Before this change, a test runner using this self test would see a return code of 0 when the tests using a child process (namely the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC tests) failed, masking test failures.

Fixes: 11f75a01448f ("selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC") Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu jeffxu@google.com Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com --- tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c index dbdd9ec5e397..8eb49204f9ea 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c @@ -1207,7 +1207,24 @@ static pid_t spawn_newpid_thread(unsigned int flags, int (*fn)(void *))

static void join_newpid_thread(pid_t pid) { - waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); + int wstatus; + + if (waitpid(pid, &wstatus, 0) < 0) { + printf("newpid thread: waitpid() failed: %m\n"); + abort(); + } + + if (WIFEXITED(wstatus) && WEXITSTATUS(wstatus) != 0) { + printf("newpid thread: exited with non-zero error code %d\n", + WEXITSTATUS(wstatus)); + abort(); + } + + if (WIFSIGNALED(wstatus)) { + printf("newpid thread: killed by signal %d\n", + WTERMSIG(wstatus)); + abort(); + } }

/*

Given the difficulty of auditing all of userspace to figure out whether every memfd_create() user has switched to passing MFD_EXEC and MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL flags, it seems far less distruptive to make it possible for older programs that don't make use of executable memfds to run under vm.memfd_noexec=2. Otherwise, a small dependency change can result in spurious errors. For programs that don't use executable memfds, passing MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is functionally a no-op and thus having the same

In addition, every failure under vm.memfd_noexec=2 needs to print to the kernel log so that userspace can figure out where the error came from. The concerns about pr_warn_ratelimited() spam that caused the switch to pr_warn_once()[1,2] do not apply to the vm.memfd_noexec=2 case.

This is a user-visible API change, but as it allows programs to do something that would be blocked before, and the sysctl itself was broken and recently released, it seems unlikely this will cause any issues.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/Y5yS8wCnuYGLHMj4@x1n/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/202212161233.85C9783FB@keescook/

Cc: Dominique Martinet asmadeus@codewreck.org Cc: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.3+ Fixes: 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com --- include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 16 ++++------------ mm/memfd.c | 30 +++++++++++------------------- tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h index c758809d5bcf..53974d79d98e 100644 --- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h @@ -17,18 +17,10 @@ struct fs_pin;

#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) -/* - * sysctl for vm.memfd_noexec - * 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL - * acts like MFD_EXEC was set. - * 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL - * acts like MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set. - * 2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be - * rejected. - */ -#define MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC 0 -#define MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL 1 -#define MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED 2 +/* modes for vm.memfd_noexec sysctl */ +#define MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC 0 /* MFD_EXEC implied if unset */ +#define MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL 1 /* MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL implied if unset */ +#define MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED 2 /* same as 1, except MFD_EXEC rejected */ #endif

struct pid_namespace { diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c index 0bdbd2335af7..d65485c762de 100644 --- a/mm/memfd.c +++ b/mm/memfd.c @@ -271,30 +271,22 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned int arg) static int check_sysctl_memfd_noexec(unsigned int *flags) { #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL - char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; - int sysctl = MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC; - struct pid_namespace *ns; - - ns = task_active_pid_ns(current); - if (ns) - sysctl = ns->memfd_noexec_scope; + int sysctl = task_active_pid_ns(current)->memfd_noexec_scope;

if (!(*flags & (MFD_EXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL))) { - if (sysctl == MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL) + if (sysctl >= MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL) *flags |= MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL; else *flags |= MFD_EXEC; }

- if (*flags & MFD_EXEC && sysctl >= MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED) { - pr_warn_once( - "memfd_create(): MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is enforced, pid=%d '%s'\n", - task_pid_nr(current), get_task_comm(comm, current)); - + if (!(*flags & MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL) && sysctl >= MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED) { + pr_err_ratelimited( + "%s[%d]: memfd_create() requires MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL with vm.memfd_noexec=%d\n", + current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), sysctl); return -EACCES; } #endif - return 0; }

@@ -302,7 +294,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, const char __user *, uname, unsigned int, flags) { - char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; unsigned int *file_seals; struct file *file; int fd, error; @@ -325,12 +316,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,

if (!(flags & (MFD_EXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL))) { pr_warn_once( - "memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, pid=%d '%s'\n", - task_pid_nr(current), get_task_comm(comm, current)); + "%s[%d]: memfd_create() called without MFD_EXEC or MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL set\n", + current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); }

