This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.157 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Fri Feb 15 18:36:26 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.157-rc1... or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------- Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Linux 4.9.157-rc1
Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org batman-adv: Force mac header to start of data on xmit
Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org batman-adv: Avoid WARN on net_device without parent in netns
Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de xfrm: refine validation of template and selector families
Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com libceph: avoid KEEPALIVE_PENDING races in ceph_con_keepalive()
Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Revert "cifs: In Kconfig CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX needs depends on legacy (insecure cifs)"
Vladis Dronov vdronov@redhat.com HID: debug: fix the ring buffer implementation
J. Bruce Fields bfields@redhat.com nfsd4: catch some false session retries
J. Bruce Fields bfields@redhat.com nfsd4: fix cached replies to solo SEQUENCE compounds
Thomas Hellstrom thellstrom@vmware.com drm/vmwgfx: Return error code from vmw_execbuf_copy_fence_user
Thomas Hellstrom thellstrom@vmware.com drm/vmwgfx: Fix setting of dma masks
Tina Zhang tina.zhang@intel.com drm/modes: Prevent division by zero htotal
Felix Fietkau nbd@nbd.name mac80211: ensure that mgmt tx skbs have tailroom for encryption
Marc Gonzalez marc.w.gonzalez@free.fr ARM: tango: Improve ARCH_MULTIPLATFORM compatibility
Russell King rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk ARM: iop32x/n2100: fix PCI IRQ mapping
Paul Burton paul.burton@mips.com MIPS: VDSO: Include $(ccflags-vdso) in o32,n32 .lds builds
Aaro Koskinen aaro.koskinen@iki.fi MIPS: OCTEON: don't set octeon_dma_bar_type if PCI is disabled
Vladimir Kondratiev vladimir.kondratiev@linux.intel.com mips: cm: reprime error cause
Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org debugfs: fix debugfs_rename parameter checking
Tomas Winkler tomas.winkler@intel.com samples: mei: use /dev/mei0 instead of /dev/mei
Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com misc: vexpress: Off by one in vexpress_syscfg_exec()
Eric W. Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com signal: Better detection of synchronous signals
Eric W. Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com signal: Always notice exiting tasks
Matt Ranostay matt.ranostay@konsulko.com iio: chemical: atlas-ph-sensor: correct IIO_TEMP values to millicelsius
Martin Kepplinger martin.kepplinger@ginzinger.com mtd: rawnand: gpmi: fix MX28 bus master lockup problem
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- arch/arm/mach-iop32x/n2100.c | 3 +- arch/arm/mach-tango/pm.c | 6 +- arch/arm/mach-tango/pm.h | 7 ++ arch/arm/mach-tango/setup.c | 2 + arch/mips/kernel/mips-cm.c | 2 +- arch/mips/pci/pci-octeon.c | 10 +-- arch/mips/vdso/Makefile | 4 +- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c | 9 ++- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 2 +- drivers/hid/hid-debug.c | 122 +++++++++++++------------------- drivers/iio/chemical/atlas-ph-sensor.c | 7 +- drivers/misc/vexpress-syscfg.c | 2 +- drivers/mtd/nand/gpmi-nand/gpmi-lib.c | 15 ++-- fs/cifs/Kconfig | 2 +- fs/debugfs/inode.c | 7 ++ fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 57 +++++++++++++-- fs/nfsd/state.h | 2 + fs/nfsd/xdr4.h | 13 +++- include/linux/hid-debug.h | 9 ++- kernel/signal.c | 58 ++++++++++++++- net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c | 5 +- net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c | 2 + net/ceph/messenger.c | 5 +- net/mac80211/tx.c | 12 +++- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 13 ++-- samples/mei/mei-amt-version.c | 2 +- 28 files changed, 249 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Martin Kepplinger martin.kepplinger@ginzinger.com
commit d5d27fd9826b59979b184ec288e4812abac0e988 upstream.
Disable BCH soft reset according to MX23 erratum #2847 ("BCH soft reset may cause bus master lock up") for MX28 too. It has the same problem.
