NET]: Fix free_netdev on register_netdev failure.") Cc: Sean Tranchetti stranche@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan subashab@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/core/dev.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -6837,6 +6837,8 @@ int register_netdevice(struct net_device ret = notifier_to_errno(ret); if (ret) { rollback_registered(dev); + rcu_barrier(); + dev->reg_state = NETREG_UNREGISTERED; } /*

From: Christophe JAILLET christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr

[ Upstream commit b456d72412ca8797234449c25815e82f4e1426c0 ]

The '.exit' functions from 'pernet_operations' structure should be marked as __net_exit, not __net_init.

Fixes: 8e2d61e0aed2 ("sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner marcelo.leitner@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/sctp/protocol.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c +++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c @@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ static int __net_init sctp_ctrlsock_init return status; }

-static void __net_init sctp_ctrlsock_exit(struct net *net) +static void __net_exit sctp_ctrlsock_exit(struct net *net) { /* Free the control endpoint. */ inet_ctl_sock_destroy(net->sctp.ctl_sock);

From: Neal Cardwell ncardwell@google.com

[ Upstream commit af38d07ed391b21f7405fa1f936ca9686787d6d2 ]

Fix tcp_ecn_withdraw_cwr() to clear the correct bit: TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR.

Rationale: basically, TCP_ECN_DEMAND_CWR is a bit that is purely about the behavior of data receivers, and deciding whether to reflect incoming IP ECN CE marks as outgoing TCP th->ece marks. The TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR bit is purely about the behavior of data senders, and deciding whether to send CWR. The tcp_ecn_withdraw_cwr() function is only called from tcp_undo_cwnd_reduction() by data senders during an undo, so it should zero the sender-side state, TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR. It does not make sense to stop the reflection of incoming CE bits on incoming data packets just because outgoing packets were spuriously retransmitted.

The bug has been reproduced with packetdrill to manifest in a scenario with RFC3168 ECN, with an incoming data packet with CE bit set and carrying a TCP timestamp value that causes cwnd undo. Before this fix, the IP CE bit was ignored and not reflected in the TCP ECE header bit, and sender sent a TCP CWR ('W') bit on the next outgoing data packet, even though the cwnd reduction had been undone. After this fix, the sender properly reflects the CE bit and does not set the W bit.

Note: the bug actually predates 2005 git history; this Fixes footer is chosen to be the oldest SHA1 I have tested (from Sep 2007) for which the patch applies cleanly (since before this commit the code was in a .h file).

Fixes: bdf1ee5d3bd3 ("[TCP]: Move code from tcp_ecn.h to tcp*.c and tcp.h & remove it") Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell ncardwell@google.com Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng ycheng@google.com Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh soheil@google.com Cc: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static void tcp_ecn_accept_cwr(struct tc

static void tcp_ecn_withdraw_cwr(struct tcp_sock *tp) { - tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_DEMAND_CWR; + tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR; }

static void __tcp_ecn_check_ce(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)

From: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com

[ Upstream commit 77f22f92dff8e7b45c7786a430626d38071d4670 ]

I got a UAF repport in tun driver when doing fuzzy test:

[ 466.269490] ================================================================== [ 466.271792] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0 [ 466.271806] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888372139250 by task tun-test/2699 [ 466.271810] [ 466.271824] CPU: 1 PID: 2699 Comm: tun-test Not tainted 5.3.0-rc1-00001-g5a9433db2614-dirty #427 [ 466.271833] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 466.271838] Call Trace: [ 466.271858] dump_stack+0xca/0x13e [ 466.271871] ? tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0 [ 466.271890] print_address_description+0x79/0x440 [ 466.271906] ? vprintk_func+0x5e/0xf0 [ 466.271920] ? tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0 [ 466.271935] __kasan_report+0x15c/0x1df [ 466.271958] ? tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0 [ 466.271976] kasan_report+0xe/0x20 [ 466.271987] tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0 [ 466.272013] do_iter_readv_writev+0x4b7/0x740 [ 466.272032] ? default_llseek+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 466.272072] do_iter_read+0x1c5/0x5e0 [ 466.272110] vfs_readv+0x108/0x180 [ 466.299007] ? compat_rw_copy_check_uvector+0x440/0x440 [ 466.299020] ? fsnotify+0x888/0xd50 [ 466.299040] ? __fsnotify_parent+0xd0/0x350 [ 466.299064] ? fsnotify_first_mark+0x1e0/0x1e0 [ 466.304548] ? vfs_write+0x264/0x510 [ 466.304569] ? ksys_write+0x101/0x210 [ 466.304591] ? do_preadv+0x116/0x1a0 [ 466.304609] do_preadv+0x116/0x1a0 [ 466.309829] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x600 [ 466.309849] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 466.309861] RIP: 0033:0x4560f9 [ 466.309875] Code: 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 466.309889] RSP: 002b:00007ffffa5166e8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000127 [ 466.322992] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000400460 RCX: 00000000004560f9 [ 466.322999] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00000000200008c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 466.323007] RBP: 00007ffffa516700 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 466.323014] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000000000040cb10 [ 466.323021] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000006d7018 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 466.323057] [ 466.323064] Allocated by task 2605: [ 466.335165] save_stack+0x19/0x80 [ 466.336240] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.8+0xa0/0xd0 [ 466.337755] kmem_cache_alloc+0xe8/0x320 [ 466.339050] getname_flags+0xca/0x560 [ 466.340229] user_path_at_empty+0x2c/0x50 [ 466.341508] vfs_statx+0xe6/0x190 [ 466.342619] __do_sys_newstat+0x81/0x100 [ 466.343908] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x600 [ 466.345303] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 466.347034] [ 466.347517] Freed by task 2605: [ 466.348471] save_stack+0x19/0x80 [ 466.349476] __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180 [ 466.350726] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x430 [ 466.351874] putname+0xe2/0x120 [ 466.352921] filename_lookup+0x257/0x3e0 [ 466.354319] vfs_statx+0xe6/0x190 [ 466.355498] __do_sys_newstat+0x81/0x100 [ 466.356889] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x600 [ 466.358037] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 466.359567] [ 466.360050] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888372139100 [ 466.360050] which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096 [ 466.363735] The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of [ 466.363735] 4096-byte region [ffff888372139100, ffff88837213a100) [ 466.367179] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 466.368604] page:ffffea000dc84e00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8883df1b4f00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 466.371582] flags: 0x2fffff80010200(slab|head) [ 466.372910] raw: 002fffff80010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff8883df1b4f00 [ 466.375209] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 466.377778] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 466.379730] [ 466.380288] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 466.381844] ffff888372139100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 466.384009] ffff888372139180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 466.386131] >ffff888372139200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 466.388257] ^ [ 466.390234] ffff888372139280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 466.392512] ffff888372139300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 466.394667] ==================================================================

tun_chr_read_iter() accessed the memory which freed by free_netdev() called by tun_set_iff():

