From: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu

commit a54c4613dac1500b40e4ab55199f7c51f028e848 upstream.

The location of the system.data extended attribute can change whenever xattr_sem is not taken. So we need to recalculate the i_inline_off field since it mgiht have changed between ext4_write_begin() and ext4_write_end().

This means that caching i_inline_off is probably not helpful, so in the long run we should probably get rid of it and shrink the in-memory ext4 inode slightly, but let's fix the race the simple way for now.

Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: f19d5870cbf72 ("ext4: add normal write support for inline data") Reported-by: syzbot+13146364637c7363a7de@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/ext4/inline.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ext4/inline.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c @@ -750,6 +750,12 @@ int ext4_write_inline_data_end(struct in ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); BUG_ON(!ext4_has_inline_data(inode));

+ /* + * ei->i_inline_off may have changed since ext4_write_begin() + * called ext4_try_to_write_inline_data() + */ + (void) ext4_find_inline_data_nolock(inode); + kaddr = kmap_atomic(page); ext4_write_inline_data(inode, &iloc, kaddr, pos, len); kunmap_atomic(kaddr);

From: Krzysztof Hałasa khalasa@piap.pl

[ Upstream commit 7cca7c8096e2c8a4149405438329b5035d0744f0 ]

Video captured in 1400x1050 resolution (bytesperline aka stride = 1408 bytes) is invalid. Fix it.

Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Halasa khalasa@piap.pl Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/m3y2bmq7a4.fsf@t19.piap.pl [p.zabel@pengutronix.de: added "gpu: ipu-v3:" prefix to commit description] Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel p.zabel@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/ipu-v3/ipu-cpmem.c | 30 +++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/ipu-v3/ipu-cpmem.c b/drivers/gpu/ipu-v3/ipu-cpmem.c index a9d2501500a1..170371770dd4 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/ipu-v3/ipu-cpmem.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/ipu-v3/ipu-cpmem.c @@ -545,21 +545,21 @@ static const struct ipu_rgb def_bgra_16 = { .bits_per_pixel = 16, };

-#define Y_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((x) + pix->width * (y)) -#define U_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((pix->width * pix->height) + \ - (pix->width * ((y) / 2) / 2) + (x) / 2) -#define V_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((pix->width * pix->height) + \ - (pix->width * pix->height / 4) + \ - (pix->width * ((y) / 2) / 2) + (x) / 2) -#define U2_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((pix->width * pix->height) + \ - (pix->width * (y) / 2) + (x) / 2) -#define V2_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((pix->width * pix->height) + \ - (pix->width * pix->height / 2) + \ - (pix->width * (y) / 2) + (x) / 2) -#define UV_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((pix->width * pix->height) + \ - (pix->width * ((y) / 2)) + (x)) -#define UV2_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((pix->width * pix->height) + \ - (pix->width * y) + (x)) +#define Y_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((x) + pix->bytesperline * (y)) +#define U_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((pix->bytesperline * pix->height) + \ + (pix->bytesperline * ((y) / 2) / 2) + (x) / 2) +#define V_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((pix->bytesperline * pix->height) + \ + (pix->bytesperline * pix->height / 4) + \ + (pix->bytesperline * ((y) / 2) / 2) + (x) / 2) +#define U2_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((pix->bytesperline * pix->height) + \ + (pix->bytesperline * (y) / 2) + (x) / 2) +#define V2_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((pix->bytesperline * pix->height) + \ + (pix->bytesperline * pix->height / 2) + \ + (pix->bytesperline * (y) / 2) + (x) / 2) +#define UV_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((pix->bytesperline * pix->height) + \ + (pix->bytesperline * ((y) / 2)) + (x)) +#define UV2_OFFSET(pix, x, y) ((pix->bytesperline * pix->height) + \ + (pix->bytesperline * y) + (x))

#define NUM_ALPHA_CHANNELS 7

From: Harini Katakam harini.katakam@xilinx.com

[ Upstream commit 85520079afce885b80647fbd0d13d8f03d057167 ]

macb_ptp_desc will not return NULL under most circumstances with correct Kconfig and IP design config register. But for the sake of the extreme corner case, check for NULL when using the helper. In case of rx_tstamp, no action is necessary except to return (similar to timestamp disabled) and warn. In case of TX, return -EINVAL to let the skb be free. Perform this check before marking skb in progress. Fixes coverity warning: (4) Event dereference: Dereferencing a null pointer "desc_ptp"

Signed-off-by: Harini Katakam harini.katakam@xilinx.com Reviewed-by: Radhey Shyam Pandey radhey.shyam.pandey@xilinx.com Signed-off-by: Michal Simek michal.simek@xilinx.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c index 8f912de44def..ecb0fb1ddde7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c @@ -286,6 +286,12 @@ void gem_ptp_rxstamp(struct macb *bp, struct sk_buff *skb,

if (GEM_BFEXT(DMA_RXVALID, desc->addr)) { desc_ptp = macb_ptp_desc(bp, desc); + /* Unlikely but check */ + if (!desc_ptp) { + dev_warn_ratelimited(&bp->pdev->dev, + "Timestamp not supported in BD\n"); + return; + } gem_hw_timestamp(bp, desc_ptp->ts_1, desc_ptp->ts_2, &ts); memset(shhwtstamps, 0, sizeof(struct skb_shared_hwtstamps)); shhwtstamps->hwtstamp = ktime_set(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec); @@ -318,8 +324,11 @@ int gem_ptp_txstamp(struct macb_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb, if (CIRC_SPACE(head, tail, PTP_TS_BUFFER_SIZE) == 0) return -ENOMEM;

- skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags |= SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS; desc_ptp = macb_ptp_desc(queue->bp, desc); + /* Unlikely but check */ + if (!desc_ptp) + return -EINVAL; + skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags |= SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS; tx_timestamp = &queue->tx_timestamps[head]; tx_timestamp->skb = skb; /* ensure ts_1/ts_2 is loaded after ctrl (TX_USED check) */

From: Xiaoyao Li xiaoyao.li@intel.com

[ Upstream commit c53c6b7409f4cd9e542991b53d597fbe2751d7db ]

Per SDM, bit 2:0 of CPUID(0x14,1).EAX[2:0] reports the number of configurable address ranges for filtering, not bit 1:0.

Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li xiaoyao.li@intel.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Acked-by: Alexander Shishkin alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210824040622.4081502-1-xiaoyao.li@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c index f03100bc5fd1..849f0ba53a9b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static struct pt_cap_desc { PT_CAP(topa_multiple_entries, 0, CPUID_ECX, BIT(1)), PT_CAP(single_range_output, 0, CPUID_ECX, BIT(2)), PT_CAP(payloads_lip, 0, CPUID_ECX, BIT(31)), - PT_CAP(num_address_ranges, 1, CPUID_EAX, 0x3), + PT_CAP(num_address_ranges, 1, CPUID_EAX, 0x7), PT_CAP(mtc_periods, 1, CPUID_EAX, 0xffff0000), PT_CAP(cycle_thresholds, 1, CPUID_EBX, 0xffff), PT_CAP(psb_periods, 1, CPUID_EBX, 0xffff0000),

From: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de

[ Upstream commit 222013f9ac30b9cec44301daa8dbd0aae38abffb ]

Support for cryptoloop has been officially marked broken and deprecated in favor of dm-crypt (which supports the same broken algorithms if needed) in Linux 2.6.4 (released in March 2004), and support for it has been entirely removed from losetup in util-linux 2.23 (released in April 2013). Add a warning and a deprecation schedule.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210827163250.255325-1-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/block/Kconfig | 4 ++-- drivers/block/cryptoloop.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/block/Kconfig b/drivers/block/Kconfig index e101f286ac35..60662771bd46 100644 --- a/drivers/block/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/block/Kconfig @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ config BLK_DEV_LOOP_MIN_COUNT dynamically allocated with the /dev/loop-control interface.

config BLK_DEV_CRYPTOLOOP - tristate "Cryptoloop Support" + tristate "Cryptoloop Support (DEPRECATED)" select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_CBC depends on BLK_DEV_LOOP @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ config BLK_DEV_CRYPTOLOOP WARNING: This device is not safe for journaled file systems like ext3 or Reiserfs. Please use the Device Mapper crypto module instead, which can be configured to be on-disk compatible with the - cryptoloop device. + cryptoloop device. cryptoloop support will be removed in Linux 5.16.

source "drivers/block/drbd/Kconfig"

diff --git a/drivers/block/cryptoloop.c b/drivers/block/cryptoloop.c index 7033a4beda66..1b84105dfe62 100644 --- a/drivers/block/cryptoloop.c +++ b/drivers/block/cryptoloop.c @@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ init_cryptoloop(void)

if (rc) printk(KERN_ERR "cryptoloop: loop_register_transfer failed\n"); + else + pr_warn("the cryptoloop driver has been deprecated and will be removed in in Linux 5.16\n"); return rc; }

From: Zubin Mithra zsm@chromium.org

commit f3eef46f0518a2b32ca1244015820c35a22cfe4a upstream.

Syzkaller reported a divide error in snd_pcm_lib_ioctl. fifo_size is of type snd_pcm_uframes_t(unsigned long). If frame_size is 0x100000000, the error occurs.

Fixes: a9960e6a293e ("ALSA: pcm: fix fifo_size frame calculation") Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra zsm@chromium.org Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck groeck@chromium.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210827153735.789452-1-zsm@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- sound/core/pcm_lib.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/sound/core/pcm_lib.c +++ b/sound/core/pcm_lib.c @@ -1751,7 +1751,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_lib_ioctl_fifo_size(s channels = params_channels(params); frame_size = snd_pcm_format_size(format, channels); if (frame_size > 0) - params->fifo_size /= (unsigned)frame_size; + params->fifo_size /= frame_size; } return 0; }

From: Pavel Skripkin paskripkin@gmail.com

commit 514e97674400462cc09c459a1ddfb9bf39017223 upstream.

My local syzbot instance hit memory leak in usb_set_configuration(). The problem was in unputted usb interface. In case of errors after usb_get_intf() the reference should be putted to correclty free memory allocated for this interface.

Fixes: ec16dae5453e ("V4L/DVB (7019): V4L: add support for Syntek DC1125 webcams") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin paskripkin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/media/usb/stkwebcam/stk-webcam.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/media/usb/stkwebcam/stk-webcam.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/stkwebcam/stk-webcam.c @@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ static int stk_camera_probe(struct usb_i if (!dev->isoc_ep) { pr_err("Could not find isoc-in endpoint\n"); err = -ENODEV; - goto error; + goto error_put; } dev->vsettings.palette = V4L2_PIX_FMT_RGB565; dev->vsettings.mode = MODE_VGA; @@ -1368,10 +1368,12 @@ static int stk_camera_probe(struct usb_i

err = stk_register_video_device(dev); if (err) - goto error; + goto error_put;

return 0;

+error_put: + usb_put_intf(interface); error: v4l2_ctrl_handler_free(hdl); v4l2_device_unregister(&dev->v4l2_dev);

From: Colin Ian King colin.king@canonical.com

commit 20fb73911fec01f06592de1cdbca00b66602ebd7 upstream.

The function imx_mmdc_perf_init recently had a 3rd argument added to it but the equivalent macro was not updated and is still the older 2 argument version. Fix this by adding in the missing 3rd argumement mmdc_ipg_clk.

Fixes: f07ec8536580 ("ARM: imx: add missing clk_disable_unprepare()") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King colin.king@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo shawnguo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu (CIP) nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/arm/mach-imx/mmdc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/arm/mach-imx/mmdc.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-imx/mmdc.c @@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ pmu_free:

#else #define imx_mmdc_remove NULL -#define imx_mmdc_perf_init(pdev, mmdc_base) 0 +#define imx_mmdc_perf_init(pdev, mmdc_base, mmdc_ipg_clk) 0 #endif

static int imx_mmdc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)

From: Tom Rix trix@redhat.com

commit 161a582bd1d8681095f158d11bc679a58f1d026b upstream.

clang static analysis reports this problem

mos7720.c:352:2: warning: Undefined or garbage value returned to caller return d; ^~~~~~~~

In the parport_mos7715_read_data()'s call to read_mos_reg(), 'd' is only set after the alloc block.

buf = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf) return -ENOMEM;

Although the problem is reported in parport_most7715_read_data(), none of the callee's of read_mos_reg() check the return status.

Make sure to clear the return-value buffer also on allocation failures.

Fixes: 0d130367abf5 ("USB: serial: mos7720: fix control-message error handling") Signed-off-by: Tom Rix trix@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210111220904.1035957-1-trix@redhat.com [ johan: only clear the buffer on errors, amend commit message ] Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/usb/serial/mos7720.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/mos7720.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/mos7720.c @@ -226,8 +226,10 @@ static int read_mos_reg(struct usb_seria int status;

buf = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!buf) + if (!buf) { + *data = 0; return -ENOMEM; + }

status = usb_control_msg(usbdev, pipe, request, requesttype, value, index, buf, 1, MOS_WDR_TIMEOUT);

From: Trond Myklebust trondmy@gmail.com

commit 83dd59a0b9afc3b1a2642fb5c9b0585b1c08768f upstream.

RPC server procedures are normally expected to return a __be32 encoded status value of type 'enum rpc_accept_stat', however at least one function wants to return an authentication status of type 'enum rpc_auth_stat' in the case where authentication fails. This patch adds functionality to allow this.

Fixes: a4e187d83d88 ("NFS: Don't drop CB requests with invalid principals") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields bfields@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/nfs/callback_xdr.c | 2 +- include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h | 2 ++ net/sunrpc/svc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nfs/callback_xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfs/callback_xdr.c @@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ static __be32 nfs4_callback_compound(str

out_invalidcred: pr_warn_ratelimited("NFS: NFSv4 callback contains invalid cred\n"); - return rpc_autherr_badcred; + return svc_return_autherr(rqstp, rpc_autherr_badcred); }

/* --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h @@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ struct svc_rqst { #define RQ_VICTIM (5) /* about to be shut down */ #define RQ_BUSY (6) /* request is busy */ #define RQ_DATA (7) /* request has data */ +#define RQ_AUTHERR (8) /* Request status is auth error */ unsigned long rq_flags; /* flags field */ ktime_t rq_qtime; /* enqueue time */

@@ -504,6 +505,7 @@ unsigned int svc_fill_write_vector(st char *svc_fill_symlink_pathname(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct kvec *first, void *p, size_t total); +__be32 svc_return_autherr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 auth_err);

#define RPC_MAX_ADDRBUFLEN (63U)

--- a/net/sunrpc/svc.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svc.c @@ -1146,6 +1146,22 @@ static __printf(2,3) void svc_printk(str

extern void svc_tcp_prep_reply_hdr(struct svc_rqst *);

+__be32 +svc_return_autherr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 auth_err) +{ + set_bit(RQ_AUTHERR, &rqstp->rq_flags); + return auth_err; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svc_return_autherr); + +static __be32 +svc_get_autherr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *statp) +{ + if (test_and_clear_bit(RQ_AUTHERR, &rqstp->rq_flags)) + return *statp; + return rpc_auth_ok; +} + /* * Common routine for processing the RPC request. */ @@ -1296,11 +1312,9 @@ svc_process_common(struct svc_rqst *rqst procp->pc_release(rqstp); goto dropit; } - if (*statp == rpc_autherr_badcred) { - if (procp->pc_release) - procp->pc_release(rqstp); - goto err_bad_auth; - } + auth_stat = svc_get_autherr(rqstp, statp); + if (auth_stat != rpc_auth_ok) + goto err_release_bad_auth; if (*statp == rpc_success && procp->pc_encode && !procp->pc_encode(rqstp, resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len)) { dprintk("svc: failed to encode reply\n"); @@ -1359,6 +1373,9 @@ err_bad_rpc: svc_putnl(resv, 2); goto sendit;

+err_release_bad_auth: + if (procp->pc_release) + procp->pc_release(rqstp); err_bad_auth: dprintk("svc: authentication failed (%d)\n", ntohl(auth_stat)); serv->sv_stats->rpcbadauth++;

From: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au

commit 2fb0a2c989837c976b68233496bbaefb47cd3d6f upstream.

The comment here is wrong, the addi reads from r2 not r12. The code is correct, 0x38420000 = addi r2,r2,0.

Fixes: a61674bdfc7c ("powerpc/module: Handle R_PPC64_ENTRY relocations") Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/powerpc/kernel/module_64.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/module_64.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/module_64.c @@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ int apply_relocate_add(Elf64_Shdr *sechd /* * If found, replace it with: * addis r2, r12, (.TOC.-func)@ha - * addi r2, r12, (.TOC.-func)@l + * addi r2, r2, (.TOC.-func)@l */ ((uint32_t *)location)[0] = 0x3c4c0000 + PPC_HA(value); ((uint32_t *)location)[1] = 0x38420000 + PPC_LO(value);

From: Esben Haabendal esben@geanix.com

commit ce03b94ba682a67e8233c9ee3066071656ded58f upstream.

Fixes: f63963411942 ("net: ll_temac: Avoid ndo_start_xmit returning NETDEV_TX_BUSY") Signed-off-by: Esben Haabendal esben@geanix.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c @@ -736,10 +736,8 @@ temac_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, st /* Kick off the transfer */ lp->dma_out(lp, TX_TAILDESC_PTR, tail_p); /* DMA start */

- if (temac_check_tx_bd_space(lp, MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1)) { - netdev_info(ndev, "%s -> netif_stop_queue\n", __func__); + if (temac_check_tx_bd_space(lp, MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1)) netif_stop_queue(ndev); - }

return NETDEV_TX_OK; }

From: Qu Wenruo wqu@suse.com

commit 4e9655763b82a91e4c341835bb504a2b1590f984 upstream.

This reverts commit f2165627319ffd33a6217275e5690b1ab5c45763.

[BUG] It's no longer possible to create compressed inline extent after commit f2165627319f ("btrfs: compression: don't try to compress if we don't have enough pages").

[CAUSE] For compression code, there are several possible reasons we have a range that needs to be compressed while it's no more than one page.

- Compressed inline write The data is always smaller than one sector and the test lacks the condition to properly recognize a non-inline extent.

- Compressed subpage write For the incoming subpage compressed write support, we require page alignment of the delalloc range. And for 64K page size, we can compress just one page into smaller sectors.

For those reasons, the requirement for the data to be more than one page is not correct, and is already causing regression for compressed inline data writeback. The idea of skipping one page to avoid wasting CPU time could be revisited in the future.

[FIX] Fix it by reverting the offending commit.

Reported-by: Zygo Blaxell ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/afa2742.c084f5d6.17b6b08dffc@tnonline.ne... Fixes: f2165627319f ("btrfs: compression: don't try to compress if we don't have enough pages") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo wqu@suse.com Reviewed-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ again: * inode has not been flagged as nocompress. This flag can * change at any time if we discover bad compression ratios. */ - if (nr_pages > 1 && inode_need_compress(inode, start, end)) { + if (inode_need_compress(inode, start, end)) { WARN_ON(pages); pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS); if (!pages) {

From: Yoshihiro Shimoda yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com

commit 57f3ffdc11143f56f1314972fe86fe17a0dcde85 upstream.

According to the datasheet, "Upon the completion of FW Download, there is no need to write or reload FW.". Otherwise, it's possible to cause unexpected behaviors. So, adds such a condition.

