While the latent entropy plugin mostly doesn't derive entropy from get_random_const() for measuring the call graph, when __latent_entropy is applied to a constant, then it's initialized statically to output from get_random_const(). In that case, this data is derived from a 64-bit seed, which means a buffer of 512 bits doesn't really have that amount of compile-time entropy.
This patch fixes that shortcoming by just buffering chunks of /dev/urandom output and doling it out as requested.
At the same time, it's important that we don't break the use of -frandom-seed, for people who want the runtime benefits of the latent entropy plugin, while still having compile-time determinism. In that case, we detect whether gcc's set_random_seed() has been called by making a call to get_random_seed(noinit=true) in the plugin init function, which is called after set_random_seed() is called but before anything that calls get_random_seed(noinit=false), and seeing if it's zero or not. If it's not zero, we're in deterministic mode, and so we just generate numbers with a basic xorshift prng.
Fixes: 38addce8b600 ("gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: PaX Team pageexec@freemail.hu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com --- Changes v1->v2: - Pipacs pointed out that using /dev/urandom unconditionally would break the use of -frandom-seed, so now we check for that and keep with something deterministic in that case.
I'm not super familiar with this plugin or its conventions, so pointers would be most welcome if something here looks amiss. The decision to buffer 2k at a time is pretty arbitrary too; I haven't measured usage.
scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c | 48 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c index 589454bce930..042442013ae1 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c @@ -82,29 +82,37 @@ __visible int plugin_is_GPL_compatible; static GTY(()) tree latent_entropy_decl;
static struct plugin_info latent_entropy_plugin_info = { - .version = "201606141920vanilla", + .version = "202203311920vanilla", .help = "disable\tturn off latent entropy instrumentation\n", };
-static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT seed; -/* - * get_random_seed() (this is a GCC function) generates the seed. - * This is a simple random generator without any cryptographic security because - * the entropy doesn't come from here. - */ +static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT deterministic_seed; +static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT rnd_buf[256]; +static size_t rnd_idx = ARRAY_SIZE(rnd_buf); +static int urandom_fd = -1; + static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT get_random_const(void) { - unsigned int i; - unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT ret = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < 8 * sizeof(ret); i++) { - ret = (ret << 1) | (seed & 1); - seed >>= 1; - if (ret & 1) - seed ^= 0xD800000000000000ULL; + if (deterministic_seed) { + unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT w = deterministic_seed; + w ^= w << 13; + w ^= w >> 7; + w ^= w << 17; + deterministic_seed = w; + return deterministic_seed; }
- return ret; + if (urandom_fd < 0) { + urandom_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY); + if (urandom_fd < 0) + abort(); + } + if (rnd_idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(rnd_buf)) { + if (read(urandom_fd, rnd_buf, sizeof(rnd_buf)) != sizeof(rnd_buf)) + abort(); + rnd_idx = 0; + } + return rnd_buf[rnd_idx++]; }
static tree tree_get_random_const(tree type) @@ -537,8 +545,6 @@ static void latent_entropy_start_unit(void *gcc_data __unused, tree type, id; int quals;
- seed = get_random_seed(false); - if (in_lto_p) return;
@@ -573,6 +579,12 @@ __visible int plugin_init(struct plugin_name_args *plugin_info, const struct plugin_argument * const argv = plugin_info->argv; int i;
+ /* + * Call get_random_seed() with noinit=true, so that this returns + * 0 in the case where no seed has been passed via -frandom-seed. + */ + deterministic_seed = get_random_seed(true); + static const struct ggc_root_tab gt_ggc_r_gt_latent_entropy[] = { { .base = &latent_entropy_decl,
On Sun, Apr 03, 2022 at 10:40:36PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
While the latent entropy plugin mostly doesn't derive entropy from get_random_const() for measuring the call graph, when __latent_entropy is applied to a constant, then it's initialized statically to output from get_random_const(). In that case, this data is derived from a 64-bit seed, which means a buffer of 512 bits doesn't really have that amount of compile-time entropy.
This patch fixes that shortcoming by just buffering chunks of /dev/urandom output and doling it out as requested.
