Fatal SIGSYS signals were not being delivered to pid namespace init processes. Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
Reported-by: Robert Święcki robert@swiecki.net Suggested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org --- kernel/signal.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 38602738866e..33e3ee4f3383 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1342,9 +1342,10 @@ force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, } /* * Don't clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE for traced tasks, users won't expect - * debugging to leave init killable. + * debugging to leave init killable, unless it is intended to exit. */ - if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL && !t->ptrace) + if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL && + (!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))) t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE; ret = send_signal(sig, info, t, PIDTYPE_PID); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 3:53 AM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
Fatal SIGSYS signals were not being delivered to pid namespace init processes. Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
Reported-by: Robert Święcki robert@swiecki.net Suggested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
kernel/signal.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 38602738866e..33e3ee4f3383 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1342,9 +1342,10 @@ force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, } /* * Don't clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE for traced tasks, users won't expect
* debugging to leave init killable.
* debugging to leave init killable, unless it is intended to exit. */
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL && !t->ptrace)
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL &&(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))) t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;
You're changing the subclause:
!t->ptrace
to:
(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))
which means that the change only affects cases where the process has a ptracer, right? That's not the scenario the commit message is talking about...
ret = send_signal(sig, info, t, PIDTYPE_PID); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);-- 2.30.2
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 05:18:39PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 3:53 AM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
Fatal SIGSYS signals were not being delivered to pid namespace init processes. Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
Reported-by: Robert Święcki robert@swiecki.net Suggested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
kernel/signal.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 38602738866e..33e3ee4f3383 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1342,9 +1342,10 @@ force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, } /* * Don't clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE for traced tasks, users won't expect
* debugging to leave init killable.
* debugging to leave init killable, unless it is intended to exit. */
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL && !t->ptrace)
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL &&(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))) t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;You're changing the subclause:
!t->ptrace
to:
(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))
which means that the change only affects cases where the process has a ptracer, right? That's not the scenario the commit message is talking about...
Sorry, yes, I was not as accurate as I should have been in the commit log. I have changed it to:
Fatal SIGSYS signals (i.e. seccomp RET_KILL_* syscall filter actions) were not being delivered to ptraced pid namespace init processes. Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
ret = send_signal(sig, info, t, PIDTYPE_PID); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);-- 2.30.2
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 6:37 PM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 05:18:39PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 3:53 AM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
Fatal SIGSYS signals were not being delivered to pid namespace init processes. Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
Reported-by: Robert Święcki robert@swiecki.net Suggested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
kernel/signal.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 38602738866e..33e3ee4f3383 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1342,9 +1342,10 @@ force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, } /* * Don't clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE for traced tasks, users won't expect
* debugging to leave init killable.
* debugging to leave init killable, unless it is intended to exit. */
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL && !t->ptrace)
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL &&(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))) t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;You're changing the subclause:
!t->ptrace
to:
(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))
which means that the change only affects cases where the process has a ptracer, right? That's not the scenario the commit message is talking about...
Sorry, yes, I was not as accurate as I should have been in the commit log. I have changed it to:
Fatal SIGSYS signals (i.e. seccomp RET_KILL_* syscall filter actions) were not being delivered to ptraced pid namespace init processes. Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
So basically force_sig_info() is trying to figure out whether get_signal() will later on check for SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE (the SIG_DFL case), and if so, it clears the flag from the target's signal_struct that marks the process as unkillable?
This used to be:
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL) t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;
Then someone noticed that in the ptrace case, the signal might not actually end up being consumed by the target process, and added the "&& !t->ptrace" clause in commit eb61b5911bdc923875cde99eb25203a0e2b06d43.
And now Robert Swiecki noticed that that still didn't accurately model what'll happen in get_signal().
This seems hacky to me, and also racy: What if, while you're going through a SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS in an unkillable process, some other thread e.g. concurrently changes the disposition of SIGSYS from a custom handler to SIG_DFL?