Fixes: 4ac8918f3a73 ("usb: host: xhci-plat: add support for the R-Car H2 and M2 xHCI controllers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.17+ Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210827063227.81990-1-yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesa... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-rcar.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-rcar.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-rcar.c @@ -143,6 +143,13 @@ static int xhci_rcar_download_firmware(s const struct soc_device_attribute *attr; const char *firmware_name;

+ /* + * According to the datasheet, "Upon the completion of FW Download, + * there is no need to write or reload FW". + */ + if (readl(regs + RCAR_USB3_DL_CTRL) & RCAR_USB3_DL_CTRL_FW_SUCCESS) + return 0; + attr = soc_device_match(rcar_quirks_match); if (attr) quirks = (uintptr_t)attr->data;

From: Chunfeng Yun chunfeng.yun@mediatek.com

commit 44e4439d8f9f8d0e9da767d1f31e7c211081feca upstream.

usb_endpoint_maxp() returns actual max packet size, @mult will always be zero, fix it by using usb_endpoint_maxp_mult() instead to get mult.

Fixes: 4d79e042ed8b ("usb: mtu3: add support for usb3.1 IP") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chunfeng Yun chunfeng.yun@mediatek.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1628836253-7432-3-git-send-email-chunfeng.yun@medi... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/usb/mtu3/mtu3_gadget.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/mtu3/mtu3_gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/mtu3/mtu3_gadget.c @@ -69,14 +69,12 @@ static int mtu3_ep_enable(struct mtu3_ep u32 interval = 0; u32 mult = 0; u32 burst = 0; - int max_packet; int ret;

desc = mep->desc; comp_desc = mep->comp_desc; mep->type = usb_endpoint_type(desc); - max_packet = usb_endpoint_maxp(desc); - mep->maxp = max_packet & GENMASK(10, 0); + mep->maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(desc);

switch (mtu->g.speed) { case USB_SPEED_SUPER: @@ -97,7 +95,7 @@ static int mtu3_ep_enable(struct mtu3_ep usb_endpoint_xfer_int(desc)) { interval = desc->bInterval; interval = clamp_val(interval, 1, 16) - 1; - mult = (max_packet & GENMASK(12, 11)) >> 11; + mult = usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(desc) - 1; } break; default:

From: Marek Behún kabel@kernel.org

commit b8da302e2955fe4d41eb9d48199242674d77dbe0 upstream.

pci_device_add() calls HEADER fixups after pci_configure_device(), which configures Max Payload Size.

Convert MPS-related fixups to EARLY fixups so pci_configure_mps() takes them into account.

Fixes: 27d868b5e6cfa ("PCI: Set MPS to match upstream bridge") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624171418.27194-1-kabel@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marek Behún kabel@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas bhelgaas@google.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/pci/quirks.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c +++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c @@ -3152,12 +3152,12 @@ static void fixup_mpss_256(struct pci_de { dev->pcie_mpss = 1; /* 256 bytes */ } -DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SOLARFLARE, - PCI_DEVICE_ID_SOLARFLARE_SFC4000A_0, fixup_mpss_256); -DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SOLARFLARE, - PCI_DEVICE_ID_SOLARFLARE_SFC4000A_1, fixup_mpss_256); -DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SOLARFLARE, - PCI_DEVICE_ID_SOLARFLARE_SFC4000B, fixup_mpss_256); +DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_EARLY(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SOLARFLARE, + PCI_DEVICE_ID_SOLARFLARE_SFC4000A_0, fixup_mpss_256); +DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_EARLY(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SOLARFLARE, + PCI_DEVICE_ID_SOLARFLARE_SFC4000A_1, fixup_mpss_256); +DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_EARLY(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SOLARFLARE, + PCI_DEVICE_ID_SOLARFLARE_SFC4000B, fixup_mpss_256);

/* * Intel 5000 and 5100 Memory controllers have an erratum with read completion

From: Jeongtae Park jeongtae.park@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 1852f5ed358147095297a09cc3c6f160208a676d ]

This patch fixes the offset of register error log by using regmap_get_offset().

Signed-off-by: Jeongtae Park jeongtae.park@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210701142630.44936-1-jeongtae.park@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c index e8b3353c18eb..330ab9c85d1b 100644 --- a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c +++ b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c @@ -1479,7 +1479,7 @@ static int _regmap_raw_write_impl(struct regmap *map, unsigned int reg, if (ret) { dev_err(map->dev, "Error in caching of register: %x ret: %d\n", - reg + i, ret); + reg + regmap_get_offset(map, i), ret); return ret; } }

From: Quentin Perret qperret@google.com

[ Upstream commit f95091536f78971b269ec321b057b8d630b0ad8a ]

It is possible for sched_getattr() to incorrectly report the state of the reset_on_fork flag when called on a deadline task.

Indeed, if the flag was set on a deadline task using sched_setattr() with flags (SCHED_FLAG_RESET_ON_FORK | SCHED_FLAG_KEEP_PARAMS), then p->sched_reset_on_fork will be set, but __setscheduler() will bail out early, which means that the dl_se->flags will not get updated by __setscheduler_params()->__setparam_dl(). Consequently, if sched_getattr() is then called on the task, __getparam_dl() will override kattr.sched_flags with the now out-of-date copy in dl_se->flags and report the stale value to userspace.

To fix this, make sure to only copy the flags that are relevant to sched_deadline to and from the dl_se->flags field.

Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret qperret@google.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210727101103.2729607-2-qperret@google.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/sched/deadline.c | 7 ++++--- kernel/sched/sched.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/sched/deadline.c b/kernel/sched/deadline.c index aa592dc3cb40..9b2bb5f3ce09 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/deadline.c +++ b/kernel/sched/deadline.c @@ -2615,7 +2615,7 @@ void __setparam_dl(struct task_struct *p, const struct sched_attr *attr) dl_se->dl_runtime = attr->sched_runtime; dl_se->dl_deadline = attr->sched_deadline; dl_se->dl_period = attr->sched_period ?: dl_se->dl_deadline; - dl_se->flags = attr->sched_flags; + dl_se->flags = attr->sched_flags & SCHED_DL_FLAGS; dl_se->dl_bw = to_ratio(dl_se->dl_period, dl_se->dl_runtime); dl_se->dl_density = to_ratio(dl_se->dl_deadline, dl_se->dl_runtime); } @@ -2628,7 +2628,8 @@ void __getparam_dl(struct task_struct *p, struct sched_attr *attr) attr->sched_runtime = dl_se->dl_runtime; attr->sched_deadline = dl_se->dl_deadline; attr->sched_period = dl_se->dl_period; - attr->sched_flags = dl_se->flags; + attr->sched_flags &= ~SCHED_DL_FLAGS; + attr->sched_flags |= dl_se->flags; }

/* @@ -2703,7 +2704,7 @@ bool dl_param_changed(struct task_struct *p, const struct sched_attr *attr) if (dl_se->dl_runtime != attr->sched_runtime || dl_se->dl_deadline != attr->sched_deadline || dl_se->dl_period != attr->sched_period || - dl_se->flags != attr->sched_flags) + dl_se->flags != (attr->sched_flags & SCHED_DL_FLAGS)) return true;

return false; diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h index 7b7ba91e319b..55e695080fc6 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/sched.h +++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h @@ -209,6 +209,8 @@ static inline int task_has_dl_policy(struct task_struct *p) */ #define SCHED_FLAG_SUGOV 0x10000000

+#define SCHED_DL_FLAGS (SCHED_FLAG_RECLAIM | SCHED_FLAG_DL_OVERRUN | SCHED_FLAG_SUGOV) + static inline bool dl_entity_is_special(struct sched_dl_entity *dl_se) { #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_SCHEDUTIL

From: Tony Lindgren tony@atomide.com

[ Upstream commit fe28140b3393b0ba1eb95cc109f974a7e58b26fd ]

We should not clear FLAGS_DMA_ACTIVE before omap_sham_update_dma_stop() is done calling dma_unmap_sg(). We already clear FLAGS_DMA_ACTIVE at the end of omap_sham_update_dma_stop().

The early clearing of FLAGS_DMA_ACTIVE is not causing issues as we do not need to defer anything based on FLAGS_DMA_ACTIVE currently. So this can be applied as clean-up.

Cc: Lokesh Vutla lokeshvutla@ti.com Cc: Tero Kristo kristo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren tony@atomide.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/crypto/omap-sham.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/omap-sham.c b/drivers/crypto/omap-sham.c index 4d31ef472436..180f2f61b8fb 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/omap-sham.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/omap-sham.c @@ -1739,7 +1739,7 @@ static void omap_sham_done_task(unsigned long data) if (test_and_clear_bit(FLAGS_OUTPUT_READY, &dd->flags)) goto finish; } else if (test_bit(FLAGS_DMA_READY, &dd->flags)) { - if (test_and_clear_bit(FLAGS_DMA_ACTIVE, &dd->flags)) { + if (test_bit(FLAGS_DMA_ACTIVE, &dd->flags)) { omap_sham_update_dma_stop(dd); if (dd->err) { err = dd->err;

From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de

[ Upstream commit 627ef5ae2df8eeccb20d5af0e4cfa4df9e61ed28 ]

If __hrtimer_start_range_ns() is invoked with an already armed hrtimer then the timer has to be canceled first and then added back. If the timer is the first expiring timer then on removal the clockevent device is reprogrammed to the next expiring timer to avoid that the pending expiry fires needlessly.

If the new expiry time ends up to be the first expiry again then the clock event device has to reprogrammed again.

Avoid this by checking whether the timer is the first to expire and in that case, keep the timer on the current CPU and delay the reprogramming up to the point where the timer has been enqueued again.

Reported-by: Lorenzo Colitti lorenzo@google.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210713135157.873137732@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/time/hrtimer.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c index 0e04b24cec81..32ee24f5142a 100644 --- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c +++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c @@ -1020,12 +1020,13 @@ static void __remove_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *timer, * remove hrtimer, called with base lock held */ static inline int -remove_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *timer, struct hrtimer_clock_base *base, bool restart) +remove_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *timer, struct hrtimer_clock_base *base, + bool restart, bool keep_local) { u8 state = timer->state;

if (state & HRTIMER_STATE_ENQUEUED) { - int reprogram; + bool reprogram;

/* * Remove the timer and force reprogramming when high @@ -1038,8 +1039,16 @@ remove_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *timer, struct hrtimer_clock_base *base, bool rest debug_deactivate(timer); reprogram = base->cpu_base == this_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases);

+ /* + * If the timer is not restarted then reprogramming is + * required if the timer is local. If it is local and about + * to be restarted, avoid programming it twice (on removal + * and a moment later when it's requeued). + */ if (!restart) state = HRTIMER_STATE_INACTIVE; + else + reprogram &= !keep_local;

__remove_hrtimer(timer, base, state, reprogram); return 1; @@ -1093,9 +1102,31 @@ static int __hrtimer_start_range_ns(struct hrtimer *timer, ktime_t tim, struct hrtimer_clock_base *base) { struct hrtimer_clock_base *new_base; + bool force_local, first;

- /* Remove an active timer from the queue: */ - remove_hrtimer(timer, base, true); + /* + * If the timer is on the local cpu base and is the first expiring + * timer then this might end up reprogramming the hardware twice + * (on removal and on enqueue). To avoid that by prevent the + * reprogram on removal, keep the timer local to the current CPU + * and enforce reprogramming after it is queued no matter whether + * it is the new first expiring timer again or not. + */ + force_local = base->cpu_base == this_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases); + force_local &= base->cpu_base->next_timer == timer; + + /* + * Remove an active timer from the queue. In case it is not queued + * on the current CPU, make sure that remove_hrtimer() updates the + * remote data correctly. + * + * If it's on the current CPU and the first expiring timer, then + * skip reprogramming, keep the timer local and enforce + * reprogramming later if it was the first expiring timer. This + * avoids programming the underlying clock event twice (once at + * removal and once after enqueue). + */ + remove_hrtimer(timer, base, true, force_local);

if (mode & HRTIMER_MODE_REL) tim = ktime_add_safe(tim, base->get_time()); @@ -1105,9 +1136,24 @@ static int __hrtimer_start_range_ns(struct hrtimer *timer, ktime_t tim, hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(timer, tim, delta_ns);

/* Switch the timer base, if necessary: */ - new_base = switch_hrtimer_base(timer, base, mode & HRTIMER_MODE_PINNED); + if (!force_local) { + new_base = switch_hrtimer_base(timer, base, + mode & HRTIMER_MODE_PINNED); + } else { + new_base = base; + } + + first = enqueue_hrtimer(timer, new_base, mode); + if (!force_local) + return first;

- return enqueue_hrtimer(timer, new_base, mode); + /* + * Timer was forced to stay on the current CPU to avoid + * reprogramming on removal and enqueue. Force reprogram the + * hardware by evaluating the new first expiring timer. + */ + hrtimer_force_reprogram(new_base->cpu_base, 1); + return 0; }

/** @@ -1168,7 +1214,7 @@ int hrtimer_try_to_cancel(struct hrtimer *timer) base = lock_hrtimer_base(timer, &flags);

if (!hrtimer_callback_running(timer)) - ret = remove_hrtimer(timer, base, false); + ret = remove_hrtimer(timer, base, false, false);

unlock_hrtimer_base(timer, &flags);

From: Pali Rohár pali@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 28ce50f8d96ec9035f60c9348294ea26b94db944 ]

Currently iocharset=utf8 mount option is broken. To use UTF-8 as iocharset, it is required to use utf8 mount option.

Fix iocharset=utf8 mount option to use be equivalent to the utf8 mount option.

If UTF-8 as iocharset is used then s_nls_iocharset is set to NULL. So simplify code around, remove s_utf8 field as to distinguish between UTF-8 and non-UTF-8 it is needed just to check if s_nls_iocharset is set to NULL or not.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210808162453.1653-5-pali@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár pali@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/isofs/inode.c | 27 +++++++++++++-------------- fs/isofs/isofs.h | 1 - fs/isofs/joliet.c | 4 +--- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/isofs/inode.c b/fs/isofs/inode.c index 488a9e7f8f66..2355ad62b81f 100644 --- a/fs/isofs/inode.c +++ b/fs/isofs/inode.c @@ -157,7 +157,6 @@ struct iso9660_options{ unsigned int overriderockperm:1; unsigned int uid_set:1; unsigned int gid_set:1; - unsigned int utf8:1; unsigned char map; unsigned char check; unsigned int blocksize; @@ -357,7 +356,6 @@ static int parse_options(char *options, struct iso9660_options *popt) popt->gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; popt->uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; popt->iocharset = NULL; - popt->utf8 = 0; popt->overriderockperm = 0; popt->session=-1; popt->sbsector=-1; @@ -390,10 +388,13 @@ static int parse_options(char *options, struct iso9660_options *popt) case Opt_cruft: popt->cruft = 1; break; +#ifdef CONFIG_JOLIET case Opt_utf8: - popt->utf8 = 1; + kfree(popt->iocharset); + popt->iocharset = kstrdup("utf8", GFP_KERNEL); + if (!popt->iocharset) + return 0; break; -#ifdef CONFIG_JOLIET case Opt_iocharset: kfree(popt->iocharset); popt->iocharset = match_strdup(&args[0]); @@ -496,7 +497,6 @@ static int isofs_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root) if (sbi->s_nocompress) seq_puts(m, ",nocompress"); if (sbi->s_overriderockperm) seq_puts(m, ",overriderockperm"); if (sbi->s_showassoc) seq_puts(m, ",showassoc"); - if (sbi->s_utf8) seq_puts(m, ",utf8");

if (sbi->s_check) seq_printf(m, ",check=%c", sbi->s_check); if (sbi->s_mapping) seq_printf(m, ",map=%c", sbi->s_mapping); @@ -519,9 +519,10 @@ static int isofs_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root) seq_printf(m, ",fmode=%o", sbi->s_fmode);

#ifdef CONFIG_JOLIET - if (sbi->s_nls_iocharset && - strcmp(sbi->s_nls_iocharset->charset, CONFIG_NLS_DEFAULT) != 0) + if (sbi->s_nls_iocharset) seq_printf(m, ",iocharset=%s", sbi->s_nls_iocharset->charset); + else + seq_puts(m, ",iocharset=utf8"); #endif return 0; } @@ -865,14 +866,13 @@ root_found: sbi->s_nls_iocharset = NULL;

#ifdef CONFIG_JOLIET - if (joliet_level && opt.utf8 == 0) { + if (joliet_level) { char *p = opt.iocharset ? opt.iocharset : CONFIG_NLS_DEFAULT; - sbi->s_nls_iocharset = load_nls(p); - if (! sbi->s_nls_iocharset) { - /* Fail only if explicit charset specified */ - if (opt.iocharset) + if (strcmp(p, "utf8") != 0) { + sbi->s_nls_iocharset = opt.iocharset ? + load_nls(opt.iocharset) : load_nls_default(); + if (!sbi->s_nls_iocharset) goto out_freesbi; - sbi->s_nls_iocharset = load_nls_default(); } } #endif @@ -888,7 +888,6 @@ root_found: sbi->s_gid = opt.gid; sbi->s_uid_set = opt.uid_set; sbi->s_gid_set = opt.gid_set; - sbi->s_utf8 = opt.utf8; sbi->s_nocompress = opt.nocompress; sbi->s_overriderockperm = opt.overriderockperm; /* diff --git a/fs/isofs/isofs.h b/fs/isofs/isofs.h index 055ec6c586f7..dcdc191ed183 100644 --- a/fs/isofs/isofs.h +++ b/fs/isofs/isofs.h @@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ struct isofs_sb_info { unsigned char s_session; unsigned int s_high_sierra:1; unsigned int s_rock:2; - unsigned int s_utf8:1; unsigned int s_cruft:1; /* Broken disks with high byte of length * containing junk */ unsigned int s_nocompress:1; diff --git a/fs/isofs/joliet.c b/fs/isofs/joliet.c index be8b6a9d0b92..c0f04a1e7f69 100644 --- a/fs/isofs/joliet.c +++ b/fs/isofs/joliet.c @@ -41,14 +41,12 @@ uni16_to_x8(unsigned char *ascii, __be16 *uni, int len, struct nls_table *nls) int get_joliet_filename(struct iso_directory_record * de, unsigned char *outname, struct inode * inode) { - unsigned char utf8; struct nls_table *nls; unsigned char len = 0;

- utf8 = ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_utf8; nls = ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_nls_iocharset;

- if (utf8) { + if (!nls) { len = utf16s_to_utf8s((const wchar_t *) de->name, de->name_len[0] >> 1, UTF16_BIG_ENDIAN, outname, PAGE_SIZE);

From: Ruozhu Li liruozhu@huawei.com

[ Upstream commit 85032874f80ba17bf187de1d14d9603bf3f582b8 ]

We update ctrl->queue_count and schedule another reconnect when io queue count is zero.But we will never try to create any io queue in next reco- nnection, because ctrl->queue_count already set to zero.We will end up having an admin-only session in Live state, which is exactly what we try to avoid in the original patch. Update ctrl->queue_count after queue_count zero checking to fix it.

