Since commit 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets"), when guest gso is off, the allocated size for big packets is not MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE anymore but depends on negotiated MTU. The number of allocated frags for big packets is stored in vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags.
Because the host announced buffer length can be malicious (e.g. the host vhost_net driver's get_rx_bufs is modified to announce incorrect length), we need a check in virtio_net receive path. Currently, the check is not adapted to the new change which can lead to NULL page pointer dereference in the below while loop when receiving length that is larger than the allocated one.
This commit fixes the received length check corresponding to the new change.
Fixes: 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh minhquangbui99@gmail.com --- Changes in v4: - Remove unrelated changes, add more comments Changes in v3: - Convert BUG_ON to WARN_ON_ONCE Changes in v2: - Remove incorrect give_pages call --- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index a757cbcab87f..0ffe78b3fd8d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *page_to_skb(struct virtnet_info *vi, { struct sk_buff *skb; struct virtio_net_common_hdr *hdr; - unsigned int copy, hdr_len, hdr_padded_len; + unsigned int copy, hdr_len, hdr_padded_len, max_remaining_len; struct page *page_to_free = NULL; int tailroom, shinfo_size; char *p, *hdr_p, *buf; @@ -915,13 +915,23 @@ static struct sk_buff *page_to_skb(struct virtnet_info *vi, * This is here to handle cases when the device erroneously * tries to receive more than is possible. This is usually * the case of a broken device. + * + * The number of allocated pages for big packet is + * vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1, the start of first page is + * for virtio header, the remaining is for data. We need to ensure + * the remaining len does not go out of the allocated pages. + * Please refer to add_recvbuf_big for more details on big packet + * buffer allocation. */ - if (unlikely(len > MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE)) { + BUG_ON(offset >= PAGE_SIZE); + max_remaining_len = (unsigned int)PAGE_SIZE - offset; + max_remaining_len += vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE; + if (unlikely(len > max_remaining_len)) { net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: too much data\n", skb->dev->name); dev_kfree_skb(skb); return NULL; } - BUG_ON(offset >= PAGE_SIZE); + while (len) { unsigned int frag_size = min((unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset, len); skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags, page, offset,
On Thu, Oct 23, 2025 at 12:08 AM Bui Quang Minh minhquangbui99@gmail.com wrote:
Since commit 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets"), when guest gso is off, the allocated size for big packets is not MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE anymore but depends on negotiated MTU. The number of allocated frags for big packets is stored in vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags.
Because the host announced buffer length can be malicious (e.g. the host vhost_net driver's get_rx_bufs is modified to announce incorrect length), we need a check in virtio_net receive path. Currently, the check is not adapted to the new change which can lead to NULL page pointer dereference in the below while loop when receiving length that is larger than the allocated one.
This commit fixes the received length check corresponding to the new change.
Fixes: 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh minhquangbui99@gmail.com
Changes in v4:
- Remove unrelated changes, add more comments
Changes in v3:
- Convert BUG_ON to WARN_ON_ONCE
Changes in v2:
- Remove incorrect give_pages call
Acked-by: Jason Wang jasowang@redhat.com
Thanks
On Wed, 22 Oct 2025 23:06:23 +0700, Bui Quang Minh minhquangbui99@gmail.com wrote:
Since commit 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets"), when guest gso is off, the allocated size for big packets is not MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE anymore but depends on negotiated MTU. The number of allocated frags for big packets is stored in vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags.
Because the host announced buffer length can be malicious (e.g. the host vhost_net driver's get_rx_bufs is modified to announce incorrect length), we need a check in virtio_net receive path. Currently, the check is not adapted to the new change which can lead to NULL page pointer dereference in the below while loop when receiving length that is larger than the allocated one.
This commit fixes the received length check corresponding to the new change.
Fixes: 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh minhquangbui99@gmail.com
Changes in v4:
- Remove unrelated changes, add more comments
Changes in v3:
- Convert BUG_ON to WARN_ON_ONCE
Changes in v2:
- Remove incorrect give_pages call
drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index a757cbcab87f..0ffe78b3fd8d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *page_to_skb(struct virtnet_info *vi, { struct sk_buff *skb; struct virtio_net_common_hdr *hdr;
- unsigned int copy, hdr_len, hdr_padded_len;
- unsigned int copy, hdr_len, hdr_padded_len, max_remaining_len; struct page *page_to_free = NULL; int tailroom, shinfo_size; char *p, *hdr_p, *buf;
@@ -915,13 +915,23 @@ static struct sk_buff *page_to_skb(struct virtnet_info *vi, * This is here to handle cases when the device erroneously * tries to receive more than is possible. This is usually * the case of a broken device.
** The number of allocated pages for big packet is* vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1, the start of first page is* for virtio header, the remaining is for data. We need to ensure* the remaining len does not go out of the allocated pages.* Please refer to add_recvbuf_big for more details on big packet* buffer allocation.
- if (unlikely(len > MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE)) {
- BUG_ON(offset >= PAGE_SIZE);
- max_remaining_len = (unsigned int)PAGE_SIZE - offset;
- max_remaining_len += vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE;
Could we perform this check inside `receive_big` to avoid computing `max_remaining_len` altogether? Instead, we could directly compare `len` against `(vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE`.
And I’d like to know if this check is necessary for other modes as well.
Thanks.