Instead of trying to figure out whether the signal would have been fatal without SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE, I think it would be better to find a way to tell the signal-handling code that SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE should be bypassed for this specific signal, or something along those lines... but of course that's also kind of messy because the signal-sending code might fall back to just using the pending signal mask on allocation failure IIRC?
Jann Horn jannh@google.com writes:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 6:37 PM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 05:18:39PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 3:53 AM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
Fatal SIGSYS signals were not being delivered to pid namespace init processes. Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
Reported-by: Robert Święcki robert@swiecki.net Suggested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
kernel/signal.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 38602738866e..33e3ee4f3383 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1342,9 +1342,10 @@ force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, } /* * Don't clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE for traced tasks, users won't expect
* debugging to leave init killable.
* debugging to leave init killable, unless it is intended to exit. */
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL && !t->ptrace)
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL &&(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))) t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;You're changing the subclause:
!t->ptrace
to:
(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))
which means that the change only affects cases where the process has a ptracer, right? That's not the scenario the commit message is talking about...
Sorry, yes, I was not as accurate as I should have been in the commit log. I have changed it to:
Fatal SIGSYS signals (i.e. seccomp RET_KILL_* syscall filter actions) were not being delivered to ptraced pid namespace init processes. Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
So basically force_sig_info() is trying to figure out whether get_signal() will later on check for SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE (the SIG_DFL case), and if so, it clears the flag from the target's signal_struct that marks the process as unkillable?
This used to be:
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL) t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;
Then someone noticed that in the ptrace case, the signal might not actually end up being consumed by the target process, and added the "&& !t->ptrace" clause in commit eb61b5911bdc923875cde99eb25203a0e2b06d43.
And now Robert Swiecki noticed that that still didn't accurately model what'll happen in get_signal().
This seems hacky to me, and also racy: What if, while you're going through a SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS in an unkillable process, some other thread e.g. concurrently changes the disposition of SIGSYS from a custom handler to SIG_DFL?
Instead of trying to figure out whether the signal would have been fatal without SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE, I think it would be better to find a way to tell the signal-handling code that SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE should be bypassed for this specific signal, or something along those lines... but of course that's also kind of messy because the signal-sending code might fall back to just using the pending signal mask on allocation failure IIRC?
I am actively working on this. I think I know how to get there but it requires cleanups elsewhere as well, so it is not really an approach that is appropriate for backporting.
The big bottleneck is that we need to make signals that trigger coredumps eligible for short circuit delivery, and that takes a little doing.
Eric
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 07:01:39PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 6:37 PM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 05:18:39PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 3:53 AM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
Fatal SIGSYS signals were not being delivered to pid namespace init processes. Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
Reported-by: Robert Święcki robert@swiecki.net Suggested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
kernel/signal.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 38602738866e..33e3ee4f3383 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1342,9 +1342,10 @@ force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, } /* * Don't clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE for traced tasks, users won't expect
* debugging to leave init killable.
* debugging to leave init killable, unless it is intended to exit. */
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL && !t->ptrace)
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL &&(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))) t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;You're changing the subclause:
!t->ptrace
to:
(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))
which means that the change only affects cases where the process has a ptracer, right? That's not the scenario the commit message is talking about...
Sorry, yes, I was not as accurate as I should have been in the commit log. I have changed it to:
Fatal SIGSYS signals (i.e. seccomp RET_KILL_* syscall filter actions) were not being delivered to ptraced pid namespace init processes. Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
So basically force_sig_info() is trying to figure out whether get_signal() will later on check for SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE (the SIG_DFL case), and if so, it clears the flag from the target's signal_struct that marks the process as unkillable?
This used to be:
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL) t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;
Then someone noticed that in the ptrace case, the signal might not actually end up being consumed by the target process, and added the "&& !t->ptrace" clause in commit eb61b5911bdc923875cde99eb25203a0e2b06d43.
And now Robert Swiecki noticed that that still didn't accurately model what'll happen in get_signal().
This seems hacky to me, and also racy: What if, while you're going through a SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS in an unkillable process, some other thread e.g. concurrently changes the disposition of SIGSYS from a custom handler to SIG_DFL?