At the same time, it's important that we don't break the use of -frandom-seed, for people who want the runtime benefits of the latent entropy plugin, while still having compile-time determinism. In that case, we detect whether gcc's set_random_seed() has been called by making a call to get_random_seed(noinit=true) in the plugin init function, which is called after set_random_seed() is called but before anything that calls get_random_seed(noinit=false), and seeing if it's zero or not. If it's not zero, we're in deterministic mode, and so we just generate numbers with a basic xorshift prng.
This mixes two changes: the pRNG change and the "use urandom if non-deterministic" change. I think these should be split, so the pRNG change can be explicitly justified.
More notes below...
Fixes: 38addce8b600 ("gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: PaX Team pageexec@freemail.hu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com
Changes v1->v2:
- Pipacs pointed out that using /dev/urandom unconditionally would break the use of -frandom-seed, so now we check for that and keep with something deterministic in that case.
I'm not super familiar with this plugin or its conventions, so pointers would be most welcome if something here looks amiss. The decision to buffer 2k at a time is pretty arbitrary too; I haven't measured usage.
scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c | 48 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c index 589454bce930..042442013ae1 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c @@ -82,29 +82,37 @@ __visible int plugin_is_GPL_compatible; static GTY(()) tree latent_entropy_decl; static struct plugin_info latent_entropy_plugin_info = {
- .version = "201606141920vanilla",
- .version = "202203311920vanilla",
This doesn't really need to be versioned. We can change this to just "vanilla", IMO.
.help = "disable\tturn off latent entropy instrumentation\n", }; -static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT seed; -/*
- get_random_seed() (this is a GCC function) generates the seed.
- This is a simple random generator without any cryptographic security because
- the entropy doesn't come from here.
- */
+static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT deterministic_seed; +static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT rnd_buf[256]; +static size_t rnd_idx = ARRAY_SIZE(rnd_buf); +static int urandom_fd = -1;
static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT get_random_const(void) {
- unsigned int i;
- unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT ret = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < 8 * sizeof(ret); i++) {
ret = (ret << 1) | (seed & 1);seed >>= 1;if (ret & 1)seed ^= 0xD800000000000000ULL;
- if (deterministic_seed) {
unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT w = deterministic_seed;w ^= w << 13;w ^= w >> 7;w ^= w << 17;deterministic_seed = w;return deterministic_seed;
While seemingly impossible, perhaps don't reset "deterministic_seed", and just continue to use "seed", so that it can never become "0" again.
}
- return ret;
- if (urandom_fd < 0) {
urandom_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);if (urandom_fd < 0)abort();- }
- if (rnd_idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(rnd_buf)) {
if (read(urandom_fd, rnd_buf, sizeof(rnd_buf)) != sizeof(rnd_buf))abort();rnd_idx = 0;- }
- return rnd_buf[rnd_idx++];
} static tree tree_get_random_const(tree type) @@ -537,8 +545,6 @@ static void latent_entropy_start_unit(void *gcc_data __unused, tree type, id; int quals;
- seed = get_random_seed(false);
- if (in_lto_p) return;
@@ -573,6 +579,12 @@ __visible int plugin_init(struct plugin_name_args *plugin_info, const struct plugin_argument * const argv = plugin_info->argv; int i;
- /*
* Call get_random_seed() with noinit=true, so that this returns* 0 in the case where no seed has been passed via -frandom-seed.*/- deterministic_seed = get_random_seed(true);
i.e. have this be:
deterministic_seed = get_random_seed(true); if (deterministic_seed) seed = get_random_seed(false);
- static const struct ggc_root_tab gt_ggc_r_gt_latent_entropy[] = { { .base = &latent_entropy_decl,
-- 2.35.1
Hi Kees,
On Mon, Apr 4, 2022 at 8:49 PM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
This mixes two changes: the pRNG change and the "use urandom if non-deterministic" change. I think these should be split, so the pRNG change can be explicitly justified.
Alright, I'll split those. Or, more probably, just drop the xorshift thing. There's not actually a strong reason for preferring xorshift. I did it because it produces more uniformity and is faster to compute and all that. But none of that stuff actually matters here. It was just a sort of "well I'm at it..." thing.
static struct plugin_info latent_entropy_plugin_info = {
- .version = "201606141920vanilla",
- .version = "202203311920vanilla",
This doesn't really need to be versioned. We can change this to just "vanilla", IMO.
