On 1/13/22 14:44, Eric Biggers wrote:

From: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com

Don't leak a reference to the key if its algorithm is unknown.

Fixes: 947d70597236 ("ima: Support EC keys for signature verification") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com

---

security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index 23240d793b07..895f4b9ce8c6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -109,22 +109,25 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, pk = asymmetric_key_public_key(key); pks.pkey_algo = pk->pkey_algo;

• if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "rsa"))

• if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "rsa")) { pks.encoding = "pkcs1";

• else if (!strncmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6))

• } else if (!strncmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6)) { /* edcsa-nist-p192 etc. */ pks.encoding = "x962";

• else if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") ||

•    !strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "sm2"))
  

• } else if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") ||

•    !strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "sm2")) {
  

  pks.encoding = "raw";

• else

• return -ENOPKG;
  

• } else {

• ret = -ENOPKG;
  

• goto out;
  

• }

pks.digest = (u8 *)data; pks.digest_size = datalen; pks.s = hdr->sig; pks.s_size = siglen; ret = verify_signature(key, &pks); +out: key_put(key); pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret;

base-commit: feb7a43de5ef625ad74097d8fd3481d5dbc06a59

Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger stefanb@linux.ibm.com