- if (check_sysctl_memfd_noexec(&flags) < 0) - return -EACCES; + error = check_sysctl_memfd_noexec(&flags); + if (error < 0) + return error;

/* length includes terminating zero */ len = strnlen_user(uname, MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN + 1); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c index 8eb49204f9ea..8b7390ad81d1 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c @@ -1145,11 +1145,23 @@ static void test_sysctl_child(void)

printf("%s sysctl 2\n", memfd_str); sysctl_assert_write("2"); - mfd_fail_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2", - MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); - mfd_fail_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_MFD_EXEC", - MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_EXEC); - fd = mfd_assert_new("", 0, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL); + mfd_fail_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_exec", + MFD_EXEC | MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); + + fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_dfl", + mfd_def_size, + MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); + mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666); + mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC); + mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777); + close(fd); + + fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_noexec_seal", + mfd_def_size, + MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL | MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); + mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666); + mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC); + mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777); close(fd);

sysctl_fail_write("0");

This sysctl has the very unusual behaviour of not allowing any user (even CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to reduce the restriction setting, meaning that if you were to set this sysctl to a more restrictive option in the host pidns you would need to reboot your machine in order to reset it.

The justification given in [1] is that this is a security feature and thus it should not be possible to disable. Aside from the fact that we have plenty of security-related sysctls that can be disabled after being enabled (fs.protected_symlinks for instance), the protection provided by the sysctl is to stop users from being able to create a binary and then execute it. A user with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can trivially do this without memfd_create(2):

% cat mount-memfd.c #include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/mount.h>

#define SHELLCODE "#!/bin/echo this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs:"

int main(void) { int fsfd = fsopen("tmpfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC); assert(fsfd >= 0); assert(!fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 2));

int dfd = fsmount(fsfd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, 0); assert(dfd >= 0);

int execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0782); assert(execfd >= 0); assert(write(execfd, SHELLCODE, strlen(SHELLCODE)) == strlen(SHELLCODE)); assert(!close(execfd));

char *execpath = NULL; char *argv[] = { "bad-exe", NULL }, *envp[] = { NULL }; execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); assert(execfd >= 0); assert(asprintf(&execpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", execfd) > 0); assert(!execve(execpath, argv, envp)); } % ./mount-memfd this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs: /proc/self/fd/5 %

Given that it is possible for CAP_SYS_ADMIN users to create executable binaries without memfd_create(2) and without touching the host filesystem (not to mention the many other things a CAP_SYS_ADMIN process would be able to do that would be equivalent or worse), it seems strange to cause a fair amount of headache to admins when there doesn't appear to be an actual security benefit to blocking this. There appear to be concerns about confused-deputy-esque attacks[2] but a confused deputy that can write to arbitrary sysctls is a bigger security issue than executable memfds.

/* New API */

The primary requirement from the original author appears to be more based on the need to be able to restrict an entire system in a hierarchical manner[3], such that child namespaces cannot re-enable executable memfds.

So, implement that behaviour explicitly -- the vm.memfd_noexec scope is evaluated up the pidns tree to &init_pid_ns and you have the most restrictive value applied to you. The new lower limit you can set vm.memfd_noexec is whatever limit applies to your parent.

Note that a pidns will inherit a copy of the parent pidns's effective vm.memfd_noexec setting at unshare() time. This matches the existing behaviour, and it also ensures that a pidns will never have its vm.memfd_noexec setting *lowered* behind its back (but it will be raised if the parent raises theirs).

/* Backwards Compatibility */

As the previous version of the sysctl didn't allow you to lower the setting at all, there are no backwards compatibility issues with this aspect of the change.

However it should be noted that now that the setting is completely hierarchical. Previously, a cloned pidns would just copy the current pidns setting, meaning that if the parent's vm.memfd_noexec was changed it wouldn't propoagate to existing pid namespaces. Now, the restriction applies recursively. This is a uAPI change, however:

* The sysctl is very new, having been merged in 6.3. * Several aspects of the sysctl were broken up until this patchset and the other patchset by Jeff Xu last month.

