The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to stable@vger.kernel.org.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x e871abcda3b67d0820b4182ebe93435624e9c6a4 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to 'stable@vger.kernel.org' --in-reply-to '2024041908-ethically-floss-e1ea@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^..

Possible dependencies:

e871abcda3b6 ("random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context") bbc7e1bed1f5 ("random: add back async readiness notifier") 9148de3196ed ("random: reseed in delayed work rather than on-demand") f62384995e4c ("random: split initialization into early step and later step") 745558f95885 ("random: use hwgenerator randomness more frequently at early boot") 228dfe98a313 ("Merge tag 'char-misc-6.0-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc")

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From e871abcda3b67d0820b4182ebe93435624e9c6a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Jason@zx2c4.com Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 13:38:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context

The entropy accounting changes a static key when the RNG has initialized, since it only ever initializes once. Static key changes, however, cannot be made from atomic context, so depending on where the last creditable entropy comes from, the static key change might need to be deferred to a worker.

Previously the code used the execute_in_process_context() helper function, which accounts for whether or not the caller is in_interrupt(). However, that doesn't account for the case where the caller is actually in process context but is holding a spinlock.

This turned out to be the case with input_handle_event() in drivers/input/input.c contributing entropy:

[<ffffffd613025ba0>] die+0xa8/0x2fc [<ffffffd613027428>] bug_handler+0x44/0xec [<ffffffd613016964>] brk_handler+0x90/0x144 [<ffffffd613041e58>] do_debug_exception+0xa0/0x148 [<ffffffd61400c208>] el1_dbg+0x60/0x7c [<ffffffd61400c000>] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x38/0x90 [<ffffffd613011294>] el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x6c [<ffffffd613102d88>] __might_resched+0x1fc/0x2e8 [<ffffffd613102b54>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x7c [<ffffffd6130b6eac>] cpus_read_lock+0x1c/0xec [<ffffffd6132c2820>] static_key_enable+0x14/0x38 [<ffffffd61400ac08>] crng_set_ready+0x14/0x28 [<ffffffd6130df4dc>] execute_in_process_context+0xb8/0xf8 [<ffffffd61400ab30>] _credit_init_bits+0x118/0x1dc [<ffffffd6138580c8>] add_timer_randomness+0x264/0x270 [<ffffffd613857e54>] add_input_randomness+0x38/0x48 [<ffffffd613a80f94>] input_handle_event+0x2b8/0x490 [<ffffffd613a81310>] input_event+0x6c/0x98

According to Guoyong, it's not really possible to refactor the various drivers to never hold a spinlock there. And in_atomic() isn't reliable.

So, rather than trying to be too fancy, just punt the change in the static key to a workqueue always. There's basically no drawback of doing this, as the code already needed to account for the static key not changing immediately, and given that it's just an optimization, there's not exactly a hurry to change the static key right away, so deferal is fine.

Reported-by: Guoyong Wang guoyong.wang@mediatek.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f5bda35fba61 ("random: use static branch for crng_ready()") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 456be28ba67c..2597cb43f438 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)

static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) { - static struct execute_work set_ready; + static DECLARE_WORK(set_ready, crng_set_ready); unsigned int new, orig, add; unsigned long flags;

@@ -718,8 +718,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)

if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) { crng_reseed(NULL); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ - if (static_key_initialized) - execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready); + if (static_key_initialized && system_unbound_wq) + queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &set_ready); atomic_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_notifier, 0, NULL); wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); @@ -890,8 +890,8 @@ void __init random_init(void)

/* * If we were initialized by the cpu or bootloader before jump labels - * are initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where - * it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized. + * or workqueues are initialized, then we should enable the static + * branch here, where it's guaranteed that these have been initialized. */ if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >= CRNG_READY) crng_set_ready(NULL);