This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.74 release. There are 27 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Oct 2022 17:51:33 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.74-rc1... or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------- Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Linux 5.15.74-rc1
Shunsuke Mie mie@igel.co.jp misc: pci_endpoint_test: Fix pci_endpoint_test_{copy,write,read}() panic
Shunsuke Mie mie@igel.co.jp misc: pci_endpoint_test: Aggregate params checking for xfer
Cameron Gutman aicommander@gmail.com Input: xpad - fix wireless 360 controller breaking after suspend
Pavel Rojtberg rojtberg@gmail.com Input: xpad - add supported devices as contributed on github
Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com wifi: cfg80211: update hidden BSSes to avoid WARN_ON
Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com wifi: mac80211: fix crash in beacon protection for P2P-device
Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com wifi: mac80211_hwsim: avoid mac80211 warning on bad rate
Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com wifi: cfg80211: avoid nontransmitted BSS list corruption
Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com wifi: cfg80211: fix BSS refcounting bugs
Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com wifi: cfg80211: ensure length byte is present before access
Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com wifi: cfg80211/mac80211: reject bad MBSSID elements
Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com wifi: cfg80211: fix u8 overflow in cfg80211_update_notlisted_nontrans()
Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com random: use expired timer rather than wq for mixing fast pool
Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com random: avoid reading two cache lines on irq randomness
Giovanni Cabiddu giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com Revert "crypto: qat - reduce size of mapped region"
Nathan Lynch nathanl@linux.ibm.com Revert "powerpc/rtas: Implement reentrant rtas call"
Frank Wunderlich frank-w@public-files.de USB: serial: qcserial: add new usb-id for Dell branded EM7455
Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org scsi: stex: Properly zero out the passthrough command structure
Orlando Chamberlain redecorating@protonmail.com efi: Correct Macmini DMI match in uefi cert quirk
Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de ALSA: hda: Fix position reporting on Poulsbo
Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com random: clamp credited irq bits to maximum mixed
Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com random: restore O_NONBLOCK support
Hu Weiwen sehuww@mail.scut.edu.cn ceph: don't truncate file in atomic_open
Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com nilfs2: replace WARN_ONs by nilfs_error for checkpoint acquisition failure
Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com nilfs2: fix leak of nilfs_root in case of writer thread creation failure
Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com nilfs2: fix use-after-free bug of struct nilfs_root
Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com nilfs2: fix NULL pointer dereference at nilfs_bmap_lookup_at_level()
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h | 1 - arch/powerpc/include/asm/rtas.h | 1 - arch/powerpc/kernel/paca.c | 32 ----------- arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 54 ------------------- arch/powerpc/sysdev/xics/ics-rtas.c | 22 ++++---- drivers/char/mem.c | 4 +- drivers/char/random.c | 25 ++++++--- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c | 12 ++--- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 20 ++++++- drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c | 34 +++++++++--- drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c | 2 + drivers/scsi/stex.c | 17 +++--- drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c | 1 + fs/ceph/file.c | 10 ++-- fs/nilfs2/inode.c | 19 ++++++- fs/nilfs2/segment.c | 21 +++++--- include/scsi/scsi_cmnd.h | 2 +- net/mac80211/rx.c | 12 +++-- net/mac80211/util.c | 2 + net/wireless/scan.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++---------- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 2 +- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 3 +- 23 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 179 deletions(-)
From: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
commit 21a87d88c2253350e115029f14fe2a10a7e6c856 upstream.
If the i_mode field in inode of metadata files is corrupted on disk, it can cause the initialization of bmap structure, which should have been called from nilfs_read_inode_common(), not to be called. This causes a lockdep warning followed by a NULL pointer dereference at nilfs_bmap_lookup_at_level().
This patch fixes these issues by adding a missing sanitiy check for the i_mode field of metadata file's inode.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221002030804.29978-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+2b32eb36c1a825b7a74c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/nilfs2/inode.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/nilfs2/inode.c +++ b/fs/nilfs2/inode.c @@ -444,6 +444,8 @@ int nilfs_read_inode_common(struct inode inode->i_atime.tv_nsec = le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_mtime_nsec); inode->i_ctime.tv_nsec = le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_ctime_nsec); inode->i_mtime.tv_nsec = le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_mtime_nsec); + if (nilfs_is_metadata_file_inode(inode) && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return -EIO; /* this inode is for metadata and corrupted */ if (inode->i_nlink == 0) return -ESTALE; /* this inode is deleted */
From: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
commit d325dc6eb763c10f591c239550b8c7e5466a5d09 upstream.
If the beginning of the inode bitmap area is corrupted on disk, an inode with the same inode number as the root inode can be allocated and fail soon after. In this case, the subsequent call to nilfs_clear_inode() on that bogus root inode will wrongly decrement the reference counter of struct nilfs_root, and this will erroneously free struct nilfs_root, causing kernel oopses.
This fixes the problem by changing nilfs_new_inode() to skip reserved inode numbers while repairing the inode bitmap.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221003150519.39789-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+b8c672b0e22615c80fe0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Khalid Masum khalid.masum.92@gmail.com Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/nilfs2/inode.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/nilfs2/inode.c +++ b/fs/nilfs2/inode.c @@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ struct inode *nilfs_new_inode(struct ino struct inode *inode; struct nilfs_inode_info *ii; struct nilfs_root *root; + struct buffer_head *bh; int err = -ENOMEM; ino_t ino;
@@ -347,11 +348,25 @@ struct inode *nilfs_new_inode(struct ino ii->i_state = BIT(NILFS_I_NEW); ii->i_root = root;
- err = nilfs_ifile_create_inode(root->ifile, &ino, &ii->i_bh); + err = nilfs_ifile_create_inode(root->ifile, &ino, &bh); if (unlikely(err)) goto failed_ifile_create_inode; /* reference count of i_bh inherits from nilfs_mdt_read_block() */
+ if (unlikely(ino < NILFS_USER_INO)) { + nilfs_warn(sb, + "inode bitmap is inconsistent for reserved inodes"); + do { + brelse(bh); + err = nilfs_ifile_create_inode(root->ifile, &ino, &bh); + if (unlikely(err)) + goto failed_ifile_create_inode; + } while (ino < NILFS_USER_INO); + + nilfs_info(sb, "repaired inode bitmap for reserved inodes"); + } + ii->i_bh = bh; + atomic64_inc(&root->inodes_count); inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode); inode->i_ino = ino;
From: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
commit d0d51a97063db4704a5ef6bc978dddab1636a306 upstream.
If nilfs_attach_log_writer() failed to create a log writer thread, it frees a data structure of the log writer without any cleanup. After commit e912a5b66837 ("nilfs2: use root object to get ifile"), this causes a leak of struct nilfs_root, which started to leak an ifile metadata inode and a kobject on that struct.
In addition, if the kernel is booted with panic_on_warn, the above ifile metadata inode leak will cause the following panic when the nilfs2 kernel module is removed:
kmem_cache_destroy nilfs2_inode_cache: Slab cache still has objects when called from nilfs_destroy_cachep+0x16/0x3a [nilfs2] WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 1464 at mm/slab_common.c:494 kmem_cache_destroy+0x138/0x140 ... RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_destroy+0x138/0x140 Code: 00 20 00 00 e8 a9 55 d8 ff e9 76 ff ff ff 48 8b 53 60 48 c7 c6 20 70 65 86 48 c7 c7 d8 69 9c 86 48 8b 4c 24 28 e8 ef 71 c7 00 <0f> 0b e9 53 ff ff ff c3 48 81 ff ff 0f 00 00 77 03 31 c0 c3 53 48 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? nilfs_palloc_freev.cold.24+0x58/0x58 [nilfs2] nilfs_destroy_cachep+0x16/0x3a [nilfs2] exit_nilfs_fs+0xa/0x1b [nilfs2] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x1d9/0x3a0 ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x1a/0x50 ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.19+0x119/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd ... </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
This patch fixes these issues by calling nilfs_detach_log_writer() cleanup function if spawning the log writer thread fails.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221007085226.57667-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Fixes: e912a5b66837 ("nilfs2: use root object to get ifile") Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+7381dc4ad60658ca4c05@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/nilfs2/segment.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/nilfs2/segment.c +++ b/fs/nilfs2/segment.c @@ -2786,10 +2786,9 @@ int nilfs_attach_log_writer(struct super inode_attach_wb(nilfs->ns_bdev->bd_inode, NULL);
err = nilfs_segctor_start_thread(nilfs->ns_writer); - if (err) { - kfree(nilfs->ns_writer); - nilfs->ns_writer = NULL; - } + if (unlikely(err)) + nilfs_detach_log_writer(sb); + return err; }
From: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
commit 723ac751208f6d6540191689cfbf6c77135a7a1b upstream.