Signed-off-by: Ruozhu Li liruozhu@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg sagi@grimberg.me Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c b/drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c index 8798274dc3ba..ffd6a7204509 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c @@ -643,13 +643,13 @@ static int nvme_rdma_alloc_io_queues(struct nvme_rdma_ctrl *ctrl) if (ret) return ret;

- ctrl->ctrl.queue_count = nr_io_queues + 1; - if (ctrl->ctrl.queue_count < 2) { + if (nr_io_queues == 0) { dev_err(ctrl->ctrl.device, "unable to set any I/O queues\n"); return -ENOMEM; }

+ ctrl->ctrl.queue_count = nr_io_queues + 1; dev_info(ctrl->ctrl.device, "creating %d I/O queues.\n", nr_io_queues);

From: Vineeth Vijayan vneethv@linux.ibm.com

[ Upstream commit d3683c055212bf910d4e318f7944910ce10dbee6 ]

Introduce dev_busid, which exports the device-id associated with the io-subchannel (and message-subchannel). The dev_busid indicates that of the device which may be physically installed on the corrosponding subchannel. The dev_busid value "none" indicates that the subchannel is not valid, there is no I/O device currently associated with the subchannel.

The dev_busid information would be helpful to write device-specific udev-rules associated with the subchannel. The dev_busid interface would be available even when the sch is not bound to any driver or if there is no operational device connected on it. Hence this attribute can be used to write udev-rules which are specific to the device associated with the subchannel.

Signed-off-by: Vineeth Vijayan vneethv@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter oberpar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik gor@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/s390/cio/css.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/s390/cio/css.c b/drivers/s390/cio/css.c index 825a8f2703b4..6efe50d70c4b 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/cio/css.c +++ b/drivers/s390/cio/css.c @@ -364,9 +364,26 @@ static ssize_t pimpampom_show(struct device *dev, } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(pimpampom);

+static ssize_t dev_busid_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct subchannel *sch = to_subchannel(dev); + struct pmcw *pmcw = &sch->schib.pmcw; + + if ((pmcw->st == SUBCHANNEL_TYPE_IO || + pmcw->st == SUBCHANNEL_TYPE_MSG) && pmcw->dnv) + return sysfs_emit(buf, "0.%x.%04x\n", sch->schid.ssid, + pmcw->dev); + else + return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n"); +} +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(dev_busid); + static struct attribute *io_subchannel_type_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_chpids.attr, &dev_attr_pimpampom.attr, + &dev_attr_dev_busid.attr, NULL, }; ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(io_subchannel_type);

From: Giovanni Cabiddu giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 5147f0906d50a9d26f2b8698cd06b5680e9867ff ]

The function adf_dev_init() ignores the error code reported by enable_vf2pf_comms(). If the latter fails, e.g. the VF is not compatible with the pf, then the load of the VF driver progresses. This patch changes adf_dev_init() so that the error code from enable_vf2pf_comms() is returned to the caller.

Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com Reviewed-by: Marco Chiappero marco.chiappero@intel.com Reviewed-by: Fiona Trahe fiona.trahe@intel.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c index 26556c713049..7a7d43c47534 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ int adf_dev_init(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) struct service_hndl *service; struct list_head *list_itr; struct adf_hw_device_data *hw_data = accel_dev->hw_device; + int ret;

if (!hw_data) { dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), @@ -171,9 +172,9 @@ int adf_dev_init(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) }

hw_data->enable_error_correction(accel_dev); - hw_data->enable_vf2pf_comms(accel_dev); + ret = hw_data->enable_vf2pf_comms(accel_dev);

- return 0; + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(adf_dev_init);

From: Marco Chiappero marco.chiappero@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 3d655732b0199562267a05c7ff69ecdd11632939 ]

Use reinit_completion() to set to a clean state a completion variable, used to coordinate the VF to PF request-response flow, before every new VF request.

Signed-off-by: Marco Chiappero marco.chiappero@intel.com Co-developed-by: Giovanni Cabiddu giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com Reviewed-by: Fiona Trahe fiona.trahe@intel.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_pf2vf_msg.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_pf2vf_msg.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_pf2vf_msg.c index b3875fdf6cd7..9dab2cc11fdf 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_pf2vf_msg.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_pf2vf_msg.c @@ -361,6 +361,8 @@ static int adf_vf2pf_request_version(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) msg |= ADF_PFVF_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION << ADF_VF2PF_COMPAT_VER_REQ_SHIFT; BUILD_BUG_ON(ADF_PFVF_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION > 255);

+ reinit_completion(&accel_dev->vf.iov_msg_completion); + /* Send request from VF to PF */ ret = adf_iov_putmsg(accel_dev, msg, 0); if (ret) {

From: Giovanni Cabiddu giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 645ae0af1840199086c33e4f841892ebee73f615 ]

The function adf_iov_putmsg() is only used inside the intel_qat module therefore should not be exported. Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL for the function adf_iov_putmsg().

Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com Reviewed-by: Fiona Trahe fiona.trahe@intel.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_pf2vf_msg.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_pf2vf_msg.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_pf2vf_msg.c index 9dab2cc11fdf..c64481160b71 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_pf2vf_msg.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_pf2vf_msg.c @@ -231,7 +231,6 @@ int adf_iov_putmsg(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, u32 msg, u8 vf_nr)

return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(adf_iov_putmsg);

void adf_vf2pf_req_hndl(struct adf_accel_vf_info *vf_info) {

From: Stian Skjelstad stian.skjelstad@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 58bc6d1be2f3b0ceecb6027dfa17513ec6aa2abb ]

When parsing the ExtendedAttr data, malicous or corrupt attribute length could cause kernel hangs and buffer overruns in some special cases.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210822093332.25234-1-stian.skjelstad@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Stian Skjelstad stian.skjelstad@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/udf/misc.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/udf/misc.c b/fs/udf/misc.c index 401e64cde1be..853bcff51043 100644 --- a/fs/udf/misc.c +++ b/fs/udf/misc.c @@ -173,13 +173,22 @@ struct genericFormat *udf_get_extendedattr(struct inode *inode, uint32_t type, else offset = le32_to_cpu(eahd->appAttrLocation);

- while (offset < iinfo->i_lenEAttr) { + while (offset + sizeof(*gaf) < iinfo->i_lenEAttr) { + uint32_t attrLength; + gaf = (struct genericFormat *)&ea[offset]; + attrLength = le32_to_cpu(gaf->attrLength); + + /* Detect undersized elements and buffer overflows */ + if ((attrLength < sizeof(*gaf)) || + (attrLength > (iinfo->i_lenEAttr - offset))) + break; + if (le32_to_cpu(gaf->attrType) == type && gaf->attrSubtype == subtype) return gaf; else - offset += le32_to_cpu(gaf->attrLength); + offset += attrLength; } }

From: Tony Lindgren tony@atomide.com

[ Upstream commit 209ab223ad5b18e437289235e3bde12593b94ac4 ]

Depending on the DMA driver being used, the struct dma_slave_config may need to be initialized to zero for the unused data.

For example, we have three DMA drivers using src_port_window_size and dst_port_window_size. If these are left uninitialized, it can cause DMA failures.

For spi-fsl-dspi, this is probably not currently an issue but is still good to fix though.

Fixes: 90ba37033cb9 ("spi: spi-fsl-dspi: Add DMA support for Vybrid") Cc: Sanchayan Maity maitysanchayan@gmail.com Cc: Vladimir Oltean vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Cc: Peter Ujfalusi peter.ujfalusi@gmail.com Cc: Vinod Koul vkoul@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren tony@atomide.com Acked-by: Vladimir Oltean vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210810081727.19491-1-tony@atomide.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c index 25486ee8379b..cfbf1ffb61bf 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c @@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ static int dspi_request_dma(struct fsl_dspi *dspi, phys_addr_t phy_addr) goto err_rx_dma_buf; }

+ memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg)); cfg.src_addr = phy_addr + SPI_POPR; cfg.dst_addr = phy_addr + SPI_PUSHR; cfg.src_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES;

From: Hongbo Li herberthbli@tencent.com

[ Upstream commit b6f756726e4dfe75be1883f6a0202dcecdc801ab ]

We should set the additional space to 0 in mpi_resize(). So use kcalloc() instead of kmalloc_array().

In lib/mpi/ec.c: /**************** * Resize the array of A to NLIMBS. the additional space is cleared * (set to 0) [done by m_realloc()] */ int mpi_resize(MPI a, unsigned nlimbs)

Like the comment of kernel's mpi_resize() said, the additional space need to be set to 0, but when a->d is not NULL, it does not set.

The kernel's mpi lib is from libgcrypt, the mpi resize in libgcrypt is _gcry_mpi_resize() which set the additional space to 0.

This bug may cause mpi api which use mpi_resize() get wrong result under the condition of using the additional space without initiation. If this condition is not met, the bug would not be triggered. Currently in kernel, rsa, sm2 and dh use mpi lib, and they works well, so the bug is not triggered in these cases.

add_points_edwards() use the additional space directly, so it will get a wrong result.

Fixes: cdec9cb5167a ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)") Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li herberthbli@tencent.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- lib/mpi/mpiutil.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c b/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c index 20ed0f766787..00825028cc84 100644 --- a/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c +++ b/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int mpi_resize(MPI a, unsigned nlimbs) return 0; /* no need to do it */

if (a->d) { - p = kmalloc_array(nlimbs, sizeof(mpi_limb_t), GFP_KERNEL); + p = kcalloc(nlimbs, sizeof(mpi_limb_t), GFP_KERNEL); if (!p) return -ENOMEM; memcpy(p, a->d, a->alloced * sizeof(mpi_limb_t));

From: Giovanni Cabiddu giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 462354d986b6a89c6449b85f17aaacf44e455216 ]

Replace vf_mask type with unsigned long to avoid a stack-out-of-bound.

This is to fix the following warning reported by KASAN the first time adf_msix_isr_ae() gets called.

[ 692.091987] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in find_first_bit+0x28/0x50 [ 692.092017] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88afdf789e60 by task swapper/32/0 [ 692.092076] Call Trace: [ 692.092089] <IRQ> [ 692.092101] dump_stack+0x9c/0xcf [ 692.092132] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x130 [ 692.092164] ? find_first_bit+0x28/0x50 [ 692.092185] kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x111 [ 692.092213] ? static_obj+0x10/0x80 [ 692.092234] ? find_first_bit+0x28/0x50 [ 692.092262] find_first_bit+0x28/0x50 [ 692.092288] adf_msix_isr_ae+0x16e/0x230 [intel_qat]

Fixes: ed8ccaef52fa ("crypto: qat - Add support for SRIOV") Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com Reviewed-by: Marco Chiappero marco.chiappero@intel.com Reviewed-by: Fiona Trahe fiona.trahe@intel.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_isr.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_isr.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_isr.c index 4898ef41fd9f..7d319c5c071c 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_isr.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_isr.c @@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ #include "adf_transport_access_macros.h" #include "adf_transport_internal.h"

+#define ADF_MAX_NUM_VFS 32 + static int adf_enable_msix(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) { struct adf_accel_pci *pci_dev_info = &accel_dev->accel_pci_dev; @@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ static irqreturn_t adf_msix_isr_ae(int irq, void *dev_ptr) struct adf_bar *pmisc = &GET_BARS(accel_dev)[hw_data->get_misc_bar_id(hw_data)]; void __iomem *pmisc_bar_addr = pmisc->virt_addr; - u32 vf_mask; + unsigned long vf_mask;

/* Get the interrupt sources triggered by VFs */ vf_mask = ((ADF_CSR_RD(pmisc_bar_addr, ADF_ERRSOU5) & @@ -132,8 +134,7 @@ static irqreturn_t adf_msix_isr_ae(int irq, void *dev_ptr) * unless the VF is malicious and is attempting to * flood the host OS with VF2PF interrupts. */ - for_each_set_bit(i, (const unsigned long *)&vf_mask, - (sizeof(vf_mask) * BITS_PER_BYTE)) { + for_each_set_bit(i, &vf_mask, ADF_MAX_NUM_VFS) { vf_info = accel_dev->pf.vf_info + i;

if (!__ratelimit(&vf_info->vf2pf_ratelimit)) {

From: Chunyan Zhang chunyan.zhang@unisoc.com

[ Upstream commit 245ca2cc212bb2a078332ec99afbfbb202f44c2d ]

Use 50ms as default timeout value and the time clock is 32768HZ. The original value of WDG_LOAD_VAL is not correct, so this patch fixes it.

Fixes: ac1775012058 ("spi: sprd: Add the support of restarting the system") Signed-off-by: Chunyan Zhang chunyan.zhang@unisoc.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210826091549.2138125-2-zhang.lyra@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/spi/spi-sprd-adi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-sprd-adi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-sprd-adi.c index e41976010dc4..97f44458ee7b 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-sprd-adi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-sprd-adi.c @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ #define HWRST_STATUS_SPRDISK 0xc0

/* Use default timeout 50 ms that converts to watchdog values */ -#define WDG_LOAD_VAL ((50 * 1000) / 32768) +#define WDG_LOAD_VAL ((50 * 32768) / 1000) #define WDG_LOAD_MASK GENMASK(15, 0) #define WDG_UNLOCK_KEY 0xe551

From: Geert Uytterhoeven geert+renesas@glider.be

[ Upstream commit 2a1c55d4762dd34a8b0f2e36fb01b7b16b60735b ]

Merely enabling CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST should not enable additional code. To fix this, restrict the automatic enabling of ROCKCHIP_GRF to ARCH_ROCKCHIP, and ask the user in case of compile-testing.

Fixes: 4c58063d4258f6be ("soc: rockchip: add driver handling grf setup") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven geert+renesas@glider.be Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210208143855.418374-1-geert+renesas@glider.be Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner heiko@sntech.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/soc/rockchip/Kconfig | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/soc/rockchip/Kconfig b/drivers/soc/rockchip/Kconfig index 20da55d9cbb1..d483b0e29b81 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/rockchip/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/soc/rockchip/Kconfig @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ if ARCH_ROCKCHIP || COMPILE_TEST #

config ROCKCHIP_GRF - bool - default y + bool "Rockchip General Register Files support" if COMPILE_TEST + default y if ARCH_ROCKCHIP help The General Register Files are a central component providing special additional settings registers for a lot of soc-components.

From: Dongliang Mu mudongliangabcd@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 797c061ad715a9a1480eb73f44b6939fbe3209ed ]

If vp702x_usb_in_op fails, the mac address is not initialized. And vp702x_read_mac_addr does not handle this failure, which leads to the uninit-value in dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_init.

Fix this by handling the failure of vp702x_usb_in_op.

Fixes: 786baecfe78f ("[media] dvb-usb: move it to drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb") Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu mudongliangabcd@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sean Young sean@mess.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/vp702x.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/vp702x.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/vp702x.c index c3529ea59da9..fcd66757b34d 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/vp702x.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/vp702x.c @@ -294,16 +294,22 @@ static int vp702x_rc_query(struct dvb_usb_device *d, u32 *event, int *state) static int vp702x_read_mac_addr(struct dvb_usb_device *d,u8 mac[6]) { u8 i, *buf; + int ret; struct vp702x_device_state *st = d->priv;

mutex_lock(&st->buf_mutex); buf = st->buf; - for (i = 6; i < 12; i++) - vp702x_usb_in_op(d, READ_EEPROM_REQ, i, 1, &buf[i - 6], 1); + for (i = 6; i < 12; i++) { + ret = vp702x_usb_in_op(d, READ_EEPROM_REQ, i, 1, + &buf[i - 6], 1); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + }

memcpy(mac, buf, 6); +err: mutex_unlock(&st->buf_mutex); - return 0; + return ret; }

static int vp702x_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)

From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit 59da0b38bc2ea570ede23a3332ecb3e7574ce6b2 ]

Smatch complains that some of these struct members are not initialized leading to a stack information disclosure:

net/bluetooth/sco.c:778 sco_conn_defer_accept() warn: check that 'cp.retrans_effort' doesn't leak information

This seems like a valid warning. I've added a default case to fix this issue.

Fixes: 2f69a82acf6f ("Bluetooth: Use voice setting in deferred SCO connection request") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/bluetooth/sco.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/sco.c b/net/bluetooth/sco.c index a4ca55df7390..2561e462400e 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/sco.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/sco.c @@ -761,6 +761,11 @@ static void sco_conn_defer_accept(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 setting) cp.max_latency = cpu_to_le16(0xffff); cp.retrans_effort = 0xff; break; + default: + /* use CVSD settings as fallback */ + cp.max_latency = cpu_to_le16(0xffff); + cp.retrans_effort = 0xff; + break; }

hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_ACCEPT_SYNC_CONN_REQ,

From: Pavel Skripkin paskripkin@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 8ca34a13f7f9b3fa2c464160ffe8cc1a72088204 ]

Syzbot reported warning in netlbl_cipsov4_add(). The problem was in too big doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size passed to kcalloc(). Since this value comes from userpace there is no need to warn if value is not correct.

The same problem may occur with other kcalloc() calls in this function, so, I've added __GFP_NOWARN flag to all kcalloc() calls there.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+cdd51ee2e6b0b2e18c0d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 96cb8e3313c7 ("[NetLabel]: CIPSOv4 and Unlabeled packet integration") Acked-by: Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin paskripkin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c index 3e3494c8d42f..0559d442ad80 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c @@ -198,14 +198,14 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct genl_info *info, } doi_def->map.std->lvl.local = kcalloc(doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size, sizeof(u32), - GFP_KERNEL); + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); if (doi_def->map.std->lvl.local == NULL) { ret_val = -ENOMEM; goto add_std_failure; } doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso = kcalloc(doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso_size, sizeof(u32), - GFP_KERNEL); + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); if (doi_def->map.std->lvl.cipso == NULL) { ret_val = -ENOMEM; goto add_std_failure; @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct genl_info *info, doi_def->map.std->cat.local = kcalloc( doi_def->map.std->cat.local_size, sizeof(u32), - GFP_KERNEL); + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); if (doi_def->map.std->cat.local == NULL) { ret_val = -ENOMEM; goto add_std_failure; @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct genl_info *info, doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso = kcalloc( doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso_size, sizeof(u32), - GFP_KERNEL); + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); if (doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso == NULL) { ret_val = -ENOMEM; goto add_std_failure;

From: Dongliang Mu mudongliangabcd@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 6fa54bc713c262e1cfbc5613377ef52280d7311f ]

If em28xx_ir_init fails, it would decrease the refcount of dev. However, in the em28xx_ir_fini, when ir is NULL, it goes to ref_put and decrease the refcount of dev. This will lead to a refcount bug.

Fix this bug by removing the kref_put in the error handling code of em28xx_ir_init.

refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x18e/0x1a0 lib/refcount.c:28 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.13.0 #3 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x18e/0x1a0 lib/refcount.c:28 Call Trace: kref_put.constprop.0+0x60/0x85 include/linux/kref.h:69 em28xx_usb_disconnect.cold+0xd7/0xdc drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-cards.c:4150 usb_unbind_interface+0xbf/0x3a0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:458 __device_release_driver drivers/base/dd.c:1201 [inline] device_release_driver_internal+0x22a/0x230 drivers/base/dd.c:1232 bus_remove_device+0x108/0x160 drivers/base/bus.c:529 device_del+0x1fe/0x510 drivers/base/core.c:3540 usb_disable_device+0xd1/0x1d0 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1419 usb_disconnect+0x109/0x330 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2221 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5151 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5440 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5586 [inline] hub_event+0xf81/0x1d40 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5668 process_one_work+0x2c9/0x610 kernel/workqueue.c:2276 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2338 [inline] worker_thread+0x333/0x5b0 kernel/workqueue.c:2424 kthread+0x188/0x1d0 kernel/kthread.c:319 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295

Reported-by: Dongliang Mu mudongliangabcd@gmail.com Fixes: ac5688637144 ("media: em28xx: Fix possible memory leak of em28xx struct") Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu mudongliangabcd@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sean Young sean@mess.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-input.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-input.c b/drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-input.c index 3612f0d730dd..92007a225d8e 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-input.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/em28xx/em28xx-input.c @@ -865,7 +865,6 @@ error: kfree(ir); ref_put: em28xx_shutdown_buttons(dev); - kref_put(&dev->ref, em28xx_free_device); return err; }

From: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com

[ Upstream commit da9f2150684ea684a7ddd6d7f0e38b2bdf43dcd8 ]

It is inconsistent to return PCI_D0 from pci_target_state() instead of the original target state if 'wakeup' is true and the device cannot signal PME from D0.