And thus it seems incredibly unlikely that any real users would run into this issue. In the worst case, if this causes userspace isues we could make it so that modifying the setting follows the hierarchical rules but the restriction checking uses the cached copy.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/CABi2SkWnAgHK1i6iqSqPMYuNEhtHBkO8jUuCvmG3RmUB5TKHJw@... [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/CALmYWFs_dNCzw_pW1yRAo4bGCPEtykroEQaowNULp7svwMLjOg@... [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/CALmYWFuahdUF7cT4cm7_TGLqPanuHXJ-hVSfZt7vpTnc18DPrw@...

Cc: Dominique Martinet asmadeus@codewreck.org Cc: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.3+ Fixes: 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com --- include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/pid.c | 3 +++ kernel/pid_namespace.c | 6 +++--- kernel/pid_sysctl.h | 28 ++++++++++++---------------- mm/memfd.c | 3 ++- 5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h index 53974d79d98e..f9f9931e02d6 100644 --- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ struct pid_namespace { int reboot; /* group exit code if this pidns was rebooted */ struct ns_common ns; #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) - /* sysctl for vm.memfd_noexec */ int memfd_noexec_scope; #endif } __randomize_layout; @@ -56,6 +55,23 @@ static inline struct pid_namespace *get_pid_ns(struct pid_namespace *ns) return ns; }

+#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) +static inline int pidns_memfd_noexec_scope(struct pid_namespace *ns) +{ + int scope = MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC; + + for (; ns; ns = ns->parent) + scope = max(scope, READ_ONCE(ns->memfd_noexec_scope)); + + return scope; +} +#else +static inline int pidns_memfd_noexec_scope(struct pid_namespace *ns) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + extern struct pid_namespace *copy_pid_ns(unsigned long flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct pid_namespace *ns); extern void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns); @@ -70,6 +86,11 @@ static inline struct pid_namespace *get_pid_ns(struct pid_namespace *ns) return ns; }

+static inline int pidns_memfd_noexec_scope(struct pid_namespace *ns) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline struct pid_namespace *copy_pid_ns(unsigned long flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct pid_namespace *ns) { diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c index 6a1d23a11026..fee14a4486a3 100644 --- a/kernel/pid.c +++ b/kernel/pid.c @@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ struct pid_namespace init_pid_ns = { #ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS .ns.ops = &pidns_operations, #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) + .memfd_noexec_scope = MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC, +#endif }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_pid_ns);

diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c index 0bf44afe04dd..619972c78774 100644 --- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c @@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ static struct pid_namespace *create_pid_namespace(struct user_namespace *user_ns ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns); ns->ucounts = ucounts; ns->pid_allocated = PIDNS_ADDING; - - initialize_memfd_noexec_scope(ns); - +#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) + ns->memfd_noexec_scope = pidns_memfd_noexec_scope(parent_pid_ns); +#endif return ns;

out_free_idr: diff --git a/kernel/pid_sysctl.h b/kernel/pid_sysctl.h index b26e027fc9cd..2ee41a3a1dfd 100644 --- a/kernel/pid_sysctl.h +++ b/kernel/pid_sysctl.h @@ -5,33 +5,30 @@ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>

#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) -static inline void initialize_memfd_noexec_scope(struct pid_namespace *ns) -{ - ns->memfd_noexec_scope = - task_active_pid_ns(current)->memfd_noexec_scope; -} - static int pid_mfd_noexec_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buf, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { struct pid_namespace *ns = task_active_pid_ns(current); struct ctl_table table_copy; + int err, scope, parent_scope;

if (write && !ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM;

table_copy = *table; - if (ns != &init_pid_ns) - table_copy.data = &ns->memfd_noexec_scope;

- /* - * set minimum to current value, the effect is only bigger - * value is accepted. - */ - if (*(int *)table_copy.data > *(int *)table_copy.extra1) - table_copy.extra1 = table_copy.data; + /* You cannot set a lower enforcement value than your parent. */ + parent_scope = pidns_memfd_noexec_scope(ns->parent); + /* Equivalent to pidns_memfd_noexec_scope(ns). */ + scope = max(READ_ONCE(ns->memfd_noexec_scope), parent_scope); + + table_copy.data = &scope; + table_copy.extra1 = &parent_scope;

