FAILED: patch "[PATCH] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to stable@vger.kernel.org.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 532b53cebe58f34ce1c0f34d866f5c0e335c53c6 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to 'stable@vger.kernel.org' --in-reply-to '2024101412-prowling-snowflake-9fe0@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
532b53cebe58 ("secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map") f7c5b1aab5ef ("mm/secretmem: remove reduntant return value")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 532b53cebe58f34ce1c0f34d866f5c0e335c53c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Roy roypat@amazon.co.uk Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2024 09:00:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map
Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map(). This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages).
More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(), set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages), but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the direct map.
Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be affected.
From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the intended behavior [1] (preferred over having set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped between v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA allocations.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124164930.GK8537@kernel.org/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-11-rppt@kernel.org/#t [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-10-rppt@kernel.org/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241001080056.784735-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas") Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy roypat@amazon.co.uk Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) rppt@kernel.org Cc: Alexander Graf graf@amazon.com Cc: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com Cc: James Gowans jgowans@amazon.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org
diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index 3afb5ad701e1..399552814fd0 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags) /* make sure local flags do not confict with global fcntl.h */ BUILD_BUG_ON(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK & O_CLOEXEC);
- if (!secretmem_enable) + if (!secretmem_enable || !can_set_direct_map()) return -ENOSYS;
if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC)) @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = {
static int __init secretmem_init(void) { - if (!secretmem_enable) + if (!secretmem_enable || !can_set_direct_map()) return 0;
secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs);
From: Patrick Roy roypat@amazon.co.uk
Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map(). This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages).
More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(), set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages), but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the direct map.
Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be affected.
From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the intended behavior [1] (preferred over having set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped between v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA allocations.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124164930.GK8537@kernel.org/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-11-rppt@kernel.org/#t [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-10-rppt@kernel.org/
Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas") Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy roypat@amazon.co.uk Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) rppt@kernel.org --- mm/secretmem.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index d1986ce2e7c7..624663a94808 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags) /* make sure local flags do not confict with global fcntl.h */ BUILD_BUG_ON(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK & O_CLOEXEC);
- if (!secretmem_enable) + if (!secretmem_enable || !can_set_direct_map()) return -ENOSYS;
if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC)) @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static int secretmem_init(void) { int ret = 0;
- if (!secretmem_enable) + if (!secretmem_enable || !can_set_direct_map()) return ret;
secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs);
On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 06:21:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
From: Patrick Roy roypat@amazon.co.uk
Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map(). This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages).
More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(), set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages), but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the direct map.
Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be affected.
From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the intended behavior [1] (preferred over having set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped between v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA allocations.
Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas") Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy roypat@amazon.co.uk Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) rppt@kernel.org
mm/secretmem.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
What is the git id of this change in Linus's tree?
On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 05:55:22PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 06:21:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
From: Patrick Roy roypat@amazon.co.uk
Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map(). This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages).
More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(), set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages), but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the direct map.
Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be affected.
From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the intended behavior [1] (preferred over having set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped between v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA allocations.
Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas") Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy roypat@amazon.co.uk Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) rppt@kernel.org
mm/secretmem.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
What is the git id of this change in Linus's tree?
532b53cebe58f34ce1c0f34d866f5c0e335c53c6
On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 07:35:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 05:55:22PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 06:21:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
From: Patrick Roy roypat@amazon.co.uk
Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map(). This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages).
More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(), set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages), but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the direct map.
Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be affected.
From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the intended behavior [1] (preferred over having set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped between v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA allocations.
Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas") Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy roypat@amazon.co.uk Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) rppt@kernel.org
mm/secretmem.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
What is the git id of this change in Linus's tree?
532b53cebe58f34ce1c0f34d866f5c0e335c53c6
Thanks, next time please include that in the original patch so we don't have to do this back/forth emails :)
now queued up.
greg k-h
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Greg KH -
gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org
-
Mike Rapoport