If creation or finalization of a checkpoint fails due to anomalies in the checkpoint metadata on disk, a kernel warning is generated.
This patch replaces the WARN_ONs by nilfs_error, so that a kernel, booted with panic_on_warn, does not panic. A nilfs_error is appropriate here to handle the abnormal filesystem condition.
This also replaces the detected error codes with an I/O error so that neither of the internal error codes is returned to callers.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220929123330.19658-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+fbb3e0b24e8dae5a16ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/nilfs2/segment.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/nilfs2/segment.c +++ b/fs/nilfs2/segment.c @@ -875,9 +875,11 @@ static int nilfs_segctor_create_checkpoi nilfs_mdt_mark_dirty(nilfs->ns_cpfile); nilfs_cpfile_put_checkpoint( nilfs->ns_cpfile, nilfs->ns_cno, bh_cp); - } else - WARN_ON(err == -EINVAL || err == -ENOENT); - + } else if (err == -EINVAL || err == -ENOENT) { + nilfs_error(sci->sc_super, + "checkpoint creation failed due to metadata corruption."); + err = -EIO; + } return err; }
@@ -891,7 +893,11 @@ static int nilfs_segctor_fill_in_checkpo err = nilfs_cpfile_get_checkpoint(nilfs->ns_cpfile, nilfs->ns_cno, 0, &raw_cp, &bh_cp); if (unlikely(err)) { - WARN_ON(err == -EINVAL || err == -ENOENT); + if (err == -EINVAL || err == -ENOENT) { + nilfs_error(sci->sc_super, + "checkpoint finalization failed due to metadata corruption."); + err = -EIO; + } goto failed_ibh; } raw_cp->cp_snapshot_list.ssl_next = 0;
From: Hu Weiwen sehuww@mail.scut.edu.cn
commit 7cb9994754f8a36ae9e5ec4597c5c4c2d6c03832 upstream.
Clear O_TRUNC from the flags sent in the MDS create request.
`atomic_open' is called before permission check. We should not do any modification to the file here. The caller will do the truncation afterward.
Fixes: 124e68e74099 ("ceph: file operations") Signed-off-by: Hu Weiwen sehuww@mail.scut.edu.cn Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li xiubli@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com [Xiubo: fixed a trivial conflict for 5.19 backport] Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li xiubli@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/ceph/file.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -703,6 +703,12 @@ int ceph_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, if (dentry->d_name.len > NAME_MAX) return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ /* + * Do not truncate the file, since atomic_open is called before the + * permission check. The caller will do the truncation afterward. + */ + flags &= ~O_TRUNC; + if (flags & O_CREAT) { if (ceph_quota_is_max_files_exceeded(dir)) return -EDQUOT; @@ -770,9 +776,7 @@ retry: }
set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_PARENT_LOCKED, &req->r_req_flags); - err = ceph_mdsc_do_request(mdsc, - (flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) ? dir : NULL, - req); + err = ceph_mdsc_do_request(mdsc, (flags & O_CREAT) ? dir : NULL, req); if (err == -ENOENT) { dentry = ceph_handle_snapdir(req, dentry); if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
From: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com
commit cd4f24ae9404fd31fc461066e57889be3b68641b upstream.
Prior to 5.6, when /dev/random was opened with O_NONBLOCK, it would return -EAGAIN if there was no entropy. When the pools were unified in 5.6, this was lost. The post 5.6 behavior of blocking until the pool is initialized, and ignoring O_NONBLOCK in the process, went unnoticed, with no reports about the regression received for two and a half years. However, eventually this indeed did break somebody's userspace.
So we restore the old behavior, by returning -EAGAIN if the pool is not initialized. Unlike the old /dev/random, this can only occur during early boot, after which it never blocks again.
In order to make this O_NONBLOCK behavior consistent with other expectations, also respect users reading with preadv2(RWF_NOWAIT) and similar.
Fixes: 30c08efec888 ("random: make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom") Reported-by: Guozihua guozihua@huawei.com Reported-by: Zhongguohua zhongguohua1@huawei.com Cc: Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Cc: Andrew Lutomirski luto@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/char/mem.c | 4 ++-- drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c @@ -702,8 +702,8 @@ static const struct memdev { #endif [5] = { "zero", 0666, &zero_fops, 0 }, [7] = { "full", 0666, &full_fops, 0 }, - [8] = { "random", 0666, &random_fops, 0 }, - [9] = { "urandom", 0666, &urandom_fops, 0 }, + [8] = { "random", 0666, &random_fops, FMODE_NOWAIT }, + [9] = { "urandom", 0666, &urandom_fops, FMODE_NOWAIT }, #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK [11] = { "kmsg", 0644, &kmsg_fops, 0 }, #endif --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1298,6 +1298,11 @@ static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct k { int ret;
+ if (!crng_ready() && + ((kiocb->ki_flags & (IOCB_NOWAIT | IOCB_NOIO)) || + (kiocb->ki_filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK))) + return -EAGAIN; + ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); if (ret != 0) return ret;
From: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com
commit e78a802a7b4febf53f2a92842f494b01062d85a8 upstream.
Since the most that's mixed into the pool is sizeof(long)*2, don't credit more than that many bytes of entropy.
Fixes: e3e33fc2ea7f ("random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(str local_irq_enable();
mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool)); - credit_init_bits(max(1u, (count & U16_MAX) / 64)); + credit_init_bits(clamp_t(unsigned int, (count & U16_MAX) / 64, 1, sizeof(pool) * 8));
memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool)); }
From: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de
commit 56e696c0f0c71b77fff921fc94b58a02f0445b2c upstream.
Hans reported that his Sony VAIO VPX11S1E showed the broken sound behavior at the start of the stream for a couple of seconds, and it turned out that the position_fix=1 option fixes the issue. It implies that the position reporting is inaccurate, and very likely hitting on all Poulsbo devices.
The patch applies the workaround for Poulsbo generically to switch to LPIB mode instead of the default position buffer.
Reported-and-tested-by: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3e8697e1-87c6-7a7b-d2e8-b21f1d2f181b@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221001142124.7241-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c @@ -2523,7 +2523,8 @@ static const struct pci_device_id azx_id .driver_data = AZX_DRIVER_SCH | AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_PCH_NOPM }, /* Poulsbo */ { PCI_DEVICE(0x8086, 0x811b), - .driver_data = AZX_DRIVER_SCH | AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_PCH_BASE }, + .driver_data = AZX_DRIVER_SCH | AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_PCH_BASE | + AZX_DCAPS_POSFIX_LPIB }, /* Oaktrail */ { PCI_DEVICE(0x8086, 0x080a), .driver_data = AZX_DRIVER_SCH | AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_PCH_BASE },
From: Orlando Chamberlain redecorating@protonmail.com
commit bab715bdaa9ebf28d99a6d1efb2704a30125e96d upstream.
It turns out Apple doesn't capitalise the "mini" in "Macmini" in DMI, which is inconsistent with other model line names.
Correct the capitalisation of Macmini in the quirk for skipping loading platform certs on T2 Macs.