- return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buf, lenp, ppos); + err = proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buf, lenp, ppos); + if (!err && write) + WRITE_ONCE(ns->memfd_noexec_scope, scope); + return err; }

static struct ctl_table pid_ns_ctl_table_vm[] = { @@ -51,7 +48,6 @@ static inline void register_pid_ns_sysctl_table_vm(void) register_sysctl("vm", pid_ns_ctl_table_vm); } #else -static inline void initialize_memfd_noexec_scope(struct pid_namespace *ns) {} static inline void register_pid_ns_sysctl_table_vm(void) {} #endif

diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c index aa46521057ab..1cad1904fc26 100644 --- a/mm/memfd.c +++ b/mm/memfd.c @@ -271,7 +271,8 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned int arg) static int check_sysctl_memfd_noexec(unsigned int *flags) { #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL - int sysctl = task_active_pid_ns(current)->memfd_noexec_scope; + struct pid_namespace *ns = task_active_pid_ns(current); + int sysctl = pidns_memfd_noexec_scope(ns);

if (!(*flags & (MFD_EXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL))) { if (sysctl >= MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL)

This adds proper tests for the nesting functionality of vm.memfd_noexec as well as some minor cleanups to spawn_*_thread().

Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com --- tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 339 +++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 254 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c index 8b7390ad81d1..3df008677239 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> +#include <ctype.h>

#include "common.h"

@@ -43,7 +44,6 @@ */ static size_t mfd_def_size = MFD_DEF_SIZE; static const char *memfd_str = MEMFD_STR; -static pid_t spawn_newpid_thread(unsigned int flags, int (*fn)(void *)); static int newpid_thread_fn2(void *arg); static void join_newpid_thread(pid_t pid);

@@ -96,12 +96,12 @@ static void sysctl_assert_write(const char *val) int fd = open("/proc/sys/vm/memfd_noexec", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);

if (fd < 0) { - printf("open sysctl failed\n"); + printf("open sysctl failed: %m\n"); abort(); }

if (write(fd, val, strlen(val)) < 0) { - printf("write sysctl failed\n"); + printf("write sysctl %s failed: %m\n", val); abort(); } } @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static void sysctl_fail_write(const char *val) int fd = open("/proc/sys/vm/memfd_noexec", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);

if (fd < 0) { - printf("open sysctl failed\n"); + printf("open sysctl failed: %m\n"); abort(); }

@@ -122,6 +122,33 @@ static void sysctl_fail_write(const char *val) } }

+static void sysctl_assert_equal(const char *val) +{ + char *p, buf[128] = {}; + int fd = open("/proc/sys/vm/memfd_noexec", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + + if (fd < 0) { + printf("open sysctl failed: %m\n"); + abort(); + } + + if (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) { + printf("read sysctl failed: %m\n"); + abort(); + } + + /* Strip trailing whitespace. */ + p = buf; + while (!isspace(*p)) + p++; + *p = '\0'; + + if (strcmp(buf, val) != 0) { + printf("unexpected sysctl value: expected %s, got %s\n", val, buf); + abort(); + } +} + static int mfd_assert_reopen_fd(int fd_in) { int fd; @@ -736,7 +763,7 @@ static int idle_thread_fn(void *arg) return 0; }

-static pid_t spawn_idle_thread(unsigned int flags) +static pid_t spawn_thread(unsigned int flags, int (*fn)(void *), void *arg) { uint8_t *stack; pid_t pid; @@ -747,10 +774,7 @@ static pid_t spawn_idle_thread(unsigned int flags) abort(); }

- pid = clone(idle_thread_fn, - stack + STACK_SIZE, - SIGCHLD | flags, - NULL); + pid = clone(fn, stack + STACK_SIZE, SIGCHLD | flags, arg); if (pid < 0) { printf("clone() failed: %m\n"); abort(); @@ -759,6 +783,33 @@ static pid_t spawn_idle_thread(unsigned int flags) return pid; }

+static void join_thread(pid_t pid) +{ + int wstatus; + + if (waitpid(pid, &wstatus, 0) < 0) { + printf("newpid thread: waitpid() failed: %m\n"); + abort(); + } + + if (WIFEXITED(wstatus) && WEXITSTATUS(wstatus) != 0) { + printf("newpid thread: exited with non-zero error code %d\n", + WEXITSTATUS(wstatus)); + abort(); + } + + if (WIFSIGNALED(wstatus)) { + printf("newpid thread: killed by signal %d\n", + WTERMSIG(wstatus)); + abort(); + } +} + +static pid_t spawn_idle_thread(unsigned int flags) +{ + return spawn_thread(flags, idle_thread_fn, NULL); +} + static void join_idle_thread(pid_t pid) { kill(pid, SIGTERM); @@ -1111,42 +1162,69 @@ static void test_noexec_seal(void) close(fd); }