CPUA CPUB tun_set_iff() alloc_netdev_mqs() tun_attach() tun_chr_read_iter() tun_get() tun_do_read() tun_ring_recv() register_netdevice() <-- inject error goto err_detach tun_detach_all() <-- set RCV_SHUTDOWN free_netdev() <-- called from err_free_dev path netdev_freemem() <-- free the memory without check refcount (In this path, the refcount cannot prevent freeing the memory of dev, and the memory will be used by dev_put() called by tun_chr_read_iter() on CPUB.) (Break from tun_ring_recv(), because RCV_SHUTDOWN is set) tun_put() dev_put() <-- use the memory freed by netdev_freemem()

Put the publishing of tfile->tun after register_netdevice(), so tun_get() won't get the tun pointer that freed by err_detach path if register_netdevice() failed.

Fixes: eb0fb363f920 ("tuntap: attach queue 0 before registering netdevice") Reported-by: Hulk Robot hulkci@huawei.com Suggested-by: Jason Wang jasowang@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/tun.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/tun.c +++ b/drivers/net/tun.c @@ -597,7 +597,8 @@ static void tun_detach_all(struct net_de module_put(THIS_MODULE); }

-static int tun_attach(struct tun_struct *tun, struct file *file, bool skip_filter) +static int tun_attach(struct tun_struct *tun, struct file *file, + bool skip_filter, bool publish_tun) { struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data; int err; @@ -630,7 +631,8 @@ static int tun_attach(struct tun_struct } tfile->queue_index = tun->numqueues; tfile->socket.sk->sk_shutdown &= ~RCV_SHUTDOWN; - rcu_assign_pointer(tfile->tun, tun); + if (publish_tun) + rcu_assign_pointer(tfile->tun, tun); rcu_assign_pointer(tun->tfiles[tun->numqueues], tfile); tun->numqueues++;

@@ -1641,7 +1643,7 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, if (err < 0) return err;

- err = tun_attach(tun, file, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NOFILTER); + err = tun_attach(tun, file, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NOFILTER, true); if (err < 0) return err;

@@ -1722,13 +1724,17 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX);

INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled); - err = tun_attach(tun, file, false); + err = tun_attach(tun, file, false, false); if (err < 0) goto err_free_flow;

err = register_netdevice(tun->dev); if (err < 0) goto err_detach; + /* free_netdev() won't check refcnt, to aovid race + * with dev_put() we need publish tun after registration. + */ + rcu_assign_pointer(tfile->tun, tun); }

netif_carrier_on(tun->dev); @@ -1867,7 +1873,7 @@ static int tun_set_queue(struct file *fi ret = security_tun_dev_attach_queue(tun->security); if (ret < 0) goto unlock; - ret = tun_attach(tun, file, false); + ret = tun_attach(tun, file, false, true); } else if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_DETACH_QUEUE) { tun = rtnl_dereference(tfile->tun); if (!tun || !(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE) || tfile->detached)

From: Filipe Manana fdmanana@suse.com

commit 410f954cb1d1c79ae485dd83a175f21954fd87cd upstream.

Sometimes when fsync'ing a file we need to log that other inodes exist and when we need to do that we acquire a reference on the inodes and then drop that reference using iput() after logging them.

That generally is not a problem except if we end up doing the final iput() (dropping the last reference) on the inode and that inode has a link count of 0, which can happen in a very short time window if the logging path gets a reference on the inode while it's being unlinked.

In that case we end up getting the eviction callback, btrfs_evict_inode(), invoked through the iput() call chain which needs to drop all of the inode's items from its subvolume btree, and in order to do that, it needs to join a transaction at the helper function evict_refill_and_join(). However because the task previously started a transaction at the fsync handler, btrfs_sync_file(), it has current->journal_info already pointing to a transaction handle and therefore evict_refill_and_join() will get that transaction handle from btrfs_join_transaction(). From this point on, two different problems can happen:

1) evict_refill_and_join() will often change the transaction handle's block reserve (->block_rsv) and set its ->bytes_reserved field to a value greater than 0. If evict_refill_and_join() never commits the transaction, the eviction handler ends up decreasing the reference count (->use_count) of the transaction handle through the call to btrfs_end_transaction(), and after that point we have a transaction handle with a NULL ->block_rsv (which is the value prior to the transaction join from evict_refill_and_join()) and a ->bytes_reserved value greater than 0. If after the eviction/iput completes the inode logging path hits an error or it decides that it must fallback to a transaction commit, the btrfs fsync handle, btrfs_sync_file(), gets a non-zero value from btrfs_log_dentry_safe(), and because of that non-zero value it tries to commit the transaction using a handle with a NULL ->block_rsv and a non-zero ->bytes_reserved value. This makes the transaction commit hit an assertion failure at btrfs_trans_release_metadata() because ->bytes_reserved is not zero but the ->block_rsv is NULL. The produced stack trace for that is like the following:

[192922.917158] assertion failed: !trans->bytes_reserved, file: fs/btrfs/transaction.c, line: 816 [192922.917553] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [192922.917922] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3532! [192922.918310] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI [192922.918666] CPU: 2 PID: 883 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 5.1.4-btrfs-next-47 #1 [192922.919035] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626ccb91-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [192922.919801] RIP: 0010:assfail.constprop.25+0x18/0x1a [btrfs] (...) [192922.920925] RSP: 0018:ffffaebdc8a27da8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [192922.921315] RAX: 0000000000000051 RBX: ffff95c9c16a41c0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [192922.921692] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff95cab6b16838 RDI: ffff95cab6b16838 [192922.922066] RBP: ffff95c9c16a41c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [192922.922442] R10: ffffaebdc8a27e70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff95ca731a0980 [192922.922820] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff95ca84c73338 R15: ffff95ca731a0ea8 [192922.923200] FS: 00007f337eda4e80(0000) GS:ffff95cab6b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [192922.923579] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [192922.923948] CR2: 00007f337edad000 CR3: 00000001e00f6002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [192922.924329] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [192922.924711] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [192922.925105] Call Trace: [192922.925505] btrfs_trans_release_metadata+0x10c/0x170 [btrfs] [192922.925911] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x3e/0xaf0 [btrfs] [192922.926324] btrfs_sync_file+0x44c/0x490 [btrfs] [192922.926731] do_fsync+0x38/0x60 [192922.927138] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20 [192922.927543] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1c0 [192922.927939] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe (...) [192922.934077] ---[ end trace f00808b12068168f ]---