Currently users get:
------------[ cut here ]------------ [Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffa30640054000 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 8 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x55/0xe0 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/u12:0 Not tainted 5.18.14-arch1-2-t2 #1 4535eb3fc40fd08edab32a509fbf4c9bc52d111e Hardware name: Apple Inc. Macmini8,1/Mac-7BA5B2DFE22DDD8C, BIOS 1731.120.10.0.0 (iBridge: 19.16.15071.0.0,0) 04/24/2022 Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts ... ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled! integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list
Fixes: 155ca952c7ca ("efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Aditya Garg gargaditya08@live.com Tested-by: Samuel Jiang chyishian.jiang@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Orlando Chamberlain redecorating@protonmail.com Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id uefi_s { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,1") }, { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,2") }, { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir9,1") }, - { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacMini8,1") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "Macmini8,1") }, { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacPro7,1") }, { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,1") }, { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,2") },
From: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org
commit 6022f210461fef67e6e676fd8544ca02d1bcfa7a upstream.
The passthrough structure is declared off of the stack, so it needs to be set to zero before copied back to userspace to prevent any unintentional data leakage. Switch things to be statically allocated which will fill the unused fields with 0 automatically.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YxrjN3OOw2HHl9tx@kroah.com Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" jejb@linux.ibm.com Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" martin.petersen@oracle.com Cc: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Reported-by: hdthky hdthky0@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/scsi/stex.c | 17 +++++++++-------- include/scsi/scsi_cmnd.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/stex.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/stex.c @@ -665,16 +665,17 @@ stex_queuecommand_lck(struct scsi_cmnd * return 0; case PASSTHRU_CMD: if (cmd->cmnd[1] == PASSTHRU_GET_DRVVER) { - struct st_drvver ver; + const struct st_drvver ver = { + .major = ST_VER_MAJOR, + .minor = ST_VER_MINOR, + .oem = ST_OEM, + .build = ST_BUILD_VER, + .signature[0] = PASSTHRU_SIGNATURE, + .console_id = host->max_id - 1, + .host_no = hba->host->host_no, + }; size_t cp_len = sizeof(ver);
- ver.major = ST_VER_MAJOR; - ver.minor = ST_VER_MINOR; - ver.oem = ST_OEM; - ver.build = ST_BUILD_VER; - ver.signature[0] = PASSTHRU_SIGNATURE; - ver.console_id = host->max_id - 1; - ver.host_no = hba->host->host_no; cp_len = scsi_sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd, &ver, cp_len); if (sizeof(ver) == cp_len) cmd->result = DID_OK << 16; --- a/include/scsi/scsi_cmnd.h +++ b/include/scsi/scsi_cmnd.h @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static inline unsigned int scsi_get_resi for_each_sg(scsi_sglist(cmd), sg, nseg, __i)
static inline int scsi_sg_copy_from_buffer(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd, - void *buf, int buflen) + const void *buf, int buflen) { return sg_copy_from_buffer(scsi_sglist(cmd), scsi_sg_count(cmd), buf, buflen);
From: Frank Wunderlich frank-w@public-files.de
commit eee48781ea199e32c1d0c4732641c494833788ca upstream.
Add support for Dell 5811e (EM7455) with USB-id 0x413c:0x81c2.
Signed-off-by: Frank Wunderlich frank-w@public-files.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b3)}, /* Dell Wireless 5809e Gobi(TM) 4G LTE Mobile Broadband Card (rev3) */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b5)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b6)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */ + {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81c2)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cb)}, /* Dell Wireless 5816e QDL */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cc)}, /* Dell Wireless 5816e */ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cf)}, /* Dell Wireless 5819 */
From: Nathan Lynch nathanl@linux.ibm.com
commit f88aabad33ea22be2ce1c60d8901942e4e2a9edb upstream.
At the time this was submitted by Leonardo, I confirmed -- or thought I had confirmed -- with PowerVM partition firmware development that the following RTAS functions:
- ibm,get-xive - ibm,int-off - ibm,int-on - ibm,set-xive
were safe to call on multiple CPUs simultaneously, not only with respect to themselves as indicated by PAPR, but with arbitrary other RTAS calls:
https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/875zcy2v8o.fsf@linux.ibm.com/
Recent discussion with firmware development makes it clear that this is not true, and that the code in commit b664db8e3f97 ("powerpc/rtas: Implement reentrant rtas call") is unsafe, likely explaining several strange bugs we've seen in internal testing involving DLPAR and LPM. These scenarios use ibm,configure-connector, whose internal state can be corrupted by the concurrent use of the "reentrant" functions, leading to symptoms like endless busy statuses from RTAS.
Fixes: b664db8e3f97 ("powerpc/rtas: Implement reentrant rtas call") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.8+ Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch nathanl@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour laurent.dufour@fr.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220907220111.223267-1-nathanl@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h | 1 arch/powerpc/include/asm/rtas.h | 1 arch/powerpc/kernel/paca.c | 32 --------------------- arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 54 ------------------------------------ arch/powerpc/sysdev/xics/ics-rtas.c | 22 +++++++------- 5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h @@ -263,7 +263,6 @@ struct paca_struct { u64 l1d_flush_size; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES - struct rtas_args *rtas_args_reentrant; u8 *mce_data_buf; /* buffer to hold per cpu rtas errlog */ #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES */
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/rtas.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/rtas.h @@ -240,7 +240,6 @@ extern struct rtas_t rtas; extern int rtas_token(const char *service); extern int rtas_service_present(const char *service); extern int rtas_call(int token, int, int, int *, ...); -int rtas_call_reentrant(int token, int nargs, int nret, int *outputs, ...); void rtas_call_unlocked(struct rtas_args *args, int token, int nargs, int nret, ...); extern void __noreturn rtas_restart(char *cmd); --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/paca.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/paca.c @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/svm.h> #include <asm/ultravisor.h> -#include <asm/rtas.h>
#include "setup.h"
@@ -172,30 +171,6 @@ static struct slb_shadow * __init new_sl
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
-#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES -/** - * new_rtas_args() - Allocates rtas args - * @cpu: CPU number - * @limit: Memory limit for this allocation - * - * Allocates a struct rtas_args and return it's pointer, - * if not in Hypervisor mode - * - * Return: Pointer to allocated rtas_args - * NULL if CPU in Hypervisor Mode - */ -static struct rtas_args * __init new_rtas_args(int cpu, unsigned long limit) -{ - limit = min_t(unsigned long, limit, RTAS_INSTANTIATE_MAX); - - if (early_cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)) - return NULL; - - return alloc_paca_data(sizeof(struct rtas_args), L1_CACHE_BYTES, - limit, cpu); -} -#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES */ - /* The Paca is an array with one entry per processor. Each contains an * lppaca, which contains the information shared between the * hypervisor and Linux. @@ -234,10 +209,6 @@ void __init initialise_paca(struct paca_ /* For now -- if we have threads this will be adjusted later */ new_paca->tcd_ptr = &new_paca->tcd; #endif - -#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES - new_paca->rtas_args_reentrant = NULL; -#endif }
/* Put the paca pointer into r13 and SPRG_PACA */ @@ -310,9 +281,6 @@ void __init allocate_paca(int cpu) #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 paca->slb_shadow_ptr = new_slb_shadow(cpu, limit); #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES - paca->rtas_args_reentrant = new_rtas_args(cpu, limit); -#endif paca_struct_size += sizeof(struct paca_struct); }
