This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

selinux: ensure the context is NUL terminated in security_context_to_sid_core()

to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git%3Ba=su...

The filename of the patch is: selinux-ensure-the-context-is-nul-terminated-in-security_context_to_sid_core.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let stable@vger.kernel.org know about it.

From ef28df55ac27e1e5cd122e19fa311d886d47a756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 18:51:12 -0500 Subject: selinux: ensure the context is NUL terminated in security_context_to_sid_core()

From: Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com

commit ef28df55ac27e1e5cd122e19fa311d886d47a756 upstream.

The syzbot/syzkaller automated tests found a problem in security_context_to_sid_core() during early boot (before we load the SELinux policy) where we could potentially feed context strings without NUL terminators into the strcmp() function.

We already guard against this during normal operation (after the SELinux policy has been loaded) by making a copy of the context strings and explicitly adding a NUL terminator to the end. The patch extends this protection to the early boot case (no loaded policy) by moving the context copy earlier in security_context_to_sid_core().

Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com Reviewed-By: William Roberts william.c.roberts@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 ++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1413,27 +1413,25 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core( if (!scontext_len) return -EINVAL;

+ /* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */ + scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags); + if (!scontext2) + return -ENOMEM; + if (!ss_initialized) { int i;

for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) { - if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) { + if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext2)) { *sid = i; - return 0; + goto out; } } *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; - return 0; + goto out; } *sid = SECSID_NULL;

- /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */ - scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags); - if (!scontext2) - return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len); - scontext2[scontext_len] = 0; - if (force) { /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */ rc = -ENOMEM;

Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from paul@paul-moore.com are

queue-4.14/selinux-skip-bounded-transition-processing-if-the-policy-isn-t-loaded.patch queue-4.14/selinux-ensure-the-context-is-nul-terminated-in-security_context_to_sid_core.patch