2) If evict_refill_and_join() decides to commit the transaction, it will be able to do it, since the nested transaction join only increments the transaction handle's ->use_count reference counter and it does not prevent the transaction from getting committed. This means that after eviction completes, the fsync logging path will be using a transaction handle that refers to an already committed transaction. What happens when using such a stale transaction can be unpredictable, we are at least having a use-after-free on the transaction handle itself, since the transaction commit will call kmem_cache_free() against the handle regardless of its ->use_count value, or we can end up silently losing all the updates to the log tree after that iput() in the logging path, or using a transaction handle that in the meanwhile was allocated to another task for a new transaction, etc, pretty much unpredictable what can happen.

In order to fix both of them, instead of using iput() during logging, use btrfs_add_delayed_iput(), so that the logging path of fsync never drops the last reference on an inode, that step is offloaded to a safe context (usually the cleaner kthread).

The assertion failure issue was sporadically triggered by the test case generic/475 from fstests, which loads the dm error target while fsstress is running, which lead to fsync failing while logging inodes with -EIO errors and then trying later to commit the transaction, triggering the assertion failure.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana fdmanana@suse.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- fs/btrfs/tree-log.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c @@ -5133,7 +5133,7 @@ process_leaf: }

if (btrfs_inode_in_log(di_inode, trans->transid)) { - iput(di_inode); + btrfs_add_delayed_iput(di_inode); continue; }

@@ -5143,7 +5143,7 @@ process_leaf: btrfs_release_path(path); ret = btrfs_log_inode(trans, root, di_inode, log_mode, 0, LLONG_MAX, ctx); - iput(di_inode); + btrfs_add_delayed_iput(di_inode); if (ret) goto next_dir_inode; if (ctx->log_new_dentries) { @@ -5281,7 +5281,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_all_parents(struct

ret = btrfs_log_inode(trans, root, dir_inode, LOG_INODE_ALL, 0, LLONG_MAX, ctx); - iput(dir_inode); + btrfs_add_delayed_iput(dir_inode); if (ret) goto out; }

From: Thomas Huth thuth@redhat.com

commit 53936b5bf35e140ae27e4bbf0447a61063f400da upstream.

When the userspace program runs the KVM_S390_INTERRUPT ioctl to inject an interrupt, we convert them from the legacy struct kvm_s390_interrupt to the new struct kvm_s390_irq via the s390int_to_s390irq() function. However, this function does not take care of all types of interrupts that we can inject into the guest later (see do_inject_vcpu()). Since we do not clear out the s390irq values before calling s390int_to_s390irq(), there is a chance that we copy random data from the kernel stack which could be leaked to the userspace later.

Specifically, the problem exists with the KVM_S390_INT_PFAULT_INIT interrupt: s390int_to_s390irq() does not handle it, and the function __inject_pfault_init() later copies irq->u.ext which contains the random kernel stack data. This data can then be leaked either to the guest memory in __deliver_pfault_init(), or the userspace might retrieve it directly with the KVM_S390_GET_IRQ_STATE ioctl.

Fix it by handling that interrupt type in s390int_to_s390irq(), too, and by making sure that the s390irq struct is properly pre-initialized. And while we're at it, make sure that s390int_to_s390irq() now directly returns -EINVAL for unknown interrupt types, so that we immediately get a proper error code in case we add more interrupt types to do_inject_vcpu() without updating s390int_to_s390irq() sometime in the future.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger borntraeger@de.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank frankja@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth thuth@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20190912115438.25761-1-thuth@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger borntraeger@de.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c | 10 ++++++++++ arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c @@ -1487,6 +1487,16 @@ int s390int_to_s390irq(struct kvm_s390_i case KVM_S390_MCHK: irq->u.mchk.mcic = s390int->parm64; break; + case KVM_S390_INT_PFAULT_INIT: + irq->u.ext.ext_params = s390int->parm; + irq->u.ext.ext_params2 = s390int->parm64; + break; + case KVM_S390_RESTART: + case KVM_S390_INT_CLOCK_COMP: + case KVM_S390_INT_CPU_TIMER: + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; } return 0; } --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c @@ -2541,7 +2541,7 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *fi } case KVM_S390_INTERRUPT: { struct kvm_s390_interrupt s390int; - struct kvm_s390_irq s390irq; + struct kvm_s390_irq s390irq = {};

r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&s390int, argp, sizeof(s390int)))

From: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com

commit f7eea636c3d505fe6f1d1066234f1aaf7171b681 upstream.

The implementation of vmread to memory is still incomplete, as it lacks the ability to do vmread to I/O memory just like vmptrst.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -7247,6 +7247,7 @@ static int handle_vmread(struct kvm_vcpu unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION); u32 vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO); gva_t gva = 0; + struct x86_exception e;

if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu) || !nested_vmx_check_vmcs12(vcpu)) @@ -7273,8 +7274,10 @@ static int handle_vmread(struct kvm_vcpu vmx_instruction_info, true, &gva)) return 1; /* _system ok, as nested_vmx_check_permission verified cpl=0 */ - kvm_write_guest_virt_system(vcpu, gva, &field_value, - (is_long_mode(vcpu) ? 8 : 4), NULL); + if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(vcpu, gva, &field_value, + (is_long_mode(vcpu) ? 8 : 4), + NULL)) + kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e); }

nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);

From: Paul Burton paul.burton@mips.com

commit 0648e50e548d881d025b9419a1a168753c8e2bf7 upstream.

The MIPS VDSO build currently doesn't provide the -msoft-float flag to the compiler as the kernel proper does. This results in an attempt to use the compiler's default floating point configuration, which can be problematic in cases where this is incompatible with the target CPU's -march= flag. For example decstation_defconfig fails to build using toolchains in which gcc was configured --with-fp-32=xx with the following error:

LDS arch/mips/vdso/vdso.lds cc1: error: '-march=r3000' requires '-mfp32' make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:379: arch/mips/vdso/vdso.lds] Error 1

The kernel proper avoids this error because we build with the -msoft-float compiler flag, rather than using the compiler's default. Pass this flag through to the VDSO build so that it too becomes agnostic to the toolchain's floating point configuration.