This only happens when the device cannot signal PME from the original target state and any shallower power states (including D0) and that case is effectively equivalent to the one in which PME singaling is not supported at all. Since the original target state is returned in the latter case, make the function do that in the former one too.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pm/3149540.aeNJFYEL58@kreacher/ Fixes: 666ff6f83e1d ("PCI/PM: Avoid using device_may_wakeup() for runtime PM") Reported-by: Mika Westerberg mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com Reported-by: Utkarsh H Patel utkarsh.h.patel@intel.com Reported-by: Koba Ko koba.ko@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com Tested-by: Mika Westerberg mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/pci/pci.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c index 9ebf32de8575..a9fc40458d62 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c @@ -2274,16 +2274,20 @@ static pci_power_t pci_target_state(struct pci_dev *dev, bool wakeup) if (dev->current_state == PCI_D3cold) target_state = PCI_D3cold;

- if (wakeup) { + if (wakeup && dev->pme_support) { + pci_power_t state = target_state; + /* * Find the deepest state from which the device can generate * PME#. */ - if (dev->pme_support) { - while (target_state - && !(dev->pme_support & (1 << target_state))) - target_state--; - } + while (state && !(dev->pme_support & (1 << state))) + state--; + + if (state) + return state; + else if (dev->pme_support & 1) + return PCI_D0; }

return target_state;

From: Stephan Gerhold stephan@gerhold.net

[ Upstream commit e3d4571955050736bbf3eda0a9538a09d9fcfce8 ]

The SMSM driver detects interrupt edges by tracking the last state it has seen (and has triggered the interrupt handler for). This works fine, but only if the interrupt does not change state while masked.

For example, if an interrupt is unmasked while the state is HIGH, the stored last_value for that interrupt might still be LOW. Then, when the remote processor triggers smsm_intr() we assume that nothing has changed, even though the state might have changed from HIGH to LOW.

Attempt to fix this by checking the current remote state before unmasking an IRQ. Use atomic operations to avoid the interrupt handler from interfering with the unmask function.

This fixes modem crashes in some edge cases with the BAM-DMUX driver. Specifically, the BAM-DMUX interrupt handler is not called for the HIGH -> LOW smsm state transition if the BAM-DMUX driver is loaded (and therefore unmasks the interrupt) after the modem was already started:

qcom-q6v5-mss 4080000.remoteproc: fatal error received: a2_task.c:3188: Assert FALSE failed: A2 DL PER deadlock timer expired waiting for Apps ACK

Fixes: c97c4090ff72 ("soc: qcom: smsm: Add driver for Qualcomm SMSM") Signed-off-by: Stephan Gerhold stephan@gerhold.net Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712135703.324748-2-stephan@gerhold.net Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson bjorn.andersson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/soc/qcom/smsm.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/smsm.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/smsm.c index 50214b620865..2b49d2c212da 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/smsm.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/smsm.c @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ struct smsm_entry { DECLARE_BITMAP(irq_enabled, 32); DECLARE_BITMAP(irq_rising, 32); DECLARE_BITMAP(irq_falling, 32); - u32 last_value; + unsigned long last_value;

u32 *remote_state; u32 *subscription; @@ -212,8 +212,7 @@ static irqreturn_t smsm_intr(int irq, void *data) u32 val;

val = readl(entry->remote_state); - changed = val ^ entry->last_value; - entry->last_value = val; + changed = val ^ xchg(&entry->last_value, val);

for_each_set_bit(i, entry->irq_enabled, 32) { if (!(changed & BIT(i))) @@ -274,6 +273,12 @@ static void smsm_unmask_irq(struct irq_data *irqd) struct qcom_smsm *smsm = entry->smsm; u32 val;

+ /* Make sure our last cached state is up-to-date */ + if (readl(entry->remote_state) & BIT(irq)) + set_bit(irq, &entry->last_value); + else + clear_bit(irq, &entry->last_value); + set_bit(irq, entry->irq_enabled);

if (entry->subscription) {

From: Dmitry Baryshkov dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org

[ Upstream commit a41cdb693595ae1904dd793fc15d6954f4295e27 ]

dpu_hw_ctl_clear_all_blendstages() clears settings for the few first LMs instead of mixers actually used for the CTL. Change it to clear necessary data, using provided mixer ids.

Fixes: 25fdd5933e4c ("drm/msm: Add SDM845 DPU support") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210704230519.4081467-1-dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.o... Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Rob Clark robdclark@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_hw_ctl.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_hw_ctl.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_hw_ctl.c index 79bafea66354..a40ea5c68572 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_hw_ctl.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_hw_ctl.c @@ -296,10 +296,12 @@ static void dpu_hw_ctl_clear_all_blendstages(struct dpu_hw_ctl *ctx) int i;

for (i = 0; i < ctx->mixer_count; i++) { - DPU_REG_WRITE(c, CTL_LAYER(LM_0 + i), 0); - DPU_REG_WRITE(c, CTL_LAYER_EXT(LM_0 + i), 0); - DPU_REG_WRITE(c, CTL_LAYER_EXT2(LM_0 + i), 0); - DPU_REG_WRITE(c, CTL_LAYER_EXT3(LM_0 + i), 0); + enum dpu_lm mixer_id = ctx->mixer_hw_caps[i].id; + + DPU_REG_WRITE(c, CTL_LAYER(mixer_id), 0); + DPU_REG_WRITE(c, CTL_LAYER_EXT(mixer_id), 0); + DPU_REG_WRITE(c, CTL_LAYER_EXT2(mixer_id), 0); + DPU_REG_WRITE(c, CTL_LAYER_EXT3(mixer_id), 0); } }

From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi desmondcheongzx@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit e1dee2c1de2b4dd00eb44004a4bda6326ed07b59 ]

In commit 4e1a720d0312 ("Bluetooth: avoid killing an already killed socket"), a check was added to sco_sock_kill to skip killing a socket if the SOCK_DEAD flag was set.

This was done after a trace for a use-after-free bug showed that the same sock pointer was being killed twice.

Unfortunately, this check prevents sco_sock_kill from running on any socket. sco_sock_kill kills a socket only if it's zapped and orphaned, however sock_orphan announces that the socket is dead before detaching it. i.e., orphaned sockets have the SOCK_DEAD flag set.

To fix this, we remove the check for SOCK_DEAD, and avoid repeated calls to sco_sock_kill by removing incorrect calls in:

1. sco_sock_timeout. The socket should not be killed on timeout as further processing is expected to be done. For example, sco_sock_connect sets the timer then waits for the socket to be connected or for an error to be returned.

2. sco_conn_del. This function should clean up resources for the connection, but the socket itself should be cleaned up in sco_sock_release.

3. sco_sock_close. Calls to sco_sock_close in sco_sock_cleanup_listen and sco_sock_release are followed by sco_sock_kill. Hence the duplicated call should be removed.

Fixes: 4e1a720d0312 ("Bluetooth: avoid killing an already killed socket") Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi desmondcheongzx@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz luiz.von.dentz@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/bluetooth/sco.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/sco.c b/net/bluetooth/sco.c index 2561e462400e..2fbea653540b 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/sco.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/sco.c @@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ static void sco_sock_timeout(struct timer_list *t) sk->sk_state_change(sk); bh_unlock_sock(sk);

- sco_sock_kill(sk); sock_put(sk); }

@@ -176,7 +175,6 @@ static void sco_conn_del(struct hci_conn *hcon, int err) sco_sock_clear_timer(sk); sco_chan_del(sk, err); bh_unlock_sock(sk); - sco_sock_kill(sk); sock_put(sk); }

@@ -393,8 +391,7 @@ static void sco_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent) */ static void sco_sock_kill(struct sock *sk) { - if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || sk->sk_socket || - sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) + if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || sk->sk_socket) return;

BT_DBG("sk %p state %d", sk, sk->sk_state); @@ -446,7 +443,6 @@ static void sco_sock_close(struct sock *sk) lock_sock(sk); __sco_sock_close(sk); release_sock(sk); - sco_sock_kill(sk); }

static void sco_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent)

From: Sergey Shtylyov s.shtylyov@omp.ru

[ Upstream commit 50855c31573b02963f0aa2aacfd4ea41c31ae0e0 ]

The driver neglects to check the result of platform_get_irq()'s call and blithely passes the negative error codes to devm_request_irq() (which takes *unsigned* IRQ #), causing it to fail with -EINVAL, overriding an original error code. Stop calling devm_request_irq() with the invalid IRQ #s.

Fixes: 8b2e76687b39 ("USB: AT91 UDC updates, mostly power management") Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov s.shtylyov@omp.ru Acked-by: Felipe Balbi balbi@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6654a224-739a-1a80-12f0-76d920f87b6c@omp.ru Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/usb/gadget/udc/at91_udc.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/at91_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/at91_udc.c index 03959dc86cfd..dd5cdcdfa403 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/at91_udc.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/at91_udc.c @@ -1879,7 +1879,9 @@ static int at91udc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) clk_disable(udc->iclk);

/* request UDC and maybe VBUS irqs */ - udc->udp_irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); + udc->udp_irq = retval = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); + if (retval < 0) + goto err_unprepare_iclk; retval = devm_request_irq(dev, udc->udp_irq, at91_udc_irq, 0, driver_name, udc); if (retval) {

From: Sergey Shtylyov s.shtylyov@omp.ru

[ Upstream commit 0881e22c06e66af0b64773c91c8868ead3d01aa1 ]

The driver neglects to check the result of platform_get_irq()'s calls and blithely passes the negative error codes to request_threaded_irq() (which takes *unsigned* IRQ #), causing them both to fail with -EINVAL, overriding an original error code. Stop calling request_threaded_irq() with the invalid IRQ #s.

Fixes: c33fad0c3748 ("usb: otg: Adding twl6030-usb transceiver driver for OMAP4430") Acked-by: Felipe Balbi balbi@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov s.shtylyov@omp.ru Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9507f50b-50f1-6dc4-f57c-3ed4e53a1c25@omp.ru Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/usb/phy/phy-twl6030-usb.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/phy/phy-twl6030-usb.c b/drivers/usb/phy/phy-twl6030-usb.c index dade34d70419..859af6113b45 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/phy/phy-twl6030-usb.c +++ b/drivers/usb/phy/phy-twl6030-usb.c @@ -342,6 +342,11 @@ static int twl6030_usb_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) twl->irq2 = platform_get_irq(pdev, 1); twl->linkstat = MUSB_UNKNOWN;

+ if (twl->irq1 < 0) + return twl->irq1; + if (twl->irq2 < 0) + return twl->irq2; + twl->comparator.set_vbus = twl6030_set_vbus; twl->comparator.start_srp = twl6030_start_srp;

From: Sergey Shtylyov s.shtylyov@omp.ru

[ Upstream commit 4ac5132e8a4300637a2da8f5d6bc7650db735b8a ]

The driver neglects to check the result of platform_get_irq()'s call and blithely passes the negative error codes to usb_add_hcd() (which takes *unsigned* IRQ #), causing request_irq() that it calls to fail with -EINVAL, overriding an original error code. Stop calling usb_add_hcd() with the invalid IRQ #s.

Fixes: 78c73414f4f6 ("USB: ohci: add support for tmio-ohci cell") Acked-by: Alan Stern stern@rowland.harvard.edu Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov s.shtylyov@omp.ru Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/402e1a45-a0a4-0e08-566a-7ca1331506b1@omp.ru Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/usb/host/ohci-tmio.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/ohci-tmio.c b/drivers/usb/host/ohci-tmio.c index a631dbb369d7..983a00e2988d 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/ohci-tmio.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/ohci-tmio.c @@ -199,6 +199,9 @@ static int ohci_hcd_tmio_drv_probe(struct platform_device *dev) if (!cell) return -EINVAL;

+ if (irq < 0) + return irq; + hcd = usb_create_hcd(&ohci_tmio_hc_driver, &dev->dev, dev_name(&dev->dev)); if (!hcd) { ret = -ENOMEM;

From: Chih-Kang Chang gary.chang@realtek.com

[ Upstream commit f50d2ff8f016b79a2ff4acd5943a1eda40c545d4 ]

ieee80211_amsdu_realloc_pad() fails to account for extra_tx_headroom, the original reserved headroom might be eaten. Add the necessary extra_tx_headroom.

Fixes: 6e0456b54545 ("mac80211: add A-MSDU tx support") Signed-off-by: Chih-Kang Chang gary.chang@realtek.com Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih pkshih@realtek.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210816085128.10931-2-pkshih@realtek.com [fix indentation] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/mac80211/tx.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c index 3530d1a5fc98..5c5908127fcb 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -3142,7 +3142,9 @@ static bool ieee80211_amsdu_prepare_head(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, if (info->control.flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_AMSDU) return true;

- if (!ieee80211_amsdu_realloc_pad(local, skb, sizeof(*amsdu_hdr))) + if (!ieee80211_amsdu_realloc_pad(local, skb, + sizeof(*amsdu_hdr) + + local->hw.extra_tx_headroom)) return false;

data = skb_push(skb, sizeof(*amsdu_hdr));

From: Pavel Skripkin paskripkin@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit f41a4b2b5eb7872109723dab8ae1603bdd9d9ec1 ]

Syzbot hit "task hung" bug in hci_req_sync(). The problem was in unreasonable huge inquiry timeout passed from userspace. Fix it by adding sanity check for timeout value to hci_inquiry().

Since hci_inquiry() is the only user of hci_req_sync() with user controlled timeout value, it makes sense to check timeout value in hci_inquiry() and don't touch hci_req_sync().

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+be2baed593ea56c6a84c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin paskripkin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c index ec6150564f59..26acacb2fa95 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c @@ -1296,6 +1296,12 @@ int hci_inquiry(void __user *arg) goto done; }

+ /* Restrict maximum inquiry length to 60 seconds */ + if (ir.length > 60) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto done; + } + hci_dev_lock(hdev); if (inquiry_cache_age(hdev) > INQUIRY_CACHE_AGE_MAX || inquiry_cache_empty(hdev) || ir.flags & IREQ_CACHE_FLUSH) {

From: Sergey Shtylyov s.shtylyov@omp.ru

[ Upstream commit d6840a5e370b7ea4fde16ce2caf431bcc87f9a75 ]

Iff platform_get_irq() returns 0, the driver's probe() method will return 0 early (as if the method's call was successful). Let's consider IRQ0 valid for simplicity -- devm_request_irq() can always override that decision...

Fixes: e0d1ec97853f ("i2c-s3c2410: Change IRQ to be plain integer.") Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov s.shtylyov@omp.ru Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang wsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-s3c2410.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-s3c2410.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-s3c2410.c index d3603e261a84..4c6036920388 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-s3c2410.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-s3c2410.c @@ -1179,7 +1179,7 @@ static int s3c24xx_i2c_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) */ if (!(i2c->quirks & QUIRK_POLL)) { i2c->irq = ret = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); - if (ret <= 0) { + if (ret < 0) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "cannot find IRQ\n"); clk_unprepare(i2c->clk); return ret;

From: Tony Lindgren tony@atomide.com

[ Upstream commit ee5165354d498e5bceb0b386e480ac84c5f8c28c ]

Depending on the DMA driver being used, the struct dma_slave_config may need to be initialized to zero for the unused data.

For example, we have three DMA drivers using src_port_window_size and dst_port_window_size. If these are left uninitialized, it can cause DMA failures.

For moxart, this is probably not currently an issue but is still good to fix though.

Fixes: 1b66e94e6b99 ("mmc: moxart: Add MOXA ART SD/MMC driver") Cc: Jonas Jensen jonas.jensen@gmail.com Cc: Vinod Koul vkoul@kernel.org Cc: Peter Ujfalusi peter.ujfalusi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren tony@atomide.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210810081644.19353-3-tony@atomide.com Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson ulf.hansson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/mmc/host/moxart-mmc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/moxart-mmc.c b/drivers/mmc/host/moxart-mmc.c index a0670e9cd012..5553a5643f40 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/moxart-mmc.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/moxart-mmc.c @@ -631,6 +631,7 @@ static int moxart_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) host->dma_chan_tx, host->dma_chan_rx); host->have_dma = true;

+ memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg)); cfg.src_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES; cfg.dst_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES;

From: Sergey Shtylyov s.shtylyov@omp.ru

[ Upstream commit 58fb7c643d346e2364404554f531cfa6a1a3917c ]

Iff platform_get_irq() returns 0, the driver's probe() method will return 0 early (as if the method's call was successful). Let's consider IRQ0 valid for simplicity -- devm_request_irq() can always override that decision...

Fixes: ce38815d39ea ("I2C: mediatek: Add driver for MediaTek I2C controller") Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov s.shtylyov@omprussia.ru Reviewed-by: Qii Wang qii.wang@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang wsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mt65xx.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mt65xx.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mt65xx.c index 2bb4d20ead32..e09b065a6aff 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mt65xx.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mt65xx.c @@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ static int mtk_i2c_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return PTR_ERR(i2c->pdmabase);

irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); - if (irq <= 0) + if (irq < 0) return irq;

init_completion(&i2c->msg_complete);

From: Christophe JAILLET christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr

[ Upstream commit d2f42e09393c774ab79088d8e3afcc62b3328fc9 ]

If no suitable DMA configuration is available, a previous 'bdc_phy_init()' call must be undone by a corresponding 'bdc_phy_exit()' call.

Branch to the existing error handling path instead of returning directly.

Fixes: cc29d4f67757 ("usb: bdc: Add support for USB phy") Acked-by: Florian Fainelli f.fainelli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0c5910979f39225d5d8fe68c9ab1c147c68ddee1.162931473... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/usb/gadget/udc/bdc/bdc_core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/bdc/bdc_core.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/bdc/bdc_core.c index e174b1b889da..d04de117bf63 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/bdc/bdc_core.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/bdc/bdc_core.c @@ -568,7 +568,8 @@ static int bdc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (ret) { dev_err(dev, "No suitable DMA config available, abort\n"); - return -ENOTSUPP; + ret = -ENOTSUPP; + goto phycleanup; } dev_dbg(dev, "Using 32-bit address\n"); }

From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit fd6729ec534cffbbeb3917761e6d1fe6a412d3fe ]

This error path is unlikely because of it checked for NULL and returned -ENOMEM earlier in the function. But it should return an error code here as well if we ever do hit it because of a race condition or something.

Fixes: bdcd81707973 ("Add ath6kl cleaned up driver") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo kvalo@codeaurora.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210813113438.GB30697@kili Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath6kl/wmi.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath6kl/wmi.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath6kl/wmi.c index 987ebae8ea0e..afa7a82ffd5d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath6kl/wmi.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath6kl/wmi.c @@ -2513,8 +2513,10 @@ static int ath6kl_wmi_sync_point(struct wmi *wmi, u8 if_idx) goto free_data_skb;

for (index = 0; index < num_pri_streams; index++) { - if (WARN_ON(!data_sync_bufs[index].skb)) + if (WARN_ON(!data_sync_bufs[index].skb)) { + ret = -ENOMEM; goto free_data_skb; + }

ep_id = ath6kl_ac2_endpoint_id(wmi->parent_dev, data_sync_bufs[index].