Observed problem: once per 100,000+ MX28 reboots NAND read failed on DMA timeout errors: [ 1.770823] UBI: attaching mtd3 to ubi0 [ 2.768088] gpmi_nand: DMA timeout, last DMA :1 [ 3.958087] gpmi_nand: BCH timeout, last DMA :1 [ 4.156033] gpmi_nand: Error in ECC-based read: -110 [ 4.161136] UBI warning: ubi_io_read: error -110 while reading 64 bytes from PEB 0:0, read only 0 bytes, retry [ 4.171283] step 1 error [ 4.173846] gpmi_nand: Chip: 0, Error -1
Without BCH soft reset we successfully executed 1,000,000 MX28 reboots.
I have a quote from NXP regarding this problem, from July 18th 2016:
"As the i.MX23 and i.MX28 are of the same generation, they share many characteristics. Unfortunately, also the erratas may be shared. In case of the documented erratas and the workarounds, you can also apply the workaround solution of one device on the other one. This have been reported, but I’m afraid that there are not an estimated date for updating the Errata documents. Please accept our apologies for any inconveniences this may cause."
Fixes: 6f2a6a52560a ("mtd: nand: gpmi: reset BCH earlier, too, to avoid NAND startup problems") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Manfred Schlaegl manfred.schlaegl@ginzinger.com Signed-off-by: Martin Kepplinger martin.kepplinger@ginzinger.com Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal miquel.raynal@bootlin.com Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam festevam@gmail.com Acked-by: Han Xu han.xu@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon bbrezillon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/mtd/nand/gpmi-nand/gpmi-lib.c | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/mtd/nand/gpmi-nand/gpmi-lib.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/gpmi-nand/gpmi-lib.c @@ -168,9 +168,10 @@ int gpmi_init(struct gpmi_nand_data *thi
/* * Reset BCH here, too. We got failures otherwise :( - * See later BCH reset for explanation of MX23 handling + * See later BCH reset for explanation of MX23 and MX28 handling */ - ret = gpmi_reset_block(r->bch_regs, GPMI_IS_MX23(this)); + ret = gpmi_reset_block(r->bch_regs, + GPMI_IS_MX23(this) || GPMI_IS_MX28(this)); if (ret) goto err_out;
@@ -275,13 +276,11 @@ int bch_set_geometry(struct gpmi_nand_da
/* * Due to erratum #2847 of the MX23, the BCH cannot be soft reset on this - * chip, otherwise it will lock up. So we skip resetting BCH on the MX23. - * On the other hand, the MX28 needs the reset, because one case has been - * seen where the BCH produced ECC errors constantly after 10000 - * consecutive reboots. The latter case has not been seen on the MX23 - * yet, still we don't know if it could happen there as well. + * chip, otherwise it will lock up. So we skip resetting BCH on the MX23 + * and MX28. */ - ret = gpmi_reset_block(r->bch_regs, GPMI_IS_MX23(this)); + ret = gpmi_reset_block(r->bch_regs, + GPMI_IS_MX23(this) || GPMI_IS_MX28(this)); if (ret) goto err_out;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matt Ranostay matt.ranostay@konsulko.com
commit 0808831dc62e90023ad14ff8da4804c7846e904b upstream.
IIO_TEMP scale value for temperature was incorrect and not in millicelsius as required by the ABI documentation.
Signed-off-by: Matt Ranostay matt.ranostay@konsulko.com Fixes: 27dec00ecf2d (iio: chemical: add Atlas pH-SM sensor support) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/iio/chemical/atlas-ph-sensor.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/iio/chemical/atlas-ph-sensor.c +++ b/drivers/iio/chemical/atlas-ph-sensor.c @@ -453,9 +453,8 @@ static int atlas_read_raw(struct iio_dev case IIO_CHAN_INFO_SCALE: switch (chan->type) { case IIO_TEMP: - *val = 1; /* 0.01 */ - *val2 = 100; - break; + *val = 10; + return IIO_VAL_INT; case IIO_PH: *val = 1; /* 0.001 */ *val2 = 1000; @@ -486,7 +485,7 @@ static int atlas_write_raw(struct iio_de int val, int val2, long mask) { struct atlas_data *data = iio_priv(indio_dev); - __be32 reg = cpu_to_be32(val); + __be32 reg = cpu_to_be32(val / 10);
if (val2 != 0 || val < 0 || val > 20000) return -EINVAL;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric W. Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com
commit 35634ffa1751b6efd8cf75010b509dcb0263e29b upstream.
