3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com

commit 62ef68bb4d00f1a662e487f3fc44ce8521c416aa upstream.

We will want to filter away MSR_IA32_SMBASE from the emulated_msrs if the host CPU does not support SMM virtualization. Introduce the logic to do that, and also move paravirt MSRs to emulated_msrs for simplicity and to get rid of KVM_SAVE_MSRS_BEGIN.

Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář rkrcmar@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -876,17 +876,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_rdpmc); * * This list is modified at module load time to reflect the * capabilities of the host cpu. This capabilities test skips MSRs that are - * kvm-specific. Those are put in the beginning of the list. + * kvm-specific. Those are put in emulated_msrs; filtering of emulated_msrs + * may depend on host virtualization features rather than host cpu features. */

-#define KVM_SAVE_MSRS_BEGIN 12 static u32 msrs_to_save[] = { - MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME, MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK, - MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW, MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW, - HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID, HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL, - HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT, HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC, - HV_X64_MSR_APIC_ASSIST_PAGE, MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN, MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME, - MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_STAR, #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 @@ -899,7 +893,14 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = {

static unsigned num_msrs_to_save;

-static const u32 emulated_msrs[] = { +static u32 emulated_msrs[] = { + MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME, MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK, + MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW, MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW, + HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID, HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL, + HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT, HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC, + HV_X64_MSR_APIC_ASSIST_PAGE, MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN, MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME, + MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN, + MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST, MSR_IA32_TSCDEADLINE, MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, @@ -907,6 +908,8 @@ static const u32 emulated_msrs[] = { MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL, };

+static unsigned num_emulated_msrs; + bool kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer) { if (efer & efer_reserved_bits) @@ -2774,7 +2777,7 @@ long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *fil if (copy_from_user(&msr_list, user_msr_list, sizeof msr_list)) goto out; n = msr_list.nmsrs; - msr_list.nmsrs = num_msrs_to_save + ARRAY_SIZE(emulated_msrs); + msr_list.nmsrs = num_msrs_to_save + num_emulated_msrs; if (copy_to_user(user_msr_list, &msr_list, sizeof msr_list)) goto out; r = -E2BIG; @@ -2786,7 +2789,7 @@ long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *fil goto out; if (copy_to_user(user_msr_list->indices + num_msrs_to_save, &emulated_msrs, - ARRAY_SIZE(emulated_msrs) * sizeof(u32))) + num_emulated_msrs * sizeof(u32))) goto out; r = 0; break; @@ -4009,8 +4012,7 @@ static void kvm_init_msr_list(void) u32 dummy[2]; unsigned i, j;

- /* skip the first msrs in the list. KVM-specific */ - for (i = j = KVM_SAVE_MSRS_BEGIN; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save); i++) { + for (i = j = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save); i++) { if (rdmsr_safe(msrs_to_save[i], &dummy[0], &dummy[1]) < 0) continue;

@@ -4035,6 +4037,18 @@ static void kvm_init_msr_list(void) j++; } num_msrs_to_save = j; + + for (i = j = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(emulated_msrs); i++) { + switch (emulated_msrs[i]) { + default: + break; + } + + if (j < i) + emulated_msrs[j] = emulated_msrs[i]; + j++; + } + num_emulated_msrs = j; }

static int vcpu_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, int len,

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com

commit 3c9fa24ca7c9c47605672916491f79e8ccacb9e6 upstream.

The functions that were used in the emulation of fxrstor, fxsave, sgdt and sidt were originally meant for task switching, and as such they did not check privilege levels. This is very bad when the same functions are used in the emulation of unprivileged instructions. This is CVE-2018-10853.

The obvious fix is to add a new argument to ops->read_std and ops->write_std, which decides whether the access is a "system" access or should use the processor's CPL.

Fixes: 129a72a0d3c8 ("KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std", 2017-01-12) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com [bwh: Backported to 3.16: Drop change in handle_ud()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h @@ -104,11 +104,12 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops { * @addr: [IN ] Linear address from which to read. * @val: [OUT] Value read from memory, zero-extended to 'u_long'. * @bytes: [IN ] Number of bytes to read from memory. + * @system:[IN ] Whether the access is forced to be at CPL0. */ int (*read_std)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned long addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes, - struct x86_exception *fault); + struct x86_exception *fault, bool system);

/* * write_std: Write bytes of standard (non-emulated/special) memory. @@ -116,10 +117,11 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops { * @addr: [IN ] Linear address to which to write. * @val: [OUT] Value write to memory, zero-extended to 'u_long'. * @bytes: [IN ] Number of bytes to write to memory. + * @system:[IN ] Whether the access is forced to be at CPL0. */ int (*write_std)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned long addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes, - struct x86_exception *fault); + struct x86_exception *fault, bool system); /* * fetch: Read bytes of standard (non-emulated/special) memory. * Used for instruction fetch. --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -734,14 +734,14 @@ static int linearize(struct x86_emulate_ static int linear_read_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong linear, void *data, unsigned size) { - return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception); + return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true); }

static int linear_write_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong linear, void *data, unsigned int size) { - return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception); + return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true); }

static int segmented_read_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, @@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ static int segmented_read_std(struct x86 rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, false, &linear); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; - return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception); + return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, false); }

static int segmented_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, @@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ static int segmented_write_std(struct x8 rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, true, &linear); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; - return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception); + return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, false); }

/* @@ -2472,12 +2472,12 @@ static bool emulator_io_port_access_allo #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 base |= ((u64)base3) << 32; #endif - r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2, NULL); + r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2, NULL, true); if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return false; if (io_bitmap_ptr + port/8 > desc_limit_scaled(&tr_seg)) return false; - r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2, NULL); + r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2, NULL, true); if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return false; if ((perm >> bit_idx) & mask) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -4191,10 +4191,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_read_guest_virt);

static int emulator_read_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes, - struct x86_exception *exception) + struct x86_exception *exception, bool system) { struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt); - return kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, 0, exception); + u32 access = 0; + + if (!system && kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) == 3) + access |= PFERR_USER_MASK; + + return kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, access, exception); }

static int kvm_write_guest_virt_helper(gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes, @@ -4229,12 +4234,17 @@ out: }

static int emulator_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gva_t addr, void *val, - unsigned int bytes, struct x86_exception *exception) + unsigned int bytes, struct x86_exception *exception, + bool system) { struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt); + u32 access = PFERR_WRITE_MASK; + + if (!system && kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) == 3) + access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;

return kvm_write_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, - PFERR_WRITE_MASK, exception); + access, exception); }

int kvm_write_guest_virt_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, void *val,

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG)" shuah@kernel.org

commit 22076557b07c12086eeb16b8ce2b0b735f7a27e7 upstream.

usbip_host updates device status without holding lock from stub probe, disconnect and rebind code paths. When multiple requests to import a device are received, these unprotected code paths step all over each other and drive fails with NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors.

The driver uses a table lock to protect the busid array for adding and deleting busids to the table. However, the probe, disconnect and rebind paths get the busid table entry and update the status without holding the busid table lock. Add a new finer grain lock to protect the busid entry. This new lock will be held to search and update the busid entry fields from get_busid_idx(), add_match_busid() and del_match_busid().

match_busid_show() does the same to access the busid entry fields.

get_busid_priv() changed to return the pointer to the busid entry holding the busid lock. stub_probe(), stub_disconnect() and stub_device_rebind() call put_busid_priv() to release the busid lock before returning. This changes fixes the unprotected code paths eliminating the race conditions in updating the busid entries.

Reported-by: Jakub Jirasek Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) shuah@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filenames, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/staging/usbip/stub.h | 2 ++ drivers/staging/usbip/stub_dev.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/staging/usbip/stub_main.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/stub.h +++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/stub.h @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct bus_id_priv { struct stub_device *sdev; struct usb_device *udev; char shutdown_busid; + spinlock_t busid_lock; };

/* stub_priv is allocated from stub_priv_cache */ @@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ extern struct usb_device_driver stub_dri

/* stub_main.c */ struct bus_id_priv *get_busid_priv(const char *busid); +void put_busid_priv(struct bus_id_priv *bid); int del_match_busid(char *busid); void stub_device_cleanup_urbs(struct stub_device *sdev);

--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_dev.c +++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_dev.c @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device struct stub_device *sdev = NULL; const char *udev_busid = dev_name(&udev->dev); struct bus_id_priv *busid_priv; - int rc; + int rc = 0;

dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Enter probe\n");

@@ -358,13 +358,15 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device * other matched drivers by the driver core. * See driver_probe_device() in driver/base/dd.c */ - return -ENODEV; + rc = -ENODEV; + goto call_put_busid_priv; }

if (udev->descriptor.bDeviceClass == USB_CLASS_HUB) { dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "%s is a usb hub device... skip!\n", udev_busid); - return -ENODEV; + rc = -ENODEV; + goto call_put_busid_priv; }

if (!strcmp(udev->bus->bus_name, "vhci_hcd")) { @@ -372,13 +374,16 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device "%s is attached on vhci_hcd... skip!\n", udev_busid);