From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

[ Upstream commit 67d6d681e15b578c1725bad8ad079e05d1c48a8e ]

Even after commit 6457378fe796 ("ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in fnhe_hashfun()"), an attacker can still use brute force to learn some secrets from a victim linux host.

One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash table bucket a random value.

Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions could contain 6 items under attack.

After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items, between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets.

This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table, by 50% in average, we do not expect this to be a problem.

This patch is more complex than the prior one (IPv6 equivalent), because IPv4 was reusing the oldest entry. Since we need to be able to evict more than one entry per update_or_create_fnhe() call, I had to replace fnhe_oldest() with fnhe_remove_oldest().

Also note that we will queue extra kfree_rcu() calls under stress, which hopefully wont be a too big issue.

Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: Keyu Man kman001@ucr.edu Cc: Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Reviewed-by: David Ahern dsahern@kernel.org Tested-by: David Ahern dsahern@kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/ipv4/route.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index 1491d239385e..d72bffab6ffc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -604,18 +604,25 @@ static void fnhe_flush_routes(struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe) } }

-static struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe_oldest(struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash) +static void fnhe_remove_oldest(struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash) { - struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, *oldest; + struct fib_nh_exception __rcu **fnhe_p, **oldest_p; + struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, *oldest = NULL;

- oldest = rcu_dereference(hash->chain); - for (fnhe = rcu_dereference(oldest->fnhe_next); fnhe; - fnhe = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_next)) { - if (time_before(fnhe->fnhe_stamp, oldest->fnhe_stamp)) + for (fnhe_p = &hash->chain; ; fnhe_p = &fnhe->fnhe_next) { + fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(*fnhe_p, + lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock)); + if (!fnhe) + break; + if (!oldest || + time_before(fnhe->fnhe_stamp, oldest->fnhe_stamp)) { oldest = fnhe; + oldest_p = fnhe_p; + } } fnhe_flush_routes(oldest); - return oldest; + *oldest_p = oldest->fnhe_next; + kfree_rcu(oldest, rcu); }

static inline u32 fnhe_hashfun(__be32 daddr) @@ -692,16 +699,21 @@ static void update_or_create_fnhe(struct fib_nh *nh, __be32 daddr, __be32 gw, if (rt) fill_route_from_fnhe(rt, fnhe); } else { - if (depth > FNHE_RECLAIM_DEPTH) - fnhe = fnhe_oldest(hash); - else { - fnhe = kzalloc(sizeof(*fnhe), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!fnhe) - goto out_unlock; - - fnhe->fnhe_next = hash->chain; - rcu_assign_pointer(hash->chain, fnhe); + /* Randomize max depth to avoid some side channels attacks. */ + int max_depth = FNHE_RECLAIM_DEPTH + + prandom_u32_max(FNHE_RECLAIM_DEPTH); + + while (depth > max_depth) { + fnhe_remove_oldest(hash); + depth--; } + + fnhe = kzalloc(sizeof(*fnhe), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!fnhe) + goto out_unlock; + + fnhe->fnhe_next = hash->chain; + fnhe->fnhe_genid = genid; fnhe->fnhe_daddr = daddr; fnhe->fnhe_gw = gw; @@ -709,6 +721,8 @@ static void update_or_create_fnhe(struct fib_nh *nh, __be32 daddr, __be32 gw, fnhe->fnhe_mtu_locked = lock; fnhe->fnhe_expires = max(1UL, expires);

+ rcu_assign_pointer(hash->chain, fnhe); + /* Exception created; mark the cached routes for the nexthop * stale, so anyone caching it rechecks if this exception * applies to them.

From: Stefan Wahren stefan.wahren@i2se.com

[ Upstream commit 429205da6c834447a57279af128bdd56ccd5225e ]

Based on tests the QCA7000 doesn't support checksum offloading. So assume ip_summed is CHECKSUM_NONE and let the kernel take care of the checksum handling. This fixes data transfer issues in noisy environments.

Reported-by: Michael Heimpold michael.heimpold@in-tech.com Fixes: 291ab06ecf67 ("net: qualcomm: new Ethernet over SPI driver for QCA7000") Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren stefan.wahren@i2se.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_spi.c | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_uart.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_spi.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_spi.c index 9d188931bc09..afd49c7fd87f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_spi.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_spi.c @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ qcaspi_receive(struct qcaspi *qca) skb_put(qca->rx_skb, retcode); qca->rx_skb->protocol = eth_type_trans( qca->rx_skb, qca->rx_skb->dev); - qca->rx_skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; + skb_checksum_none_assert(qca->rx_skb); netif_rx_ni(qca->rx_skb); qca->rx_skb = netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align(net_dev, net_dev->mtu + VLAN_ETH_HLEN); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_uart.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_uart.c index db6068cd7a1f..466e9d07697a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_uart.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_uart.c @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ qca_tty_receive(struct serdev_device *serdev, const unsigned char *data, skb_put(qca->rx_skb, retcode); qca->rx_skb->protocol = eth_type_trans( qca->rx_skb, qca->rx_skb->dev); - qca->rx_skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY; + skb_checksum_none_assert(qca->rx_skb); netif_rx_ni(qca->rx_skb); qca->rx_skb = netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align(netdev, netdev->mtu +

From: Guillaume Nault gnault@redhat.com

commit 2dce224f469f060b9998a5a869151ef83c08ce77 upstream.

__peernet2id() can be protected by RCU as it only calls idr_for_each(), which is RCU-safe, and never modifies the nsid table.

rtnl_net_dumpid() can also do lockless lookups. It does two nested idr_for_each() calls on nsid tables (one direct call and one indirect call because of rtnl_net_dumpid_one() calling __peernet2id()). The netnsid tables are never updated. Therefore it is safe to not take the nsid_lock and run within an RCU-critical section instead.

Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault gnault@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge haakon.bugge@oracle.com

--- net/core/net_namespace.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c +++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c @@ -192,9 +192,9 @@ static int net_eq_idr(int id, void *net, return 0; }

-/* Should be called with nsid_lock held. If a new id is assigned, the bool alloc - * is set to true, thus the caller knows that the new id must be notified via - * rtnl. +/* Must be called from RCU-critical section or with nsid_lock held. If + * a new id is assigned, the bool alloc is set to true, thus the + * caller knows that the new id must be notified via rtnl. */ static int __peernet2id_alloc(struct net *net, struct net *peer, bool *alloc) { @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int __peernet2id_alloc(struct net return NETNSA_NSID_NOT_ASSIGNED; }

-/* should be called with nsid_lock held */ +/* Must be called from RCU-critical section or with nsid_lock held */ static int __peernet2id(struct net *net, struct net *peer) { bool no = false; @@ -261,9 +261,10 @@ int peernet2id(struct net *net, struct n { int id;

- spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock); + rcu_read_lock(); id = __peernet2id(net, peer); - spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + return id; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(peernet2id); @@ -837,6 +838,7 @@ struct rtnl_net_dump_cb { int s_idx; };

+/* Runs in RCU-critical section. */ static int rtnl_net_dumpid_one(int id, void *peer, void *data) { struct rtnl_net_dump_cb *net_cb = (struct rtnl_net_dump_cb *)data; @@ -867,9 +869,9 @@ static int rtnl_net_dumpid(struct sk_buf .s_idx = cb->args[0], };

- spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock); + rcu_read_lock(); idr_for_each(&net->netns_ids, rtnl_net_dumpid_one, &net_cb); - spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock); + rcu_read_unlock();

cb->args[0] = net_cb.idx; return skb->len;

From: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com

commit 8c4bca10ceafc43b1ca0a9fab5fa27e13cbce99e upstream.

The stat() family of syscalls report the wrong size for encrypted symlinks, which has caused breakage in several userspace programs.

Fix this by calling fscrypt_symlink_getattr() after ext4_getattr() for encrypted symlinks. This function computes the correct size by reading and decrypting the symlink target (if it's not already cached).

For more details, see the commit which added fscrypt_symlink_getattr().

Fixes: f348c252320b ("ext4 crypto: add symlink encryption") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210702065350.209646-3-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/ext4/symlink.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/symlink.c +++ b/fs/ext4/symlink.c @@ -52,10 +52,19 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_get_li return paddr; }

+static int ext4_encrypted_symlink_getattr(const struct path *path, + struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, + unsigned int query_flags) +{ + ext4_getattr(path, stat, request_mask, query_flags); + + return fscrypt_symlink_getattr(path, stat); +} + const struct inode_operations ext4_encrypted_symlink_inode_operations = { .get_link = ext4_encrypted_get_link, .setattr = ext4_setattr, - .getattr = ext4_getattr, + .getattr = ext4_encrypted_symlink_getattr, .listxattr = ext4_listxattr, };

From: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com

commit 064c734986011390b4d111f1a99372b7f26c3850 upstream.

The stat() family of syscalls report the wrong size for encrypted symlinks, which has caused breakage in several userspace programs.

Fix this by calling fscrypt_symlink_getattr() after ubifs_getattr() for encrypted symlinks. This function computes the correct size by reading and decrypting the symlink target (if it's not already cached).

For more details, see the commit which added fscrypt_symlink_getattr().

Fixes: ca7f85be8d6c ("ubifs: Add support for encrypted symlinks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210702065350.209646-5-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/ubifs/file.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/ubifs/file.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/file.c @@ -1642,6 +1642,16 @@ static const char *ubifs_get_link(struct return fscrypt_get_symlink(inode, ui->data, ui->data_len, done); }

+static int ubifs_symlink_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, + u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags) +{ + ubifs_getattr(path, stat, request_mask, query_flags); + + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(d_inode(path->dentry))) + return fscrypt_symlink_getattr(path, stat); + return 0; +} + const struct address_space_operations ubifs_file_address_operations = { .readpage = ubifs_readpage, .writepage = ubifs_writepage, @@ -1669,7 +1679,7 @@ const struct inode_operations ubifs_file const struct inode_operations ubifs_symlink_inode_operations = { .get_link = ubifs_get_link, .setattr = ubifs_setattr, - .getattr = ubifs_getattr, + .getattr = ubifs_symlink_getattr, #ifdef CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_XATTR .listxattr = ubifs_listxattr, #endif

From: Babu Moger babu.moger@amd.com

commit 527f721478bce3f49b513a733bacd19d6f34b08c upstream.

The recent commit

064855a69003 ("x86/resctrl: Fix default monitoring groups reporting")

caused a RHEL build failure with an uninitialized variable warning treated as an error because it removed the default case snippet.

The RHEL Makefile uses '-Werror=maybe-uninitialized' to force possibly uninitialized variable warnings to be treated as errors. This is also reported by smatch via the 0day robot.

The error from the RHEL build is:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c: In function ‘__mon_event_count’: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c:261:12: error: ‘m’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized] m->chunks += chunks; ^~

The upstream Makefile does not build using '-Werror=maybe-uninitialized'. So, the problem is not seen there. Fix the problem by putting back the default case snippet.

[ bp: note that there's nothing wrong with the code and other compilers do not trigger this warning - this is being done just so the RHEL compiler is happy. ]

Fixes: 064855a69003 ("x86/resctrl: Fix default monitoring groups reporting") Reported-by: Terry Bowman Terry.Bowman@amd.com Reported-by: kernel test robot lkp@intel.com Signed-off-by: Babu Moger babu.moger@amd.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre reinette.chatre@intel.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/162949631908.23903.17090272726012848523.stgit@bmog... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_monitor.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_monitor.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_monitor.c @@ -252,6 +252,12 @@ static u64 __mon_event_count(u32 rmid, s case QOS_L3_MBM_LOCAL_EVENT_ID: m = &rr->d->mbm_local[rmid]; break; + default: + /* + * Code would never reach here because an invalid + * event id would fail the __rmid_read. + */ + return RMID_VAL_ERROR; }

if (rr->first) {

From: Austin Kim austin.kim@lge.com

commit a32ad90426a9c8eb3915eed26e08ce133bd9e0da upstream.

With W=1 build, the compiler throws warning message as below:

security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c:24:12: warning: no previous prototype for ‘ima_mok_init’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] __init int ima_mok_init(void)

Silence the warning by adding static keyword to ima_mok_init().

Signed-off-by: Austin Kim austin.kim@lge.com Fixes: 41c89b64d718 ("IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring; /* * Allocate the IMA blacklist keyring */ -__init int ima_mok_init(void) +static __init int ima_mok_init(void) { struct key_restriction *restriction;

From: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp

commit 8c28051cdcbe9dfcec6bd0a4709d67a09df6edae upstream.

syzbot is reporting page fault at vga16fb_fillrect() [1], for vga16fb_check_var() is failing to detect multiplication overflow.

if (vxres * vyres > maxmem) { vyres = maxmem / vxres; if (vyres < yres) return -ENOMEM; }

Since no module would accept too huge resolutions where multiplication overflow happens, let's reject in the common path.

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=04168c8063cfdde1db5e [1] Reported-by: syzbot syzbot+04168c8063cfdde1db5e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Debugged-by: Randy Dunlap rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven geert+renesas@glider.be Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/185175d6-227a-7b55-433d-b07092... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c @@ -971,6 +971,7 @@ fb_set_var(struct fb_info *info, struct if ((var->activate & FB_ACTIVATE_FORCE) || memcmp(&info->var, var, sizeof(struct fb_var_screeninfo))) { u32 activate = var->activate; + u32 unused;

/* When using FOURCC mode, make sure the red, green, blue and * transp fields are set to 0. @@ -995,6 +996,11 @@ fb_set_var(struct fb_info *info, struct if (var->xres < 8 || var->yres < 8) return -EINVAL;

+ /* Too huge resolution causes multiplication overflow. */ + if (check_mul_overflow(var->xres, var->yres, &unused) || + check_mul_overflow(var->xres_virtual, var->yres_virtual, &unused)) + return -EINVAL; + ret = info->fbops->fb_check_var(var, info);

if (ret)

From: Linus Walleij linus.walleij@linaro.org

commit aaedb9e00e5400220a8871180d23a83e67f29f63 upstream.

Since a few kernel releases the Pogoplug 4 has crashed like this during boot:

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000002 (...) [<c04116ec>] (strlen) from [<c00ead80>] (kstrdup+0x1c/0x4c) [<c00ead80>] (kstrdup) from [<c04591d8>] (__clk_register+0x44/0x37c) [<c04591d8>] (__clk_register) from [<c04595ec>] (clk_hw_register+0x20/0x44) [<c04595ec>] (clk_hw_register) from [<c045bfa8>] (__clk_hw_register_mux+0x198/0x1e4) [<c045bfa8>] (__clk_hw_register_mux) from [<c045c050>] (clk_register_mux_table+0x5c/0x6c) [<c045c050>] (clk_register_mux_table) from [<c0acf3e0>] (kirkwood_clk_muxing_setup.constprop.0+0x13c/0x1ac) [<c0acf3e0>] (kirkwood_clk_muxing_setup.constprop.0) from [<c0aceae0>] (of_clk_init+0x12c/0x214) [<c0aceae0>] (of_clk_init) from [<c0ab576c>] (time_init+0x20/0x2c) [<c0ab576c>] (time_init) from [<c0ab3d18>] (start_kernel+0x3dc/0x56c) [<c0ab3d18>] (start_kernel) from [<00000000>] (0x0) Code: e3130020 1afffffb e12fff1e c08a1078 (e5d03000)

This is because the "powersave" mux clock 0 was provided in an unterminated array, which is required by the loop in the driver:

/* Count, allocate, and register clock muxes */ for (n = 0; desc[n].name;) n++;

Here n will go out of bounds and then call clk_register_mux() on random memory contents after the mux clock.

Fix this by terminating the array with a blank entry.

Fixes: 105299381d87 ("cpufreq: kirkwood: use the powersave multiplexer") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrew Lunn andrew@lunn.ch Cc: Chris Packham chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz Cc: Gregory CLEMENT gregory.clement@bootlin.com Cc: Sebastian Hesselbarth sebastian.hesselbarth@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij linus.walleij@linaro.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210814235514.403426-1-linus.walleij@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn andrew@lunn.ch Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd sboyd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/clk/mvebu/kirkwood.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/clk/mvebu/kirkwood.c +++ b/drivers/clk/mvebu/kirkwood.c @@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ static const char *powersave_parents[] = static const struct clk_muxing_soc_desc kirkwood_mux_desc[] __initconst = { { "powersave", powersave_parents, ARRAY_SIZE(powersave_parents), 11, 1, 0 }, + { } };

static struct clk *clk_muxing_get_src(

From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi desmondcheongzx@gmail.com

commit 0d977e0eba234e01a60bdde27314dc21374201b3 upstream.

This crash was observed with a failed assertion on device close:

BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3902 at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2150 btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1d2/0x1e0 [btrfs] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic libcrc32c crc32c_intel xor zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash lzo_compress lzo_decompress raid6_pq loop CPU: 1 PID: 3902 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc5-default+ #1532 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space [btrfs] RIP: 0010:btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1d2/0x1e0 [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffffb7a5452d7d80 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffabee13c4 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff97834176a378 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff97835195d388 R13: 0000000005b08000 R14: ffff978385484000 R15: 000000000000016c FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9783bd800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000056190d003fe8 CR3: 000000002a81e005 CR4: 0000000000170ea0 Call Trace: flush_space+0x197/0x2f0 [btrfs] btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x139/0x300 [btrfs] process_one_work+0x262/0x5e0 worker_thread+0x4c/0x320 ? process_one_work+0x5e0/0x5e0 kthread+0x144/0x170 ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 irq event stamp: 19334989 hardirqs last enabled at (19334997): [<ffffffffab0e0c87>] console_unlock+0x2b7/0x400 hardirqs last disabled at (19335006): [<ffffffffab0e0d0d>] console_unlock+0x33d/0x400 softirqs last enabled at (19334900): [<ffffffffaba0030d>] __do_softirq+0x30d/0x574 softirqs last disabled at (19334893): [<ffffffffab0721ec>] irq_exit_rcu+0x12c/0x140 ---[ end trace 45939e308e0dd3c7 ]--- BTRFS: error (device vdd) in btrfs_run_delayed_refs:2150: errno=-28 No space left BTRFS info (device vdd): forced readonly BTRFS warning (device vdd): failed setting block group ro: -30 BTRFS info (device vdd): suspending dev_replace for unmount assertion failed: !test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT, &device->dev_state), in fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1150 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3431! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 1 PID: 3982 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 5.14.0-rc5-default+ #1532 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:assertfail.constprop.0+0x18/0x1a [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffffb7a5454c7db8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000068 RBX: ffff978364b91c00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffabee13c4 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff9783523a4c00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9783523a4d18 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 00007f61c8f42800(0000) GS:ffff9783bd800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000056190cffa810 CR3: 0000000030b96002 CR4: 0000000000170ea0 Call Trace: btrfs_close_one_device.cold+0x11/0x55 [btrfs] close_fs_devices+0x44/0xb0 [btrfs] btrfs_close_devices+0x48/0x160 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x69/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x2c/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0x144/0x1b0 task_work_run+0x59/0xa0 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xe7/0xf0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xaf/0xf0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

This happens when close_ctree is called while a dev_replace hasn't completed. In close_ctree, we suspend the dev_replace, but keep the replace target around so that we can resume the dev_replace procedure when we mount the root again. This is the call trace:

close_ctree(): btrfs_dev_replace_suspend_for_unmount(); btrfs_close_devices(): btrfs_close_fs_devices(): btrfs_close_one_device(): ASSERT(!test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT, &device->dev_state));

However, since the replace target sticks around, there is a device with BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT set on close, and we fail the assertion in btrfs_close_one_device.