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c @@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ #include <asm/time.h> #include <asm/mmu.h> #include <asm/topology.h> -#include <asm/paca.h>
/* This is here deliberately so it's only used in this file */ void enter_rtas(unsigned long); @@ -845,59 +844,6 @@ void rtas_activate_firmware(void) pr_err("ibm,activate-firmware failed (%i)\n", fwrc); }
-#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES -/** - * rtas_call_reentrant() - Used for reentrant rtas calls - * @token: Token for desired reentrant RTAS call - * @nargs: Number of Input Parameters - * @nret: Number of Output Parameters - * @outputs: Array of outputs - * @...: Inputs for desired RTAS call - * - * According to LoPAR documentation, only "ibm,int-on", "ibm,int-off", - * "ibm,get-xive" and "ibm,set-xive" are currently reentrant. - * Reentrant calls need their own rtas_args buffer, so not using rtas.args, but - * PACA one instead. - * - * Return: -1 on error, - * First output value of RTAS call if (nret > 0), - * 0 otherwise, - */ -int rtas_call_reentrant(int token, int nargs, int nret, int *outputs, ...) -{ - va_list list; - struct rtas_args *args; - unsigned long flags; - int i, ret = 0; - - if (!rtas.entry || token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) - return -1; - - local_irq_save(flags); - preempt_disable(); - - /* We use the per-cpu (PACA) rtas args buffer */ - args = local_paca->rtas_args_reentrant; - - va_start(list, outputs); - va_rtas_call_unlocked(args, token, nargs, nret, list); - va_end(list); - - if (nret > 1 && outputs) - for (i = 0; i < nret - 1; ++i) - outputs[i] = be32_to_cpu(args->rets[i + 1]); - - if (nret > 0) - ret = be32_to_cpu(args->rets[0]); - - local_irq_restore(flags); - preempt_enable(); - - return ret; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES */ - /** * Find a specific pseries error log in an RTAS extended event log. * @log: RTAS error/event log --- a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/xics/ics-rtas.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/xics/ics-rtas.c @@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ static void ics_rtas_unmask_irq(struct i
server = xics_get_irq_server(d->irq, irq_data_get_affinity_mask(d), 0);
- call_status = rtas_call_reentrant(ibm_set_xive, 3, 1, NULL, hw_irq, - server, DEFAULT_PRIORITY); + call_status = rtas_call(ibm_set_xive, 3, 1, NULL, hw_irq, server, + DEFAULT_PRIORITY); if (call_status != 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ibm_set_xive irq %u server %x returned %d\n", @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static void ics_rtas_unmask_irq(struct i }
/* Now unmask the interrupt (often a no-op) */ - call_status = rtas_call_reentrant(ibm_int_on, 1, 1, NULL, hw_irq); + call_status = rtas_call(ibm_int_on, 1, 1, NULL, hw_irq); if (call_status != 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ibm_int_on irq=%u returned %d\n", __func__, hw_irq, call_status); @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static void ics_rtas_mask_real_irq(unsig if (hw_irq == XICS_IPI) return;
- call_status = rtas_call_reentrant(ibm_int_off, 1, 1, NULL, hw_irq); + call_status = rtas_call(ibm_int_off, 1, 1, NULL, hw_irq); if (call_status != 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ibm_int_off irq=%u returned %d\n", __func__, hw_irq, call_status); @@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ static void ics_rtas_mask_real_irq(unsig }
/* Have to set XIVE to 0xff to be able to remove a slot */ - call_status = rtas_call_reentrant(ibm_set_xive, 3, 1, NULL, hw_irq, - xics_default_server, 0xff); + call_status = rtas_call(ibm_set_xive, 3, 1, NULL, hw_irq, + xics_default_server, 0xff); if (call_status != 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ibm_set_xive(0xff) irq=%u returned %d\n", __func__, hw_irq, call_status); @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static int ics_rtas_set_affinity(struct if (hw_irq == XICS_IPI || hw_irq == XICS_IRQ_SPURIOUS) return -1;
- status = rtas_call_reentrant(ibm_get_xive, 1, 3, xics_status, hw_irq); + status = rtas_call(ibm_get_xive, 1, 3, xics_status, hw_irq);
if (status) { printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ibm,get-xive irq=%u returns %d\n", @@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ static int ics_rtas_set_affinity(struct pr_debug("%s: irq %d [hw 0x%x] server: 0x%x\n", __func__, d->irq, hw_irq, irq_server);
- status = rtas_call_reentrant(ibm_set_xive, 3, 1, NULL, - hw_irq, irq_server, xics_status[1]); + status = rtas_call(ibm_set_xive, 3, 1, NULL, + hw_irq, irq_server, xics_status[1]);
if (status) { printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ibm,set-xive irq=%u returns %d\n", @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static int ics_rtas_check(struct ics *ic return -EINVAL;
/* Check if RTAS knows about this interrupt */ - rc = rtas_call_reentrant(ibm_get_xive, 1, 3, status, hw_irq); + rc = rtas_call(ibm_get_xive, 1, 3, status, hw_irq); if (rc) return -ENXIO;
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ static long ics_rtas_get_server(struct i { int rc, status[2];
- rc = rtas_call_reentrant(ibm_get_xive, 1, 3, status, vec); + rc = rtas_call(ibm_get_xive, 1, 3, status, vec); if (rc) return -1; return status[0];
From: Giovanni Cabiddu giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com
commit 9c5f21b198d259bfe1191b1fedf08e2eab15b33b upstream.
This reverts commit e48767c17718067ba21fb2ef461779ec2506f845.
In an attempt to resolve a set of warnings reported by the static analyzer Smatch, the reverted commit improperly reduced the sizes of the DMA mappings used for the input and output parameters for both RSA and DH creating a mismatch (map size=8 bytes, unmap size=64 bytes).
This issue is reported when CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG is selected, when the crypto self test is run. The function dma_unmap_single() reports a warning similar to the one below, saying that the `device driver frees DMA memory with different size`.
DMA-API: 4xxx 0000:06:00.0: device driver frees DMA memory with different size [device address=0x0000000123206c80] [map size=8 bytes] [unmap size=64 bytes] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/dma/debug.c:973 check_unmap+0x3d0/0x8c0\ ... Call Trace: <IRQ> debug_dma_unmap_page+0x5c/0x60 qat_dh_cb+0xd7/0x110 [intel_qat] qat_alg_asym_callback+0x1a/0x30 [intel_qat] adf_response_handler+0xbd/0x1a0 [intel_qat] tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0xcd/0xe0 __do_softirq+0xf8/0x30c __irq_exit_rcu+0xbf/0x140 common_interrupt+0xb9/0xd0 </IRQ> <TASK>
The original commit was correct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c @@ -332,13 +332,13 @@ static int qat_dh_compute_value(struct k qat_req->out.dh.out_tab[1] = 0; /* Mapping in.in.b or in.in_g2.xa is the same */ qat_req->phy_in = dma_map_single(dev, &qat_req->in.dh.in.b, - sizeof(qat_req->in.dh.in.b), + sizeof(struct qat_dh_input_params), DMA_TO_DEVICE); if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(dev, qat_req->phy_in))) goto unmap_dst;
qat_req->phy_out = dma_map_single(dev, &qat_req->out.dh.r, - sizeof(qat_req->out.dh.r), + sizeof(struct qat_dh_output_params), DMA_TO_DEVICE); if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(dev, qat_req->phy_out))) goto unmap_in_params; @@ -728,13 +728,13 @@ static int qat_rsa_enc(struct akcipher_r qat_req->in.rsa.in_tab[3] = 0; qat_req->out.rsa.out_tab[1] = 0; qat_req->phy_in = dma_map_single(dev, &qat_req->in.rsa.enc.m, - sizeof(qat_req->in.rsa.enc.m), + sizeof(struct qat_rsa_input_params), DMA_TO_DEVICE); if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(dev, qat_req->phy_in))) goto unmap_dst;
qat_req->phy_out = dma_map_single(dev, &qat_req->out.rsa.enc.c, - sizeof(qat_req->out.rsa.enc.c), + sizeof(struct qat_rsa_output_params), DMA_TO_DEVICE); if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(dev, qat_req->phy_out))) goto unmap_in_params; @@ -873,13 +873,13 @@ static int qat_rsa_dec(struct akcipher_r qat_req->in.rsa.in_tab[3] = 0; qat_req->out.rsa.out_tab[1] = 0; qat_req->phy_in = dma_map_single(dev, &qat_req->in.rsa.dec.c, - sizeof(qat_req->in.rsa.dec.c), + sizeof(struct qat_rsa_input_params), DMA_TO_DEVICE); if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(dev, qat_req->phy_in))) goto unmap_dst;
qat_req->phy_out = dma_map_single(dev, &qat_req->out.rsa.dec.m, - sizeof(qat_req->out.rsa.dec.m), + sizeof(struct qat_rsa_output_params), DMA_TO_DEVICE); if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(dev, qat_req->phy_out))) goto unmap_in_params;
From: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com
commit 9ee0507e896b45af6d65408c77815800bce30008 upstream.