-static void test_sysctl_child(void) +static void test_sysctl_sysctl0(void) { int fd; - int pid;

- printf("%s sysctl 0\n", memfd_str); - sysctl_assert_write("0"); - fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_0", + sysctl_assert_equal("0"); + + fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_0_dfl", mfd_def_size, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); - mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0777); mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0); mfd_assert_chmod(fd, 0644); close(fd); +}

- printf("%s sysctl 1\n", memfd_str); - sysctl_assert_write("1"); - fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_1", +static void test_sysctl_set_sysctl0(void) +{ + sysctl_assert_write("0"); + test_sysctl_sysctl0(); +} + +static void test_sysctl_sysctl1(void) +{ + int fd; + + sysctl_assert_equal("1"); + + fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_1_dfl", mfd_def_size, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); + mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666); + mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC); + mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777); + close(fd);

- printf("%s child ns\n", memfd_str); - pid = spawn_newpid_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, newpid_thread_fn2); - join_newpid_thread(pid); + fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_1_exec", + mfd_def_size, + MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_EXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); + mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0777); + mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0); + mfd_assert_chmod(fd, 0644); + close(fd);

+ fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_1_noexec", + mfd_def_size, + MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666); mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC); mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777); - sysctl_fail_write("0"); close(fd); +}

- printf("%s sysctl 2\n", memfd_str); - sysctl_assert_write("2"); - mfd_fail_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_exec", - MFD_EXEC | MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); +static void test_sysctl_set_sysctl1(void) +{ + sysctl_assert_write("1"); + test_sysctl_sysctl1(); +} + +static void test_sysctl_sysctl2(void) +{ + int fd; + + sysctl_assert_equal("2");

fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_dfl", mfd_def_size, @@ -1156,98 +1234,188 @@ static void test_sysctl_child(void) mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777); close(fd);

- fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_noexec_seal", + mfd_fail_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_exec", + MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_EXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); + + fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_noexec", mfd_def_size, - MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL | MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); + MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666); mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC); mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777); close(fd); - - sysctl_fail_write("0"); - sysctl_fail_write("1"); }

-static int newpid_thread_fn(void *arg) +static void test_sysctl_set_sysctl2(void) { - test_sysctl_child(); - return 0; + sysctl_assert_write("2"); + test_sysctl_sysctl2(); }

-static void test_sysctl_child2(void) +static int sysctl_simple_child(void *arg) { int fd; + int pid;

- sysctl_fail_write("0"); - fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_1", - mfd_def_size, - MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); + printf("%s sysctl 0\n", memfd_str); + test_sysctl_set_sysctl0();

- mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666); - mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC); - mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777); - close(fd); + printf("%s sysctl 1\n", memfd_str); + test_sysctl_set_sysctl1(); + + printf("%s sysctl 0\n", memfd_str); + test_sysctl_set_sysctl0(); + + printf("%s sysctl 2\n", memfd_str); + test_sysctl_set_sysctl2(); + + printf("%s sysctl 1\n", memfd_str); + test_sysctl_set_sysctl1(); + + printf("%s sysctl 0\n", memfd_str); + test_sysctl_set_sysctl0(); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Test sysctl + * A very basic test to make sure the core sysctl semantics work. + */ +static void test_sysctl_simple(void) +{ + int pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_simple_child, NULL); + + join_thread(pid); }

-static int newpid_thread_fn2(void *arg) +static int sysctl_nested(void *arg) { - test_sysctl_child2(); + void (*fn)(void) = arg; + + fn(); return 0; } -static pid_t spawn_newpid_thread(unsigned int flags, int (*fn)(void *)) + +static int sysctl_nested_wait(void *arg) { - uint8_t *stack; - pid_t pid; + /* Wait for a SIGCONT. */ + kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); + return sysctl_nested(arg); +}

- stack = malloc(STACK_SIZE); - if (!stack) { - printf("malloc(STACK_SIZE) failed: %m\n"); - abort(); - } +static void test_sysctl_sysctl1_failset(void) +{ + sysctl_fail_write("0"); + test_sysctl_sysctl1(); +}

- pid = clone(fn, - stack + STACK_SIZE, - SIGCHLD | flags, - NULL); - if (pid < 0) { - printf("clone() failed: %m\n"); - abort(); - } +static void test_sysctl_sysctl2_failset(void) +{ + sysctl_fail_write("1"); + test_sysctl_sysctl2();