- return -ENODEV; + rc = -ENODEV; + goto call_put_busid_priv; }

/* ok, this is my device */ sdev = stub_device_alloc(udev); - if (!sdev) - return -ENOMEM; + if (!sdev) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto call_put_busid_priv; + }

dev_info(&udev->dev, "usbip-host: register new device (bus %u dev %u)\n", @@ -410,7 +415,9 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device } busid_priv->status = STUB_BUSID_ALLOC;

- return 0; + rc = 0; + goto call_put_busid_priv; + err_files: usb_hub_release_port(udev->parent, udev->portnum, (struct usb_dev_state *) udev); @@ -421,6 +428,9 @@ err_port:

busid_priv->sdev = NULL; stub_device_free(sdev); + +call_put_busid_priv: + put_busid_priv(busid_priv); return rc; }

@@ -459,7 +469,7 @@ static void stub_disconnect(struct usb_d /* get stub_device */ if (!sdev) { dev_err(&udev->dev, "could not get device"); - return; + goto call_put_busid_priv; }

dev_set_drvdata(&udev->dev, NULL); @@ -474,12 +484,12 @@ static void stub_disconnect(struct usb_d (struct usb_dev_state *) udev); if (rc) { dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "unable to release port\n"); - return; + goto call_put_busid_priv; }

/* If usb reset is called from event handler */ if (busid_priv->sdev->ud.eh == current) - return; + goto call_put_busid_priv;

/* shutdown the current connection */ shutdown_busid(busid_priv); @@ -492,6 +502,9 @@ static void stub_disconnect(struct usb_d

if (busid_priv->status == STUB_BUSID_ALLOC) busid_priv->status = STUB_BUSID_ADDED; + +call_put_busid_priv: + put_busid_priv(busid_priv); }

#ifdef CONFIG_PM --- a/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_main.c +++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_main.c @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ static spinlock_t busid_table_lock;

static void init_busid_table(void) { + int i; + /* * This also sets the bus_table[i].status to * STUB_BUSID_OTHER, which is 0. @@ -47,6 +49,9 @@ static void init_busid_table(void) memset(busid_table, 0, sizeof(busid_table));

spin_lock_init(&busid_table_lock); + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) + spin_lock_init(&busid_table[i].busid_lock); }

/* @@ -58,15 +63,20 @@ static int get_busid_idx(const char *bus int i; int idx = -1;

- for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) + for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) { + spin_lock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock); if (busid_table[i].name[0]) if (!strncmp(busid_table[i].name, busid, BUSID_SIZE)) { idx = i; + spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock); break; } + spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock); + } return idx; }

+/* Returns holding busid_lock. Should call put_busid_priv() to unlock */ struct bus_id_priv *get_busid_priv(const char *busid) { int idx; @@ -74,13 +84,21 @@ struct bus_id_priv *get_busid_priv(const

spin_lock(&busid_table_lock); idx = get_busid_idx(busid); - if (idx >= 0) + if (idx >= 0) { bid = &(busid_table[idx]); + /* get busid_lock before returning */ + spin_lock(&bid->busid_lock); + } spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);

return bid; }

+void put_busid_priv(struct bus_id_priv *bid) +{ + spin_unlock(&bid->busid_lock); +} + static int add_match_busid(char *busid) { int i; @@ -93,15 +111,19 @@ static int add_match_busid(char *busid) goto out; }

- for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) + for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) { + spin_lock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock); if (!busid_table[i].name[0]) { strncpy(busid_table[i].name, busid, BUSID_SIZE); if ((busid_table[i].status != STUB_BUSID_ALLOC) && (busid_table[i].status != STUB_BUSID_REMOV)) busid_table[i].status = STUB_BUSID_ADDED; ret = 0; + spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock); break; } + spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock); + }

out: spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock); @@ -122,6 +144,8 @@ int del_match_busid(char *busid) /* found */ ret = 0;

+ spin_lock(&busid_table[idx].busid_lock); + if (busid_table[idx].status == STUB_BUSID_OTHER) memset(busid_table[idx].name, 0, BUSID_SIZE);

@@ -129,6 +153,7 @@ int del_match_busid(char *busid) (busid_table[idx].status != STUB_BUSID_ADDED)) busid_table[idx].status = STUB_BUSID_REMOV;

+ spin_unlock(&busid_table[idx].busid_lock); out: spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);

@@ -141,9 +166,12 @@ static ssize_t show_match_busid(struct d char *out = buf;

spin_lock(&busid_table_lock); - for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) + for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) { + spin_lock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock); if (busid_table[i].name[0]) out += sprintf(out, "%s ", busid_table[i].name); + spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock); + } spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock); out += sprintf(out, "\n");

@@ -223,7 +251,7 @@ static void stub_device_rebind(void) } spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);

- /* now run rebind */ + /* now run rebind - no need to hold locks. driver files are removed */ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) { if (busid_table[i].name[0] && busid_table[i].shutdown_busid) { @@ -253,6 +281,8 @@ static ssize_t rebind_store(struct devic

/* mark the device for deletion so probe ignores it during rescan */ bid->status = STUB_BUSID_OTHER; + /* release the busid lock */ + put_busid_priv(bid);

ret = do_rebind((char *) buf, bid); if (ret < 0)

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org

commit b3681dd548d06deb2e1573890829dff4b15abf46 upstream.

error_entry and error_exit communicate the user vs. kernel status of the frame using %ebx. This is unnecessary -- the information is in regs->cs. Just use regs->cs.

This makes error_entry simpler and makes error_exit more robust.

It also fixes a nasty bug. Before all the Spectre nonsense, the xen_failsafe_callback entry point returned like this:

ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK SAVE_C_REGS SAVE_EXTRA_REGS ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER jmp error_exit

And it did not go through error_entry. This was bogus: RBX contained garbage, and error_exit expected a flag in RBX.

Fortunately, it generally contained *nonzero* garbage, so the correct code path was used. As part of the Spectre fixes, code was added to clear RBX to mitigate certain speculation attacks. Now, depending on kernel configuration, RBX got zeroed and, when running some Wine workloads, the kernel crashes. This was introduced by:

commit 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")

With this patch applied, RBX is no longer needed as a flag, and the problem goes away.

I suspect that malicious userspace could use this bug to crash the kernel even without the offending patch applied, though.

[ Historical note: I wrote this patch as a cleanup before I was aware of the bug it fixed. ]

[ Note to stable maintainers: this should probably get applied to all kernels. If you're nervous about that, a more conservative fix to add xorl %ebx,%ebx; incl %ebx before the jump to error_exit should also fix the problem. ]

Reported-and-tested-by: M. Vefa Bicakci m.v.b@runbox.com Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org Cc: Boris Ostrovsky boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: Borislav Petkov bp@alien8.de Cc: Brian Gerst brgerst@gmail.com Cc: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: Denys Vlasenko dvlasenk@redhat.com Cc: Dominik Brodowski linux@dominikbrodowski.net Cc: Greg KH gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: H. Peter Anvin hpa@zytor.com Cc: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com Cc: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Fixes: 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b5010a090d3586b2d6e06c7ad3ec5542d1241c45.1532282627... Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - error_exit moved EBX to EAX before testing it, so delete both instructions - error_exit does RESTORE_REST earlier, so adjust the offset to saved CS accordingly - Drop inapplicable comment changes - Adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- --- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S @@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ ENTRY(\sym) .if \paranoid jmp paranoid_exit /* %ebx: no swapgs flag */ .else - jmp error_exit /* %ebx: no swapgs flag */ + jmp error_exit .endif

CFI_ENDPROC @@ -1411,7 +1411,6 @@ END(paranoid_exit)

/* * Exception entry point. This expects an error code/orig_rax on the stack. - * returns in "no swapgs flag" in %ebx. */ ENTRY(error_entry) XCPT_FRAME @@ -1440,7 +1439,6 @@ ENTRY(error_entry) * the kernel CR3 here. */ SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3 - xorl %ebx,%ebx testl $3,CS+8(%rsp) je error_kernelspace error_swapgs: @@ -1456,7 +1454,6 @@ error_sti: * for these here too. */ error_kernelspace: - incl %ebx leaq native_irq_return_iret(%rip),%rcx cmpq %rcx,RIP+8(%rsp) je error_bad_iret @@ -1477,22 +1474,18 @@ error_bad_iret: mov %rsp,%rdi call fixup_bad_iret mov %rax,%rsp - decl %ebx /* Return to usergs */ jmp error_sti CFI_ENDPROC END(error_entry)

- -/* ebx: no swapgs flag (1: don't need swapgs, 0: need it) */ ENTRY(error_exit) DEFAULT_FRAME - movl %ebx,%eax RESTORE_REST DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE) TRACE_IRQS_OFF GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx) - testl %eax,%eax - jne retint_kernel + testb $3, CS-ARGOFFSET(%rsp) + jz retint_kernel LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT_IRQ movl TI_flags(%rcx),%edx movl $_TIF_WORK_MASK,%edi

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu

commit 8bc1379b82b8e809eef77a9fedbb75c6c297be19 upstream.