Note that this is filtered out from KBUILD_CFLAGS rather than simply always using -msoft-float such that if we switch the kernel to use -mno-float in the future the VDSO will automatically inherit the change.

The VDSO doesn't actually include any floating point code, and its .MIPS.abiflags section is already manually generated to specify that it's compatible with any floating point ABI. As such this change should have no effect on the resulting VDSO, apart from fixing the build failure for affected toolchains.

Signed-off-by: Paul Burton paul.burton@mips.com Reported-by: Kevin Hilman khilman@baylibre.com Reported-by: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net Tested-by: Kevin Hilman khilman@baylibre.com Fixes: ebb5e78cc634 ("MIPS: Initial implementation of a VDSO") Cc: Maciej W. Rozycki macro@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+ Cc: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/mips/vdso/Makefile | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/mips/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/mips/vdso/Makefile @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ ccflags-vdso := \ $(filter -E%,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \ $(filter -mmicromips,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \ $(filter -march=%,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \ + $(filter -m%-float,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \ -D__VDSO__ cflags-vdso := $(ccflags-vdso) \ $(filter -W%,$(filter-out -Wa$(comma)%,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS))) \

From: Muchun Song smuchun@gmail.com

commit ac43432cb1f5c2950408534987e57c2071e24d8f upstream.

There is a race condition between removing glue directory and adding a new device under the glue dir. It can be reproduced in following test:

CPU1: CPU2:

device_add() get_device_parent() class_dir_create_and_add() kobject_add_internal() create_dir() // create glue_dir

device_add() get_device_parent() kobject_get() // get glue_dir

device_del() cleanup_glue_dir() kobject_del(glue_dir)

kobject_add() kobject_add_internal() create_dir() // in glue_dir sysfs_create_dir_ns() kernfs_create_dir_ns(sd)

sysfs_remove_dir() // glue_dir->sd=NULL sysfs_put() // free glue_dir->sd

// sd is freed kernfs_new_node(sd) kernfs_get(glue_dir) kernfs_add_one() kernfs_put()

Before CPU1 remove last child device under glue dir, if CPU2 add a new device under glue dir, the glue_dir kobject reference count will be increase to 2 via kobject_get() in get_device_parent(). And CPU2 has been called kernfs_create_dir_ns(), but not call kernfs_new_node(). Meanwhile, CPU1 call sysfs_remove_dir() and sysfs_put(). This result in glue_dir->sd is freed and it's reference count will be 0. Then CPU2 call kernfs_get(glue_dir) will trigger a warning in kernfs_get() and increase it's reference count to 1. Because glue_dir->sd is freed by CPU1, the next call kernfs_add_one() by CPU2 will fail(This is also use-after-free) and call kernfs_put() to decrease reference count. Because the reference count is decremented to 0, it will also call kmem_cache_free() to free the glue_dir->sd again. This will result in double free.

In order to avoid this happening, we also should make sure that kernfs_node for glue_dir is released in CPU1 only when refcount for glue_dir kobj is 1 to fix this race.

The following calltrace is captured in kernel 4.14 with the following patch applied:

commit 726e41097920 ("drivers: core: Remove glue dirs from sysfs earlier")

-------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 3.633703] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 513 at .../fs/kernfs/dir.c:494 Here is WARN_ON(!atomic_read(&kn->count) in kernfs_get(). .... [ 3.633986] Call trace: [ 3.633991] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0xa8/0xb0 [ 3.633994] sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x54/0xe8 [ 3.634001] kobject_add_internal+0x22c/0x3f0 [ 3.634005] kobject_add+0xe4/0x118 [ 3.634011] device_add+0x200/0x870 [ 3.634017] _request_firmware+0x958/0xc38 [ 3.634020] request_firmware_into_buf+0x4c/0x70 .... [ 3.634064] kernel BUG at .../mm/slub.c:294! Here is BUG_ON(object == fp) in set_freepointer(). .... [ 3.634346] Call trace: [ 3.634351] kmem_cache_free+0x504/0x6b8 [ 3.634355] kernfs_put+0x14c/0x1d8 [ 3.634359] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x88/0xb0 [ 3.634362] sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x54/0xe8 [ 3.634366] kobject_add_internal+0x22c/0x3f0 [ 3.634370] kobject_add+0xe4/0x118 [ 3.634374] device_add+0x200/0x870 [ 3.634378] _request_firmware+0x958/0xc38 [ 3.634381] request_firmware_into_buf+0x4c/0x70 --------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fixes: 726e41097920 ("drivers: core: Remove glue dirs from sysfs earlier") Signed-off-by: Muchun Song smuchun@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha mojha@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Prateek Sood prsood@codeaurora.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190727032122.24639-1-smuchun@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/base/core.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/base/core.c +++ b/drivers/base/core.c @@ -857,12 +857,63 @@ static inline struct kobject *get_glue_d */ static void cleanup_glue_dir(struct device *dev, struct kobject *glue_dir) { + unsigned int ref; + /* see if we live in a "glue" directory */ if (!live_in_glue_dir(glue_dir, dev)) return;

mutex_lock(&gdp_mutex); - if (!kobject_has_children(glue_dir)) + /** + * There is a race condition between removing glue directory + * and adding a new device under the glue directory. + * + * CPU1: CPU2: + * + * device_add() + * get_device_parent() + * class_dir_create_and_add() + * kobject_add_internal() + * create_dir() // create glue_dir + * + * device_add() + * get_device_parent() + * kobject_get() // get glue_dir + * + * device_del() + * cleanup_glue_dir() + * kobject_del(glue_dir) + * + * kobject_add() + * kobject_add_internal() + * create_dir() // in glue_dir + * sysfs_create_dir_ns() + * kernfs_create_dir_ns(sd) + * + * sysfs_remove_dir() // glue_dir->sd=NULL + * sysfs_put() // free glue_dir->sd + * + * // sd is freed + * kernfs_new_node(sd) + * kernfs_get(glue_dir) + * kernfs_add_one() + * kernfs_put() + * + * Before CPU1 remove last child device under glue dir, if CPU2 add + * a new device under glue dir, the glue_dir kobject reference count + * will be increase to 2 in kobject_get(k). And CPU2 has been called + * kernfs_create_dir_ns(). Meanwhile, CPU1 call sysfs_remove_dir() + * and sysfs_put(). This result in glue_dir->sd is freed. + * + * Then the CPU2 will see a stale "empty" but still potentially used + * glue dir around in kernfs_new_node(). + * + * In order to avoid this happening, we also should make sure that + * kernfs_node for glue_dir is released in CPU1 only when refcount + * for glue_dir kobj is 1. + */ + ref = atomic_read(&glue_dir->kref.refcount); + if (!kobject_has_children(glue_dir) && !--ref) kobject_del(glue_dir); kobject_put(glue_dir); mutex_unlock(&gdp_mutex);

From: Christophe Leroy christophe.leroy@c-s.fr

commit ee483d32ee1a1a7f7d7e918fbc350c790a5af64a upstream.