To fix this, if we come across the replace target device when closing, we should properly reset it back to allocation state. This fix also ensures that if a non-target device has a corrupted state and has the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT bit set, the assertion will still catch the error.

Reported-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Fixes: b2a616676839 ("btrfs: fix rw device counting in __btrfs_free_extra_devids") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain anand.jain@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi desmondcheongzx@gmail.com Reviewed-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c @@ -1048,6 +1048,9 @@ static void btrfs_close_one_device(struc fs_devices->rw_devices--; }

+ if (device->devid == BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID) + clear_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT, &device->dev_state); + if (test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING, &device->dev_state)) fs_devices->missing_devices--;

From: Niklas Cassel niklas.cassel@wdc.com

commit 4d643b66089591b4769bcdb6fd1bfeff2fe301b8 upstream.

A user space process should not need the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability set in order to perform a BLKREPORTZONE ioctl.

Getting the zone report is required in order to get the write pointer. Neither read() nor write() requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so it is reasonable that a user space process that can read/write from/to the device, also can get the write pointer. (Since e.g. writes have to be at the write pointer.)

Fixes: 3ed05a987e0f ("blk-zoned: implement ioctls") Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel niklas.cassel@wdc.com Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal damien.lemoal@wdc.com Reviewed-by: Aravind Ramesh aravind.ramesh@wdc.com Reviewed-by: Adam Manzanares a.manzanares@samsung.com Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani himanshu.madhani@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.10+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210811110505.29649-3-Niklas.Cassel@wdc.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- block/blk-zoned.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)

--- a/block/blk-zoned.c +++ b/block/blk-zoned.c @@ -319,9 +319,6 @@ int blkdev_report_zones_ioctl(struct blo if (!blk_queue_is_zoned(q)) return -ENOTTY;

- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EACCES; - if (copy_from_user(&rep, argp, sizeof(struct blk_zone_report))) return -EFAULT;

From: Kajol Jain kjain@linux.ibm.com

commit f9addd85fbfacf0d155e83dbee8696d6df5ed0c7 upstream.

H_GetPerformanceCounterInfo (0xF080) hcall returns the counter data in the result buffer. Result buffer has specific format defined in the PAPR specification. One of the fields is counter offset and width of the counter data returned.

Counter data are returned in a unsigned char array in big endian byte order. To get the final counter data, the values must be left shifted byte at a time. But commit 220a0c609ad17 ("powerpc/perf: Add support for the hv gpci (get performance counter info) interface") made the shifting bitwise and also assumed little endian order. Because of that, hcall counters values are reported incorrectly.

In particular this can lead to counters go backwards which messes up the counter prev vs now calculation and leads to huge counter value reporting:

#: perf stat -e hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ -C 0 -I 1000 time counts unit events 1.000078854 18,446,744,073,709,535,232 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ 2.000213293 0 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ 3.000320107 0 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ 4.000428392 0 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ 5.000537864 0 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ 6.000649087 0 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ 7.000760312 0 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ 8.000865218 16,448 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ 9.000978985 18,446,744,073,709,535,232 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ 10.001088891 16,384 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ 11.001201435 0 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ 12.001307937 18,446,744,073,709,535,232 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/

Fix the shifting logic to correct match the format, ie. read bytes in big endian order.

Fixes: e4f226b1580b ("powerpc/perf/hv-gpci: Increase request buffer size") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.6+ Reported-by: Nageswara R Sastryrnsastry@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Kajol Jain kjain@linux.ibm.com Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastryrnsastry@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210813082158.429023-1-kjain@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static unsigned long single_gpci_request */ count = 0; for (i = offset; i < offset + length; i++) - count |= arg->bytes[i] << (i - offset); + count |= (u64)(arg->bytes[i]) << ((length - 1 - (i - offset)) * 8);

*value = count; out:

From: Andy Shevchenko andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com

commit e130816164e244b692921de49771eeb28205152d upstream.

Add a macro to test if entry is pointing to the head of the list which is useful in cases like:

list_for_each_entry(pos, &head, member) { if (cond) break; } if (list_entry_is_head(pos, &head, member)) return -ERRNO;

that allows to avoid additional variable to be added to track if loop has not been stopped in the middle.

While here, convert list_for_each_entry*() family of macros to use a new one.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Reviewed-by: Cezary Rojewski cezary.rojewski@intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200929134342.51489-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.int... Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/linux/list.h | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/list.h +++ b/include/linux/list.h @@ -485,6 +485,15 @@ static inline void list_splice_tail_init pos = n, n = pos->prev)

/** + * list_entry_is_head - test if the entry points to the head of the list + * @pos: the type * to cursor + * @head: the head for your list. + * @member: the name of the list_head within the struct. + */ +#define list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member) \ + (&pos->member == (head)) + +/** * list_for_each_entry - iterate over list of given type * @pos: the type * to use as a loop cursor. * @head: the head for your list. @@ -492,7 +501,7 @@ static inline void list_splice_tail_init */ #define list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) \ for (pos = list_first_entry(head, typeof(*pos), member); \ - &pos->member != (head); \ + !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member); \ pos = list_next_entry(pos, member))

/** @@ -503,7 +512,7 @@ static inline void list_splice_tail_init */ #define list_for_each_entry_reverse(pos, head, member) \ for (pos = list_last_entry(head, typeof(*pos), member); \ - &pos->member != (head); \ + !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member); \ pos = list_prev_entry(pos, member))

/** @@ -528,7 +537,7 @@ static inline void list_splice_tail_init */ #define list_for_each_entry_continue(pos, head, member) \ for (pos = list_next_entry(pos, member); \ - &pos->member != (head); \ + !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member); \ pos = list_next_entry(pos, member))

/** @@ -542,7 +551,7 @@ static inline void list_splice_tail_init */ #define list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(pos, head, member) \ for (pos = list_prev_entry(pos, member); \ - &pos->member != (head); \ + !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member); \ pos = list_prev_entry(pos, member))

/** @@ -554,7 +563,7 @@ static inline void list_splice_tail_init * Iterate over list of given type, continuing from current position. */ #define list_for_each_entry_from(pos, head, member) \ - for (; &pos->member != (head); \ + for (; !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member); \ pos = list_next_entry(pos, member))

/** @@ -567,7 +576,7 @@ static inline void list_splice_tail_init * Iterate backwards over list of given type, continuing from current position. */ #define list_for_each_entry_from_reverse(pos, head, member) \ - for (; &pos->member != (head); \ + for (; !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member); \ pos = list_prev_entry(pos, member))

/** @@ -580,7 +589,7 @@ static inline void list_splice_tail_init #define list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, n, head, member) \ for (pos = list_first_entry(head, typeof(*pos), member), \ n = list_next_entry(pos, member); \ - &pos->member != (head); \ + !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member); \ pos = n, n = list_next_entry(n, member))

/** @@ -596,7 +605,7 @@ static inline void list_splice_tail_init #define list_for_each_entry_safe_continue(pos, n, head, member) \ for (pos = list_next_entry(pos, member), \ n = list_next_entry(pos, member); \ - &pos->member != (head); \ + !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member); \ pos = n, n = list_next_entry(n, member))

/** @@ -611,7 +620,7 @@ static inline void list_splice_tail_init */ #define list_for_each_entry_safe_from(pos, n, head, member) \ for (n = list_next_entry(pos, member); \ - &pos->member != (head); \ + !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member); \ pos = n, n = list_next_entry(n, member))

/** @@ -627,7 +636,7 @@ static inline void list_splice_tail_init #define list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse(pos, n, head, member) \ for (pos = list_last_entry(head, typeof(*pos), member), \ n = list_prev_entry(pos, member); \ - &pos->member != (head); \ + !list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member); \ pos = n, n = list_prev_entry(n, member))

/**

From: Edward Cree ecree@solarflare.com

commit 679c782de14bd48c19dd74cd1af20a2bc05dd936 upstream.

By giving each register its own liveness chain, we elide the skip_callee() logic. Instead, each register's parent is the state it inherits from; both check_func_call() and prepare_func_exit() automatically connect reg states to the correct chain since when they copy the reg state across (r1-r5 into the callee as args, and r0 out as the return value) they also copy the parent pointer.

Signed-off-by: Edward Cree ecree@solarflare.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org [OP: adjusted context for 4.19] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait ovidiu.panait@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 8 - kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 183 ++++++++++--------------------------------- 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 144 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ enum bpf_reg_liveness { };

struct bpf_reg_state { + /* Ordering of fields matters. See states_equal() */ enum bpf_reg_type type; union { /* valid when type == PTR_TO_PACKET */ @@ -62,7 +63,6 @@ struct bpf_reg_state { * came from, when one is tested for != NULL. */ u32 id; - /* Ordering of fields matters. See states_equal() */ /* For scalar types (SCALAR_VALUE), this represents our knowledge of * the actual value. * For pointer types, this represents the variable part of the offset @@ -79,15 +79,15 @@ struct bpf_reg_state { s64 smax_value; /* maximum possible (s64)value */ u64 umin_value; /* minimum possible (u64)value */ u64 umax_value; /* maximum possible (u64)value */ + /* parentage chain for liveness checking */ + struct bpf_reg_state *parent; /* Inside the callee two registers can be both PTR_TO_STACK like * R1=fp-8 and R2=fp-8, but one of them points to this function stack * while another to the caller's stack. To differentiate them 'frameno' * is used which is an index in bpf_verifier_state->frame[] array * pointing to bpf_func_state. - * This field must be second to last, for states_equal() reasons. */ u32 frameno; - /* This field must be last, for states_equal() reasons. */ enum bpf_reg_liveness live; };

@@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ struct bpf_stack_state { */ struct bpf_func_state { struct bpf_reg_state regs[MAX_BPF_REG]; - struct bpf_verifier_state *parent; /* index of call instruction that called into this func */ int callsite; /* stack frame number of this function state from pov of @@ -132,7 +131,6 @@ struct bpf_func_state { struct bpf_verifier_state { /* call stack tracking */ struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; - struct bpf_verifier_state *parent; u32 curframe; bool speculative; }; --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -380,9 +380,9 @@ static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_f /* do_check() starts with zero-sized stack in struct bpf_verifier_state to * make it consume minimal amount of memory. check_stack_write() access from * the program calls into realloc_func_state() to grow the stack size. - * Note there is a non-zero 'parent' pointer inside bpf_verifier_state - * which this function copies over. It points to previous bpf_verifier_state - * which is never reallocated + * Note there is a non-zero parent pointer inside each reg of bpf_verifier_state + * which this function copies over. It points to corresponding reg in previous + * bpf_verifier_state which is never reallocated */ static int realloc_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int size, bool copy_old) @@ -467,7 +467,6 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bp } dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; - dst_state->parent = src->parent; for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { dst = dst_state->frame[i]; if (!dst) { @@ -739,6 +738,7 @@ static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_ve for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; + regs[i].parent = NULL; }

/* frame pointer */ @@ -883,74 +883,21 @@ next: return 0; }

-static -struct bpf_verifier_state *skip_callee(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, - struct bpf_verifier_state *parent, - u32 regno) -{ - struct bpf_verifier_state *tmp = NULL; - - /* 'parent' could be a state of caller and - * 'state' could be a state of callee. In such case - * parent->curframe < state->curframe - * and it's ok for r1 - r5 registers - * - * 'parent' could be a callee's state after it bpf_exit-ed. - * In such case parent->curframe > state->curframe - * and it's ok for r0 only - */ - if (parent->curframe == state->curframe || - (parent->curframe < state->curframe && - regno >= BPF_REG_1 && regno <= BPF_REG_5) || - (parent->curframe > state->curframe && - regno == BPF_REG_0)) - return parent; - - if (parent->curframe > state->curframe && - regno >= BPF_REG_6) { - /* for callee saved regs we have to skip the whole chain - * of states that belong to callee and mark as LIVE_READ - * the registers before the call - */ - tmp = parent; - while (tmp && tmp->curframe != state->curframe) { - tmp = tmp->parent; - } - if (!tmp) - goto bug; - parent = tmp; - } else { - goto bug; - } - return parent; -bug: - verbose(env, "verifier bug regno %d tmp %p\n", regno, tmp); - verbose(env, "regno %d parent frame %d current frame %d\n", - regno, parent->curframe, state->curframe); - return NULL; -} - +/* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all + * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc. + */ static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, - struct bpf_verifier_state *parent, - u32 regno) + const struct bpf_reg_state *state, + struct bpf_reg_state *parent) { bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */

- if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) - /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ - return 0; - while (parent) { /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ - if (writes && state->frame[state->curframe]->regs[regno].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) + if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) break; - parent = skip_callee(env, state, parent, regno); - if (!parent) - return -EFAULT; /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ - parent->frame[parent->curframe]->regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_READ; + parent->live |= REG_LIVE_READ; state = parent; parent = state->parent; writes = true; @@ -976,7 +923,10 @@ static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_veri verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); return -EACCES; } - return mark_reg_read(env, vstate, vstate->parent, regno); + /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ + if (regno != BPF_REG_FP) + return mark_reg_read(env, &regs[regno], + regs[regno].parent); } else { /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { @@ -1087,8 +1037,8 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_ } else { u8 type = STACK_MISC;

- /* regular write of data into stack */ - state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = (struct bpf_reg_state) {}; + /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ + state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;

/* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon @@ -1113,61 +1063,6 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_ return 0; }

-/* registers of every function are unique and mark_reg_read() propagates - * the liveness in the following cases: - * - from callee into caller for R1 - R5 that were used as arguments - * - from caller into callee for R0 that used as result of the call - * - from caller to the same caller skipping states of the callee for R6 - R9, - * since R6 - R9 are callee saved by implicit function prologue and - * caller's R6 != callee's R6, so when we propagate liveness up to - * parent states we need to skip callee states for R6 - R9. - * - * stack slot marking is different, since stacks of caller and callee are - * accessible in both (since caller can pass a pointer to caller's stack to - * callee which can pass it to another function), hence mark_stack_slot_read() - * has to propagate the stack liveness to all parent states at given frame number. - * Consider code: - * f1() { - * ptr = fp - 8; - * *ptr = ctx; - * call f2 { - * .. = *ptr; - * } - * .. = *ptr; - * } - * First *ptr is reading from f1's stack and mark_stack_slot_read() has - * to mark liveness at the f1's frame and not f2's frame. - * Second *ptr is also reading from f1's stack and mark_stack_slot_read() has - * to propagate liveness to f2 states at f1's frame level and further into - * f1 states at f1's frame level until write into that stack slot - */ -static void mark_stack_slot_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, - struct bpf_verifier_state *parent, - int slot, int frameno) -{ - bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ - - while (parent) { - if (parent->frame[frameno]->allocated_stack <= slot * BPF_REG_SIZE) - /* since LIVE_WRITTEN mark is only done for full 8-byte - * write the read marks are conservative and parent - * state may not even have the stack allocated. In such case - * end the propagation, since the loop reached beginning - * of the function - */ - break; - /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ - if (writes && state->frame[frameno]->stack[slot].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) - break; - /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ - parent->frame[frameno]->stack[slot].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_READ; - state = parent; - parent = state->parent; - writes = true; - } -} - static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *reg_state /* func where register points to */, int off, int size, int value_regno) @@ -1205,8 +1100,8 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_v */ state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; } - mark_stack_slot_read(env, vstate, vstate->parent, spi, - reg_state->frameno); + mark_reg_read(env, &reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, + reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent); return 0; } else { int zeros = 0; @@ -1222,8 +1117,8 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_v off, i, size); return -EACCES; } - mark_stack_slot_read(env, vstate, vstate->parent, spi, - reg_state->frameno); + mark_reg_read(env, &reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, + reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent); if (value_regno >= 0) { if (zeros == size) { /* any size read into register is zero extended, @@ -1927,8 +1822,8 @@ mark: /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' */ - mark_stack_slot_read(env, env->cur_state, env->cur_state->parent, - spi, state->frameno); + mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, + state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent); } return update_stack_depth(env, state, off); } @@ -2384,11 +2279,13 @@ static int check_func_call(struct bpf_ve state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, subprog /* subprog number within this prog */);

- /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access */ + /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent + * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain + */ for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i];

- /* after the call regsiters r0 - r5 were scratched */ + /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { mark_reg_not_init(env, caller->regs, caller_saved[i]); check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); @@ -4844,7 +4741,7 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state /* explored state didn't use this */ return true;

- equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, frameno)) == 0; + equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0;

if (rold->type == PTR_TO_STACK) /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to @@ -5083,7 +4980,7 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_veri * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison - * in mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() is for. + * in mark_reg_read() is for. */ static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, @@ -5104,7 +5001,8 @@ static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf if (vparent->frame[vparent->curframe]->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) continue; if (vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) { - err = mark_reg_read(env, vstate, vparent, i); + err = mark_reg_read(env, &vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]->regs[i], + &vparent->frame[vstate->curframe]->regs[i]); if (err) return err; } @@ -5119,7 +5017,8 @@ static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf if (parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ) continue; if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ) - mark_stack_slot_read(env, vstate, vparent, i, frame); + mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr, + &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr); } } return err; @@ -5129,7 +5028,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_v { struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; - struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; + struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new; int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0;

sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx]; @@ -5175,16 +5074,18 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_v return -ENOMEM;

/* add new state to the head of linked list */ - err = copy_verifier_state(&new_sl->state, cur); + new = &new_sl->state; + err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); if (err) { - free_verifier_state(&new_sl->state, false); + free_verifier_state(new, false); kfree(new_sl); return err; } new_sl->next = env->explored_states[insn_idx]; env->explored_states[insn_idx] = new_sl; /* connect new state to parentage chain */ - cur->parent = &new_sl->state; + for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) + cur_regs(env)[i].parent = &new->frame[new->curframe]->regs[i]; /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark @@ -5197,9 +5098,13 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_v /* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */ for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j]; + struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j];

- for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) + for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE; + frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent = + &newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr; + } } return 0; }

From: Andrey Ignatov rdna@fb.com

commit 2011fccfb61bbd1d7c8864b2b3ed7012342e9ba3 upstream.

Currently there is a difference in how verifier checks memory access for helper arguments for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_STACK with regard to variable part of offset.

check_map_access, that is used for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, can handle variable offsets just fine, so that BPF program can call a helper like this:

some_helper(map_value_ptr + off, size);

, where offset is unknown at load time, but is checked by program to be in a safe rage (off >= 0 && off + size < map_value_size).