In order to avoid reading and dirtying two cache lines on every IRQ, move the work_struct to the bottom of the fast_pool struct. add_ interrupt_randomness() always touches .pool and .count, which are currently split, because .mix pushes everything down. Instead, move .mix to the bottom, so that .pool and .count are always in the first cache line, since .mix is only accessed when the pool is full.
Fixes: 58340f8e952b ("random: defer fast pool mixing to worker") Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior bigeasy@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -894,10 +894,10 @@ void __init add_bootloader_randomness(co }
struct fast_pool { - struct work_struct mix; unsigned long pool[4]; unsigned long last; unsigned int count; + struct work_struct mix; };
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = {
From: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com
commit 748bc4dd9e663f23448d8ad7e58c011a67ea1eca upstream.
Previously, the fast pool was dumped into the main pool periodically in the fast pool's hard IRQ handler. This worked fine and there weren't problems with it, until RT came around. Since RT converts spinlocks into sleeping locks, problems cropped up. Rather than switching to raw spinlocks, the RT developers preferred we make the transformation from originally doing:
do_some_stuff() spin_lock() do_some_other_stuff() spin_unlock()
to doing:
do_some_stuff() queue_work_on(some_other_stuff_worker)
This is an ordinary pattern done all over the kernel. However, Sherry noticed a 10% performance regression in qperf TCP over a 40gbps InfiniBand card. Quoting her message:
MT27500 Family [ConnectX-3] cards: Infiniband device 'mlx4_0' port 1 status: default gid: fe80:0000:0000:0000:0010:e000:0178:9eb1 base lid: 0x6 sm lid: 0x1 state: 4: ACTIVE phys state: 5: LinkUp rate: 40 Gb/sec (4X QDR) link_layer: InfiniBand
Cards are configured with IP addresses on private subnet for IPoIB performance testing. Regression identified in this bug is in TCP latency in this stack as reported by qperf tcp_lat metric:
We have one system listen as a qperf server: [root@yourQperfServer ~]# qperf
Have the other system connect to qperf server as a client (in this case, it’s X7 server with Mellanox card): [root@yourQperfClient ~]# numactl -m0 -N0 qperf 20.20.20.101 -v -uu -ub --time 60 --wait_server 20 -oo msg_size:4K:1024K:*2 tcp_lat
Rather than incur the scheduling latency from queue_work_on, we can instead switch to running on the next timer tick, on the same core. This also batches things a bit more -- once per jiffy -- which is okay now that mix_interrupt_randomness() can credit multiple bits at once.
Reported-by: Sherry Yang sherry.yang@oracle.com Tested-by: Paul Webb paul.x.webb@oracle.com Cc: Sherry Yang sherry.yang@oracle.com Cc: Phillip Goerl phillip.goerl@oracle.com Cc: Jack Vogel jack.vogel@oracle.com Cc: Nicky Veitch nicky.veitch@oracle.com Cc: Colm Harrington colm.harrington@oracle.com Cc: Ramanan Govindarajan ramanan.govindarajan@oracle.com Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior bigeasy@linutronix.de Cc: Dominik Brodowski linux@dominikbrodowski.net Cc: Tejun Heo tj@kernel.org Cc: Sultan Alsawaf sultan@kerneltoast.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 58340f8e952b ("random: defer fast pool mixing to worker") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/char/random.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -897,17 +897,20 @@ struct fast_pool { unsigned long pool[4]; unsigned long last; unsigned int count; - struct work_struct mix; + struct timer_list mix; };
+static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct timer_list *work); + static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = { #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT #define FASTMIX_PERM SIPHASH_PERMUTATION - .pool = { SIPHASH_CONST_0, SIPHASH_CONST_1, SIPHASH_CONST_2, SIPHASH_CONST_3 } + .pool = { SIPHASH_CONST_0, SIPHASH_CONST_1, SIPHASH_CONST_2, SIPHASH_CONST_3 }, #else #define FASTMIX_PERM HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION - .pool = { HSIPHASH_CONST_0, HSIPHASH_CONST_1, HSIPHASH_CONST_2, HSIPHASH_CONST_3 } + .pool = { HSIPHASH_CONST_0, HSIPHASH_CONST_1, HSIPHASH_CONST_2, HSIPHASH_CONST_3 }, #endif + .mix = __TIMER_INITIALIZER(mix_interrupt_randomness, 0) };
/* @@ -949,7 +952,7 @@ int __cold random_online_cpu(unsigned in } #endif
-static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) +static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct timer_list *work) { struct fast_pool *fast_pool = container_of(work, struct fast_pool, mix); /* @@ -1003,10 +1006,11 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) if (new_count < 1024 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ)) return;
- if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func)) - INIT_WORK(&fast_pool->mix, mix_interrupt_randomness); fast_pool->count |= MIX_INFLIGHT; - queue_work_on(raw_smp_processor_id(), system_highpri_wq, &fast_pool->mix); + if (!timer_pending(&fast_pool->mix)) { + fast_pool->mix.expires = jiffies; + add_timer_on(&fast_pool->mix, raw_smp_processor_id()); + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
commit aebe9f4639b13a1f4e9a6b42cdd2e38c617b442d upstream.
In the copy code of the elements, we do the following calculation to reach the end of the MBSSID element:
/* copy the IEs after MBSSID */ cpy_len = mbssid[1] + 2;
This looks fine, however, cpy_len is a u8, the same as mbssid[1], so the addition of two can overflow. In this case the subsequent memcpy() will overflow the allocated buffer, since it copies 256 bytes too much due to the way the allocation and memcpy() sizes are calculated.
Fix this by using size_t for the cpy_len variable.
This fixes CVE-2022-41674.
Reported-by: Soenke Huster shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de Tested-by: Soenke Huster shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de Fixes: 0b8fb8235be8 ("cfg80211: Parsing of Multiple BSSID information in scanning") Reviewed-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/wireless/scan.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/wireless/scan.c +++ b/net/wireless/scan.c @@ -2238,7 +2238,7 @@ cfg80211_update_notlisted_nontrans(struc size_t new_ie_len; struct cfg80211_bss_ies *new_ies; const struct cfg80211_bss_ies *old; - u8 cpy_len; + size_t cpy_len;
lockdep_assert_held(&wiphy_to_rdev(wiphy)->bss_lock);
From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
commit 8f033d2becc24aa6bfd2a5c104407963560caabc upstream.
Per spec, the maximum value for the MaxBSSID ('n') indicator is 8, and the minimum is 1 since a multiple BSSID set with just one BSSID doesn't make sense (the # of BSSIDs is limited by 2^n).
Limit this in the parsing in both cfg80211 and mac80211, rejecting any elements with an invalid value.
This fixes potentially bad shifts in the processing of these inside the cfg80211_gen_new_bssid() function later.
I found this during the investigation of CVE-2022-41674 fixed by the previous patch.