Use a separate journal transaction if it turns out that we need to convert an inline file to use an data block. Otherwise we could end up failing due to not having journal credits.

This addresses CVE-2018-10883.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200071

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -2701,9 +2701,6 @@ extern struct buffer_head *ext4_get_firs extern int ext4_inline_data_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, int *has_inline); -extern int ext4_try_to_evict_inline_data(handle_t *handle, - struct inode *inode, - int needed); extern void ext4_inline_data_truncate(struct inode *inode, int *has_inline);

extern int ext4_convert_inline_data(struct inode *inode); --- a/fs/ext4/inline.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c @@ -877,11 +877,11 @@ retry_journal: }

if (ret == -ENOSPC) { + ext4_journal_stop(handle); ret = ext4_da_convert_inline_data_to_extent(mapping, inode, flags, fsdata); - ext4_journal_stop(handle); if (ret == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries)) goto retry_journal; @@ -1839,42 +1839,6 @@ out: return (error < 0 ? error : 0); }

-/* - * Called during xattr set, and if we can sparse space 'needed', - * just create the extent tree evict the data to the outer block. - * - * We use jbd2 instead of page cache to move data to the 1st block - * so that the whole transaction can be committed as a whole and - * the data isn't lost because of the delayed page cache write. - */ -int ext4_try_to_evict_inline_data(handle_t *handle, - struct inode *inode, - int needed) -{ - int error; - struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry; - struct ext4_inode *raw_inode; - struct ext4_iloc iloc; - - error = ext4_get_inode_loc(inode, &iloc); - if (error) - return error; - - raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&iloc); - entry = (struct ext4_xattr_entry *)((void *)raw_inode + - EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_off); - if (EXT4_XATTR_LEN(entry->e_name_len) + - EXT4_XATTR_SIZE(le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size)) < needed) { - error = -ENOSPC; - goto out; - } - - error = ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock(handle, inode, &iloc); -out: - brelse(iloc.bh); - return error; -} - void ext4_inline_data_truncate(struct inode *inode, int *has_inline) { handle_t *handle; --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -1028,22 +1028,8 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set(handle_t if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize == 0) return -ENOSPC; error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, inode); - if (error) { - if (error == -ENOSPC && - ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { - error = ext4_try_to_evict_inline_data(handle, inode, - EXT4_XATTR_LEN(strlen(i->name) + - EXT4_XATTR_SIZE(i->value_len))); - if (error) - return error; - error = ext4_xattr_ibody_find(inode, i, is); - if (error) - return error; - error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, inode); - } - if (error) - return error; - } + if (error) + return error; header = IHDR(inode, ext4_raw_inode(&is->iloc)); if (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(s->first)) { header->h_magic = cpu_to_le32(EXT4_XATTR_MAGIC);

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Huey me@kylehuey.com

commit af8b3cd3934ec60f4c2a420d19a9d416554f140b upstream.

Help the compiler to avoid reevaluating the thread flags for each checked bit by reordering the bit checks and providing an explicit xor for evaluation.

With default defconfigs for each arch,

x86_64: arch/x86/kernel/process.o text data bss dec hex 3056 8577 16 11649 2d81 Before 3024 8577 16 11617 2d61 After

i386: arch/x86/kernel/process.o text data bss dec hex 2957 8673 8 11638 2d76 Before 2925 8673 8 11606 2d56 After

Originally-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey khuey@kylehuey.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170214081104.9244-2-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - We don't do refresh_tr_limit() here - Use ACCESS_ONCE() instead of READ_ONCE()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -196,48 +196,56 @@ int set_tsc_mode(unsigned int val) return 0; }

+static inline void switch_to_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss, + struct thread_struct *prev, + struct thread_struct *next, + unsigned long tifp, unsigned long tifn) +{ + if (tifn & _TIF_IO_BITMAP) { + /* + * Copy the relevant range of the IO bitmap. + * Normally this is 128 bytes or less: + */ + memcpy(tss->io_bitmap, next->io_bitmap_ptr, + max(prev->io_bitmap_max, next->io_bitmap_max)); + } else if (tifp & _TIF_IO_BITMAP) { + /* + * Clear any possible leftover bits: + */ + memset(tss->io_bitmap, 0xff, prev->io_bitmap_max); + } +} + void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p, struct tss_struct *tss) { struct thread_struct *prev, *next; + unsigned long tifp, tifn;

prev = &prev_p->thread; next = &next_p->thread;

- if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP) ^ - test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP)) { + tifn = ACCESS_ONCE(task_thread_info(next_p)->flags); + tifp = ACCESS_ONCE(task_thread_info(prev_p)->flags); + switch_to_bitmap(tss, prev, next, tifp, tifn); + + propagate_user_return_notify(prev_p, next_p); + + if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP) { unsigned long debugctl = get_debugctlmsr();

debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF; - if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP)) + if (tifn & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP) debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF; - update_debugctlmsr(debugctl); }

- if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_NOTSC) ^ - test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_NOTSC)) { - /* prev and next are different */ - if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_NOTSC)) + if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOTSC) { + if (tifn & _TIF_NOTSC) hard_disable_TSC(); else hard_enable_TSC(); } - - if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_IO_BITMAP)) { - /* - * Copy the relevant range of the IO bitmap. - * Normally this is 128 bytes or less: - */ - memcpy(tss->io_bitmap, next->io_bitmap_ptr, - max(prev->io_bitmap_max, next->io_bitmap_max)); - } else if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_IO_BITMAP)) { - /* - * Clear any possible leftover bits: - */ - memset(tss->io_bitmap, 0xff, prev->io_bitmap_max); - } - propagate_user_return_notify(prev_p, next_p); }

/*

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Yan yanaijie@huawei.com

commit 318aaf34f1179b39fa9c30fa0f3288b645beee39 upstream.

When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed, but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a warning like below:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037 ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1 ...... Call trace: [<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc [<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8 [<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c [<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694 [<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80 [<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170 [<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390 [<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418 [<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138 [<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked for ever.

As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle ata qcs correctly after this.

Signed-off-by: Jason Yan yanaijie@huawei.com CC: Xiaofei Tan tanxiaofei@huawei.com CC: John Garry john.garry@huawei.com CC: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com Reviewed-by: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_scsi_host.c | 33 ++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_scsi_host.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_scsi_host.c @@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ out_done: static void sas_eh_finish_cmd(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd) { struct sas_ha_struct *sas_ha = SHOST_TO_SAS_HA(cmd->device->host); + struct domain_device *dev = cmd_to_domain_dev(cmd); struct sas_task *task = TO_SAS_TASK(cmd);

/* At this point, we only get called following an actual abort @@ -258,6 +259,14 @@ static void sas_eh_finish_cmd(struct scs */ sas_end_task(cmd, task);

+ if (dev_is_sata(dev)) { + /* defer commands to libata so that libata EH can + * handle ata qcs correctly + */ + list_move_tail(&cmd->eh_entry, &sas_ha->eh_ata_q); + return; + } + /* now finish the command and move it on to the error * handler done list, this also takes it off the * error handler pending list. @@ -265,22 +274,6 @@ static void sas_eh_finish_cmd(struct scs scsi_eh_finish_cmd(cmd, &sas_ha->eh_done_q); }

-static void sas_eh_defer_cmd(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd) -{ - struct domain_device *dev = cmd_to_domain_dev(cmd); - struct sas_ha_struct *ha = dev->port->ha; - struct sas_task *task = TO_SAS_TASK(cmd); - - if (!dev_is_sata(dev)) { - sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd); - return; - } - - /* report the timeout to libata */ - sas_end_task(cmd, task); - list_move_tail(&cmd->eh_entry, &ha->eh_ata_q); -} - static void sas_scsi_clear_queue_lu(struct list_head *error_q, struct scsi_cmnd *my_cmd) { struct scsi_cmnd *cmd, *n; @@ -288,7 +281,7 @@ static void sas_scsi_clear_queue_lu(stru list_for_each_entry_safe(cmd, n, error_q, eh_entry) { if (cmd->device->sdev_target == my_cmd->device->sdev_target && cmd->device->lun == my_cmd->device->lun) - sas_eh_defer_cmd(cmd); + sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd); } }

@@ -677,12 +670,12 @@ static void sas_eh_handle_sas_errors(str case TASK_IS_DONE: SAS_DPRINTK("%s: task 0x%p is done\n", __func__, task); - sas_eh_defer_cmd(cmd); + sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd); continue; case TASK_IS_ABORTED: SAS_DPRINTK("%s: task 0x%p is aborted\n", __func__, task); - sas_eh_defer_cmd(cmd); + sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd); continue; case TASK_IS_AT_LU: SAS_DPRINTK("task 0x%p is at LU: lu recover\n", task); @@ -693,7 +686,7 @@ static void sas_eh_handle_sas_errors(str "recovered\n", SAS_ADDR(task->dev), cmd->device->lun); - sas_eh_defer_cmd(cmd); + sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd); sas_scsi_clear_queue_lu(work_q, cmd); goto Again; }

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Chinner dchinner@redhat.com

commit ee457001ed6c6f31ddad69c24c1da8f377d8472d upstream.

