commit 58738c495e15badd2015e19ff41f1f1ed55200bc upstream.
Dan reports: The patch 62232e45f4a2: "libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for nvdimm_bus and nvdimm devices" from Jun 8, 2015, leads to the following static checker warning:
drivers/nvdimm/bus.c:1018 __nd_ioctl() warn: integer overflows 'buf_len'
From a casual review, this seems like it might be a real bug. On the first iteration we load some data into in_env[]. On the second iteration we read a use controlled "in_size" from nd_cmd_in_size(). It can go up to UINT_MAX - 1. A high number means we will fill the whole in_env[] buffer. But we potentially keep looping and adding more to in_len so now it can be any value.
It simple enough to change, but it feels weird that we keep looping even though in_env is totally full. Shouldn't we just return an error if we don't have space for desc->in_num.
We keep looping because the size of the total input is allowed to be bigger than the 'envelope' which is a subset of the payload that tells us how much data to expect. For safety explicitly check that buf_len does not overflow which is what the checker flagged.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 62232e45f4a2: "libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for nvdimm_bus..." Reported-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com --- drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c index 0392eb8a0dea..8311a93cabd8 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c @@ -812,16 +812,17 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm, int read_only, unsigned int ioctl_cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc = nvdimm_bus->nd_desc; - size_t buf_len = 0, in_len = 0, out_len = 0; static char out_env[ND_CMD_MAX_ENVELOPE]; static char in_env[ND_CMD_MAX_ENVELOPE]; const struct nd_cmd_desc *desc = NULL; unsigned int cmd = _IOC_NR(ioctl_cmd); void __user *p = (void __user *) arg; struct device *dev = &nvdimm_bus->dev; - struct nd_cmd_pkg pkg; const char *cmd_name, *dimm_name; + u32 in_len = 0, out_len = 0; unsigned long cmd_mask; + struct nd_cmd_pkg pkg; + u64 buf_len = 0; void *buf; int rc, i;
@@ -882,7 +883,7 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm, }
if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL) { - dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s, idx: %llu, in: %zu, out: %zu, len %zu\n", + dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s, idx: %llu, in: %u, out: %u, len %llu\n", __func__, dimm_name, pkg.nd_command, in_len, out_len, buf_len);
@@ -912,9 +913,9 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm, out_len += out_size; }
- buf_len = out_len + in_len; + buf_len = (u64) out_len + (u64) in_len; if (buf_len > ND_IOCTL_MAX_BUFLEN) { - dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s cmd: %s buf_len: %zu > %d\n", __func__, + dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s cmd: %s buf_len: %llu > %d\n", __func__, dimm_name, cmd_name, buf_len, ND_IOCTL_MAX_BUFLEN); return -EINVAL;
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
libnvdimm: fix integer overflow static analysis warning
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git%3Ba=su...
The filename of the patch is: libnvdimm-fix-integer-overflow-static-analysis-warning.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let stable@vger.kernel.org know about it.
From foo@baz Mon Feb 26 20:55:53 CET 2018
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 14:05:38 -0800 Subject: libnvdimm: fix integer overflow static analysis warning To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Message-ID: 151942353841.21775.10479863744600514056.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
commit 58738c495e15badd2015e19ff41f1f1ed55200bc upstream.
Dan reports: The patch 62232e45f4a2: "libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for nvdimm_bus and nvdimm devices" from Jun 8, 2015, leads to the following static checker warning:
drivers/nvdimm/bus.c:1018 __nd_ioctl() warn: integer overflows 'buf_len'
From a casual review, this seems like it might be a real bug. On the first iteration we load some data into in_env[]. On the second iteration we read a use controlled "in_size" from nd_cmd_in_size(). It can go up to UINT_MAX - 1. A high number means we will fill the whole in_env[] buffer. But we potentially keep looping and adding more to in_len so now it can be any value.
It simple enough to change, but it feels weird that we keep looping even though in_env is totally full. Shouldn't we just return an error if we don't have space for desc->in_num.
We keep looping because the size of the total input is allowed to be bigger than the 'envelope' which is a subset of the payload that tells us how much data to expect. For safety explicitly check that buf_len does not overflow which is what the checker flagged.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 62232e45f4a2: "libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for nvdimm_bus..." Reported-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c @@ -812,16 +812,17 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus int read_only, unsigned int ioctl_cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc = nvdimm_bus->nd_desc; - size_t buf_len = 0, in_len = 0, out_len = 0; static char out_env[ND_CMD_MAX_ENVELOPE]; static char in_env[ND_CMD_MAX_ENVELOPE]; const struct nd_cmd_desc *desc = NULL; unsigned int cmd = _IOC_NR(ioctl_cmd); void __user *p = (void __user *) arg; struct device *dev = &nvdimm_bus->dev; - struct nd_cmd_pkg pkg; const char *cmd_name, *dimm_name; + u32 in_len = 0, out_len = 0; unsigned long cmd_mask; + struct nd_cmd_pkg pkg; + u64 buf_len = 0; void *buf; int rc, i;
@@ -882,7 +883,7 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus }
if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL) { - dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s, idx: %llu, in: %zu, out: %zu, len %zu\n", + dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s, idx: %llu, in: %u, out: %u, len %llu\n", __func__, dimm_name, pkg.nd_command, in_len, out_len, buf_len);
@@ -912,9 +913,9 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus out_len += out_size; }
- buf_len = out_len + in_len; + buf_len = (u64) out_len + (u64) in_len; if (buf_len > ND_IOCTL_MAX_BUFLEN) { - dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s cmd: %s buf_len: %zu > %d\n", __func__, + dev_dbg(dev, "%s:%s cmd: %s buf_len: %llu > %d\n", __func__, dimm_name, cmd_name, buf_len, ND_IOCTL_MAX_BUFLEN); return -EINVAL;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dan.j.williams@intel.com are
queue-4.9/mm-fix-devm_memremap_pages-collision-handling.patch queue-4.9/ib-core-disable-memory-registration-of-filesystem-dax-vmas.patch queue-4.9/mm-avoid-spurious-bad-pmd-warning-messages.patch queue-4.9/mm-introduce-get_user_pages_longterm.patch queue-4.9/mm-fail-get_vaddr_frames-for-filesystem-dax-mappings.patch queue-4.9/fs-dax.c-fix-inefficiency-in-dax_writeback_mapping_range.patch queue-4.9/device-dax-implement-split-to-catch-invalid-munmap-attempts.patch queue-4.9/v4l2-disable-filesystem-dax-mapping-support.patch queue-4.9/libnvdimm-dax-fix-1gb-aligned-namespaces-vs-physical-misalignment.patch queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-clear-extra-registers-beyond-syscall-arguments-to-reduce-speculation-attack-surface.patch queue-4.9/libnvdimm-fix-integer-overflow-static-analysis-warning.patch
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Dan Williams -
gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org