Okay. I suppose you want it to be in a different patch too, right? In which case I'll leave it out and maybe get to it later. (I suppose one probably needs to double check whether it's used for anything interesting like dwarf debug info or whatever, where maybe it's helpful?)
- if (deterministic_seed) {
- unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT w = deterministic_seed;
- w ^= w << 13;
- w ^= w >> 7;
- w ^= w << 17;
- deterministic_seed = w;
- return deterministic_seed;
While seemingly impossible, perhaps don't reset "deterministic_seed", and just continue to use "seed", so that it can never become "0" again.
Not sure I follow. It's an LFSR. The "L" is important. It'll never become zero. It's not "seemingly". We can prove it trivially in Magma:
> w := 64; > K := GF(2); > I := IdentityMatrix(K, w); > SHL := HorizontalJoin(RemoveColumn(I, 1), ZeroMatrix(K, w, 1)); > SHR := HorizontalJoin(ZeroMatrix(K, w, 1), RemoveColumn(I, w)); > M := (I + SHL^17) * (I + SHR^7) * (I + SHL^13); > Order(M) eq 2^64 - 1; true > P<x> := MinimalPolynomial(M); > IsPrimitive(P); true > IsInvertible(M); true > Rank(M); 64
And more obviously, splitting this into "seed" and "deterministic_seed", as you suggested, wouldn't actually do much in the case when seed=0, since 0<<N==0 and 0^0==0.
Jason
While the latent entropy plugin mostly doesn't derive entropy from get_random_const() for measuring the call graph, when __latent_entropy is applied to a constant, then it's initialized statically to output from get_random_const(). In that case, this data is derived from a 64-bit seed, which means a buffer of 512 bits doesn't really have that amount of compile-time entropy.
This patch fixes that shortcoming by just buffering chunks of /dev/urandom output and doling it out as requested.
At the same time, it's important that we don't break the use of -frandom-seed, for people who want the runtime benefits of the latent entropy plugin, while still having compile-time determinism. In that case, we detect whether a seed is in use via the local_ticks variable, which the documentation explains is, "-1u, if the user has specified a particular random seed."
Fixes: 38addce8b600 ("gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: PaX Team pageexec@freemail.hu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com --- scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c | 44 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c index 589454bce930..435b956ac1bd 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c @@ -87,24 +87,40 @@ static struct plugin_info latent_entropy_plugin_info = { };
static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT seed; -/* - * get_random_seed() (this is a GCC function) generates the seed. - * This is a simple random generator without any cryptographic security because - * the entropy doesn't come from here. - */ +static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT rnd_buf[256]; +static size_t rnd_idx = ARRAY_SIZE(rnd_buf); +static int urandom_fd = -1; + static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT get_random_const(void) { - unsigned int i; - unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT ret = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < 8 * sizeof(ret); i++) { - ret = (ret << 1) | (seed & 1); - seed >>= 1; - if (ret & 1) - seed ^= 0xD800000000000000ULL; + /* + * When local_tick==-1, the user has specified a seed using + * -frandom-seed, which means we should do something deterministic. + */ + if (local_tick == -1U) { + unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT ret = 0; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < 8 * sizeof(ret); i++) { + ret = (ret << 1) | (seed & 1); + seed >>= 1; + if (ret & 1) + seed ^= 0xD800000000000000ULL; + } + return ret; }
- return ret; + if (urandom_fd < 0) { + urandom_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY); + if (urandom_fd < 0) + abort(); + } + if (rnd_idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(rnd_buf)) { + if (read(urandom_fd, rnd_buf, sizeof(rnd_buf)) != sizeof(rnd_buf)) + abort(); + rnd_idx = 0; + } + return rnd_buf[rnd_idx++]; }
static tree tree_get_random_const(tree type)
While the latent entropy plugin mostly doesn't derive entropy from get_random_const() for measuring the call graph, when __latent_entropy is applied to a constant, then it's initialized statically to output from get_random_const(). In that case, this data is derived from a 64-bit seed, which means a buffer of 512 bits doesn't really have that amount of compile-time entropy.
This patch fixes that shortcoming by just buffering chunks of /dev/urandom output and doling it out as requested.