Recently syzkaller was able to create unkillablle processes by creating a timer that is delivered as a thread local signal on SIGHUP, and receiving SIGHUP SA_NODEFERER. Ultimately causing a loop failing to deliver SIGHUP but always trying.
Upon examination it turns out part of the problem is actually most of the solution. Since 2.5 signal delivery has found all fatal signals, marked the signal group for death, and queued SIGKILL in every threads thread queue relying on signal->group_exit_code to preserve the information of which was the actual fatal signal.
The conversion of all fatal signals to SIGKILL results in the synchronous signal heuristic in next_signal kicking in and preferring SIGHUP to SIGKILL. Which is especially problematic as all fatal signals have already been transformed into SIGKILL.
Instead of dequeueing signals and depending upon SIGKILL to be the first signal dequeued, first test if the signal group has already been marked for death. This guarantees that nothing in the signal queue can prevent a process that needs to exit from exiting.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com Ref: ebf5ebe31d2c ("[PATCH] signal-fixes-2.5.59-A4") History Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- kernel/signal.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -2198,6 +2198,11 @@ relock: goto relock; }
+ /* Has this task already been marked for death? */ + ksig->info.si_signo = signr = SIGKILL; + if (signal_group_exit(signal)) + goto fatal; + for (;;) { struct k_sigaction *ka;
@@ -2293,6 +2298,7 @@ relock: continue; }
+ fatal: spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
/*
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric W. Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com
commit 7146db3317c67b517258cb5e1b08af387da0618b upstream.
Recently syzkaller was able to create unkillablle processes by creating a timer that is delivered as a thread local signal on SIGHUP, and receiving SIGHUP SA_NODEFERER. Ultimately causing a loop failing to deliver SIGHUP but always trying.
When the stack overflows delivery of SIGHUP fails and force_sigsegv is called. Unfortunately because SIGSEGV is numerically higher than SIGHUP next_signal tries again to deliver a SIGHUP.
From a quality of implementation standpoint attempting to deliver the
timer SIGHUP signal is wrong. We should attempt to deliver the synchronous SIGSEGV signal we just forced.
We can make that happening in a fairly straight forward manner by instead of just looking at the signal number we also look at the si_code. In particular for exceptions (aka synchronous signals) the si_code is always greater than 0.
That still has the potential to pick up a number of asynchronous signals as in a few cases the same si_codes that are used for synchronous signals are also used for asynchronous signals, and SI_KERNEL is also included in the list of possible si_codes.
Still the heuristic is much better and timer signals are definitely excluded. Which is enough to prevent all known ways for someone sending a process signals fast enough to cause unexpected and arguably incorrect behavior.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a27341cd5fcb ("Prioritize synchronous signals over 'normal' signals") Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- kernel/signal.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -696,6 +696,48 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const str (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info)); }
+static int dequeue_synchronous_signal(siginfo_t *info) +{ + struct task_struct *tsk = current; + struct sigpending *pending = &tsk->pending; + struct sigqueue *q, *sync = NULL; + + /* + * Might a synchronous signal be in the queue? + */ + if (!((pending->signal.sig[0] & ~tsk->blocked.sig[0]) & SYNCHRONOUS_MASK)) + return 0; + + /* + * Return the first synchronous signal in the queue. + */ + list_for_each_entry(q, &pending->list, list) { + /* Synchronous signals have a postive si_code */ + if ((q->info.si_code > SI_USER) && + (sigmask(q->info.si_signo) & SYNCHRONOUS_MASK)) { + sync = q; + goto next; + } + } + return 0; +next: + /* + * Check if there is another siginfo for the same signal. + */ + list_for_each_entry_continue(q, &pending->list, list) { + if (q->info.si_signo == sync->info.si_signo) + goto still_pending; + } + + sigdelset(&pending->signal, sync->info.si_signo); + recalc_sigpending(); +still_pending: + list_del_init(&sync->list); + copy_siginfo(info, &sync->info); + __sigqueue_free(sync); + return info->si_signo; +} + /* * called with RCU read lock from check_kill_permission() */ @@ -2216,7 +2258,15 @@ relock: goto relock; }
- signr = dequeue_signal(current, ¤t->blocked, &ksig->info); + /* + * Signals generated by the execution of an instruction + * need to be delivered before any other pending signals + * so that the instruction pointer in the signal stack + * frame points to the faulting instruction. + */ + signr = dequeue_synchronous_signal(&ksig->info); + if (!signr) + signr = dequeue_signal(current, ¤t->blocked, &ksig->info);
if (!signr) break; /* will return 0 */
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com
commit f8a70d8b889f180e6860cb1f85fed43d37844c5a upstream.