Fixes: 0b8fb8235be8 ("cfg80211: Parsing of Multiple BSSID information in scanning") Fixes: 78ac51f81532 ("mac80211: support multi-bssid") Reviewed-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/mac80211/util.c | 2 ++ net/wireless/scan.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/net/mac80211/util.c +++ b/net/mac80211/util.c @@ -1414,6 +1414,8 @@ static size_t ieee802_11_find_bssid_prof for_each_element_id(elem, WLAN_EID_MULTIPLE_BSSID, start, len) { if (elem->datalen < 2) continue; + if (elem->data[0] < 1 || elem->data[0] > 8) + continue;
for_each_element(sub, elem->data + 1, elem->datalen - 1) { u8 new_bssid[ETH_ALEN]; --- a/net/wireless/scan.c +++ b/net/wireless/scan.c @@ -2103,6 +2103,8 @@ static void cfg80211_parse_mbssid_data(s for_each_element_id(elem, WLAN_EID_MULTIPLE_BSSID, ie, ielen) { if (elem->datalen < 4) continue; + if (elem->data[0] < 1 || (int)elem->data[0] > 8) + continue; for_each_element(sub, elem->data + 1, elem->datalen - 1) { u8 profile_len;
From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
commit 567e14e39e8f8c6997a1378bc3be615afca86063 upstream.
When iterating the elements here, ensure the length byte is present before checking it to see if the entire element will fit into the buffer.
Longer term, we should rewrite this code using the type-safe element iteration macros that check all of this.
Fixes: 0b8fb8235be8 ("cfg80211: Parsing of Multiple BSSID information in scanning") Reported-by: Soenke Huster shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/wireless/scan.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/wireless/scan.c +++ b/net/wireless/scan.c @@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ static size_t cfg80211_gen_new_ie(const tmp_old = cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_SSID, ie, ielen); tmp_old = (tmp_old) ? tmp_old + tmp_old[1] + 2 : ie;
- while (tmp_old + tmp_old[1] + 2 - ie <= ielen) { + while (tmp_old + 2 - ie <= ielen && + tmp_old + tmp_old[1] + 2 - ie <= ielen) { if (tmp_old[0] == 0) { tmp_old++; continue; @@ -364,7 +365,8 @@ static size_t cfg80211_gen_new_ie(const * copied to new ie, skip ssid, capability, bssid-index ie */ tmp_new = sub_copy; - while (tmp_new + tmp_new[1] + 2 - sub_copy <= subie_len) { + while (tmp_new + 2 - sub_copy <= subie_len && + tmp_new + tmp_new[1] + 2 - sub_copy <= subie_len) { if (!(tmp_new[0] == WLAN_EID_NON_TX_BSSID_CAP || tmp_new[0] == WLAN_EID_SSID)) { memcpy(pos, tmp_new, tmp_new[1] + 2);
From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
commit 0b7808818cb9df6680f98996b8e9a439fa7bcc2f upstream.
There are multiple refcounting bugs related to multi-BSSID: - In bss_ref_get(), if the BSS has a hidden_beacon_bss, then the bss pointer is overwritten before checking for the transmitted BSS, which is clearly wrong. Fix this by using the bss_from_pub() macro.
- In cfg80211_bss_update() we copy the transmitted_bss pointer from tmp into new, but then if we release new, we'll unref it erroneously. We already set the pointer and ref it, but need to NULL it since it was copied from the tmp data.
- In cfg80211_inform_single_bss_data(), if adding to the non- transmitted list fails, we unlink the BSS and yet still we return it, but this results in returning an entry without a reference. We shouldn't return it anyway if it was broken enough to not get added there.
This fixes CVE-2022-42720.
Reported-by: Sönke Huster shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de Tested-by: Sönke Huster shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de Fixes: a3584f56de1c ("cfg80211: Properly track transmitting and non-transmitting BSS") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/wireless/scan.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/net/wireless/scan.c +++ b/net/wireless/scan.c @@ -143,18 +143,12 @@ static inline void bss_ref_get(struct cf lockdep_assert_held(&rdev->bss_lock);
bss->refcount++; - if (bss->pub.hidden_beacon_bss) { - bss = container_of(bss->pub.hidden_beacon_bss, - struct cfg80211_internal_bss, - pub); - bss->refcount++; - } - if (bss->pub.transmitted_bss) { - bss = container_of(bss->pub.transmitted_bss, - struct cfg80211_internal_bss, - pub); - bss->refcount++; - } + + if (bss->pub.hidden_beacon_bss) + bss_from_pub(bss->pub.hidden_beacon_bss)->refcount++; + + if (bss->pub.transmitted_bss) + bss_from_pub(bss->pub.transmitted_bss)->refcount++; }
static inline void bss_ref_put(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev, @@ -1743,6 +1737,8 @@ cfg80211_bss_update(struct cfg80211_regi new->refcount = 1; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->hidden_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->pub.nontrans_list); + /* we'll set this later if it was non-NULL */ + new->pub.transmitted_bss = NULL;
if (rcu_access_pointer(tmp->pub.proberesp_ies)) { hidden = rb_find_bss(rdev, tmp, BSS_CMP_HIDE_ZLEN); @@ -1983,10 +1979,15 @@ cfg80211_inform_single_bss_data(struct w spin_lock_bh(&rdev->bss_lock); if (cfg80211_add_nontrans_list(non_tx_data->tx_bss, &res->pub)) { - if (__cfg80211_unlink_bss(rdev, res)) + if (__cfg80211_unlink_bss(rdev, res)) { rdev->bss_generation++; + res = NULL; + } } spin_unlock_bh(&rdev->bss_lock); + + if (!res) + return NULL; }
trace_cfg80211_return_bss(&res->pub);
From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
commit bcca852027e5878aec911a347407ecc88d6fff7f upstream.
If a non-transmitted BSS shares enough information (both SSID and BSSID!) with another non-transmitted BSS of a different AP, then we can find and update it, and then try to add it to the non-transmitted BSS list. We do a search for it on the transmitted BSS, but if it's not there (but belongs to another transmitted BSS), the list gets corrupted.
Since this is an erroneous situation, simply fail the list insertion in this case and free the non-transmitted BSS.
This fixes CVE-2022-42721.
Reported-by: Sönke Huster shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de Tested-by: Sönke Huster shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de Fixes: 0b8fb8235be8 ("cfg80211: Parsing of Multiple BSSID information in scanning") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/wireless/scan.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
--- a/net/wireless/scan.c +++ b/net/wireless/scan.c @@ -425,6 +425,15 @@ cfg80211_add_nontrans_list(struct cfg802
rcu_read_unlock();
+ /* + * This is a bit weird - it's not on the list, but already on another + * one! The only way that could happen is if there's some BSSID/SSID + * shared by multiple APs in their multi-BSSID profiles, potentially + * with hidden SSID mixed in ... ignore it. + */ + if (!list_empty(&nontrans_bss->nontrans_list)) + return -EINVAL; + /* add to the list */ list_add_tail(&nontrans_bss->nontrans_list, &trans_bss->nontrans_list); return 0;
From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
commit 1833b6f46d7e2830251a063935ab464256defe22 upstream.
If the tool on the other side (e.g. wmediumd) gets confused about the rate, we hit a warning in mac80211. Silence that by effectively duplicating the check here and dropping the frame silently (in mac80211 it's dropped with the warning).
Reported-by: Sönke Huster shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de Tested-by: Sönke Huster shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c @@ -3749,6 +3749,8 @@ static int hwsim_cloned_frame_received_n
rx_status.band = channel->band; rx_status.rate_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_RX_RATE]); + if (rx_status.rate_idx >= data2->hw->wiphy->bands[rx_status.band]->n_bitrates) + goto out; rx_status.signal = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_SIGNAL]);
hdr = (void *)skb->data;
From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
commit b2d03cabe2b2e150ff5a381731ea0355459be09f upstream.
If beacon protection is active but the beacon cannot be decrypted or is otherwise malformed, we call the cfg80211 API to report this to userspace, but that uses a netdev pointer, which isn't present for P2P-Device. Fix this to call it only conditionally to ensure cfg80211 won't crash in the case of P2P-Device.
This fixes CVE-2022-42722.