At the same time, it's important that we don't break the use of -frandom-seed, for people who want the runtime benefits of the latent entropy plugin, while still having compile-time determinism. In that case, we detect whether a seed is in use via the local_ticks variable, which the documentation explains is, "-1u, if the user has specified a particular random seed."
Fixes: 38addce8b600 ("gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: PaX Team pageexec@freemail.hu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com --- Changes v2->v3: - Drop change to xorshift for deterministic thing. This can be done later if anybody actually finds a good reason for it. - Drop change of plugin version. Since Kees is proposing a change in the versioning scheme, that can also be a separate patch. - At Pipacs' suggestion, use local_ticks for determining if -frandom-seed is being used, since that's what gcc says to do.
scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c | 44 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c index 589454bce930..435b956ac1bd 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c @@ -87,24 +87,40 @@ static struct plugin_info latent_entropy_plugin_info = { };
static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT seed; -/* - * get_random_seed() (this is a GCC function) generates the seed. - * This is a simple random generator without any cryptographic security because - * the entropy doesn't come from here. - */ +static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT rnd_buf[256]; +static size_t rnd_idx = ARRAY_SIZE(rnd_buf); +static int urandom_fd = -1; + static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT get_random_const(void) { - unsigned int i; - unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT ret = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < 8 * sizeof(ret); i++) { - ret = (ret << 1) | (seed & 1); - seed >>= 1; - if (ret & 1) - seed ^= 0xD800000000000000ULL; + /* + * When local_tick==-1, the user has specified a seed using + * -frandom-seed, which means we should do something deterministic. + */ + if (local_tick == -1U) { + unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT ret = 0; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < 8 * sizeof(ret); i++) { + ret = (ret << 1) | (seed & 1); + seed >>= 1; + if (ret & 1) + seed ^= 0xD800000000000000ULL; + } + return ret; }
- return ret; + if (urandom_fd < 0) { + urandom_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY); + if (urandom_fd < 0) + abort(); + } + if (rnd_idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(rnd_buf)) { + if (read(urandom_fd, rnd_buf, sizeof(rnd_buf)) != sizeof(rnd_buf)) + abort(); + rnd_idx = 0; + } + return rnd_buf[rnd_idx++]; }
static tree tree_get_random_const(tree type)
On Tue, Apr 05, 2022 at 12:47:14AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
On Mon, Apr 4, 2022 at 8:49 PM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
This mixes two changes: the pRNG change and the "use urandom if non-deterministic" change. I think these should be split, so the pRNG change can be explicitly justified.
Alright, I'll split those. Or, more probably, just drop the xorshift thing. There's not actually a strong reason for preferring xorshift. I did it because it produces more uniformity and is faster to compute and all that. But none of that stuff actually matters here. It was just a sort of "well I'm at it..." thing.
Well, it's nice to have and you already wrote it, so seems a waste to just drop it. :)
static struct plugin_info latent_entropy_plugin_info = {
- .version = "201606141920vanilla",
- .version = "202203311920vanilla",
This doesn't really need to be versioned. We can change this to just "vanilla", IMO.
Okay. I suppose you want it to be in a different patch too, right? In which case I'll leave it out and maybe get to it later. (I suppose one probably needs to double check whether it's used for anything interesting like dwarf debug info or whatever, where maybe it's helpful?)
Hm, I don't think it shows up anywhere, but you can just drop the hunk that touch it. I can remove them all with a separate patch later.
- if (deterministic_seed) {
- unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT w = deterministic_seed;
- w ^= w << 13;
- w ^= w >> 7;
- w ^= w << 17;
- deterministic_seed = w;
- return deterministic_seed;
While seemingly impossible, perhaps don't reset "deterministic_seed", and just continue to use "seed", so that it can never become "0" again.
Not sure I follow. It's an LFSR. The "L" is important. It'll never become zero. It's not "seemingly". We can prove it trivially in Magma:
Got it; yeah. I was reading too quickly. My brain misparsed and got stuck on "left shift", but it's using rotation. Sorry for the noise.
Hi Kees,
On 4/5/22, Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
On Tue, Apr 05, 2022 at 12:47:14AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
On Mon, Apr 4, 2022 at 8:49 PM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
This mixes two changes: the pRNG change and the "use urandom if non-deterministic" change. I think these should be split, so the pRNG change can be explicitly justified.