When data size is not a multiple of the alg's block size, the SEC generates an error interrupt and dumps the registers. And for NULL size, the SEC does just nothing and the interrupt is awaited forever.

This patch ensures the data size is correct before submitting the request to the SEC engine.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy christophe.leroy@c-s.fr Fixes: 4de9d0b547b9 ("crypto: talitos - Add ablkcipher algorithms") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -1641,6 +1641,14 @@ static int ablkcipher_encrypt(struct abl struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(areq); struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(cipher); struct talitos_edesc *edesc; + unsigned int blocksize = + crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(crypto_ablkcipher_tfm(cipher)); + + if (!areq->nbytes) + return 0; + + if (areq->nbytes % blocksize) + return -EINVAL;

/* allocate extended descriptor */ edesc = ablkcipher_edesc_alloc(areq, true); @@ -1658,6 +1666,14 @@ static int ablkcipher_decrypt(struct abl struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(areq); struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(cipher); struct talitos_edesc *edesc; + unsigned int blocksize = + crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(crypto_ablkcipher_tfm(cipher)); + + if (!areq->nbytes) + return 0; + + if (areq->nbytes % blocksize) + return -EINVAL;

/* allocate extended descriptor */ edesc = ablkcipher_edesc_alloc(areq, false);

From: Paul Burton paul.burton@mips.com

commit 02eec6c9fc0cb13169cc97a6139771768791f92b upstream.

In nlm_fmn_send() we have a loop which attempts to send a message multiple times in order to handle the transient failure condition of a lack of available credit. When examining the status register to detect the failure we check for a condition that can never be true, which falls foul of gcc 8's -Wtautological-compare:

In file included from arch/mips/netlogic/common/irq.c:65: ./arch/mips/include/asm/netlogic/xlr/fmn.h: In function 'nlm_fmn_send': ./arch/mips/include/asm/netlogic/xlr/fmn.h:304:22: error: bitwise comparison always evaluates to false [-Werror=tautological-compare] if ((status & 0x2) == 1) ^~

If the path taken if this condition were true all we do is print a message to the kernel console. Since failures seem somewhat expected here (making the console message questionable anyway) and the condition has clearly never evaluated true we simply remove it, rather than attempting to fix it to check status correctly.

Signed-off-by: Paul Burton paul.burton@mips.com Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/20174/ Cc: Ganesan Ramalingam ganesanr@broadcom.com Cc: James Hogan jhogan@kernel.org Cc: Jayachandran C jnair@caviumnetworks.com Cc: John Crispin john@phrozen.org Cc: Ralf Baechle ralf@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/mips/include/asm/netlogic/xlr/fmn.h | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/netlogic/xlr/fmn.h +++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/netlogic/xlr/fmn.h @@ -301,8 +301,6 @@ static inline int nlm_fmn_send(unsigned for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { nlm_msgsnd(dest); status = nlm_read_c2_status0(); - if ((status & 0x2) == 1) - pr_info("Send pending fail!\n"); if ((status & 0x4) == 0) return 0; }

From: Alan Stern stern@rowland.harvard.edu

commit 3dd550a2d36596a1b0ee7955da3b611c031d3873 upstream.

The syzbot fuzzer provoked a slab-out-of-bounds error in the USB core:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0xa6/0xb0 lib/string.c:904 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881d175bed6 by task kworker/0:3/2746

CPU: 0 PID: 2746 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc5+ #28 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x6a/0x32c mm/kasan/report.c:351 __kasan_report.cold+0x1a/0x33 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe/0x12 mm/kasan/common.c:612 memcmp+0xa6/0xb0 lib/string.c:904 memcmp include/linux/string.h:400 [inline] descriptors_changed drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5579 [inline] usb_reset_and_verify_device+0x564/0x1300 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5729 usb_reset_device+0x4c1/0x920 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5898 rt2x00usb_probe+0x53/0x7af drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2x00usb.c:806

The error occurs when the descriptors_changed() routine (called during a device reset) attempts to compare the old and new BOS and capability descriptors. The length it uses for the comparison is the wTotalLength value stored in BOS descriptor, but this value is not necessarily the same as the length actually allocated for the descriptors. If it is larger the routine will call memcmp() with a length that is too big, thus reading beyond the end of the allocated region and leading to this fault.

The kernel reads the BOS descriptor twice: first to get the total length of all the capability descriptors, and second to read it along with all those other descriptors. A malicious (or very faulty) device may send different values for the BOS descriptor fields each time. The memory area will be allocated using the wTotalLength value read the first time, but stored within it will be the value read the second time.

To prevent this possibility from causing any errors, this patch modifies the BOS descriptor after it has been read the second time: It sets the wTotalLength field to the actual length of the descriptors that were read in and validated. Then the memcpy() call, or any other code using these descriptors, will be able to rely on wTotalLength being valid.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+35f4d916c623118d576e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Alan Stern stern@rowland.harvard.edu CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Pine.LNX.4.44L0.1909041154260.1722-100000@iolanthe... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/usb/core/config.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/core/config.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/config.c @@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ int usb_get_bos_descriptor(struct usb_de struct usb_bos_descriptor *bos; struct usb_dev_cap_header *cap; struct usb_ssp_cap_descriptor *ssp_cap; - unsigned char *buffer; + unsigned char *buffer, *buffer0; int length, total_len, num, i, ssac; __u8 cap_type; int ret; @@ -936,10 +936,12 @@ int usb_get_bos_descriptor(struct usb_de ret = -ENOMSG; goto err; } + + buffer0 = buffer; total_len -= length; + buffer += length;

for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { - buffer += length; cap = (struct usb_dev_cap_header *)buffer;

if (total_len < sizeof(*cap) || total_len < cap->bLength) { @@ -953,8 +955,6 @@ int usb_get_bos_descriptor(struct usb_de break; }

- total_len -= length; - if (cap->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_DEVICE_CAPABILITY) { dev_warn(ddev, "descriptor type invalid, skip\n"); continue; @@ -989,7 +989,11 @@ int usb_get_bos_descriptor(struct usb_de default: break; } + + total_len -= length; + buffer += length; } + dev->bos->desc->wTotalLength = cpu_to_le16(buffer - buffer0);

return 0;

From: Corey Minyard cminyard@mvista.com

Change

a90118c445cc x86/boot: Save fields explicitly, zero out everything else

modified the way boot parameters were saved on x86. When this was backported, e820_table didn't exists, and that change was dropped. Unfortunately, e820_table did exist, it was just named e820_map in this kernel version.