We recently came across a V4 filesystem causing memory corruption due to a newly allocated inode being setup twice and being added to the superblock inode list twice. From code inspection, the only way this could happen is if a newly allocated inode was not marked as free on disk (i.e. di_mode wasn't zero).

Running the metadump on an upstream debug kernel fails during inode allocation like so:

XFS: Assertion failed: ip->i_d.di_nblocks == 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_inod= e.c, line: 838 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:114! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 11 PID: 3496 Comm: mkdir Not tainted 4.16.0-rc5-dgc #442 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/0= 1/2014 RIP: 0010:assfail+0x28/0x30 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000236fc80 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: 0000000000004000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000ffffffc0 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffffffff8227211b RBP: ffffc9000236fce8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000bec R11: f000000000000000 R12: ffffc9000236fd30 R13: ffff8805c76bab80 R14: ffff8805c77ac800 R15: ffff88083fb12e10 FS: 00007fac8cbff040(0000) GS:ffff88083fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000= 000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fffa6783ff8 CR3: 00000005c6e2b003 CR4: 00000000000606e0 Call Trace: xfs_ialloc+0x383/0x570 xfs_dir_ialloc+0x6a/0x2a0 xfs_create+0x412/0x670 xfs_generic_create+0x1f7/0x2c0 ? capable_wrt_inode_uidgid+0x3f/0x50 vfs_mkdir+0xfb/0x1b0 SyS_mkdir+0xcf/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

Extracting the inode number we crashed on from an event trace and looking at it with xfs_db:

xfs_db> inode 184452204 xfs_db> p core.magic = 0x494e core.mode = 0100644 core.version = 2 core.format = 2 (extents) core.nlinkv2 = 1 core.onlink = 0 .....

Confirms that it is not a free inode on disk. xfs_repair also trips over this inode:

..... zero length extent (off = 0, fsbno = 0) in ino 184452204 correcting nextents for inode 184452204 bad attribute fork in inode 184452204, would clear attr fork bad nblocks 1 for inode 184452204, would reset to 0 bad anextents 1 for inode 184452204, would reset to 0 imap claims in-use inode 184452204 is free, would correct imap would have cleared inode 184452204 ..... disconnected inode 184452204, would move to lost+found

And so we have a situation where the directory structure and the inobt thinks the inode is free, but the inode on disk thinks it is still in use. Where this corruption came from is not possible to diagnose, but we can detect it and prevent the kernel from oopsing on lookup. The reproducer now results in:

$ sudo mkdir /mnt/scratch/{0,1,2,3,4,5}{0,1,2,3,4,5} mkdir: cannot create directory =E2=80=98/mnt/scratch/00=E2=80=99: File ex= ists mkdir: cannot create directory =E2=80=98/mnt/scratch/01=E2=80=99: File ex= ists mkdir: cannot create directory =E2=80=98/mnt/scratch/03=E2=80=99: Structu= re needs cleaning mkdir: cannot create directory =E2=80=98/mnt/scratch/04=E2=80=99: Input/o= utput error mkdir: cannot create directory =E2=80=98/mnt/scratch/05=E2=80=99: Input/o= utput error ....

And this corruption shutdown:

[ 54.843517] XFS (loop0): Corruption detected! Free inode 0xafe846c not= marked free on disk [ 54.845885] XFS (loop0): Internal error xfs_trans_cancel at line 1023 = of file fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c. Caller xfs_create+0x425/0x670 [ 54.848994] CPU: 10 PID: 3541 Comm: mkdir Not tainted 4.16.0-rc5-dgc #= 443 [ 54.850753] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIO= S 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 [ 54.852859] Call Trace: [ 54.853531] dump_stack+0x85/0xc5 [ 54.854385] xfs_trans_cancel+0x197/0x1c0 [ 54.855421] xfs_create+0x425/0x670 [ 54.856314] xfs_generic_create+0x1f7/0x2c0 [ 54.857390] ? capable_wrt_inode_uidgid+0x3f/0x50 [ 54.858586] vfs_mkdir+0xfb/0x1b0 [ 54.859458] SyS_mkdir+0xcf/0xf0 [ 54.860254] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x1a0 [ 54.861193] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 [ 54.862492] RIP: 0033:0x7fb73bddf547 [ 54.863358] RSP: 002b:00007ffdaa553338 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000= 000000000053 [ 54.865133] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffdaa55449a RCX: 00007fb73= bddf547 [ 54.866766] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000000001ff RDI: 00007ffda= a55449a [ 54.868432] RBP: 00007ffdaa55449a R08: 00000000000001ff R09: 00005623a= 8670dd0 [ 54.870110] R10: 00007fb73be72d5b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000= 00001ff [ 54.871752] R13: 00007ffdaa5534b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffda= a553500 [ 54.873429] XFS (loop0): xfs_do_force_shutdown(0x8) called from line 1= 024 of file fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c. Return address = ffffffff814cd050 [ 54.882790] XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data detected. Shutt= ing down filesystem [ 54.884597] XFS (loop0): Please umount the filesystem and rectify the = problem(s)

Note that this crash is only possible on v4 filesystemsi or v5 filesystems mounted with the ikeep mount option. For all other V5 filesystems, this problem cannot occur because we don't read inodes we are allocating from disk - we simply overwrite them with the new inode information.

Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner dchinner@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino cmaiolino@redhat.com Tested-by: Carlos Maiolino cmaiolino@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong darrick.wong@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong darrick.wong@oracle.com [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Look up mode in XFS inode, not VFS inode - Use positive error codes, and EIO instead of EFSCORRUPTED] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c @@ -293,7 +293,28 @@ xfs_iget_cache_miss(

trace_xfs_iget_miss(ip);

- if ((ip->i_d.di_mode == 0) && !(flags & XFS_IGET_CREATE)) { + + /* + * If we are allocating a new inode, then check what was returned is + * actually a free, empty inode. If we are not allocating an inode, + * the check we didn't find a free inode. + */ + if (flags & XFS_IGET_CREATE) { + if (ip->i_d.di_mode != 0) { + xfs_warn(mp, +"Corruption detected! Free inode 0x%llx not marked free on disk", + ino); + error = EIO; + goto out_destroy; + } + if (ip->i_d.di_nblocks != 0) { + xfs_warn(mp, +"Corruption detected! Free inode 0x%llx has blocks allocated!", + ino); + error = EIO; + goto out_destroy; + } + } else if (ip->i_d.di_mode == 0) { error = ENOENT; goto out_destroy; }

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ernesto A. Fernández ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com

commit a7ec7a4193a2eb3b5341243fc0b621c1ac9e4ec4 upstream.

An HFS+ filesystem can be mounted read-only without having a metadata directory, which is needed to support hardlinks. But if the catalog data is corrupted, a directory lookup may still find dentries claiming to be hardlinks.

hfsplus_lookup() does check that ->hidden_dir is not NULL in such a situation, but mistakenly does so after dereferencing it for the first time. Reorder this check to prevent a crash.

This happens when looking up corrupted catalog data (dentry) on a filesystem with no metadata directory (this could only ever happen on a read-only mount). Wen Xu sent the replication steps in detail to the fsdevel list: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200297

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180712215344.q44dyrhymm4ajkao@eaf Signed-off-by: Ernesto A. Fernández ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com Reported-by: Wen Xu wen.xu@gatech.edu Cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko slava@dubeyko.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- fs/hfsplus/dir.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/hfsplus/dir.c +++ b/fs/hfsplus/dir.c @@ -74,13 +74,13 @@ again: cpu_to_be32(HFSP_HARDLINK_TYPE) && entry.file.user_info.fdCreator == cpu_to_be32(HFSP_HFSPLUS_CREATOR) && + HFSPLUS_SB(sb)->hidden_dir && (entry.file.create_date == HFSPLUS_I(HFSPLUS_SB(sb)->hidden_dir)-> create_date || entry.file.create_date == HFSPLUS_I(sb->s_root->d_inode)-> - create_date) && - HFSPLUS_SB(sb)->hidden_dir) { + create_date)) { struct qstr str; char name[32];

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

commit 5800dc5c19f34e6e03b5adab1282535cb102fafd upstream.

Nadav reported that on guests we're failing to rewrite the indirect calls to CALLEE_SAVE paravirt functions. In particular the pv_queued_spin_unlock() call is left unpatched and that is all over the place. This obviously wrecks Spectre-v2 mitigation (for paravirt guests) which relies on not actually having indirect calls around.