Alright, I'll split those. Or, more probably, just drop the xorshift thing. There's not actually a strong reason for preferring xorshift. I did it because it produces more uniformity and is faster to compute and all that. But none of that stuff actually matters here. It was just a sort of "well I'm at it..." thing.
Well, it's nice to have and you already wrote it, so seems a waste to just drop it. :)
static struct plugin_info latent_entropy_plugin_info = {
.version = "201606141920vanilla",
.version = "202203311920vanilla",This doesn't really need to be versioned. We can change this to just "vanilla", IMO.
Okay. I suppose you want it to be in a different patch too, right? In which case I'll leave it out and maybe get to it later. (I suppose one probably needs to double check whether it's used for anything interesting like dwarf debug info or whatever, where maybe it's helpful?)
Hm, I don't think it shows up anywhere, but you can just drop the hunk that touch it. I can remove them all with a separate patch later.
Okay. That's what I did here https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220404230709.124508-1-Jason@zx2c4.com/ so awaiting your merge. (I still find all aspects of v2 more preferable for a variety of weak reasons in case you'd like to merge that instead, but v3 is available now.)
Jason
On Tue, Apr 05, 2022 at 02:38:58PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
Hi Kees,
On 4/5/22, Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
On Tue, Apr 05, 2022 at 12:47:14AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
On Mon, Apr 4, 2022 at 8:49 PM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
This mixes two changes: the pRNG change and the "use urandom if non-deterministic" change. I think these should be split, so the pRNG change can be explicitly justified.
Alright, I'll split those. Or, more probably, just drop the xorshift thing. There's not actually a strong reason for preferring xorshift. I did it because it produces more uniformity and is faster to compute and all that. But none of that stuff actually matters here. It was just a sort of "well I'm at it..." thing.
Well, it's nice to have and you already wrote it, so seems a waste to just drop it. :)
static struct plugin_info latent_entropy_plugin_info = {
.version = "201606141920vanilla",
.version = "202203311920vanilla",This doesn't really need to be versioned. We can change this to just "vanilla", IMO.
Okay. I suppose you want it to be in a different patch too, right? In which case I'll leave it out and maybe get to it later. (I suppose one probably needs to double check whether it's used for anything interesting like dwarf debug info or whatever, where maybe it's helpful?)
Hm, I don't think it shows up anywhere, but you can just drop the hunk that touch it. I can remove them all with a separate patch later.
Okay. That's what I did here https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220404230709.124508-1-Jason@zx2c4.com/ so awaiting your merge. (I still find all aspects of v2 more preferable for a variety of weak reasons in case you'd like to merge that instead, but v3 is available now.)
v3 uses a different check for the -f option, though? Isn't that preferred over the v2 method?
Also, I did some quick benchmarking, and any difference in runtime is completely lost in the noise, so that's good.
Hi Kees,
On 4/5/22, Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
v3 uses a different check for the -f option, though? Isn't that preferred over the v2 method?
Based on the code comments, I assume this is gcc upstream's intended method. It strikes me as worse, though, because that variable, when it's not set to -1, is set to: `local_tick = (unsigned) tv.tv_sec * 1000 + tv.tv_usec / 1000;` which is on occasion unlucky and hits -1 too. But maybe that's a bug in gcc that should be fixed instead? I don't know really. But anyway that's why I'm /also/ more into that aspect of v2.
Also, I did some quick benchmarking, and any difference in runtime is completely lost in the noise, so that's good.
Oh good to hear. So my 2k buffer is fine then.
Jason
While the latent entropy plugin mostly doesn't derive entropy from get_random_const() for measuring the call graph, when __latent_entropy is applied to a constant, then it's initialized statically to output from get_random_const(). In that case, this data is derived from a 64-bit seed, which means a buffer of 512 bits doesn't really have that amount of compile-time entropy.
This patch fixes that shortcoming by just buffering chunks of /dev/urandom output and doling it out as requested.
At the same time, it's important that we don't break the use of -frandom-seed, for people who want the runtime benefits of the latent entropy plugin, while still having compile-time determinism. In that case, we detect whether gcc's set_random_seed() has been called by making a call to get_random_seed(noinit=true) in the plugin init function, which is called after set_random_seed() is called but before anything that calls get_random_seed(noinit=false), and seeing if it's zero or not. If it's not zero, we're in deterministic mode, and so we just generate numbers with a basic xorshift prng.
