From: Markus Elfring elfring@users.sourceforge.net

[ Upstream commit ffc15626c861f811f9778914be004fcf43810a91 ]

The kfree() function was called in one case by the batadv_dat_forward_data() function during error handling even if the passed variable contained a null pointer. This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.

* Thus return directly after a batadv_dat_select_candidates() call failed at the beginning.

* Delete the label “out” which became unnecessary with this refactoring.

Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring elfring@users.sourceforge.net Acked-by: Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich sw@simonwunderlich.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c b/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c index dda62dcd59c8a..c5b7e9994a018 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c @@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static bool batadv_dat_forward_data(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,

cand = batadv_dat_select_candidates(bat_priv, ip, vid); if (!cand) - goto out; + return ret;

batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_DAT, bat_priv, "DHT_SEND for %pI4\n", &ip);

@@ -726,7 +726,6 @@ static bool batadv_dat_forward_data(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, batadv_orig_node_put(cand[i].orig_node); }

-out: kfree(cand); return ret; }

From: Harshit Mogalapalli harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit 19b070fefd0d024af3daa7329cbc0d00de5302ec ]

Syzkaller hit 'WARNING in dg_dispatch_as_host' bug.

memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 56) of single field "&dg_info->msg" at drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237 (size 24)

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1555 at drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237 dg_dispatch_as_host+0x88e/0xa60 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237

Some code commentry, based on my understanding:

544 #define VMCI_DG_SIZE(_dg) (VMCI_DG_HEADERSIZE + (size_t)(_dg)->payload_size) /// This is 24 + payload_size

memcpy(&dg_info->msg, dg, dg_size); Destination = dg_info->msg ---> this is a 24 byte structure(struct vmci_datagram) Source = dg --> this is a 24 byte structure (struct vmci_datagram) Size = dg_size = 24 + payload_size

{payload_size = 56-24 =32} -- Syzkaller managed to set payload_size to 32.

35 struct delayed_datagram_info { 36 struct datagram_entry *entry; 37 struct work_struct work; 38 bool in_dg_host_queue; 39 /* msg and msg_payload must be together. */ 40 struct vmci_datagram msg; 41 u8 msg_payload[]; 42 };

So those extra bytes of payload are copied into msg_payload[], a run time warning is seen while fuzzing with Syzkaller.

One possible way to fix the warning is to split the memcpy() into two parts -- one -- direct assignment of msg and second taking care of payload.

Gustavo quoted: "Under FORTIFY_SOURCE we should not copy data across multiple members in a structure."

Reported-by: syzkaller syzkaller@googlegroups.com Suggested-by: Vegard Nossum vegard.nossum@oracle.com Suggested-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavoars@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavoars@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@linaro.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240105164001.2129796-2-harshit.m.mogalapalli@ora... Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c index f50d22882476f..d1d8224c8800c 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c @@ -234,7 +234,8 @@ static int dg_dispatch_as_host(u32 context_id, struct vmci_datagram *dg)

dg_info->in_dg_host_queue = true; dg_info->entry = dst_entry; - memcpy(&dg_info->msg, dg, dg_size); + dg_info->msg = *dg; + memcpy(&dg_info->msg_payload, dg + 1, dg->payload_size);

INIT_WORK(&dg_info->work, dg_delayed_dispatch); schedule_work(&dg_info->work);

From: Johan Jonker jbx6244@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 1d00ba4700d1e0f88ae70d028d2e17e39078fa1c ]

Fix rk3328 hdmi ports node so that it matches the rockchip,dw-hdmi.yaml binding.

Signed-off-by: Johan Jonker jbx6244@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e5dea3b7-bf84-4474-9530-cc2da3c41104@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner heiko@sntech.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3328.dtsi | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3328.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3328.dtsi index 6ddb6b8c1fad5..ef45d5607ea1f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3328.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3328.dtsi @@ -684,11 +684,20 @@ hdmi: hdmi@ff3c0000 { status = "disabled";

ports { - hdmi_in: port { + #address-cells = <1>; + #size-cells = <0>; + + hdmi_in: port@0 { + reg = <0>; + hdmi_in_vop: endpoint { remote-endpoint = <&vop_out_hdmi>; }; }; + + hdmi_out: port@1 { + reg = <1>; + }; }; };

From: Shannon Nelson shannon.nelson@amd.com

[ Upstream commit c699f35d658f3c21b69ed24e64b2ea26381e941d ]

We claim to have the AdminQ on our irq0 and thus cpu id 0, but we need to be sure we set the affinity hint to try to keep it there.

Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson shannon.nelson@amd.com Reviewed-by: Brett Creeley brett.creeley@amd.com Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller jacob.e.keller@intel.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/pensando/ionic/ionic_lif.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/pensando/ionic/ionic_lif.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/pensando/ionic/ionic_lif.c index d718c1a6d5fc7..e7d868da6a380 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/pensando/ionic/ionic_lif.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/pensando/ionic/ionic_lif.c @@ -1874,9 +1874,12 @@ static int ionic_lif_adminq_init(struct ionic_lif *lif)

napi_enable(&qcq->napi);

- if (qcq->flags & IONIC_QCQ_F_INTR) + if (qcq->flags & IONIC_QCQ_F_INTR) { + irq_set_affinity_hint(qcq->intr.vector, + &qcq->intr.affinity_mask); ionic_intr_mask(idev->intr_ctrl, qcq->intr.index, IONIC_INTR_MASK_CLEAR); + }

qcq->flags |= IONIC_QCQ_F_INITED;

From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org

[ Upstream commit d4be85d068b4418c341f79b654399f7f0891069a ]

The UBSAN instrumentation cannot work in the vDSO since it is executing in userspace, so disable it in the Makefile. Fixes the build failures such as:

arch/sparc/vdso/vclock_gettime.c:217: undefined reference to `__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds'

Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg sam@ravnborg.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240224073617.GA2959352@ravnborg.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile b/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile index 997ffe46e953a..5b869c2c84363 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ # # Building vDSO images for sparc. # +UBSAN_SANITIZE := n

KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_LTO)

From: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com

[ Upstream commit 7411055db5ce64f836aaffd422396af0075fdc99 ]

The unhandled case in btrfs_relocate_sys_chunks() loop is a corruption, as it could be caused only by two impossible conditions:

- at first the search key is set up to look for a chunk tree item, with offset -1, this is an inexact search and the key->offset will contain the correct offset upon a successful search, a valid chunk tree item cannot have an offset -1

- after first successful search, the found_key corresponds to a chunk item, the offset is decremented by 1 before the next loop, it's impossible to find a chunk item there due to alignment and size constraints

Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com Reviewed-by: Anand Jain anand.jain@oracle.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c index e11c8da9a5605..b5873df0aa93a 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c @@ -3268,7 +3268,17 @@ static int btrfs_relocate_sys_chunks(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) mutex_unlock(&fs_info->delete_unused_bgs_mutex); goto error; } - BUG_ON(ret == 0); /* Corruption */ + if (ret == 0) { + /* + * On the first search we would find chunk tree with + * offset -1, which is not possible. On subsequent + * loops this would find an existing item on an invalid + * offset (one less than the previous one, wrong + * alignment and size). + */ + ret = -EUCLEAN; + goto error; + }

ret = btrfs_previous_item(chunk_root, path, key.objectid, key.type);

From: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com

[ Upstream commit 3c6ee34c6f9cd12802326da26631232a61743501 ]

Change BUG_ON to proper error handling if building the path buffer fails. The pointers are not printed so we don't accidentally leak kernel addresses.

Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/btrfs/send.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c index 0dfa88ac01393..576c027909f8a 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/send.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c @@ -973,7 +973,15 @@ static int iterate_inode_ref(struct btrfs_root *root, struct btrfs_path *path, ret = PTR_ERR(start); goto out; } - BUG_ON(start < p->buf); + if (unlikely(start < p->buf)) { + btrfs_err(root->fs_info, + "send: path ref buffer underflow for key (%llu %u %llu)", + found_key->objectid, + found_key->type, + found_key->offset); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } } p->start = start; } else {