This sysctl has the very unusal behaviour of not allowing any user (even CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to reduce the restriction setting, meaning that if you were to set this sysctl to a more restrictive option in the host pidns you would need to reboot your machine in order to reset it.
The justification given in [1] is that this is a security feature and thus it should not be possible to disable. Aside from the fact that we have plenty of security-related sysctls that can be disabled after being enabled (fs.protected_symlinks for instance), the protection provided by the sysctl is to stop users from being able to create a binary and then execute it. A user with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can trivially do this without memfd_create(2):
% cat mount-memfd.c #include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/mount.h>
#define SHELLCODE "#!/bin/echo this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs:"
int main(void) { int fsfd = fsopen("tmpfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC); assert(fsfd >= 0); assert(!fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 2));
int dfd = fsmount(fsfd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, 0); assert(dfd >= 0);
int execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0782); assert(execfd >= 0); assert(write(execfd, SHELLCODE, strlen(SHELLCODE)) == strlen(SHELLCODE)); assert(!close(execfd));
char *execpath = NULL; char *argv[] = { "bad-exe", NULL }, *envp[] = { NULL }; execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); assert(execfd >= 0); assert(asprintf(&execpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", execfd) > 0); assert(!execve(execpath, argv, envp)); } % ./mount-memfd this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs: /proc/self/fd/5 %
Given that it is possible for CAP_SYS_ADMIN users to create executable binaries without memfd_create(2) and without touching the host filesystem (not to mention the many other things a CAP_SYS_ADMIN process would be able to do that would be equivalent or worse), it seems strange to cause a fair amount of headache to admins when there doesn't appear to be an actual security benefit to blocking this.
It should be noted that with this change, programs that can do an unprivileged unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) would be able to create an executable memfd even if their current pidns didn't allow it. However, the same sample program above can also be used in this scenario, meaning that even with this consideration, blocking CAP_SYS_ADMIN makes little sense:
% unshare -rm ./mount-memfd this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs: /proc/self/fd/5
This simply further reinforces that locked-down environments need to disallow CLONE_NEWUSER for unprivileged users (as is already the case in most container environments).
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkWnAgHK1i6iqSqPMYuNEhtHBkO8jUuCvmG3RmUB5TK...
Cc: Dominique Martinet asmadeus@codewreck.org Cc: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.3+ Fixes: 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com --- kernel/pid_sysctl.h | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/pid_sysctl.h b/kernel/pid_sysctl.h index b26e027fc9cd..8a22bc29ebb4 100644 --- a/kernel/pid_sysctl.h +++ b/kernel/pid_sysctl.h @@ -24,13 +24,6 @@ static int pid_mfd_noexec_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, if (ns != &init_pid_ns) table_copy.data = &ns->memfd_noexec_scope;
- /* - * set minimum to current value, the effect is only bigger - * value is accepted. - */ - if (*(int *)table_copy.data > *(int *)table_copy.extra1) - table_copy.extra1 = table_copy.data; - return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buf, lenp, ppos); }
On 2023-07-14, Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com wrote:
This sysctl has the very unusal behaviour of not allowing any user (even CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to reduce the restriction setting, meaning that if you were to set this sysctl to a more restrictive option in the host pidns you would need to reboot your machine in order to reset it.
The justification given in [1] is that this is a security feature and thus it should not be possible to disable. Aside from the fact that we have plenty of security-related sysctls that can be disabled after being enabled (fs.protected_symlinks for instance), the protection provided by the sysctl is to stop users from being able to create a binary and then execute it. A user with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can trivially do this without memfd_create(2):
% cat mount-memfd.c #include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/mount.h>
#define SHELLCODE "#!/bin/echo this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs:"
int main(void) { int fsfd = fsopen("tmpfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC); assert(fsfd >= 0); assert(!fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 2));
int dfd = fsmount(fsfd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, 0); assert(dfd >= 0);
int execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0782);
0777
Oops. I must've garbled something when copying from my test program.
assert(execfd >= 0); assert(write(execfd, SHELLCODE, strlen(SHELLCODE)) == strlen(SHELLCODE)); assert(!close(execfd));
char *execpath = NULL; char *argv[] = { "bad-exe", NULL }, *envp[] = { NULL }; execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); assert(execfd >= 0); assert(asprintf(&execpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", execfd) > 0); assert(!execve(execpath, argv, envp)); } % ./mount-memfd this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs: /proc/self/fd/5 %
Given that it is possible for CAP_SYS_ADMIN users to create executable binaries without memfd_create(2) and without touching the host filesystem (not to mention the many other things a CAP_SYS_ADMIN process would be able to do that would be equivalent or worse), it seems strange to cause a fair amount of headache to admins when there doesn't appear to be an actual security benefit to blocking this.
It should be noted that with this change, programs that can do an unprivileged unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) would be able to create an executable memfd even if their current pidns didn't allow it. However, the same sample program above can also be used in this scenario, meaning that even with this consideration, blocking CAP_SYS_ADMIN makes little sense:
% unshare -rm ./mount-memfd this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs: /proc/self/fd/5
This simply further reinforces that locked-down environments need to disallow CLONE_NEWUSER for unprivileged users (as is already the case in most container environments).
Cc: Dominique Martinet asmadeus@codewreck.org Cc: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.3+ Fixes: 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com
kernel/pid_sysctl.h | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/pid_sysctl.h b/kernel/pid_sysctl.h index b26e027fc9cd..8a22bc29ebb4 100644 --- a/kernel/pid_sysctl.h +++ b/kernel/pid_sysctl.h @@ -24,13 +24,6 @@ static int pid_mfd_noexec_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, if (ns != &init_pid_ns) table_copy.data = &ns->memfd_noexec_scope;
- /*
* set minimum to current value, the effect is only bigger* value is accepted.*/- if (*(int *)table_copy.data > *(int *)table_copy.extra1)
table_copy.extra1 = table_copy.data;- return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buf, lenp, ppos);
}
I also have a patch to properly tie the sysctl to the pid namespace rather that having a global sysctl that magically has its value changed in this pid_mfd_noexec_dointvec_minmax() and another to do the same for the other pidns-tied sysctl (kernel.ns_last_pid) but I'm not sure whether it's needed. It does make vm.memfd_noexec a bit cleaner but because the two sysctls are in different tables you can't register them together AFAICS which means a bunch of needless duplication.
2.41.0
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
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Aleksa Sarai