But it's not the case for check_stack_boundary, that is used for PTR_TO_STACK, and same code with pointer to stack is rejected by verifier:

some_helper(stack_value_ptr + off, size);

For example: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 2: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0) 3: (57) r2 &= 4 4: (17) r2 -= 16 5: (0f) r2 += r10 6: (18) r1 = 0xffff888111343a80 8: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 invalid variable stack read R2 var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0x4)

Add support for variable offset access to check_stack_boundary so that if offset is checked by program to be in a safe range it's accepted by verifier.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov rdna@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org [OP: replace reg_state(env, regno) helper with "cur_regs(env) + regno"] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait ovidiu.panait@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1755,6 +1755,29 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifie BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true); }

+static int __check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, + int off, int access_size, + bool zero_size_allowed) +{ + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = cur_regs(env) + regno; + + if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 || + access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) { + if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { + verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n", + regno, off, access_size); + } else { + char tn_buf[48]; + + tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); + verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d var_off=%s access_size=%d\n", + regno, tn_buf, access_size); + } + return -EACCES; + } + return 0; +} + /* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size' * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary * and all elements of stack are initialized. @@ -1767,7 +1790,7 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct b { struct bpf_reg_state *reg = cur_regs(env) + regno; struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); - int off, i, slot, spi; + int err, min_off, max_off, i, slot, spi;

if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) { /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ @@ -1781,21 +1804,23 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct b return -EACCES; }

- /* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */ - if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { - char tn_buf[48]; - - tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); - verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n", - regno, tn_buf); - return -EACCES; - } - off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; - if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 || - access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) { - verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n", - regno, off, access_size); - return -EACCES; + if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { + min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + reg->off; + err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size, + zero_size_allowed); + if (err) + return err; + } else { + min_off = reg->smin_value + reg->off; + max_off = reg->umax_value + reg->off; + err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size, + zero_size_allowed); + if (err) + return err; + err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, max_off, access_size, + zero_size_allowed); + if (err) + return err; }

if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { @@ -1804,10 +1829,10 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct b return 0; }

- for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) { + for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { u8 *stype;

- slot = -(off + i) - 1; + slot = -i - 1; spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) goto err; @@ -1820,8 +1845,16 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct b goto mark; } err: - verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", - off, i, access_size); + if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { + verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", + min_off, i - min_off, access_size); + } else { + char tn_buf[48]; + + tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); + verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack var_off %s+%d size %d\n", + tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size); + } return -EACCES; mark: /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause @@ -1830,7 +1863,7 @@ mark: mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent); } - return update_stack_depth(env, state, off); + return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off); }

static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,

From: Andrey Ignatov rdna@fb.com

commit 088ec26d9c2da9d879ab73e3f4117f9df6c566ee upstream.

Proper support of indirect stack access with variable offset in unprivileged mode (!root) requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU in retrieve_ptr_limit().

There are no use-case for variable offset in unprivileged mode though so make verifier reject such accesses for simplicity.

Pointer arithmetics is one (and only?) way to cause variable offset and it's already rejected in unpriv mode so that verifier won't even get to helper function whose argument contains variable offset, e.g.:

0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 2: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0) 3: (57) r2 &= 4 4: (17) r2 -= 16 5: (0f) r2 += r10 variable stack access var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0x4) off=-16 size=1R2 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, prohibited for !root

Still it looks like a good idea to reject variable offset indirect stack access for unprivileged mode in check_stack_boundary() explicitly.

Fixes: 2011fccfb61b ("bpf: Support variable offset stack access from helpers") Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov rdna@fb.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net [OP: drop comment in retrieve_ptr_limit()] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait ovidiu.panait@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1811,6 +1811,19 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct b if (err) return err; } else { + /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for + * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in + * Spectre masking for stack ALU. + * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). + */ + if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + char tn_buf[48]; + + tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); + verbose(env, "R%d indirect variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", + regno, tn_buf); + return -EACCES; + } /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on

From: Andrey Ignatov rdna@fb.com

commit 8ff80e96e3ccea5ff0a890d4f18997e0344dbec2 upstream.

Test different scenarios of indirect variable-offset stack access: out of bound access (>0), min_off below initialized part of the stack, max_off+size above initialized part of the stack, initialized stack.

Example of output: ... #856/p indirect variable-offset stack access, out of bound OK #857/p indirect variable-offset stack access, max_off+size > max_initialized OK #858/p indirect variable-offset stack access, min_off < min_initialized OK #859/p indirect variable-offset stack access, ok OK ...

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov rdna@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org [OP: backport to 4.19] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait ovidiu.panait@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c @@ -8495,7 +8495,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN, }, { - "indirect variable-offset stack access", + "indirect variable-offset stack access, out of bound", .insns = { /* Fill the top 8 bytes of the stack */ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), @@ -8516,11 +8516,86 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, .fixup_map1 = { 5 }, - .errstr = "variable stack read R2", + .errstr = "invalid stack type R2 var_off", .result = REJECT, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN, }, { + "indirect variable-offset stack access, max_off+size > max_initialized", + .insns = { + /* Fill only the second from top 8 bytes of the stack. */ + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -16, 0), + /* Get an unknown value. */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 0), + /* Make it small and 4-byte aligned. */ + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 4), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_2, 16), + /* Add it to fp. We now have either fp-12 or fp-16, but we don't know + * which. fp-12 size 8 is partially uninitialized stack. + */ + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + /* Dereference it indirectly. */ + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .fixup_map1 = { 5 }, + .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack var_off", + .result = REJECT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN, + }, + { + "indirect variable-offset stack access, min_off < min_initialized", + .insns = { + /* Fill only the top 8 bytes of the stack. */ + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), + /* Get an unknown value */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 0), + /* Make it small and 4-byte aligned. */ + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 4), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_2, 16), + /* Add it to fp. We now have either fp-12 or fp-16, but we don't know + * which. fp-16 size 8 is partially uninitialized stack. + */ + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + /* Dereference it indirectly. */ + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .fixup_map1 = { 5 }, + .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack var_off", + .result = REJECT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN, + }, + { + "indirect variable-offset stack access, ok", + .insns = { + /* Fill the top 16 bytes of the stack. */ + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -16, 0), + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), + /* Get an unknown value. */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 0), + /* Make it small and 4-byte aligned. */ + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 4), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_2, 16), + /* Add it to fp. We now have either fp-12 or fp-16, we don't know + * which, but either way it points to initialized stack. + */ + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + /* Dereference it indirectly. */ + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .fixup_map1 = { 6 }, + .result = ACCEPT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN, + }, + { "direct stack access with 32-bit wraparound. test1", .insns = { BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),

From: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org

commit fc559a70d57c6ee5443f7a750858503e94cdc941 upstream.

fix tests that incorrectly assumed that the verifier cannot track constants through stack.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko andriin@fb.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net [OP: backport to 4.19] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait ovidiu.panait@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 31 +++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c @@ -3888,7 +3888,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0xffffffff), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -8), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -8), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_0, 0xffff), @@ -6560,9 +6561,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { { "helper access to variable memory: stack, bitwise AND, zero included", .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 64), @@ -6577,9 +6578,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { { "helper access to variable memory: stack, bitwise AND + JMP, wrong max", .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 65), @@ -6653,9 +6654,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { { "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP, bounds + offset", .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_2, 64, 5), @@ -6674,9 +6675,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { { "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP, wrong max", .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_2, 65, 4), @@ -6694,9 +6695,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { { "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP, no max check", .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128), BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0), @@ -6714,9 +6715,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { { "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP, no min check", .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_2, 64, 3), @@ -6732,9 +6733,9 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { { "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP (signed), no min check", .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2, 64, 3), @@ -6776,6 +6777,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { { "helper access to variable memory: map, JMP, wrong max", .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 8), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0), @@ -6783,7 +6785,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 10), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, sizeof(struct test_val)), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_6), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -128), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10, -128), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2, @@ -6795,7 +6797,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, - .fixup_map2 = { 3 }, + .fixup_map2 = { 4 }, .errstr = "invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=0 size=49", .result = REJECT, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT, @@ -6830,6 +6832,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { { "helper access to variable memory: map adjusted, JMP, wrong max", .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1, 8), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0), @@ -6838,7 +6841,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 11), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 20), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, sizeof(struct test_val)), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_6), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -128), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10, -128), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2, @@ -6850,7 +6853,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, - .fixup_map2 = { 3 }, + .fixup_map2 = { 4 }, .errstr = "R1 min value is outside of the array range", .result = REJECT, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT, @@ -6872,8 +6875,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { { "helper access to variable memory: size > 0 not allowed on NULL (ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL)", .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 1), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -128), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10, -128), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 64), @@ -7100,6 +7103,7 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { { "helper access to variable memory: 8 bytes leak", .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64), BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), @@ -7110,7 +7114,6 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -24), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -16), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -8), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 1), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -128), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10, -128), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 63),

From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net

commit 2039f26f3aca5b0e419b98f65dd36481337b86ee upstream.

Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section 2.4.4.5:

A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed.

af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") tried to mitigate this attack by sanitizing the memory locations through preemptive "fast" (low latency) stores of zero prior to the actual "slow" (high latency) store of a pointer value such that upon dependency misprediction the CPU then speculatively executes the load of the pointer value and retrieves the zero value instead of the attacker controlled scalar value previously stored at that location, meaning, subsequent access in the speculative domain is then redirected to the "zero page".

The sanitized preemptive store of zero prior to the actual "slow" store is done through a simple ST instruction based on r10 (frame pointer) with relative offset to the stack location that the verifier has been tracking on the original used register for STX, which does not have to be r10. Thus, there are no memory dependencies for this store, since it's only using r10 and immediate constant of zero; hence af86ca4e3088 /assumed/ a low latency operation.

However, a recent attack demonstrated that this mitigation is not sufficient since the preemptive store of zero could also be turned into a "slow" store and is thus bypassed as well:

[...] // r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar) // r7 = pointer to map value 31: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2 // r9 will remain "fast" register, r10 will become "slow" register below 32: (bf) r9 = r10 // JIT maps BPF reg to x86 reg: // r9 -> r15 (callee saved) // r10 -> rbp // train store forward prediction to break dependency link between both r9 // and r10 by evicting them from the predictor's LRU table. 33: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24576) 34: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0 35: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24580) 36: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0 37: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24584) 38: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0 39: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24588) 40: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0 [...] 543: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596) 544: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0 // prepare call to bpf_ringbuf_output() helper. the latter will cause rbp // to spill to stack memory while r13/r14/r15 (all callee saved regs) remain // in hardware registers. rbp becomes slow due to push/pop latency. below is // disasm of bpf_ringbuf_output() helper for better visual context: // // ffffffff8117ee20: 41 54 push r12 // ffffffff8117ee22: 55 push rbp // ffffffff8117ee23: 53 push rbx // ffffffff8117ee24: 48 f7 c1 fc ff ff ff test rcx,0xfffffffffffffffc // ffffffff8117ee2b: 0f 85 af 00 00 00 jne ffffffff8117eee0 <-- jump taken // [...] // ffffffff8117eee0: 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff mov r12,0xffffffffffffffea // ffffffff8117eee7: 5b pop rbx // ffffffff8117eee8: 5d pop rbp // ffffffff8117eee9: 4c 89 e0 mov rax,r12 // ffffffff8117eeec: 41 5c pop r12 // ffffffff8117eeee: c3 ret 545: (18) r1 = map[id:4] 547: (bf) r2 = r7 548: (b7) r3 = 0 549: (b7) r4 = 4 550: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_output#194288 // instruction 551 inserted by verifier \ 551: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here // storing map value pointer r7 at fp-16 | since value of r10 is "slow". 552: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 / // following "fast" read to the same memory location, but due to dependency // misprediction it will speculatively execute before insn 551/552 completes. 553: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r9 -16) // in speculative domain contains attacker controlled r2. in non-speculative // domain this contains r7, and thus accesses r7 +0 below. 554: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) // leak r3

As can be seen, the current speculative store bypass mitigation which the verifier inserts at line 551 is insufficient since /both/, the write of the zero sanitation as well as the map value pointer are a high latency instruction due to prior memory access via push/pop of r10 (rbp) in contrast to the low latency read in line 553 as r9 (r15) which stays in hardware registers. Thus, architecturally, fp-16 is r7, however, microarchitecturally, fp-16 can still be r2.

Initial thoughts to address this issue was to track spilled pointer loads from stack and enforce their load via LDX through r10 as well so that /both/ the preemptive store of zero /as well as/ the load use the /same/ register such that a dependency is created between the store and load. However, this option is not sufficient either since it can be bypassed as well under speculation. An updated attack with pointer spill/fills now _all_ based on r10 would look as follows:

[...] // r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar) // r7 = pointer to map value [...] // longer store forward prediction training sequence than before. 2062: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25588) 2063: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30708) = r0 2064: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25592) 2065: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30712) = r0 2066: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596) 2067: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0 // store the speculative load address (scalar) this time after the store // forward prediction training. 2068: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2 // preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores. 2069: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0 2070: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0 2071: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0 2072: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0 2073: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29712) = r0 2074: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29716) = r0 2075: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29720) = r0 2076: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29724) = r0 2077: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29728) = r0 2078: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29732) = r0 2079: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29736) = r0 2080: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29740) = r0 2081: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29744) = r0 2082: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29748) = r0 2083: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29752) = r0 2084: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29756) = r0 2085: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29760) = r0 2086: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29764) = r0 2087: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29768) = r0 2088: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29772) = r0 2089: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29776) = r0 2090: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29780) = r0 2091: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29784) = r0 2092: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29788) = r0 2093: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29792) = r0 2094: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0 2095: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0 2096: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0 2097: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0 2098: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0 // overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; same as before, also including the // sanitation store with 0 from the current mitigation by the verifier. 2099: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here 2100: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 | since store unit is still busy. // load from stack intended to bypass stores. 2101: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 2102: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) // leak r3 [...]

Looking at the CPU microarchitecture, the scheduler might issue loads (such as seen in line 2101) before stores (line 2099,2100) because the load execution units become available while the store execution unit is still busy with the sequence of dummy stores (line 2069-2098). And so the load may use the prior stored scalar from r2 at address r10 -16 for speculation. The updated attack may work less reliable on CPU microarchitectures where loads and stores share execution resources.

This concludes that the sanitizing with zero stores from af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") is insufficient. Moreover, the detection of stack reuse from af86ca4e3088 where previously data (STACK_MISC) has been written to a given stack slot where a pointer value is now to be stored does not have sufficient coverage as precondition for the mitigation either; for several reasons outlined as follows:

1) Stack content from prior program runs could still be preserved and is therefore not "random", best example is to split a speculative store bypass attack between tail calls, program A would prepare and store the oob address at a given stack slot and then tail call into program B which does the "slow" store of a pointer to the stack with subsequent "fast" read. From program B PoV such stack slot type is STACK_INVALID, and therefore also must be subject to mitigation.

2) The STACK_SPILL must not be coupled to register_is_const(&stack->spilled_ptr) condition, for example, the previous content of that memory location could also be a pointer to map or map value. Without the fix, a speculative store bypass is not mitigated in such precondition and can then lead to a type confusion in the speculative domain leaking kernel memory near these pointer types.

While brainstorming on various alternative mitigation possibilities, we also stumbled upon a retrospective from Chrome developers [0]:

[...] For variant 4, we implemented a mitigation to zero the unused memory of the heap prior to allocation, which cost about 1% when done concurrently and 4% for scavenging. Variant 4 defeats everything we could think of. We explored more mitigations for variant 4 but the threat proved to be more pervasive and dangerous than we anticipated. For example, stack slots used by the register allocator in the optimizing compiler could be subject to type confusion, leading to pointer crafting. Mitigating type confusion for stack slots alone would have required a complete redesign of the backend of the optimizing compiler, perhaps man years of work, without a guarantee of completeness. [...]

From BPF side, the problem space is reduced, however, options are rather

limited. One idea that has been explored was to xor-obfuscate pointer spills to the BPF stack:

[...] // preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores. [...] 2106: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0 2107: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0 2108: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0 2109: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0 2110: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0 // overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; xored with random 'secret' value // of 943576462 before store ... 2111: (b4) w11 = 943576462 2112: (af) r11 ^= r7 2113: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11 2114: (79) r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 2115: (b4) w2 = 943576462 2116: (af) r2 ^= r11 // ... and restored with the same 'secret' value with the help of AX reg. 2117: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) [...]

While the above would not prevent speculation, it would make data leakage infeasible by directing it to random locations. In order to be effective and prevent type confusion under speculation, such random secret would have to be regenerated for each store. The additional complexity involved for a tracking mechanism that prevents jumps such that restoring spilled pointers would not get corrupted is not worth the gain for unprivileged. Hence, the fix in here eventually opted for emitting a non-public BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC instruction which the x86 JIT translates into a lfence opcode. Inserting the latter in between the store and load instruction is one of the mitigations options [1]. The x86 instruction manual notes:

[...] An LFENCE that follows an instruction that stores to memory might complete before the data being stored have become globally visible. [...]

The latter meaning that the preceding store instruction finished execution and the store is at minimum guaranteed to be in the CPU's store queue, but it's not guaranteed to be in that CPU's L1 cache at that point (globally visible). The latter would only be guaranteed via sfence. So the load which is guaranteed to execute after the lfence for that local CPU would have to rely on store-to-load forwarding. [2], in section 2.3 on store buffers says:

[...] For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual and physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry in the store buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot available in the store buffer again. Otherwise, the CPU can immediately continue adding subsequent instructions to the ROB and execute them out of order. On Intel CPUs, the store buffer has up to 56 entries. [...]

One small upside on the fix is that it lifts constraints from af86ca4e3088 where the sanitize_stack_off relative to r10 must be the same when coming from different paths. The BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC gets emitted after a BPF_STX or BPF_ST instruction. This happens either when we store a pointer or data value to the BPF stack for the first time, or upon later pointer spills. The former needs to be enforced since otherwise stale stack data could be leaked under speculation as outlined earlier. For non-x86 JITs the BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC mapping is currently optimized away, but others could emit a speculation barrier as well if necessary. For real-world unprivileged programs e.g. generated by LLVM, pointer spill/fill is only generated upon register pressure and LLVM only tries to do that for pointers which are not used often. The program main impact will be the initial BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC sanitation for the STACK_INVALID case when the first write to a stack slot occurs e.g. upon map lookup. In future we might refine ways to mitigate the latter cost.