[Note that we don't detect if -frandom-seed is being used using the documented local_tick variable, because it's assigned via: local_tick = (unsigned) tv.tv_sec * 1000 + tv.tv_usec / 1000; which may well overflow and become -1 on its own, and so isn't reliable.]
Fixes: 38addce8b600 ("gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: PaX Team pageexec@freemail.hu Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com --- Changes v2->v4: - v4 is based on v2, not on v3, so: * We're keeping the version string change, since Kees is going to remove that anyway from everything all in one swoop, so better to increment it as is the custom now, and let that patch later change the way things are done. * The xorshift prng is retained, because why not. It's faster and produces less code. * The get_random_seed(noinit=true) technique is used to detect whether -frandom-seed is being used, rather than local_tick, because of the overflow bug in local_tick. - The size of the buffer is reduced to 256 bytes, which not only is the size which the kernel guarantees will never fail due to signals, but also more closely fits the histogram of usage, according to an allmodconfig. - Pipacs pointed out that gcc uses gcc_assert()/gcc_unreachable(), rather than abort(), so switch to using that.
scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c | 46 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c index 589454bce930..0639fa4d48bd 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c @@ -82,29 +82,35 @@ __visible int plugin_is_GPL_compatible; static GTY(()) tree latent_entropy_decl;
static struct plugin_info latent_entropy_plugin_info = { - .version = "201606141920vanilla", + .version = "202203311920vanilla", .help = "disable\tturn off latent entropy instrumentation\n", };
-static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT seed; -/* - * get_random_seed() (this is a GCC function) generates the seed. - * This is a simple random generator without any cryptographic security because - * the entropy doesn't come from here. - */ +static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT deterministic_seed; +static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT rnd_buf[32]; +static size_t rnd_idx = ARRAY_SIZE(rnd_buf); +static int urandom_fd = -1; + static unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT get_random_const(void) { - unsigned int i; - unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT ret = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < 8 * sizeof(ret); i++) { - ret = (ret << 1) | (seed & 1); - seed >>= 1; - if (ret & 1) - seed ^= 0xD800000000000000ULL; + if (deterministic_seed) { + unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT w = deterministic_seed; + w ^= w << 13; + w ^= w >> 7; + w ^= w << 17; + deterministic_seed = w; + return deterministic_seed; }
- return ret; + if (urandom_fd < 0) { + urandom_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY); + gcc_assert(urandom_fd >= 0); + } + if (rnd_idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(rnd_buf)) { + gcc_assert(read(urandom_fd, rnd_buf, sizeof(rnd_buf)) == sizeof(rnd_buf)); + rnd_idx = 0; + } + return rnd_buf[rnd_idx++]; }
static tree tree_get_random_const(tree type) @@ -537,8 +543,6 @@ static void latent_entropy_start_unit(void *gcc_data __unused, tree type, id; int quals;
- seed = get_random_seed(false); - if (in_lto_p) return;
@@ -573,6 +577,12 @@ __visible int plugin_init(struct plugin_name_args *plugin_info, const struct plugin_argument * const argv = plugin_info->argv; int i;
+ /* + * Call get_random_seed() with noinit=true, so that this returns + * 0 in the case where no seed has been passed via -frandom-seed. + */ + deterministic_seed = get_random_seed(true); + static const struct ggc_root_tab gt_ggc_r_gt_latent_entropy[] = { { .base = &latent_entropy_decl,
On Wed, 6 Apr 2022 00:28:15 +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
While the latent entropy plugin mostly doesn't derive entropy from get_random_const() for measuring the call graph, when __latent_entropy is applied to a constant, then it's initialized statically to output from get_random_const(). In that case, this data is derived from a 64-bit seed, which means a buffer of 512 bits doesn't really have that amount of compile-time entropy.
[...]
Applied to for-v5.18/hardening, thanks!
I dropped the version number change, added a pointer to the GCC bug https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=105171, and noted the rationale for the buffer size. I'll get this sent to Linus shortly.
[1/1] gcc-plugins: latent_entropy: use /dev/urandom https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/c40160f2998c
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
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Jason A. Donenfeld -
Kees Cook