Reported-by: Sönke Huster shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de Fixes: 9eaf183af741 ("mac80211: Report beacon protection failures to user space") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -1982,10 +1982,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_
if (mmie_keyidx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS || mmie_keyidx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS + - NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS) { - cfg80211_rx_unprot_mlme_mgmt(rx->sdata->dev, - skb->data, - skb->len); + NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS) { + if (rx->sdata->dev) + cfg80211_rx_unprot_mlme_mgmt(rx->sdata->dev, + skb->data, + skb->len); return RX_DROP_MONITOR; /* unexpected BIP keyidx */ }
@@ -2133,7 +2134,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_ /* either the frame has been decrypted or will be dropped */ status->flag |= RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED;
- if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_beacon(fc) && result == RX_DROP_UNUSABLE)) + if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_beacon(fc) && result == RX_DROP_UNUSABLE && + rx->sdata->dev)) cfg80211_rx_unprot_mlme_mgmt(rx->sdata->dev, skb->data, skb->len);
From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
commit c90b93b5b782891ebfda49d4e5da36632fefd5d1 upstream.
When updating beacon elements in a non-transmitted BSS, also update the hidden sub-entries to the same beacon elements, so that a future update through other paths won't trigger a WARN_ON().
The warning is triggered because the beacon elements in the hidden BSSes that are children of the BSS should always be the same as in the parent.
Reported-by: Sönke Huster shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de Tested-by: Sönke Huster shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de Fixes: 0b8fb8235be8 ("cfg80211: Parsing of Multiple BSSID information in scanning") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/wireless/scan.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/net/wireless/scan.c +++ b/net/wireless/scan.c @@ -1609,6 +1609,23 @@ struct cfg80211_non_tx_bss { u8 bssid_index; };
+static void cfg80211_update_hidden_bsses(struct cfg80211_internal_bss *known, + const struct cfg80211_bss_ies *new_ies, + const struct cfg80211_bss_ies *old_ies) +{ + struct cfg80211_internal_bss *bss; + + /* Assign beacon IEs to all sub entries */ + list_for_each_entry(bss, &known->hidden_list, hidden_list) { + const struct cfg80211_bss_ies *ies; + + ies = rcu_access_pointer(bss->pub.beacon_ies); + WARN_ON(ies != old_ies); + + rcu_assign_pointer(bss->pub.beacon_ies, new_ies); + } +} + static bool cfg80211_update_known_bss(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev, struct cfg80211_internal_bss *known, @@ -1632,7 +1649,6 @@ cfg80211_update_known_bss(struct cfg8021 kfree_rcu((struct cfg80211_bss_ies *)old, rcu_head); } else if (rcu_access_pointer(new->pub.beacon_ies)) { const struct cfg80211_bss_ies *old; - struct cfg80211_internal_bss *bss;
if (known->pub.hidden_beacon_bss && !list_empty(&known->hidden_list)) { @@ -1660,16 +1676,7 @@ cfg80211_update_known_bss(struct cfg8021 if (old == rcu_access_pointer(known->pub.ies)) rcu_assign_pointer(known->pub.ies, new->pub.beacon_ies);
- /* Assign beacon IEs to all sub entries */ - list_for_each_entry(bss, &known->hidden_list, hidden_list) { - const struct cfg80211_bss_ies *ies; - - ies = rcu_access_pointer(bss->pub.beacon_ies); - WARN_ON(ies != old); - - rcu_assign_pointer(bss->pub.beacon_ies, - new->pub.beacon_ies); - } + cfg80211_update_hidden_bsses(known, new->pub.beacon_ies, old);
if (old) kfree_rcu((struct cfg80211_bss_ies *)old, rcu_head); @@ -2319,6 +2326,8 @@ cfg80211_update_notlisted_nontrans(struc } else { old = rcu_access_pointer(nontrans_bss->beacon_ies); rcu_assign_pointer(nontrans_bss->beacon_ies, new_ies); + cfg80211_update_hidden_bsses(bss_from_pub(nontrans_bss), + new_ies, old); rcu_assign_pointer(nontrans_bss->ies, new_ies); if (old) kfree_rcu((struct cfg80211_bss_ies *)old, rcu_head);
From: Pavel Rojtberg rojtberg@gmail.com
commit b382c5e37344883dc97525d05f1f6b788f549985 upstream.
This is based on multiple commits at https://github.com/paroj/xpad
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jasper Poppe jgpoppe@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jeremy Palmer jpalmer@linz.govt.nz Signed-off-by: Ruineka ruinairas1992@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Cleber de Mattos Casali clebercasali@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kyle Gospodnetich me@kylegospodneti.ch Signed-off-by: Pavel Rojtberg rojtberg@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220818154411.510308-2-rojtberg@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ static const struct xpad_device { u8 xtype; } xpad_device[] = { { 0x0079, 0x18d4, "GPD Win 2 X-Box Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x03eb, 0xff01, "Wooting One (Legacy)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x03eb, 0xff02, "Wooting Two (Legacy)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x044f, 0x0f00, "Thrustmaster Wheel", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x044f, 0x0f03, "Thrustmaster Wheel", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x044f, 0x0f07, "Thrustmaster, Inc. Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, @@ -244,6 +246,7 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x0f0d, 0x0063, "Hori Real Arcade Pro Hayabusa (USA) Xbox One", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0f0d, 0x0067, "HORIPAD ONE", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0f0d, 0x0078, "Hori Real Arcade Pro V Kai Xbox One", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x0f0d, 0x00c5, "Hori Fighting Commander ONE", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0f30, 0x010b, "Philips Recoil", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x0f30, 0x0202, "Joytech Advanced Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x0f30, 0x8888, "BigBen XBMiniPad Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, @@ -260,6 +263,7 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x1430, 0x8888, "TX6500+ Dance Pad (first generation)", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x1430, 0xf801, "RedOctane Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x146b, 0x0601, "BigBen Interactive XBOX 360 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x146b, 0x0604, "Bigben Interactive DAIJA Arcade Stick", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1532, 0x0037, "Razer Sabertooth", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1532, 0x0a00, "Razer Atrox Arcade Stick", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x1532, 0x0a03, "Razer Wildcat", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, @@ -325,6 +329,7 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x24c6, 0x5502, "Hori Fighting Stick VX Alt", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5503, "Hori Fighting Edge", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5506, "Hori SOULCALIBUR V Stick", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x24c6, 0x5510, "Hori Fighting Commander ONE (Xbox 360/PC Mode)", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x550d, "Hori GEM Xbox controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x550e, "Hori Real Arcade Pro V Kai 360", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x551a, "PowerA FUSION Pro Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, @@ -334,6 +339,14 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x24c6, 0x5b03, "Thrustmaster Ferrari 458 Racing Wheel", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5d04, "Razer Sabertooth", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0xfafe, "Rock Candy Gamepad for Xbox 360", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x2563, 0x058d, "OneXPlayer Gamepad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x2dc8, 0x2000, "8BitDo Pro 2 Wired Controller fox Xbox", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x31e3, 0x1100, "Wooting One", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x31e3, 0x1200, "Wooting Two", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x31e3, 0x1210, "Wooting Lekker", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x31e3, 0x1220, "Wooting Two HE", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x31e3, 0x1300, "Wooting 60HE (AVR)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x31e3, 0x1310, "Wooting 60HE (ARM)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x3285, 0x0607, "Nacon GC-100", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x3767, 0x0101, "Fanatec Speedster 3 Forceshock Wheel", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0xffff, 0xffff, "Chinese-made Xbox Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, @@ -419,6 +432,7 @@ static const signed short xpad_abs_trigg static const struct usb_device_id xpad_table[] = { { USB_INTERFACE_INFO('X', 'B', 0) }, /* X-Box USB-IF not approved class */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x0079), /* GPD Win 2 Controller */ + XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x03eb), /* Wooting Keyboards (Legacy) */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x044f), /* Thrustmaster X-Box 360 controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x045e), /* Microsoft X-Box 360 controllers */ XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x045e), /* Microsoft X-Box One controllers */ @@ -429,6 +443,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id xpad_t { USB_DEVICE(0x0738, 0x4540) }, /* Mad Catz Beat Pad */ XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x0738), /* Mad Catz FightStick TE 2 */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x07ff), /* Mad Catz GamePad */ + XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x0c12), /* Zeroplus X-Box 360 controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x0e6f), /* 0x0e6f X-Box 360 controllers */ XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x0e6f), /* 0x0e6f X-Box One controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x0f0d), /* Hori Controllers */ @@ -450,8 +465,12 @@ static const struct usb_device_id xpad_t XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x20d6), /* PowerA Controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x24c6), /* PowerA Controllers */ XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x24c6), /* PowerA Controllers */ + XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x2563), /* OneXPlayer Gamepad */ + XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x260d), /* Dareu H101 */ + XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x2dc8), /* 8BitDo Pro 2 Wired Controller for Xbox */ XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x2e24), /* Hyperkin Duke X-Box One pad */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x2f24), /* GameSir Controllers */ + XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x31e3), /* Wooting Keyboards */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x3285), /* Nacon GC-100 */ { } };
From: Cameron Gutman aicommander@gmail.com
commit a17b9841152e7f4621619902b347e2cc39c32996 upstream.