[0] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.05178.pdf [1] https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2018/05/21/analysis-and-mitigation-of-specul... [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.05725.pdf

Fixes: af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") Fixes: f7cf25b2026d ("bpf: track spill/fill of constants") Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk piotras@gmail.com Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter benedict.schlueter@rub.de Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk piotras@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter benedict.schlueter@rub.de Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org [OP: - apply check_stack_write_fixed_off() changes in check_stack_write() - replace env->bypass_spec_v4 -> env->allow_ptr_leaks] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait ovidiu.panait@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 2 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data { u32 alu_limit; /* limit for add/sub register with pointer */ }; int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */ - int sanitize_stack_off; /* stack slot to be cleared */ bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */ + bool sanitize_stack_spill; /* subject to Spectre v4 sanitation */ u8 alu_state; /* used in combination with alu_limit */ };

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1008,6 +1008,19 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_ cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; if (value_regno >= 0) reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; + if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type); + + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { + if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID) { + sanitize = true; + break; + } + } + + if (sanitize) + env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true; + }

if (reg && size == BPF_REG_SIZE && register_is_const(reg) && !register_is_null(reg) && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { @@ -1018,47 +1031,10 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_ verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); return -EACCES; } - if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); return -EINVAL; } - - if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { - bool sanitize = false; - - if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && - register_is_const(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr)) - sanitize = true; - for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) - if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC) { - sanitize = true; - break; - } - if (sanitize) { - int *poff = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off; - int soff = (-spi - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE; - - /* detected reuse of integer stack slot with a pointer - * which means either llvm is reusing stack slot or - * an attacker is trying to exploit CVE-2018-3639 - * (speculative store bypass) - * Have to sanitize that slot with preemptive - * store of zero. - */ - if (*poff && *poff != soff) { - /* disallow programs where single insn stores - * into two different stack slots, since verifier - * cannot sanitize them - */ - verbose(env, - "insn %d cannot access two stack slots fp%d and fp%d", - insn_idx, *poff, soff); - return -EINVAL; - } - *poff = soff; - } - } save_register_state(state, spi, reg); } else { u8 type = STACK_MISC; @@ -5867,34 +5843,33 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct b insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;

for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { + bool ctx_access; + if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || - insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) + insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { type = BPF_READ; - else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || - insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || - insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || - insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) + ctx_access = true; + } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || + insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || + insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || + insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || + insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || + insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || + insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || + insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { type = BPF_WRITE; - else + ctx_access = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX; + } else { continue; + }

if (type == BPF_WRITE && - env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off) { + env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) { struct bpf_insn patch[] = { - /* Sanitize suspicious stack slot with zero. - * There are no memory dependencies for this store, - * since it's only using frame pointer and immediate - * constant of zero - */ - BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, - env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off, - 0), - /* the original STX instruction will immediately - * overwrite the same stack slot with appropriate value - */ *insn, + BPF_ST_NOSPEC(), };

cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch); @@ -5908,6 +5883,9 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct b continue; }

+ if (!ctx_access) + continue; + if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX) continue;

From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net

commit e042aa532c84d18ff13291d00620502ce7a38dda upstream.

In 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask") we narrowed the offset mask for unprivileged pointer arithmetic in order to mitigate a corner case where in the speculative domain it is possible to advance, for example, the map value pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of- bounds in order to leak kernel memory via side-channel to user space.

The verifier's state pruning for scalars leaves one corner case open where in the first verification path R_x holds an unknown scalar with an aux->alu_limit of e.g. 7, and in a second verification path that same register R_x, here denoted as R_x', holds an unknown scalar which has tighter bounds and would thus satisfy range_within(R_x, R_x') as well as tnum_in(R_x, R_x') for state pruning, yielding an aux->alu_limit of 3: Given the second path fits the register constraints for pruning, the final generated mask from aux->alu_limit will remain at 7. While technically not wrong for the non-speculative domain, it would however be possible to craft similar cases where the mask would be too wide as in 7fedb63a8307.

One way to fix it is to detect the presence of unknown scalar map pointer arithmetic and force a deeper search on unknown scalars to ensure that we do not run into a masking mismatch.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org [OP: adjusted context for 4.19] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait ovidiu.panait@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env { struct bpf_map *used_maps[MAX_USED_MAPS]; /* array of map's used by eBPF program */ u32 used_map_cnt; /* number of used maps */ u32 id_gen; /* used to generate unique reg IDs */ + bool explore_alu_limits; bool allow_ptr_leaks; bool seen_direct_write; struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */ --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2871,6 +2871,12 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_v alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0; alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; + + /* Limit pruning on unknown scalars to enable deep search for + * potential masking differences from other program paths. + */ + if (!off_is_imm) + env->explore_alu_limits = true; }

err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); @@ -4813,8 +4819,8 @@ static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cu }

/* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ -static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, - struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) +static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, + struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) { bool equal;

@@ -4840,6 +4846,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state return false; switch (rold->type) { case SCALAR_VALUE: + if (env->explore_alu_limits) + return false; if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ return range_within(rold, rcur) && @@ -4916,9 +4924,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state return false; }

-static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, - struct bpf_func_state *cur, - struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) +static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, + struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) { int i, spi;

@@ -4960,9 +4967,8 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_func_st continue; if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) continue; - if (!regsafe(&old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, - &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, - idmap)) + if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, + &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap)) /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types * are the same as well. @@ -5011,10 +5017,11 @@ static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf

memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch)); for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) - if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], env->idmap_scratch)) + if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], + env->idmap_scratch)) return false;

- if (!stacksafe(old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) + if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) return false;

return true;

From: Iwona Winiarska iwona.winiarska@intel.com

commit b49a0e69a7b1a68c8d3f64097d06dabb770fec96 upstream.

The check mixes pages (vm_pgoff) with bytes (vm_start, vm_end) on one side of the comparison, and uses resource address (rather than just the resource size) on the other side of the comparison. This can allow malicious userspace to easily bypass the boundary check and map pages that are located outside memory-region reserved by the driver.

Fixes: 6c4e97678501 ("drivers/misc: Add Aspeed LPC control driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Iwona Winiarska iwona.winiarska@intel.com Reviewed-by: Andrew Jeffery andrew@aj.id.au Tested-by: Andrew Jeffery andrew@aj.id.au Reviewed-by: Joel Stanley joel@aj.id.au Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley joel@jms.id.au Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/misc/aspeed-lpc-ctrl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/misc/aspeed-lpc-ctrl.c +++ b/drivers/misc/aspeed-lpc-ctrl.c @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static int aspeed_lpc_ctrl_mmap(struct f unsigned long vsize = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; pgprot_t prot = vma->vm_page_prot;

- if (vma->vm_pgoff + vsize > lpc_ctrl->mem_base + lpc_ctrl->mem_size) + if (vma->vm_pgoff + vma_pages(vma) > lpc_ctrl->mem_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) return -EINVAL;

/* ast2400/2500 AHB accesses are not cache coherent */

From: zhenwei pi pizhenwei@bytedance.com

commit f985911b7bc75d5c98ed24d8aaa8b94c590f7c6a upstream.

Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying 256 bytes datafile by keyctl command, run script: RAWDATA=rawdata SIGDATA=sigdata

modprobe pkcs8_key_parser

rm -rf *.der *.pem *.pfx rm -rf $RAWDATA dd if=/dev/random of=$RAWDATA bs=256 count=1

openssl req -nodes -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem \ -subj "/C=CN/ST=GD/L=SZ/O=vihoo/OU=dev/CN=xx.com/emailAddress=yy@xx.com"

KEY_ID=`openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | keyctl \ padd asymmetric 123 @s`

keyctl pkey_sign $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 > $SIGDATA keyctl pkey_verify $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA $SIGDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1

Then the kernel reports: WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540 pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190 ... Call Trace: public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380 ? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180 ? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130 asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80 keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

The reason of this issue, in function 'asymmetric_key_verify_signature': '.digest_size(u8) = params->in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an u8 value, so use u32 instead of u8 for digest_size field. And reorder struct public_key_signature, it saves 8 bytes on a 64-bit machine.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi pizhenwei@bytedance.com Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/crypto/public_key.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h @@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ extern void public_key_free(struct publi struct public_key_signature { struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[2]; u8 *s; /* Signature */ - u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */ u8 *digest; - u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */ + u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */ + u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */ const char *pkey_algo; const char *hash_algo; };

From: Krzysztof Kozlowski krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com

commit 54784ffa5b267f57161eb8fbb811499f22a0a0bf upstream.

Reading status register can fail in the interrupt handler. In such case, the regmap_read() will not store anything useful under passed 'val' variable and random stack value will be used to determine type of interrupt.

Handle the regmap_read() failure to avoid handling interrupt type and triggering changed power supply event based on random stack value.

Fixes: 39e7213edc4f ("max17042_battery: Support regmap to access device's registers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel sebastian.reichel@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/power/supply/max17042_battery.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/power/supply/max17042_battery.c +++ b/drivers/power/supply/max17042_battery.c @@ -856,8 +856,12 @@ static irqreturn_t max17042_thread_handl { struct max17042_chip *chip = dev; u32 val; + int ret; + + ret = regmap_read(chip->regmap, MAX17042_STATUS, &val); + if (ret) + return IRQ_HANDLED;

- regmap_read(chip->regmap, MAX17042_STATUS, &val); if ((val & STATUS_INTR_SOCMIN_BIT) || (val & STATUS_INTR_SOCMAX_BIT)) { dev_info(&chip->client->dev, "SOC threshold INTR\n");

From: Wang Hai wanghai38@huawei.com

commit a30dc6cf0dc51419021550152e435736aaef8799 upstream.

I got a NULL pointer dereference report when doing fuzz test:

Call Trace: qp_release_pages+0xae/0x130 qp_host_unregister_user_memory.isra.25+0x2d/0x80 vmci_qp_broker_unmap+0x191/0x320 ? vmci_host_do_alloc_queuepair.isra.9+0x1c0/0x1c0 vmci_host_unlocked_ioctl+0x59f/0xd50 ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x14b/0xa10 ? tomoyo_file_ioctl+0x28/0x30 ? vmci_host_do_alloc_queuepair.isra.9+0x1c0/0x1c0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xea/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

When a queue pair is created by the following call, it will not register the user memory if the page_store is NULL, and the entry->state will be set to VMCIQPB_CREATED_NO_MEM.

vmci_host_unlocked_ioctl vmci_host_do_alloc_queuepair vmci_qp_broker_alloc qp_broker_alloc qp_broker_create // set entry->state = VMCIQPB_CREATED_NO_MEM;

When unmapping this queue pair, qp_host_unregister_user_memory() will be called to unregister the non-existent user memory, which will result in a null pointer reference. It will also change VMCIQPB_CREATED_NO_MEM to VMCIQPB_CREATED_MEM, which should not be present in this operation.

Only when the qp broker has mem, it can unregister the user memory when unmapping the qp broker.

Only when the qp broker has no mem, it can register the user memory when mapping the qp broker.

Fixes: 06164d2b72aa ("VMCI: queue pairs implementation.") Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Hulk Robot hulkci@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jorgen Hansen jhansen@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Wang Hai wanghai38@huawei.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210818124845.488312-1-wanghai38@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c @@ -2249,7 +2249,8 @@ int vmci_qp_broker_map(struct vmci_handl

result = VMCI_SUCCESS;

- if (context_id != VMCI_HOST_CONTEXT_ID) { + if (context_id != VMCI_HOST_CONTEXT_ID && + !QPBROKERSTATE_HAS_MEM(entry)) { struct vmci_qp_page_store page_store;

page_store.pages = guest_mem; @@ -2356,7 +2357,8 @@ int vmci_qp_broker_unmap(struct vmci_han goto out; }

- if (context_id != VMCI_HOST_CONTEXT_ID) { + if (context_id != VMCI_HOST_CONTEXT_ID && + QPBROKERSTATE_HAS_MEM(entry)) { qp_acquire_queue_mutex(entry->produce_q); result = qp_save_headers(entry); if (result < VMCI_SUCCESS)

From: Sean Young sean@mess.org

commit 6b7f554be8c92319d7e6df92fd247ebb9beb4a45 upstream.

The LIRC_SET_TRANSMITTER_MASK ioctl should return the number of emitters if an invalid list was set.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Young sean@mess.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/media/rc/rc-loopback.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/media/rc/rc-loopback.c +++ b/drivers/media/rc/rc-loopback.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static int loop_set_tx_mask(struct rc_de

if ((mask & (RXMASK_REGULAR | RXMASK_LEARNING)) != mask) { dprintk("invalid tx mask: %u\n", mask); - return -EINVAL; + return 2; }

dprintk("setting tx mask: %u\n", mask);

From: David Heidelberg david@ixit.cz

commit b30d0289de72c62516df03fdad8d53f552c69839 upstream.

The merge_fdt_bootargs() function by definition consumes more than 1024 bytes of stack because it has a 1024 byte command line on the stack, meaning that we always get a warning when building this file:

arch/arm/boot/compressed/atags_to_fdt.c: In function 'merge_fdt_bootargs': arch/arm/boot/compressed/atags_to_fdt.c:98:1: warning: the frame size of 1032 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]

However, as this is the decompressor and we know that it has a very shallow call chain, and we do not actually risk overflowing the kernel stack at runtime here.

This just shuts up the warning by disabling the warning flag for this file.

Tested on Nexus 7 2012 builds.

Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre nico@fluxnic.net Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg david@ixit.cz Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile @@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(libfdt_objs) atags $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(libfdt_hdrs))

ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM_ATAG_DTB_COMPAT),y) +CFLAGS_REMOVE_atags_to_fdt.o += -Wframe-larger-than=${CONFIG_FRAME_WARN} +CFLAGS_atags_to_fdt.o += -Wframe-larger-than=1280 OBJS += $(libfdt_objs) atags_to_fdt.o endif

From: Krzysztof Wilczyński kw@linux.com

commit a8bd29bd49c4156ea0ec5a97812333e2aeef44e7 upstream.

The pciconfig_read() syscall reads PCI configuration space using hardware-dependent config accessors.

If the read fails on PCI, most accessors don't return an error; they pretend the read was successful and got ~0 data from the device, so the syscall returns success with ~0 data in the buffer.

When the accessor does return an error, pciconfig_read() normally fills the user's buffer with ~0 and returns an error in errno. But after e4585da22ad0 ("pci syscall.c: Switch to refcounting API"), we don't fill the buffer with ~0 for the EPERM "user lacks CAP_SYS_ADMIN" error.

Userspace may rely on the ~0 data to detect errors, but after e4585da22ad0, that would not detect CAP_SYS_ADMIN errors.

Restore the original behaviour of filling the buffer with ~0 when the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check fails.

[bhelgaas: commit log, fold in Nathan's fix https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210803200836.500658-1-nathan@kernel.org] Fixes: e4585da22ad0 ("pci syscall.c: Switch to refcounting API") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210729233755.1509616-1-kw@linux.com Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński kw@linux.com Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas bhelgaas@google.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c +++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c @@ -21,8 +21,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_read, unsigned long err; int cfg_ret;

+ err = -EPERM; + dev = NULL; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; + goto error;

err = -ENODEV; dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(0, bus, dfn);

From: Pali Rohár pali@kernel.org

commit 02bcec3ea5591720114f586960490b04b093a09e upstream.

Measurements in different conditions showed that aardvark hardware PIO response can take up to 1.44s. Increase wait timeout from 1ms to 1.5s to ensure that we do not miss responses from hardware. After 1.44s hardware returns errors (e.g. Completer abort).

The previous two patches fixed checking for PIO status, so now we can use it to also catch errors which are reported by hardware after 1.44s.

After applying this patch, kernel can detect and print PIO errors to dmesg:

[ 6.879999] advk-pcie d0070000.pcie: Non-posted PIO Response Status: CA, 0xe00 @ 0x100004 [ 6.896436] advk-pcie d0070000.pcie: Posted PIO Response Status: COMP_ERR, 0x804 @ 0x100004 [ 6.913049] advk-pcie d0070000.pcie: Posted PIO Response Status: COMP_ERR, 0x804 @ 0x100010 [ 6.929663] advk-pcie d0070000.pcie: Non-posted PIO Response Status: CA, 0xe00 @ 0x100010 [ 6.953558] advk-pcie d0070000.pcie: Posted PIO Response Status: COMP_ERR, 0x804 @ 0x100014 [ 6.970170] advk-pcie d0070000.pcie: Non-posted PIO Response Status: CA, 0xe00 @ 0x100014 [ 6.994328] advk-pcie d0070000.pcie: Posted PIO Response Status: COMP_ERR, 0x804 @ 0x100004

Without this patch kernel prints only a generic error to dmesg:

[ 5.246847] advk-pcie d0070000.pcie: config read/write timed out

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722144041.12661-3-pali@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár pali@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com Reviewed-by: Marek Behún kabel@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 7fbcb5da811b ("PCI: aardvark: Don't rely on jiffies while holding spinlock") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/pci/controller/pci-aardvark.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-aardvark.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-aardvark.c @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ (PCIE_CONF_BUS(bus) | PCIE_CONF_DEV(PCI_SLOT(devfn)) | \ PCIE_CONF_FUNC(PCI_FUNC(devfn)) | PCIE_CONF_REG(where))

-#define PIO_RETRY_CNT 500 +#define PIO_RETRY_CNT 750000 /* 1.5 s */ #define PIO_RETRY_DELAY 2 /* 2 us*/

#define LINK_WAIT_MAX_RETRIES 10

From: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit f4abaa9eebde334045ed6ac4e564d050f1df3013 ]

The power supply states of discharging, charging, full, etc, represent state of charging, not the capacity level of the battery (for which we have a separate property). Current HID usage tables to not allow for expressing charging state of the batteries found in generic styli, so we should simply assume that the battery is discharging even if current capacity is at 100% when battery strength reporting is done via HID interface. In fact, we were doing just that before commit 581c4484769e.

This change helps UIs to not mis-represent fully charged batteries in styli as being charging/topping-off.

Fixes: 581c4484769e ("HID: input: map digitizer battery usage") Reported-by: Kenneth Albanowski kenalba@google.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina jkosina@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/hid/hid-input.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-input.c b/drivers/hid/hid-input.c index 4dd151b2924e..d56ef395eb69 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-input.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-input.c @@ -427,8 +427,6 @@ static int hidinput_get_battery_property(struct power_supply *psy,

if (dev->battery_status == HID_BATTERY_UNKNOWN) val->intval = POWER_SUPPLY_STATUS_UNKNOWN; - else if (dev->battery_capacity == 100) - val->intval = POWER_SUPPLY_STATUS_FULL; else val->intval = POWER_SUPPLY_STATUS_DISCHARGING; break;

From: Leon Romanovsky leonro@nvidia.com

[ Upstream commit 8d7e415d55610d503fdb8815344846b72d194a40 ]

Starting from the beginning of infiniband subsystem, the uverbs char devices start from 192 as a minor number, see commit bc38a6abdd5a ("[PATCH] IB uverbs: core implementation").

This patch updates the admin guide documentation to reflect it.

Fixes: 9d85025b0418 ("docs-rst: create an user's manual book") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bad03e6bcde45550c01e12908a6fe7dfa4770703.162747734... Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky leonro@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe jgg@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt index 1649117e6087..9cd7926c8781 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt @@ -2993,10 +2993,10 @@ 65 = /dev/infiniband/issm1 Second InfiniBand IsSM device ... 127 = /dev/infiniband/issm63 63rd InfiniBand IsSM device - 128 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs0 First InfiniBand verbs device - 129 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs1 Second InfiniBand verbs device + 192 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs0 First InfiniBand verbs device + 193 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs1 Second InfiniBand verbs device ... - 159 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs31 31st InfiniBand verbs device + 223 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs31 31st InfiniBand verbs device

232 char Biometric Devices 0 = /dev/biometric/sensor0/fingerprint first fingerprint sensor on first device

From: Jason Gunthorpe jgg@nvidia.com

[ Upstream commit 26c22cfde5dd6e63f25c48458b0185dcb0fbb2fd ]

VFIO_NOIOMMU is supposed to be an element in the VFIO menu, not start a new menu. Correct this copy-paste mistake.

Fixes: 03a76b60f8ba ("vfio: Include No-IOMMU mode") Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe jgg@nvidia.com Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck cohuck@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0-v1-3f0b685c3679+478-vfio_menuconfig_jgg@nvidia.c... Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson alex.williamson@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/vfio/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig index c84333eb5eb5..b7765271d0fb 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ menuconfig VFIO

If you don't know what to do here, say N.

-menuconfig VFIO_NOIOMMU +config VFIO_NOIOMMU bool "VFIO No-IOMMU support" depends on VFIO help