- if (unlikely(len > max_remaining_len)) { net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: too much data\n", skb->dev->name); dev_kfree_skb(skb); return NULL; }
- BUG_ON(offset >= PAGE_SIZE);
- while (len) { unsigned int frag_size = min((unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset, len); skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags, page, offset,
-- 2.43.0
On 10/23/25 15:05, Xuan Zhuo wrote:
On Wed, 22 Oct 2025 23:06:23 +0700, Bui Quang Minh minhquangbui99@gmail.com wrote:
Since commit 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets"), when guest gso is off, the allocated size for big packets is not MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE anymore but depends on negotiated MTU. The number of allocated frags for big packets is stored in vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags.
Because the host announced buffer length can be malicious (e.g. the host vhost_net driver's get_rx_bufs is modified to announce incorrect length), we need a check in virtio_net receive path. Currently, the check is not adapted to the new change which can lead to NULL page pointer dereference in the below while loop when receiving length that is larger than the allocated one.
This commit fixes the received length check corresponding to the new change.
Fixes: 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh minhquangbui99@gmail.com
Changes in v4:
- Remove unrelated changes, add more comments
Changes in v3:
- Convert BUG_ON to WARN_ON_ONCE
Changes in v2:
- Remove incorrect give_pages call
drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index a757cbcab87f..0ffe78b3fd8d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *page_to_skb(struct virtnet_info *vi, { struct sk_buff *skb; struct virtio_net_common_hdr *hdr;
- unsigned int copy, hdr_len, hdr_padded_len;
- unsigned int copy, hdr_len, hdr_padded_len, max_remaining_len; struct page *page_to_free = NULL; int tailroom, shinfo_size; char *p, *hdr_p, *buf;
@@ -915,13 +915,23 @@ static struct sk_buff *page_to_skb(struct virtnet_info *vi, * This is here to handle cases when the device erroneously * tries to receive more than is possible. This is usually * the case of a broken device.
** The number of allocated pages for big packet is* vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1, the start of first page is* for virtio header, the remaining is for data. We need to ensure* the remaining len does not go out of the allocated pages.* Please refer to add_recvbuf_big for more details on big packet* buffer allocation.
- if (unlikely(len > MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE)) {
- BUG_ON(offset >= PAGE_SIZE);
- max_remaining_len = (unsigned int)PAGE_SIZE - offset;
- max_remaining_len += vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE;
Could we perform this check inside `receive_big` to avoid computing `max_remaining_len` altogether? Instead, we could directly compare `len` against `(vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE`.
That looks better, I'll do that in the next version.
And I’d like to know if this check is necessary for other modes as well.
Other modes have this check as well. check_mergeable_len is used in mergeable mode. In receive_small, there is a check
if (unlikely(len > GOOD_PACKET_LEN)) { goto err;
Thanks, Quang Minh.
On 10/23/25 21:39, Bui Quang Minh wrote:
On 10/23/25 15:05, Xuan Zhuo wrote:
On Wed, 22 Oct 2025 23:06:23 +0700, Bui Quang Minh minhquangbui99@gmail.com wrote:
Since commit 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets"), when guest gso is off, the allocated size for big packets is not MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE anymore but depends on negotiated MTU. The number of allocated frags for big packets is stored in vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags.
Because the host announced buffer length can be malicious (e.g. the host vhost_net driver's get_rx_bufs is modified to announce incorrect length), we need a check in virtio_net receive path. Currently, the check is not adapted to the new change which can lead to NULL page pointer dereference in the below while loop when receiving length that is larger than the allocated one.
This commit fixes the received length check corresponding to the new change.
Fixes: 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh minhquangbui99@gmail.com
Changes in v4:
- Remove unrelated changes, add more comments
Changes in v3:
- Convert BUG_ON to WARN_ON_ONCE
Changes in v2:
- Remove incorrect give_pages call
drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index a757cbcab87f..0ffe78b3fd8d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *page_to_skb(struct virtnet_info *vi, { struct sk_buff *skb; struct virtio_net_common_hdr *hdr; - unsigned int copy, hdr_len, hdr_padded_len; + unsigned int copy, hdr_len, hdr_padded_len, max_remaining_len; struct page *page_to_free = NULL; int tailroom, shinfo_size; char *p, *hdr_p, *buf; @@ -915,13 +915,23 @@ static struct sk_buff *page_to_skb(struct virtnet_info *vi, * This is here to handle cases when the device erroneously * tries to receive more than is possible. This is usually * the case of a broken device. + * + * The number of allocated pages for big packet is + * vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1, the start of first page is + * for virtio header, the remaining is for data. We need to ensure + * the remaining len does not go out of the allocated pages. + * Please refer to add_recvbuf_big for more details on big packet + * buffer allocation. */ - if (unlikely(len > MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE)) { + BUG_ON(offset >= PAGE_SIZE); + max_remaining_len = (unsigned int)PAGE_SIZE - offset; + max_remaining_len += vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE;
Could we perform this check inside `receive_big` to avoid computing `max_remaining_len` altogether? Instead, we could directly compare `len` against `(vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE`.
That looks better, I'll do that in the next version.
And I’d like to know if this check is necessary for other modes as well.
Other modes have this check as well. check_mergeable_len is used in mergeable mode. In receive_small, there is a check
if (unlikely(len > GOOD_PACKET_LEN)) { goto err;
I forgot about XDP zerocopy (XSK) mode. In that mode, there is a check in buf_to_xdp.
if (unlikely(len > bufsize)) { return NULL;
Thanks, Quang Minh.
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Bui Quang Minh -
Jason Wang -
Xuan Zhuo