- return pid; + sysctl_fail_write("0"); + test_sysctl_sysctl2(); }

-static void join_newpid_thread(pid_t pid) +static int sysctl_nested_child(void *arg) { - int wstatus; + int fd; + int pid;

- if (waitpid(pid, &wstatus, 0) < 0) { - printf("newpid thread: waitpid() failed: %m\n"); - abort(); - } + printf("%s nested sysctl 0\n", memfd_str); + sysctl_assert_write("0"); + /* A further nested pidns works the same. */ + pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_simple_child, NULL); + join_thread(pid);

- if (WIFEXITED(wstatus) && WEXITSTATUS(wstatus) != 0) { - printf("newpid thread: exited with non-zero error code %d\n", - WEXITSTATUS(wstatus)); - abort(); - } + printf("%s nested sysctl 1\n", memfd_str); + sysctl_assert_write("1"); + /* Child inherits our setting. */ + pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested, test_sysctl_sysctl1); + join_thread(pid); + /* Child cannot raise the setting. */ + pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested, + test_sysctl_sysctl1_failset); + join_thread(pid); + /* Child can lower the setting. */ + pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested, + test_sysctl_set_sysctl2); + join_thread(pid); + /* Child lowering the setting has no effect on our setting. */ + test_sysctl_sysctl1(); + + printf("%s nested sysctl 2\n", memfd_str); + sysctl_assert_write("2"); + /* Child inherits our setting. */ + pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested, test_sysctl_sysctl2); + join_thread(pid); + /* Child cannot raise the setting. */ + pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested, + test_sysctl_sysctl2_failset); + join_thread(pid); + + /* Verify that the rules are actually inherited after fork. */ + printf("%s nested sysctl 0 -> 1 after fork\n", memfd_str); + sysctl_assert_write("0");

- if (WIFSIGNALED(wstatus)) { - printf("newpid thread: killed by signal %d\n", - WTERMSIG(wstatus)); - abort(); - } + pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested_wait, + test_sysctl_sysctl1_failset); + sysctl_assert_write("1"); + kill(pid, SIGCONT); + join_thread(pid); + + printf("%s nested sysctl 0 -> 2 after fork\n", memfd_str); + sysctl_assert_write("0"); + + pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested_wait, + test_sysctl_sysctl2_failset); + sysctl_assert_write("2"); + kill(pid, SIGCONT); + join_thread(pid); + + /* + * Verify that the current effective setting is saved on fork, meaning + * that the parent lowering the sysctl doesn't affect already-forked + * children. + */ + printf("%s nested sysctl 2 -> 1 after fork\n", memfd_str); + sysctl_assert_write("2"); + pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested_wait, + test_sysctl_sysctl2); + sysctl_assert_write("1"); + kill(pid, SIGCONT); + join_thread(pid); + + printf("%s nested sysctl 2 -> 0 after fork\n", memfd_str); + sysctl_assert_write("2"); + pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested_wait, + test_sysctl_sysctl2); + sysctl_assert_write("0"); + kill(pid, SIGCONT); + join_thread(pid); + + printf("%s nested sysctl 1 -> 0 after fork\n", memfd_str); + sysctl_assert_write("1"); + pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested_wait, + test_sysctl_sysctl1); + sysctl_assert_write("0"); + kill(pid, SIGCONT); + join_thread(pid); + + return 0; }

/* - * Test sysctl - * A very basic sealing test to see whether setting/retrieving seals works. + * Test sysctl with nested pid namespaces + * Make sure that the sysctl nesting semantics work correctly. */ -static void test_sysctl(void) +static void test_sysctl_nested(void) { - int pid = spawn_newpid_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, newpid_thread_fn); + int pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested_child, NULL);

- join_newpid_thread(pid); + join_thread(pid); }

/* @@ -1433,6 +1601,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) test_seal_grow(); test_seal_resize();

+ test_sysctl_simple(); + test_sysctl_nested(); + test_share_dup("SHARE-DUP", ""); test_share_mmap("SHARE-MMAP", ""); test_share_open("SHARE-OPEN", ""); @@ -1447,8 +1618,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) test_share_fork("SHARE-FORK", SHARED_FT_STR); join_idle_thread(pid);

- test_sysctl(); - printf("memfd: DONE\n");

return 0;