The reason is an incorrect clobber test in paravirt_patch_call(); this function rewrites an indirect call with a direct call to the _SAME_ function, there is no possible way the clobbers can be different because of this.

Therefore remove this clobber check. Also put WARNs on the other patch failure case (not enough room for the instruction) which I've not seen trigger in my (limited) testing.

Three live kernel image disassemblies for lock_sock_nested (as a small function that illustrates the problem nicely). PRE is the current situation for guests, POST is with this patch applied and NATIVE is with or without the patch for !guests.

PRE:

(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested: 0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp 0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp 0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx 0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx 0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched> 0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi 0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh> 0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax 0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax 0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74> 0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp) 0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi 0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq *0xffffffff822299e8 0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx 0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp 0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi 0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi 0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip> 0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi 0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock> 0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35> End of assembler dump.

POST:

(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested: 0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp 0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp 0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx 0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx 0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched> 0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi 0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh> 0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax 0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax 0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74> 0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp) 0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi 0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq 0xffffffff810a0c20 <__raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock> 0xffffffff817be9a5 <+53>: xchg %ax,%ax 0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx 0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp 0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi 0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi 0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063aa0 <__local_bh_enable_ip> 0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi 0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock> 0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35> End of assembler dump.

NATIVE:

(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested: 0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp 0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp 0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx 0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx 0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched> 0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi 0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh> 0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax 0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax 0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74> 0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp) 0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi 0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: movb $0x0,(%rdi) 0xffffffff817be9a3 <+51>: nopl 0x0(%rax) 0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx 0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp 0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi 0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi 0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip> 0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi 0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock> 0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35> End of assembler dump.

Fixes: 63f70270ccd9 ("[PATCH] i386: PARAVIRT: add common patching machinery") Fixes: 3010a0663fd9 ("x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls") Reported-by: Nadav Amit namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk konrad.wilk@oracle.com Cc: Boris Ostrovsky boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: David Woodhouse dwmw2@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c @@ -97,10 +97,12 @@ unsigned paravirt_patch_call(void *insnb struct branch *b = insnbuf; unsigned long delta = (unsigned long)target - (addr+5);

- if (tgt_clobbers & ~site_clobbers) - return len; /* target would clobber too much for this site */ - if (len < 5) + if (len < 5) { +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + WARN_ONCE("Failing to patch indirect CALL in %ps\n", (void *)addr); +#endif return len; /* call too long for patch site */ + }

b->opcode = 0xe8; /* call */ b->delta = delta; @@ -115,8 +117,12 @@ unsigned paravirt_patch_jmp(void *insnbu struct branch *b = insnbuf; unsigned long delta = (unsigned long)target - (addr+5);

- if (len < 5) + if (len < 5) { +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + WARN_ONCE("Failing to patch indirect JMP in %ps\n", (void *)addr); +#endif return len; /* call too long for patch site */ + }

b->opcode = 0xe9; /* jmp */ b->delta = delta;

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com

commit 79367a65743975e5cac8d24d08eccc7fdae832b0 upstream.

Wrap the common invocation of ctxt->ops->read_std and ctxt->ops->write_std, so as to have a smaller patch when the functions grow another argument.

Fixes: 129a72a0d3c8 ("KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std", 2017-01-12) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -731,6 +731,19 @@ static int linearize(struct x86_emulate_ }

+static int linear_read_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong linear, + void *data, unsigned size) +{ + return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception); +} + +static int linear_write_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, + ulong linear, void *data, + unsigned int size) +{ + return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception); +} + static int segmented_read_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct segmented_address addr, void *data, @@ -1394,8 +1407,7 @@ static int read_interrupt_descriptor(str return emulate_gp(ctxt, index << 3 | 0x2);

addr = dt.address + index * 8; - return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, addr, desc, sizeof *desc, - &ctxt->exception); + return linear_read_system(ctxt, addr, desc, sizeof *desc); }

static void get_descriptor_table_ptr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, @@ -1432,8 +1444,7 @@ static int read_segment_descriptor(struc return emulate_gp(ctxt, selector & 0xfffc);

*desc_addr_p = addr = dt.address + index * 8; - return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, addr, desc, sizeof *desc, - &ctxt->exception); + return linear_read_system(ctxt, addr, desc, sizeof(*desc)); }

/* allowed just for 8 bytes segments */ @@ -1450,8 +1461,7 @@ static int write_segment_descriptor(stru return emulate_gp(ctxt, selector & 0xfffc);

addr = dt.address + index * 8; - return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, addr, desc, sizeof *desc, - &ctxt->exception); + return linear_write_system(ctxt, addr, desc, sizeof *desc); }

static int __load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, @@ -1599,8 +1609,7 @@ static int __load_segment_descriptor(str if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return ret; } else if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) { - ret = ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, desc_addr+8, &base3, - sizeof(base3), &ctxt->exception); + ret = linear_read_system(ctxt, desc_addr+8, &base3, sizeof(base3)); if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return ret; } @@ -1917,11 +1926,11 @@ static int __emulate_int_real(struct x86 eip_addr = dt.address + (irq << 2); cs_addr = dt.address + (irq << 2) + 2;

- rc = ops->read_std(ctxt, cs_addr, &cs, 2, &ctxt->exception); + rc = linear_read_system(ctxt, cs_addr, &cs, 2); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc;

- rc = ops->read_std(ctxt, eip_addr, &eip, 2, &ctxt->exception); + rc = linear_read_system(ctxt, eip_addr, &eip, 2); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc;

@@ -2573,27 +2582,23 @@ static int task_switch_16(struct x86_emu u16 tss_selector, u16 old_tss_sel, ulong old_tss_base, struct desc_struct *new_desc) { - const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops; struct tss_segment_16 tss_seg; int ret; u32 new_tss_base = get_desc_base(new_desc);

- ret = ops->read_std(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg, - &ctxt->exception); + ret = linear_read_system(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg); if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) /* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */ return ret;

save_state_to_tss16(ctxt, &tss_seg);

- ret = ops->write_std(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg, - &ctxt->exception); + ret = linear_write_system(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg); if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) /* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */ return ret;

- ret = ops->read_std(ctxt, new_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg, - &ctxt->exception); + ret = linear_read_system(ctxt, new_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg); if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) /* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */ return ret; @@ -2601,10 +2606,9 @@ static int task_switch_16(struct x86_emu if (old_tss_sel != 0xffff) { tss_seg.prev_task_link = old_tss_sel;

- ret = ops->write_std(ctxt, new_tss_base, - &tss_seg.prev_task_link, - sizeof tss_seg.prev_task_link, - &ctxt->exception); + ret = linear_write_system(ctxt, new_tss_base, + &tss_seg.prev_task_link, + sizeof tss_seg.prev_task_link); if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) /* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */ return ret; @@ -2723,15 +2727,13 @@ static int task_switch_32(struct x86_emu u16 tss_selector, u16 old_tss_sel, ulong old_tss_base, struct desc_struct *new_desc) { - const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops; struct tss_segment_32 tss_seg; int ret; u32 new_tss_base = get_desc_base(new_desc); u32 eip_offset = offsetof(struct tss_segment_32, eip); u32 ldt_sel_offset = offsetof(struct tss_segment_32, ldt_selector);

- ret = ops->read_std(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg, - &ctxt->exception); + ret = linear_read_system(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg); if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) /* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */ return ret; @@ -2739,14 +2741,13 @@ static int task_switch_32(struct x86_emu save_state_to_tss32(ctxt, &tss_seg);

/* Only GP registers and segment selectors are saved */ - ret = ops->write_std(ctxt, old_tss_base + eip_offset, &tss_seg.eip, - ldt_sel_offset - eip_offset, &ctxt->exception); + ret = linear_write_system(ctxt, old_tss_base + eip_offset, &tss_seg.eip, + ldt_sel_offset - eip_offset); if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) /* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */ return ret;

- ret = ops->read_std(ctxt, new_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg, - &ctxt->exception); + ret = linear_read_system(ctxt, new_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg); if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) /* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */ return ret; @@ -2754,10 +2755,9 @@ static int task_switch_32(struct x86_emu if (old_tss_sel != 0xffff) { tss_seg.prev_task_link = old_tss_sel;

- ret = ops->write_std(ctxt, new_tss_base, - &tss_seg.prev_task_link, - sizeof tss_seg.prev_task_link, - &ctxt->exception); + ret = linear_write_system(ctxt, new_tss_base, + &tss_seg.prev_task_link, + sizeof tss_seg.prev_task_link); if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) /* FIXME: need to provide precise fault address */ return ret;

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org

commit d78ab02c2c194257a03355fbb79eb721b381d105 upstream.