This was breaking booting on a Supermicro Super Server/A2SDi-2C-HLN4F with a Denverton CPU. Adding e820_map to the saved boot params table fixes the issue.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x, 4.4.x Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard cminyard@mvista.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ static void sanitize_boot_params(struct BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries), BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(edd_mbr_sig_buffer), BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(hdr), + BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(e820_map), BOOT_PARAM_PRESERVE(eddbuf), };

From: Matt Delco delco@chromium.org

commit b60fe990c6b07ef6d4df67bc0530c7c90a62623a upstream.

The first/last indexes are typically shared with a user app. The app can change the 'last' index that the kernel uses to store the next result. This change sanity checks the index before using it for writing to a potentially arbitrary address.

This fixes CVE-2019-14821.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5f94c1741bdc ("KVM: Add coalesced MMIO support (common part)") Signed-off-by: Matt Delco delco@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson jmattson@google.com Reported-by: syzbot+983c866c3dd6efa3662a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com [Use READ_ONCE. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c +++ b/virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static int coalesced_mmio_in_range(struc return 1; }

-static int coalesced_mmio_has_room(struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_dev *dev) +static int coalesced_mmio_has_room(struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_dev *dev, u32 last) { struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_ring *ring; unsigned avail; @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static int coalesced_mmio_has_room(struc * there is always one unused entry in the buffer */ ring = dev->kvm->coalesced_mmio_ring; - avail = (ring->first - ring->last - 1) % KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_MAX; + avail = (ring->first - last - 1) % KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_MAX; if (avail == 0) { /* full */ return 0; @@ -66,24 +66,27 @@ static int coalesced_mmio_write(struct k { struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_dev *dev = to_mmio(this); struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_ring *ring = dev->kvm->coalesced_mmio_ring; + __u32 insert;

if (!coalesced_mmio_in_range(dev, addr, len)) return -EOPNOTSUPP;

spin_lock(&dev->kvm->ring_lock);

- if (!coalesced_mmio_has_room(dev)) { + insert = READ_ONCE(ring->last); + if (!coalesced_mmio_has_room(dev, insert) || + insert >= KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_MAX) { spin_unlock(&dev->kvm->ring_lock); return -EOPNOTSUPP; }

/* copy data in first free entry of the ring */

- ring->coalesced_mmio[ring->last].phys_addr = addr; - ring->coalesced_mmio[ring->last].len = len; - memcpy(ring->coalesced_mmio[ring->last].data, val, len); + ring->coalesced_mmio[insert].phys_addr = addr; + ring->coalesced_mmio[insert].len = len; + memcpy(ring->coalesced_mmio[insert].data, val, len); smp_wmb(); - ring->last = (ring->last + 1) % KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_MAX; + ring->last = (insert + 1) % KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_MAX; spin_unlock(&dev->kvm->ring_lock); return 0; }

From: Razvan Stefanescu razvan.stefanescu@microchip.com

commit d2ace81bf902a9f11d52e59e5d232d2255a0e353 upstream.

When half-duplex RS485 communication is used, after RX is started, TX tasklet still needs to be scheduled tasklet. This avoids console freezing when more data is to be transmitted, if the serial communication is not closed.

Fixes: 69646d7a3689 ("tty/serial: atmel: RS485 HD w/DMA: enable RX after TX is stopped") Signed-off-by: Razvan Stefanescu razvan.stefanescu@microchip.com Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190813074025.16218-1-razvan.stefanescu@microchip... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/atmel_serial.c @@ -1275,7 +1275,6 @@ atmel_handle_transmit(struct uart_port *

atmel_port->hd_start_rx = false; atmel_start_rx(port); - return; }

tasklet_schedule(&atmel_port->tasklet);

From: Ilya Leoshkevich iii@linux.ibm.com

[ Upstream commit bb2d267c448f4bc3a3389d97c56391cb779178ae ]

"masking, test in bounds 3" fails on s390, because BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_2, 0) ignores the top 32 bits of BPF_REG_2. The reason is that JIT emits lcgfr instead of lcgr. The associated comment indicates that the code was intended to emit lcgr in the first place, it's just that the wrong opcode was used.

Fix by using the correct opcode.

Fixes: 054623105728 ("s390/bpf: Add s390x eBPF JIT compiler backend") Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich iii@linux.ibm.com Acked-by: Vasily Gorbik gor@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 727693e283da2..e53d410e88703 100644 --- a/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ static noinline int bpf_jit_insn(struct bpf_jit *jit, struct bpf_prog *fp, int i break; case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_NEG: /* dst = -dst */ /* lcgr %dst,%dst */ - EMIT4(0xb9130000, dst_reg, dst_reg); + EMIT4(0xb9030000, dst_reg, dst_reg); break; /* * BPF_FROM_BE/LE

From: Ilya Leoshkevich iii@linux.ibm.com

[ Upstream commit 91b4db5313a2c793aabc2143efb8ed0cf0fdd097 ]

"p runtime/jit: pass > 32bit index to tail_call" fails when bpf_jit_enable=1, because the tail call is not executed.

This in turn is because the generated code assumes index is 64-bit, while it must be 32-bit, and as a result prog array bounds check fails, while it should pass. Even if bounds check would have passed, the code that follows uses 64-bit index to compute prog array offset.

Fix by using clrj instead of clgrj for comparing index with array size, and also by using llgfr for truncating index to 32 bits before using it to compute prog array offset.