Do you mean after force_sig_info_to_task() has finished but before get_signal()? SA_IMMUTABLE will block changes to the action.
If you mean before force_sig_info_to_task(), I don't see how that's possible since it's under lock:
if (blocked || ignored || (handler != HANDLER_CURRENT)) { action->sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL; if (handler == HANDLER_EXIT) action->sa.sa_flags |= SA_IMMUTABLE; ... if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL && (!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))) t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;
Given handler = HANDLER_EXIT, it'll always be SIG_DFL.
Instead of trying to figure out whether the signal would have been fatal without SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE, I think it would be better to find a way to tell the signal-handling code that SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE should be bypassed for this specific signal, or something along those lines... but of course that's also kind of messy because the signal-sending code might fall back to just using the pending signal mask on allocation failure IIRC?
My original patch aimed that way:
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 9b04631acde8..c124a09de6de 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -2787,7 +2787,8 @@ bool get_signal(struct ksignal *ksig) * case, the signal cannot be dropped. */ if (unlikely(signal->flags & SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE) && - !sig_kernel_only(signr)) + !sig_kernel_only(signr) && + !(ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_IMMUTABLE)) continue;
if (sig_kernel_stop(signr)) {
But I don't think there's a race, and Eric's suggestion seemed better in the sense that the state change is entirely contained by force_sig_info_to_task().
-Kees
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 10:09 PM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 07:01:39PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 6:37 PM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 05:18:39PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 3:53 AM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
Fatal SIGSYS signals were not being delivered to pid namespace init processes. Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
Reported-by: Robert Święcki robert@swiecki.net Suggested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
kernel/signal.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 38602738866e..33e3ee4f3383 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1342,9 +1342,10 @@ force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, } /* * Don't clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE for traced tasks, users won't expect
* debugging to leave init killable.
* debugging to leave init killable, unless it is intended to exit. */
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL && !t->ptrace)
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL &&(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))) t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;You're changing the subclause:
!t->ptrace
to:
(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT))
which means that the change only affects cases where the process has a ptracer, right? That's not the scenario the commit message is talking about...
Sorry, yes, I was not as accurate as I should have been in the commit log. I have changed it to:
Fatal SIGSYS signals (i.e. seccomp RET_KILL_* syscall filter actions) were not being delivered to ptraced pid namespace init processes. Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
So basically force_sig_info() is trying to figure out whether get_signal() will later on check for SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE (the SIG_DFL case), and if so, it clears the flag from the target's signal_struct that marks the process as unkillable?
This used to be:
if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL) t->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;
Then someone noticed that in the ptrace case, the signal might not actually end up being consumed by the target process, and added the "&& !t->ptrace" clause in commit eb61b5911bdc923875cde99eb25203a0e2b06d43.
And now Robert Swiecki noticed that that still didn't accurately model what'll happen in get_signal().
This seems hacky to me, and also racy: What if, while you're going through a SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS in an unkillable process, some other thread e.g. concurrently changes the disposition of SIGSYS from a custom handler to SIG_DFL?
Do you mean after force_sig_info_to_task() has finished but before get_signal()? SA_IMMUTABLE will block changes to the action.
Yeah, that's what I meant. Thanks, I missed SA_IMMUTABLE. Ugh, this is not pretty code...
Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org writes:
Fatal SIGSYS signals were not being delivered to pid namespace init processes . Make sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these
^ when ptraced.
cases.
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com
I have pointed out a few nits in the wording but otherwise this looks good.
Reported-by: Robert Święcki robert@swiecki.net Suggested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
kernel/signal.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index 38602738866e..33e3ee4f3383 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1342,9 +1342,10 @@ force_sig_info_to_task(struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t, } /* * Don't clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE for traced tasks, users won't expect
* debugging to leave init killable.
* debugging to leave init killable, unless it is intended to exit.
perhaps ^ HANDLER_EXIT is always fatal.
*/
- if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL && !t->ptrace)
- if (action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL &&
(!t->ptrace || (handler == HANDLER_EXIT)))
Eric
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Eric W. Biederman -
Jann Horn -
Kees Cook