In preparation for having other callers of the seccomp mode setting logic, split the prctl entry point away from the core logic that performs seccomp mode setting.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov oleg@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski luto@amacapital.net Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- kernel/seccomp.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ long prctl_get_seccomp(void) }

/** - * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode + * seccomp_set_mode: internal function for setting seccomp mode * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER * @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ long prctl_get_seccomp(void) * * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure. */ -long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter) +static long seccomp_set_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter) { long ret = -EINVAL;

@@ -517,3 +517,15 @@ long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long sec out: return ret; } + +/** + * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode + * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use + * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER + * + * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure. + */ +long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter) +{ + return seccomp_set_mode(seccomp_mode, filter); +}

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org

commit d364a7656c1855c940dfa4baf4ebcc3c6a9e6fd2 upstream.

I tried to simulate an ancient CPU via this option, and found that it still has fxsr_opt enabled, confusing the FPU code.

Make the 'nofxsr' option also clear FXSR_OPT flag.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski luto@amacapital.net Cc: Borislav Petkov bp@alien8.de Cc: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: Fenghua Yu fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: H. Peter Anvin hpa@zytor.com Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Oleg Nesterov oleg@redhat.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -199,6 +199,15 @@ static int __init x86_noinvpcid_setup(ch } early_param("noinvpcid", x86_noinvpcid_setup);

+static int __init x86_fxsr_setup(char *s) +{ + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FXSR); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XMM); + return 1; +} +__setup("nofxsr", x86_fxsr_setup); + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 static int cachesize_override = -1; static int disable_x86_serial_nr = 1; @@ -210,14 +219,6 @@ static int __init cachesize_setup(char * } __setup("cachesize=", cachesize_setup);

-static int __init x86_fxsr_setup(char *s) -{ - setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FXSR); - setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XMM); - return 1; -} -__setup("nofxsr", x86_fxsr_setup); - static int __init x86_sep_setup(char *s) { setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEP);

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cong Wang xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com

commit cb2595c1393b4a5211534e6f0a0fbad369e21ad8 upstream.

ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct, if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().

But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc" through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it is already published.

So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt it.

Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().

Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support") Reported-by: Noam Rathaus noamr@beyondsecurity.com Signed-off-by: Cong Wang xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe jgg@mellanox.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static struct ucma_multicast* ucma_alloc return NULL;

mutex_lock(&mut); - mc->id = idr_alloc(&multicast_idr, mc, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL); + mc->id = idr_alloc(&multicast_idr, NULL, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL); mutex_unlock(&mut); if (mc->id < 0) goto error; @@ -1285,6 +1285,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_process_join(struct goto err3; }

+ mutex_lock(&mut); + idr_replace(&multicast_idr, mc, mc->id); + mutex_unlock(&mut); + mutex_unlock(&file->mut); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return 0;

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de

commit f7f3dc00f61261cdc9ccd8b886f21bc4dffd6fd9 upstream.

CPUID Fn8000_0007_EDX[CPB] is wrongly 0 on models up to B1. But they do support CPB (AMD's Core Performance Boosting cpufreq CPU feature), so fix that.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Sherry Hurwitz sherry.hurwitz@amd.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170907170821.16021-1-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Change the added case into an if-statement - s/x86_stepping/x86_mask/] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -533,6 +533,16 @@ static void init_amd_ln(struct cpuinfo_x msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, 31); }

+static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + /* + * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. It affects + * all up to and including B1. + */ + if (c->x86_model <= 1 && c->x86_mask <= 1) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB); +} + static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u32 dummy; @@ -611,6 +621,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MCE); #endif

+ if (c->x86 == 0x17) + init_amd_zn(c); + /* Enable workaround for FXSAVE leak */ if (c->x86 >= 6) set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FXSAVE_LEAK);

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Scott Bauer scott.bauer@intel.com

commit 8f3fafc9c2f0ece10832c25f7ffcb07c97a32ad4 upstream.

Like d88b6d04: "cdrom: information leak in cdrom_ioctl_media_changed()"

There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().

Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer scott.bauer@intel.com Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer sbauer@plzdonthack.me Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c +++ b/drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c @@ -2528,7 +2528,7 @@ static int cdrom_ioctl_drive_status(stru if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_SELECT_DISC) || (arg == CDSL_CURRENT || arg == CDSL_NONE)) return cdi->ops->drive_status(cdi, CDSL_CURRENT); - if (((int)arg >= cdi->capacity)) + if (arg >= cdi->capacity) return -EINVAL; return cdrom_slot_status(cdi, arg); }

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mel Gorman mgorman@suse.de

commit 48fb6f4db940e92cfb16cd878cddd59ea6120d06 upstream.

Commit 65d8fc777f6d ("futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()") removed an unnecessary lock_page() with the side-effect that page->mapping needed to be treated very carefully.

Two defensive warnings were added in case any assumption was missed and the first warning assumed a correct application would not alter a mapping backing a futex key. Since merging, it has not triggered for any unexpected case but Mark Rutland reported the following bug triggering due to the first warning.

kernel BUG at kernel/futex.c:679! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 3695 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc3-00020-g307fec773ba3 #3 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff80001e271780 task.stack: ffff000010908000 PC is at get_futex_key+0x6a4/0xcf0 kernel/futex.c:679 LR is at get_futex_key+0x6a4/0xcf0 kernel/futex.c:679 pc : [<ffff00000821ac14>] lr : [<ffff00000821ac14>] pstate: 80000145

The fact that it's a bug instead of a warning was due to an unrelated arm64 problem, but the warning itself triggered because the underlying mapping changed.

This is an application issue but from a kernel perspective it's a recoverable situation and the warning is unnecessary so this patch removes the warning. The warning may potentially be triggered with the following test program from Mark although it may be necessary to adjust NR_FUTEX_THREADS to be a value smaller than the number of CPUs in the system.

#include <linux/futex.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <unistd.h>

#define NR_FUTEX_THREADS 16 pthread_t threads[NR_FUTEX_THREADS];

void *mem;

#define MEM_PROT (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE) #define MEM_SIZE 65536

static int futex_wrapper(int *uaddr, int op, int val, const struct timespec *timeout, int *uaddr2, int val3) { syscall(SYS_futex, uaddr, op, val, timeout, uaddr2, val3); }

void *poll_futex(void *unused) { for (;;) { futex_wrapper(mem, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI, 1, NULL, mem + 4, 1); } }

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i;

mem = mmap(NULL, MEM_SIZE, MEM_PROT, MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);

printf("Mapping @ %p\n", mem);

printf("Creating futex threads...\n");

for (i = 0; i < NR_FUTEX_THREADS; i++) pthread_create(&threads[i], NULL, poll_futex, NULL);

printf("Flipping mapping...\n"); for (;;) { mmap(mem, MEM_SIZE, MEM_PROT, MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); }

return 0; }

Reported-and-tested-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman mgorman@suse.de Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- kernel/futex.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -583,13 +583,14 @@ again: * this reference was taken by ihold under the page lock * pinning the inode in place so i_lock was unnecessary. The * only way for this check to fail is if the inode was - * truncated in parallel so warn for now if this happens. + * truncated in parallel which is almost certainly an + * application bug. In such a case, just retry. * * We are not calling into get_futex_key_refs() in file-backed * cases, therefore a successful atomic_inc return below will * guarantee that get_futex_key() will still imply smp_mb(); (B). */ - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!atomic_inc_not_zero(&inode->i_count))) { + if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&inode->i_count)) { rcu_read_unlock(); put_page(page_head);

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org

commit 9f645bcc566a1e9f921bdae7528a01ced5bc3713 upstream.

cmap->len can get close to INT_MAX/2, allowing for an integer overflow in allocation. This uses kmalloc_array() instead to catch the condition.

Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect silvio.cesare@gmail.com Fixes: 8bdb3a2d7df48 ("uvesafb: the driver core") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/video/fbdev/uvesafb.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/uvesafb.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/uvesafb.c @@ -1059,7 +1059,8 @@ static int uvesafb_setcmap(struct fb_cma info->cmap.len || cmap->start < info->cmap.start) return -EINVAL;

- entries = kmalloc(sizeof(*entries) * cmap->len, GFP_KERNEL); + entries = kmalloc_array(cmap->len, sizeof(*entries), + GFP_KERNEL); if (!entries) return -ENOMEM;

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Nadav Amit namit@cs.technion.ac.il

commit e37a75a13cdae5deaa2ea2cbf8d55b5dd08638b6 upstream.

The current implementation ignores the LDTR/TR base high 32-bits on long-mode. As a result the loaded segment descriptor may be incorrect.

Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit namit@cs.technion.ac.il Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -1467,6 +1467,7 @@ static int __load_segment_descriptor(str ulong desc_addr; int ret; u16 dummy; + u32 base3 = 0;

memset(&seg_desc, 0, sizeof seg_desc);

@@ -1597,9 +1598,14 @@ static int __load_segment_descriptor(str ret = write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc); if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return ret; + } else if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) { + ret = ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, desc_addr+8, &base3, + sizeof(base3), &ctxt->exception); + if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) + return ret; } load: - ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, 0, seg); + ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, base3, seg); if (desc) *desc = seg_desc; return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu

commit 18db4b4e6fc31eda838dd1c1296d67dbcb3dc957 upstream.