Fixes: 6651ee070b31 ("s390/bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper") Reported-by: Yauheni Kaliuta yauheni.kaliuta@redhat.com Acked-by: Vasily Gorbik gor@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich iii@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index e53d410e88703..bcf409997d6dc 100644 --- a/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -1067,8 +1067,8 @@ static noinline int bpf_jit_insn(struct bpf_jit *jit, struct bpf_prog *fp, int i /* llgf %w1,map.max_entries(%b2) */ EMIT6_DISP_LH(0xe3000000, 0x0016, REG_W1, REG_0, BPF_REG_2, offsetof(struct bpf_array, map.max_entries)); - /* clgrj %b3,%w1,0xa,label0: if %b3 >= %w1 goto out */ - EMIT6_PCREL_LABEL(0xec000000, 0x0065, BPF_REG_3, + /* clrj %b3,%w1,0xa,label0: if (u32)%b3 >= (u32)%w1 goto out */ + EMIT6_PCREL_LABEL(0xec000000, 0x0077, BPF_REG_3, REG_W1, 0, 0xa);

/* @@ -1094,8 +1094,10 @@ static noinline int bpf_jit_insn(struct bpf_jit *jit, struct bpf_prog *fp, int i * goto out; */

- /* sllg %r1,%b3,3: %r1 = index * 8 */ - EMIT6_DISP_LH(0xeb000000, 0x000d, REG_1, BPF_REG_3, REG_0, 3); + /* llgfr %r1,%b3: %r1 = (u32) index */ + EMIT4(0xb9160000, REG_1, BPF_REG_3); + /* sllg %r1,%r1,3: %r1 *= 8 */ + EMIT6_DISP_LH(0xeb000000, 0x000d, REG_1, REG_1, REG_0, 3); /* lg %r1,prog(%b2,%r1) */ EMIT6_DISP_LH(0xe3000000, 0x0004, REG_1, BPF_REG_2, REG_1, offsetof(struct bpf_array, ptrs));

From: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com

[ Upstream commit 17d8c5d145000070c581f2a8aa01edc7998582ab ]

Initialise the result count to 0 rather than initialising it to the argument count. The reason is that we want to ensure we record the I/O stats correctly in the case where an error is returned (for instance in the layoutstats).

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/nfs/pagelist.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/pagelist.c b/fs/nfs/pagelist.c index 8a2077408ab06..af1bb7353792c 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pagelist.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pagelist.c @@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ static void nfs_pgio_rpcsetup(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr, }

hdr->res.fattr = &hdr->fattr; - hdr->res.count = count; + hdr->res.count = 0; hdr->res.eof = 0; hdr->res.verf = &hdr->verf; nfs_fattr_init(&hdr->fattr);

From: Doug Berger opendmb@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit c51bc12d06b3a5494fbfcbd788a8e307932a06e9 ]

A timing hazard exists when an early fork/exec thread begins exiting and sets its mm pointer to NULL while a separate core tries to update the section information.

This commit ensures that the mm pointer is not NULL before setting its section parameters. The arguments provided by commit 11ce4b33aedc ("ARM: 8672/1: mm: remove tasklist locking from update_sections_early()") are equally valid for not requiring grabbing the task_lock around this check.

Fixes: 08925c2f124f ("ARM: 8464/1: Update all mm structures with section adjustments") Signed-off-by: Doug Berger opendmb@gmail.com Acked-by: Laura Abbott labbott@redhat.com Cc: Mike Rapoport rppt@linux.ibm.com Cc: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: Florian Fainelli f.fainelli@gmail.com Cc: Rob Herring robh@kernel.org Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Peng Fan peng.fan@nxp.com Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven geert@linux-m68k.org Signed-off-by: Russell King rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/arm/mm/init.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/init.c b/arch/arm/mm/init.c index a9f6705aea238..731b7e64715b9 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/init.c @@ -691,7 +691,8 @@ static void update_sections_early(struct section_perm perms[], int n) if (t->flags & PF_KTHREAD) continue; for_each_thread(t, s) - set_section_perms(perms, n, true, s->mm); + if (s->mm) + set_section_perms(perms, n, true, s->mm); } read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); set_section_perms(perms, n, true, current->active_mm);

From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de

[ Upstream commit 3e5bedc2c258341702ddffbd7688c5e6eb01eafa ]

Rahul Tanwar reported the following bug on DT systems:

'ioapic_dynirq_base' contains the virtual IRQ base number. Presently, it is updated to the end of hardware IRQ numbers but this is done only when IOAPIC configuration type is IOAPIC_DOMAIN_LEGACY or IOAPIC_DOMAIN_STRICT. There is a third type IOAPIC_DOMAIN_DYNAMIC which applies when IOAPIC configuration comes from devicetree.

See dtb_add_ioapic() in arch/x86/kernel/devicetree.c

In case of IOAPIC_DOMAIN_DYNAMIC (DT/OF based system), 'ioapic_dynirq_base' remains to zero initialized value. This means that for OF based systems, virtual IRQ base will get set to zero.

Such systems will very likely not even boot.

For DT enabled machines ioapic_dynirq_base is irrelevant and not updated, so simply map the IRQ base 1:1 instead.

Reported-by: Rahul Tanwar rahul.tanwar@linux.intel.com Tested-by: Rahul Tanwar rahul.tanwar@linux.intel.com Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko andriy.shevchenko@intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: Alexander Shishkin alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: cheol.yong.kim@intel.com Cc: qi-ming.wu@intel.com Cc: rahul.tanwar@intel.com Cc: rppt@linux.ibm.com Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190821081330.1187-1-rahul.tanwar@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c index fd945099fc958..4d5e8ff3b5e5c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c @@ -2344,7 +2344,13 @@ unsigned int arch_dynirq_lower_bound(unsigned int from) * dmar_alloc_hwirq() may be called before setup_IO_APIC(), so use * gsi_top if ioapic_dynirq_base hasn't been initialized yet. */ - return ioapic_initialized ? ioapic_dynirq_base : gsi_top; + if (!ioapic_initialized) + return gsi_top; + /* + * For DT enabled machines ioapic_dynirq_base is irrelevant and not + * updated. So simply return @from if ioapic_dynirq_base == 0. + */ + return ioapic_dynirq_base ? : from; }

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32

From: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com

[ Upstream commit 71affe9be45a5c60b9772e1b2701710712637274 ]

If we received a reply from the server with a zero length read and no error, then that implies we are at eof.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/nfs/proc.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/proc.c b/fs/nfs/proc.c index b417bbcd97046..80ecdf2ec8b6a 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/proc.c +++ b/fs/nfs/proc.c @@ -588,7 +588,8 @@ static int nfs_read_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr) /* Emulate the eof flag, which isn't normally needed in NFSv2 * as it is guaranteed to always return the file attributes */ - if (hdr->args.offset + hdr->res.count >= hdr->res.fattr->size) + if ((hdr->res.count == 0 && hdr->args.count > 0) || + hdr->args.offset + hdr->res.count >= hdr->res.fattr->size) hdr->res.eof = 1; } return 0;

From: Ronnie Sahlberg lsahlber@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit f2aee329a68f5a907bcff11a109dfe17c0b41aeb ]

RHBZ: 1710429

When we use a domain-key to authenticate using multiuser we must also set the domainnmame for the new volume as it will be used and passed to the server in the NTLMSSP Domain-name.

Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg lsahlber@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Steve French stfrench@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 9cb72fd40eff3..90e0c51ac0450 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2466,6 +2466,7 @@ static int cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) { int rc = 0; + int is_domain = 0; const char *delim, *payload; char *desc; ssize_t len; @@ -2513,6 +2514,7 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) rc = PTR_ERR(key); goto out_err; } + is_domain = 1; }

down_read(&key->sem); @@ -2570,6 +2572,26 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) goto out_key_put; }

+ /* + * If we have a domain key then we must set the domainName in the + * for the request. + */ + if (is_domain && ses->domainName) { + vol->domainname = kstrndup(ses->domainName, + strlen(ses->domainName), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!vol->domainname) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "Unable to allocate %zd bytes for " + "domain\n", len); + rc = -ENOMEM; + kfree(vol->username); + vol->username = NULL; + kfree(vol->password); + vol->password = NULL; + goto out_key_put; + } + } + out_key_put: up_read(&key->sem); key_put(key);

From: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de

[ Upstream commit 189308d5823a089b56e2299cd96589507dac7319 ]

A similar workaround for the suspend/resume problem is needed for yet another ASUS machines, P6X models. Like the previous fix, the BIOS doesn't provide the standard DMI_SYS_* entry, so again DMI_BOARD_* entries are used instead.

Reported-and-tested-by: SteveM swm@swm1.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/sky2.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/sky2.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/sky2.c index dcd72b2a37150..8ba9eadc20791 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/sky2.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/sky2.c @@ -4946,6 +4946,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id msi_blacklist[] = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "P6T"), }, }, + { + .ident = "ASUS P6X", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK Computer INC."), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "P6X"), + }, + }, {} };

From: Christophe JAILLET christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr

[ Upstream commit e1e54ec7fb55501c33b117c111cb0a045b8eded2 ]

In commit 99cd149efe82 ("sgiseeq: replace use of dma_cache_wback_inv"), a call to 'get_zeroed_page()' has been turned into a call to 'dma_alloc_coherent()'. Only the remove function has been updated to turn the corresponding 'free_page()' into 'dma_free_attrs()'. The error hndling path of the probe function has not been updated.

Fix it now.

Rename the corresponding label to something more in line.

Fixes: 99cd149efe82 ("sgiseeq: replace use of dma_cache_wback_inv") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Reviewed-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer tbogendoerfer@suse.de Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/seeq/sgiseeq.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/seeq/sgiseeq.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/seeq/sgiseeq.c index ca73366057486..2e5f7bbd30bfa 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/seeq/sgiseeq.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/seeq/sgiseeq.c @@ -792,15 +792,16 @@ static int sgiseeq_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) printk(KERN_ERR "Sgiseeq: Cannot register net device, " "aborting.\n"); err = -ENODEV; - goto err_out_free_page; + goto err_out_free_attrs; }

printk(KERN_INFO "%s: %s %pM\n", dev->name, sgiseeqstr, dev->dev_addr);

return 0;

-err_out_free_page: - free_page((unsigned long) sp->srings); +err_out_free_attrs: + dma_free_attrs(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*sp->srings), sp->srings, + sp->srings_dma, DMA_ATTR_NON_CONSISTENT); err_out_free_dev: free_netdev(dev);

From: Hillf Danton hdanton@sina.com

[ Upstream commit d41a3effbb53b1bcea41e328d16a4d046a508381 ]

If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NULL payload - but it makes no check for this and something like the following oops may occur:

BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004ddf30 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x90/0xd0 LR [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 Call Trace: [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 (unreliable) [...] proc_keys_show+0x308/0x4c0 [...] seq_read+0x3d0/0x540 [...] proc_reg_read+0x90/0x110 [...] __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70 [...] vfs_read+0xb4/0x1b0 [...] ksys_read+0x7c/0x130 [...] system_call+0x5c/0x70

Fix this by checking for a NULL pointer when describing such a key.

Also make the read routine check for a NULL pointer to be on the safe side.

[DH: Modified to not take already-held rcu lock and modified to also check in the read routine]

Fixes: 04c567d9313e ("[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a key") Reported-by: Sachin Sant sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton hdanton@sina.com Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Tested-by: Sachin Sant sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 8882b729924dd..976deea0569e3 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, { struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];

+ if (!rka) + return; + seq_puts(m, "key:"); seq_puts(m, key->description); if (key_is_positive(key)) @@ -88,6 +91,9 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, size_t datalen; long ret;

+ if (!rka) + return -EKEYREVOKED; + datalen = rka->callout_len; ret = datalen;

From: Sean Young sean@mess.org

commit 0c4df39e504bf925ab666132ac3c98d6cbbe380b upstream.

Ensure we do not access the buffer beyond the end if no 0xff byte is encountered.

Reported-by: syzbot+eaaaf38a95427be88f4b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Sean Young sean@mess.org Reviewed-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab mchehab+samsung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/technisat-usb2.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/technisat-usb2.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/technisat-usb2.c @@ -594,9 +594,9 @@ static int technisat_usb2_frontend_attac

static int technisat_usb2_get_ir(struct dvb_usb_device *d) { - u8 buf[62], *b; - int ret; + u8 buf[62]; struct ir_raw_event ev; + int i, ret;

buf[0] = GET_IR_DATA_VENDOR_REQUEST; buf[1] = 0x08; @@ -632,26 +632,25 @@ unlock: return 0; /* no key pressed */

/* decoding */ - b = buf+1;

#if 0 deb_rc("RC: %d ", ret); - debug_dump(b, ret, deb_rc); + debug_dump(buf + 1, ret, deb_rc); #endif

ev.pulse = 0; - while (1) { - ev.pulse = !ev.pulse; - ev.duration = (*b * FIRMWARE_CLOCK_DIVISOR * FIRMWARE_CLOCK_TICK) / 1000; - ir_raw_event_store(d->rc_dev, &ev); - - b++; - if (*b == 0xff) { + for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(buf); i++) { + if (buf[i] == 0xff) { ev.pulse = 0; ev.duration = 888888*2; ir_raw_event_store(d->rc_dev, &ev); break; } + + ev.pulse = !ev.pulse; + ev.duration = (buf[i] * FIRMWARE_CLOCK_DIVISOR * + FIRMWARE_CLOCK_TICK) / 1000; + ir_raw_event_store(d->rc_dev, &ev); }

ir_raw_event_handle(d->rc_dev);