Suspending and resuming the system can sometimes cause the out URB to get hung after a reset_resume. This causes LED setting and force feedback to break on resume. To avoid this, just drop the reset_resume callback so the USB core rebinds xpad to the wireless pads on resume if a reset happened.
A nice side effect of this change is the LED ring on wireless controllers is now set correctly on system resume.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4220f7db1e42 ("Input: xpad - workaround dead irq_out after suspend/ resume") Signed-off-by: Cameron Gutman aicommander@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Rojtberg rojtberg@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220818154411.510308-3-rojtberg@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -1991,7 +1991,6 @@ static struct usb_driver xpad_driver = { .disconnect = xpad_disconnect, .suspend = xpad_suspend, .resume = xpad_resume, - .reset_resume = xpad_resume, .id_table = xpad_table, };
From: Shunsuke Mie mie@igel.co.jp
commit 3e42deaac06567c7e86d287c305ccda24db4ae3d upstream.
Each transfer test functions have same parameter checking code. This patch unites those to an introduced function.
Signed-off-by: Shunsuke Mie mie@igel.co.jp Cc: stable stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220907020100.122588-1-mie@igel.co.jp Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c +++ b/drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c @@ -332,6 +332,17 @@ static bool pci_endpoint_test_msi_irq(st return false; }
+static int pci_endpoint_test_validate_xfer_params(struct device *dev, + struct pci_endpoint_test_xfer_param *param, size_t alignment) +{ + if (param->size > SIZE_MAX - alignment) { + dev_dbg(dev, "Maximum transfer data size exceeded\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static bool pci_endpoint_test_copy(struct pci_endpoint_test *test, unsigned long arg) { @@ -363,9 +374,11 @@ static bool pci_endpoint_test_copy(struc return false; }
+ err = pci_endpoint_test_validate_xfer_params(dev, ¶m, alignment); + if (err) + return false; + size = param.size; - if (size > SIZE_MAX - alignment) - goto err;
use_dma = !!(param.flags & PCITEST_FLAGS_USE_DMA); if (use_dma) @@ -497,9 +510,11 @@ static bool pci_endpoint_test_write(stru return false; }
+ err = pci_endpoint_test_validate_xfer_params(dev, ¶m, alignment); + if (err) + return false; + size = param.size; - if (size > SIZE_MAX - alignment) - goto err;
use_dma = !!(param.flags & PCITEST_FLAGS_USE_DMA); if (use_dma) @@ -595,9 +610,11 @@ static bool pci_endpoint_test_read(struc return false; }
+ err = pci_endpoint_test_validate_xfer_params(dev, ¶m, alignment); + if (err) + return false; + size = param.size; - if (size > SIZE_MAX - alignment) - goto err;
use_dma = !!(param.flags & PCITEST_FLAGS_USE_DMA); if (use_dma)
From: Shunsuke Mie mie@igel.co.jp
commit 8e30538eca016de8e252bef174beadecd64239f0 upstream.
The dma_map_single() doesn't permit zero length mapping. It causes a follow panic.
A panic was reported on arm64:
[ 60.137988] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 60.142630] kernel BUG at kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:624! [ 60.147508] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 60.152992] Modules linked in: dw_hdmi_cec crct10dif_ce simple_bridge rcar_fdp1 vsp1 rcar_vin videobuf2_vmalloc rcar_csi2 v4l 2_mem2mem videobuf2_dma_contig videobuf2_memops pci_endpoint_test videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common rcar_fcp v4l2_fwnode v4l2_asyn c videodev mc gpio_bd9571mwv max9611 pwm_rcar ccree at24 authenc libdes phy_rcar_gen3_usb3 usb_dmac display_connector pwm_bl [ 60.186252] CPU: 0 PID: 508 Comm: pcitest Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1rpci-dev+ #237 [ 60.193387] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77951 (DT) [ 60.201302] pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 60.208263] pc : swiotlb_tbl_map_single+0x2c0/0x590 [ 60.213149] lr : swiotlb_map+0x88/0x1f0 [ 60.216982] sp : ffff80000a883bc0 [ 60.220292] x29: ffff80000a883bc0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 60.227430] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0004c0da20d0 x24: ffff80000a1f77c0 [ 60.234567] x23: 0000000000000002 x22: 0001000040000010 x21: 000000007a000000 [ 60.241703] x20: 0000000000200000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 60.248840] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff0006ff7b9180 [ 60.255977] x14: ffff0006ff7b9180 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 60.263113] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 [ 60.270249] x8 : 0001000000000010 x7 : ffff0004c6754b20 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 60.277385] x5 : ffff0004c0da2090 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001 [ 60.284521] x2 : 0000000040000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000040000010 [ 60.291658] Call trace: [ 60.294100] swiotlb_tbl_map_single+0x2c0/0x590 [ 60.298629] swiotlb_map+0x88/0x1f0 [ 60.302115] dma_map_page_attrs+0x188/0x230 [ 60.306299] pci_endpoint_test_ioctl+0x5e4/0xd90 [pci_endpoint_test] [ 60.312660] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xf0 [ 60.316583] invoke_syscall+0x44/0x108 [ 60.320334] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xcc/0xf0 [ 60.325038] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xb8 [ 60.328351] el0_svc+0x2c/0x88 [ 60.331406] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb8/0xc0 [ 60.335587] el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 [ 60.339251] Code: 52800013 d2e00414 35fff45c d503201f (d4210000) [ 60.345344] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
To fix it, this patch adds a checking the payload length if it is zero.
Fixes: 343dc693f7b7 ("misc: pci_endpoint_test: Prevent some integer overflows") Cc: stable stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shunsuke Mie mie@igel.co.jp Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220907020100.122588-2-mie@igel.co.jp Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c +++ b/drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c @@ -335,6 +335,11 @@ static bool pci_endpoint_test_msi_irq(st static int pci_endpoint_test_validate_xfer_params(struct device *dev, struct pci_endpoint_test_xfer_param *param, size_t alignment) { + if (!param->size) { + dev_dbg(dev, "Data size is zero\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (param->size > SIZE_MAX - alignment) { dev_dbg(dev, "Maximum transfer data size exceeded\n"); return -EINVAL;
On 10/13/22 10:52, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.74 release. There are 27 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Oct 2022 17:51:33 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.74-rc1... or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli f.fainelli@gmail.com
On Thu, Oct 13, 2022 at 07:52:29PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.74 release. There are 27 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Successfully cross-compiled for arm64 (bcm2711_defconfig, GCC 10.2.0) and powerpc (ps3_defconfig, GCC 12.1.0).
Tested-by: Bagas Sanjaya bagasdotme@gmail.com
On 10/13/22 11:52, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.74 release. There are 27 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Oct 2022 17:51:33 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.74-rc1... or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.15.y and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
Tested-by: Shuah Khan skhan@linuxfoundation.org
thanks, -- Shuah
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Bagas Sanjaya -
Florian Fainelli -
Greg Kroah-Hartman -
Shuah Khan