If some metadata block, such as an allocation bitmap, overlaps the superblock, it's very likely that if the file system is mounted read/write, the results will not be pretty. So disallow r/w mounts for file systems corrupted in this particular way.

Backport notes: 3.18.y is missing bc98a42c1f7d ("VFS: Convert sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY to sb_rdonly(sb)") and e462ec50cb5f ("VFS: Differentiate mount flags (MS_*) from internal superblock flags") so we simply use the sb MS_RDONLY check from pre bc98a42c1f7d in place of the sb_rdonly function used in the upstream variant of the patch.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Harsh Shandilya harsh@prjkt.io Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- fs/ext4/super.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -2115,6 +2115,8 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: " "Block bitmap for group %u overlaps " "superblock", i); + if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) + return 0; } if (block_bitmap < first_block || block_bitmap > last_block) { ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: " @@ -2127,6 +2129,8 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: " "Inode bitmap for group %u overlaps " "superblock", i); + if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) + return 0; } if (inode_bitmap < first_block || inode_bitmap > last_block) { ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: " @@ -2139,6 +2143,8 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: " "Inode table for group %u overlaps " "superblock", i); + if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) + return 0; } if (inode_table < first_block || inode_table + sbi->s_itb_per_group - 1 > last_block) {

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: "Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG)" shuah@kernel.org

commit 1e180f167d4e413afccbbb4a421b48b2de832549 upstream.

Device is left in the busid_table after unbind and rebind. Rebind initiates usb bus scan and the original driver claims the device. After rescan the device should be deleted from the busid_table as it no longer belongs to usbip_host.

Fix it to delete the device after device_attach() succeeds.

Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) shuah@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- drivers/staging/usbip/stub_main.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_main.c +++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/stub_main.c @@ -205,6 +205,9 @@ static ssize_t rebind_store(struct devic if (!bid) return -ENODEV;

+ /* mark the device for deletion so probe ignores it during rescan */ + bid->status = STUB_BUSID_OTHER; + /* device_attach() callers should hold parent lock for USB */ if (bid->udev->dev.parent) device_lock(bid->udev->dev.parent); @@ -216,6 +219,9 @@ static ssize_t rebind_store(struct devic return ret; }

+ /* delete device from busid_table */ + del_match_busid((char *) buf); + return count; }

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Mark Salyzyn salyzyn@android.com

commit 7992c18810e568b95c869b227137a2215702a805 upstream.

CVE-2018-9363

The buffer length is unsigned at all layers, but gets cast to int and checked in hidp_process_report and can lead to a buffer overflow. Switch len parameter to unsigned int to resolve issue.

This affects 3.18 and newer kernels.

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn salyzyn@android.com Fixes: a4b1b5877b514b276f0f31efe02388a9c2836728 ("HID: Bluetooth: hidp: make sure input buffers are big enough") Cc: Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org Cc: Johan Hedberg johan.hedberg@gmail.com Cc: "David S. Miller" davem@davemloft.net Cc: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Cc: Benjamin Tissoires benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com Cc: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: security@kernel.org Cc: kernel-team@android.com Acked-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c @@ -429,8 +429,8 @@ static void hidp_del_timer(struct hidp_s del_timer(&session->timer); }

-static void hidp_process_report(struct hidp_session *session, - int type, const u8 *data, int len, int intr) +static void hidp_process_report(struct hidp_session *session, int type, + const u8 *data, unsigned int len, int intr) { if (len > HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE) len = HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE;

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Shankara Pailoor shankarapailoor@gmail.com

commit 92d34134193e5b129dc24f8d79cb9196626e8d7a upstream.

The code is assuming the buffer is max_size length, but we weren't allocating enough space for it.

Signed-off-by: Shankara Pailoor shankarapailoor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp dave.kleikamp@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- fs/jfs/xattr.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/jfs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/jfs/xattr.c @@ -493,15 +493,17 @@ static int ea_get(struct inode *inode, s if (size > PSIZE) { /* * To keep the rest of the code simple. Allocate a - * contiguous buffer to work with + * contiguous buffer to work with. Make the buffer large + * enough to make use of the whole extent. */ - ea_buf->xattr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + ea_buf->max_size = (size + sb->s_blocksize - 1) & + ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1); + + ea_buf->xattr = kmalloc(ea_buf->max_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (ea_buf->xattr == NULL) return -ENOMEM;

ea_buf->flag = EA_MALLOC; - ea_buf->max_size = (size + sb->s_blocksize - 1) & - ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1);

if (ea_size == 0) return 0;

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu

commit 5012284700775a4e6e3fbe7eac4c543c4874b559 upstream.

Commit 8844618d8aa7: "ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid" will complain if block group zero does not have the EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED flag set. Unfortunately, this is not correct, since a freshly created file system has this flag cleared. It gets almost immediately after the file system is mounted read-write --- but the following somewhat unlikely sequence will end up triggering a false positive report of a corrupted file system:

mkfs.ext4 /dev/vdc mount -o ro /dev/vdc /vdc mount -o remount,rw /dev/vdc

Instead, when initializing the inode table for block group zero, test to make sure that itable_unused count is not too large, since that is the case that will result in some or all of the reserved inodes getting cleared.

This fixes the failures reported by Eric Whiteney when running generic/230 and generic/231 in the the nojournal test case.

Fixes: 8844618d8aa7 ("ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid") Reported-by: Eric Whitney enwlinux@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 5 ++++- fs/ext4/super.c | 8 +------- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c @@ -1289,7 +1289,10 @@ int ext4_init_inode_table(struct super_b ext4_itable_unused_count(sb, gdp)), sbi->s_inodes_per_block);

- if ((used_blks < 0) || (used_blks > sbi->s_itb_per_group)) { + if ((used_blks < 0) || (used_blks > sbi->s_itb_per_group) || + ((group == 0) && ((EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) - + ext4_itable_unused_count(sb, gdp)) < + EXT4_FIRST_INO(sb)))) { ext4_error(sb, "Something is wrong with group %u: " "used itable blocks: %d; " "itable unused count: %u", --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -3088,14 +3088,8 @@ static ext4_group_t ext4_has_uninit_itab if (!gdp) continue;

- if (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED)) - continue; - if (group != 0) + if (!(gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED))) break; - ext4_error(sb, "Inode table for bg 0 marked as " - "needing zeroing"); - if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) - return ngroups; }

return group;

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org

commit 3b23dd12846215eff4afb073366b80c0c4d7543e upstream.

Separates the two mode setting paths to make things more readable with fewer #ifdefs within function bodies.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov oleg@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski luto@amacapital.net Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- kernel/seccomp.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -489,48 +489,66 @@ long prctl_get_seccomp(void) }

/** - * seccomp_set_mode: internal function for setting seccomp mode - * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use - * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER - * - * This function may be called repeatedly with a @seccomp_mode of - * SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER to install additional filters. Every filter - * successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) for each system - * call the task makes. + * seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp * * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed. * * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure. */ -static long seccomp_set_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter) +static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void) { + const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT; long ret = -EINVAL;

if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode)) goto out;

- switch (seccomp_mode) { - case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: - ret = 0; #ifdef TIF_NOTSC - disable_TSC(); + disable_TSC(); #endif - break; + seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode); + ret = 0; + +out: + + return ret; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER - case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: - ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter); - if (ret) - goto out; - break; -#endif - default: +/** + * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter + * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter + * + * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters. + * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) + * for each system call the task makes. + * + * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed. + * + * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure. + */ +static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter) +{ + const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER; + long ret = -EINVAL; + + if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode)) + goto out; + + ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter); + if (ret) goto out; - }

seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode); out: return ret; } +#else +static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} +#endif

/** * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode @@ -541,5 +559,12 @@ out: */ long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter) { - return seccomp_set_mode(seccomp_mode, filter); + switch (seccomp_mode) { + case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: + return seccomp_set_mode_strict(); + case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: + return seccomp_set_mode_filter(filter); + default: + return -EINVAL; + } }

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org

commit 0fa3ecd87848c9c93c2c828ef4c3a8ca36ce46c7 upstream.

sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for group-shared directories.

But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to confuse things even more).

Reported-by: Jann Horn jannh@google.com Cc: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org Cc: Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- fs/inode.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -1827,8 +1827,14 @@ void inode_init_owner(struct inode *inod inode->i_uid = current_fsuid(); if (dir && dir->i_mode & S_ISGID) { inode->i_gid = dir->i_gid; + + /* Directories are special, and always inherit S_ISGID */ if (S_ISDIR(mode)) mode |= S_ISGID; + else if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP) && + !in_group_p(inode->i_gid) && + !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(dir, CAP_FSETID)) + mode &= ~S_ISGID; } else inode->i_gid = current_fsgid(); inode->i_mode = mode;

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu

commit e09463f220ca9a1a1ecfda84fcda658f99a1f12a upstream.

Do not set the b_modified flag in block's journal head should not until after we're sure that jbd2_journal_dirty_metadat() will not abort with an error due to there not being enough space reserved in the jbd2 handle.

Otherwise, future attempts to modify the buffer may lead a large number of spurious errors and warnings.

This addresses CVE-2018-10883.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200071

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu [bwh: Backported to 3.16: Drop the added logging statement, as it's on a code path that doesn't exist here] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- --- a/fs/jbd2/transaction.c +++ b/fs/jbd2/transaction.c @@ -1288,11 +1288,11 @@ int jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata(handle_t * of the transaction. This needs to be done * once a transaction -bzzz */ - jh->b_modified = 1; if (handle->h_buffer_credits <= 0) { ret = -ENOSPC; goto out_unlock_bh; } + jh->b_modified = 1; handle->h_buffer_credits--; }

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Eric Sandeen sandeen@sandeen.net

commit bb3d48dcf86a97dc25fe9fc2c11938e19cb4399a upstream.

xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer, for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops if we try.

This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969 Reported-by: Xu, Wen wen.xu@gatech.edu Tested-by: Xu, Wen wen.xu@gatech.edu Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen sandeen@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong darrick.wong@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong darrick.wong@oracle.com [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- fs/xfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c @@ -701,9 +701,8 @@ xfs_attr_shortform_to_leaf(xfs_da_args_t ASSERT(blkno == 0); error = xfs_attr3_leaf_create(args, blkno, &bp); if (error) { - error = xfs_da_shrink_inode(args, 0, bp); - bp = NULL; - if (error) + /* xfs_attr3_leaf_create may not have instantiated a block */ + if (bp && (xfs_da_shrink_inode(args, 0, bp) != 0)) goto out; xfs_idata_realloc(dp, size, XFS_ATTR_FORK); /* try to put */ memcpy(ifp->if_u1.if_data, tmpbuffer, size); /* it back */

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Eric Sandeen sandeen@redhat.com

commit 2c4306f719b083d17df2963bc761777576b8ad1b upstream.

If xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree fails in a mode where we call xfs_iroot_realloc(-1) to de-allocate the root, set the format back to extents.

Otherwise we can assume we can dereference ifp->if_broot based on the XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE format, and crash.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199423 Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen sandeen@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong darrick.wong@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong darrick.wong@oracle.com [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Only one failure path needs to be patched - Adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- fs/xfs/xfs_bmap.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_bmap.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_bmap.c @@ -822,6 +822,8 @@ xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree( *logflagsp = 0; if ((error = xfs_alloc_vextent(&args))) { xfs_iroot_realloc(ip, -1, whichfork); + ASSERT(ifp->if_broot == NULL); + XFS_IFORK_FMT_SET(ip, whichfork, XFS_DINODE_FMT_EXTENTS); xfs_btree_del_cursor(cur, XFS_BTREE_ERROR); return error; }

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Qu Wenruo wqu@suse.com

commit 389305b2aa68723c754f88d9dbd268a400e10664 upstream.

Invalid reloc tree can cause kernel NULL pointer dereference when btrfs does some cleanup of the reloc roots.

It turns out that fs_info::reloc_ctl can be NULL in btrfs_recover_relocation() as we allocate relocation control after all reloc roots have been verified. So when we hit: note, we haven't called set_reloc_control() thus fs_info::reloc_ctl is still NULL.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199833 Reported-by: Xu Wen wen.xu@gatech.edu Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo wqu@suse.com Tested-by: Gu Jinxiang gujx@cn.fujitsu.com Reviewed-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- fs/btrfs/relocation.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/btrfs/relocation.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/relocation.c @@ -1311,18 +1311,19 @@ static void __del_reloc_root(struct btrf struct mapping_node *node = NULL; struct reloc_control *rc = root->fs_info->reloc_ctl;

- spin_lock(&rc->reloc_root_tree.lock); - rb_node = tree_search(&rc->reloc_root_tree.rb_root, - root->node->start); - if (rb_node) { - node = rb_entry(rb_node, struct mapping_node, rb_node); - rb_erase(&node->rb_node, &rc->reloc_root_tree.rb_root); + if (rc) { + spin_lock(&rc->reloc_root_tree.lock); + rb_node = tree_search(&rc->reloc_root_tree.rb_root, + root->node->start); + if (rb_node) { + node = rb_entry(rb_node, struct mapping_node, rb_node); + rb_erase(&node->rb_node, &rc->reloc_root_tree.rb_root); + } + spin_unlock(&rc->reloc_root_tree.lock); + if (!node) + return; + BUG_ON((struct btrfs_root *)node->data != root); } - spin_unlock(&rc->reloc_root_tree.lock); - - if (!node) - return; - BUG_ON((struct btrfs_root *)node->data != root);

spin_lock(&root->fs_info->trans_lock); list_del_init(&root->root_list);

3.16.58-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org

commit 48dc92b9fc3926844257316e75ba11eb5c742b2c upstream.

This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags" parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value, used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).

In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter" for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags, and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially filter the seccomp syscall itself.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov oleg@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski luto@amacapital.net Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- arch/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 ++- include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 4 +++ kernel/seccomp.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 ++ 8 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context - secure_computing return value is checked and a return value of -1 results in the system call being skipped immediately. + - seccomp syscall wired up

config SECCOMP_FILTER def_bool y --- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl @@ -360,3 +360,4 @@ 351 i386 sched_setattr sys_sched_setattr 352 i386 sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr 353 i386 renameat2 sys_renameat2 +354 i386 seccomp sys_seccomp --- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ 314 common sched_setattr sys_sched_setattr 315 common sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr 316 common renameat2 sys_renameat2 +317 common seccomp sys_seccomp

# # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h @@ -866,4 +866,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_process_vm_writev(pi asmlinkage long sys_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type, unsigned long idx1, unsigned long idx2); asmlinkage long sys_finit_module(int fd, const char __user *uargs, int flags); +asmlinkage long sys_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, + const char __user *uargs); #endif --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h @@ -699,9 +699,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_sched_setattr, sys_sched_ __SYSCALL(__NR_sched_getattr, sys_sched_getattr) #define __NR_renameat2 276 __SYSCALL(__NR_renameat2, sys_renameat2) +#define __NR_seccomp 277 +__SYSCALL(__NR_seccomp, sys_seccomp)

#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 277 +#define __NR_syscalls 278

/* * All syscalls below here should go away really, --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h @@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ #define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT 1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */ #define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */

+/* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */ +#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0 +#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1 + /* * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value. * The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data. --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/seccomp.h> +#include <linux/syscalls.h>

/* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */

@@ -314,7 +315,7 @@ free_prog: * * Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise. */ -static long seccomp_attach_user_filter(char __user *user_filter) +static long seccomp_attach_user_filter(const char __user *user_filter) { struct sock_fprog fprog; long ret = -EFAULT; @@ -517,6 +518,7 @@ out: #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER /** * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter + * @flags: flags to change filter behavior * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter * * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters. @@ -527,11 +529,16 @@ out: * * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure. */ -static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter) +static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags, + const char __user *filter) { const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER; long ret = -EINVAL;

+ /* Validate flags. */ + if (flags != 0) + goto out; + if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode)) goto out;

@@ -544,12 +551,35 @@ out: return ret; } #else -static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter) +static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags, + const char __user *filter) { return -EINVAL; } #endif

+/* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */ +static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, + const char __user *uargs) +{ + switch (op) { + case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT: + if (flags != 0 || uargs != NULL) + return -EINVAL; + return seccomp_set_mode_strict(); + case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER: + return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs); + default: + return -EINVAL; + } +} + +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(seccomp, unsigned int, op, unsigned int, flags, + const char __user *, uargs) +{ + return do_seccomp(op, flags, uargs); +} + /** * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use @@ -559,12 +589,27 @@ static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filt */ long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter) { + unsigned int op; + char __user *uargs; + switch (seccomp_mode) { case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: - return seccomp_set_mode_strict(); + op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT; + /* + * Setting strict mode through prctl always ignored filter, + * so make sure it is always NULL here to pass the internal + * check in do_seccomp(). + */ + uargs = NULL; + break; case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: - return seccomp_set_mode_filter(filter); + op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER; + uargs = filter; + break; default: return -EINVAL; } + + /* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */ + return do_seccomp(op, 0, uargs); } --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c @@ -213,3 +213,6 @@ cond_syscall(compat_sys_open_by_handle_a

/* compare kernel pointers */ cond_syscall(sys_kcmp); + +/* operate on Secure Computing state */ +cond_syscall(sys_seccomp);