The > comparison should be >= to prevent reading beyond the end of the func->template[] array.
(The func->template array is allocated in vexpress_syscfg_regmap_init() and it has func->num_templates elements.)
Fixes: 974cc7b93441 ("mfd: vexpress: Define the device as MFD cells") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Acked-by: Sudeep Holla sudeep.holla@arm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/misc/vexpress-syscfg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/misc/vexpress-syscfg.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vexpress-syscfg.c @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static int vexpress_syscfg_exec(struct v int tries; long timeout;
- if (WARN_ON(index > func->num_templates)) + if (WARN_ON(index >= func->num_templates)) return -EINVAL;
command = readl(syscfg->base + SYS_CFGCTRL);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tomas Winkler tomas.winkler@intel.com
commit c4a46acf1db3ce547d290c29e55b3476c78dd76c upstream.
The device was moved from misc device to character devices to support multiple mei devices.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #v4.9+ Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler tomas.winkler@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- samples/mei/mei-amt-version.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/samples/mei/mei-amt-version.c +++ b/samples/mei/mei-amt-version.c @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static bool mei_init(struct mei *me, con
me->verbose = verbose;
- me->fd = open("/dev/mei", O_RDWR); + me->fd = open("/dev/mei0", O_RDWR); if (me->fd == -1) { mei_err(me, "Cannot establish a handle to the Intel MEI driver\n"); goto err;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
commit d88c93f090f708c18195553b352b9f205e65418f upstream.
debugfs_rename() needs to check that the dentries passed into it really are valid, as sometimes they are not (i.e. if the return value of another debugfs call is passed into this one.) So fix this up by properly checking if the two parent directories are errors (they are allowed to be NULL), and if the dentry to rename is not NULL or an error.
Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- fs/debugfs/inode.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c @@ -732,6 +732,13 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_rename(struct den struct dentry *dentry = NULL, *trap; struct name_snapshot old_name;
+ if (IS_ERR(old_dir)) + return old_dir; + if (IS_ERR(new_dir)) + return new_dir; + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(old_dentry)) + return old_dentry; + trap = lock_rename(new_dir, old_dir); /* Source or destination directories don't exist? */ if (d_really_is_negative(old_dir) || d_really_is_negative(new_dir))
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vladimir Kondratiev vladimir.kondratiev@linux.intel.com
commit 05dc6001af0630e200ad5ea08707187fe5537e6d upstream.
Accordingly to the documentation ---cut--- The GCR_ERROR_CAUSE.ERR_TYPE field and the GCR_ERROR_MULT.ERR_TYPE fields can be cleared by either a reset or by writing the current value of GCR_ERROR_CAUSE.ERR_TYPE to the GCR_ERROR_CAUSE.ERR_TYPE register. ---cut--- Do exactly this. Original value of cm_error may be safely written back; it clears error cause and keeps other bits untouched.
Fixes: 3885c2b463f6 ("MIPS: CM: Add support for reporting CM cache errors") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Kondratiev vladimir.kondratiev@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Paul Burton paul.burton@mips.com Cc: Ralf Baechle ralf@linux-mips.org Cc: James Hogan jhogan@kernel.org Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.3+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- arch/mips/kernel/mips-cm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/mips-cm.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/mips-cm.c @@ -424,5 +424,5 @@ void mips_cm_error_report(void) }
/* reprime cause register */ - write_gcr_error_cause(0); + write_gcr_error_cause(cm_error); }
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aaro Koskinen aaro.koskinen@iki.fi
commit dcf300a69ac307053dfb35c2e33972e754a98bce upstream.
Don't set octeon_dma_bar_type if PCI is disabled. This avoids creation of the MSI irqchip later on, and saves a bit of memory.
Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen aaro.koskinen@iki.fi Signed-off-by: Paul Burton paul.burton@mips.com Fixes: a214720cbf50 ("Disable MSI also when pcie-octeon.pcie_disable on") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.3+ Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- arch/mips/pci/pci-octeon.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/mips/pci/pci-octeon.c +++ b/arch/mips/pci/pci-octeon.c @@ -573,6 +573,11 @@ static int __init octeon_pci_setup(void) if (octeon_has_feature(OCTEON_FEATURE_PCIE)) return 0;
+ if (!octeon_is_pci_host()) { + pr_notice("Not in host mode, PCI Controller not initialized\n"); + return 0; + } + /* Point pcibios_map_irq() to the PCI version of it */ octeon_pcibios_map_irq = octeon_pci_pcibios_map_irq;
@@ -584,11 +589,6 @@ static int __init octeon_pci_setup(void) else octeon_dma_bar_type = OCTEON_DMA_BAR_TYPE_BIG;
- if (!octeon_is_pci_host()) { - pr_notice("Not in host mode, PCI Controller not initialized\n"); - return 0; - } - /* PCI I/O and PCI MEM values */ set_io_port_base(OCTEON_PCI_IOSPACE_BASE); ioport_resource.start = 0;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paul Burton paul.burton@mips.com
commit 67fc5dc8a541e8f458d7f08bf88ff55933bf9f9d upstream.
When generating vdso-o32.lds & vdso-n32.lds for use with programs running as compat ABIs under 64b kernels, we previously haven't included the compiler flags that are supposedly common to all ABIs - ie. those in the ccflags-vdso variable.
This is problematic in cases where we need to provide the -m%-float flag in order to ensure that we don't attempt to use a floating point ABI that's incompatible with the target CPU & ABI. For example a toolchain using current gcc trunk configured --with-fp-32=xx fails to build a 64r6el_defconfig kernel with the following error:
cc1: error: '-march=mips1' requires '-mfp32' make[2]: *** [arch/mips/vdso/Makefile:135: arch/mips/vdso/vdso-o32.lds] Error 1
Include $(ccflags-vdso) for the compat VDSO .lds builds, just as it is included for the native VDSO .lds & when compiling objects for the compat VDSOs. This ensures we consistently provide the -msoft-float flag amongst others, avoiding the problem by ensuring we're agnostic to the toolchain defaults.
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton paul.burton@mips.com Fixes: ebb5e78cc634 ("MIPS: Initial implementation of a VDSO") Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kevin Hilman khilman@baylibre.com Cc: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net Cc: Maciej W . Rozycki macro@linux-mips.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- arch/mips/vdso/Makefile | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/mips/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/mips/vdso/Makefile @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ $(obj)/%-o32.o: $(src)/%.c FORCE $(call cmd,force_checksrc) $(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
-$(obj)/vdso-o32.lds: KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := -mabi=32 +$(obj)/vdso-o32.lds: KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := $(ccflags-vdso) -mabi=32 $(obj)/vdso-o32.lds: $(src)/vdso.lds.S FORCE $(call if_changed_dep,cpp_lds_S)
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ $(obj)/%-n32.o: $(src)/%.c FORCE $(call cmd,force_checksrc) $(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
-$(obj)/vdso-n32.lds: KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := -mabi=n32 +$(obj)/vdso-n32.lds: KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := $(ccflags-vdso) -mabi=n32 $(obj)/vdso-n32.lds: $(src)/vdso.lds.S FORCE $(call if_changed_dep,cpp_lds_S)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Russell King rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk
commit db4090920ba2d61a5827a23e441447926a02ffee upstream.
Booting 4.20 on a TheCUS N2100 results in a kernel oops while probing PCI, due to n2100_pci_map_irq() having been discarded during boot.
Signed-off-by: Russell King rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.18+ Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- arch/arm/mach-iop32x/n2100.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/mach-iop32x/n2100.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-iop32x/n2100.c @@ -75,8 +75,7 @@ void __init n2100_map_io(void) /* * N2100 PCI. */ -static int __init -n2100_pci_map_irq(const struct pci_dev *dev, u8 slot, u8 pin) +static int n2100_pci_map_irq(const struct pci_dev *dev, u8 slot, u8 pin) { int irq;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Gonzalez marc.w.gonzalez@free.fr
commit d0f9f16788e15d9eb40f68b047732d49658c5a3a upstream.
Calling platform-specific code unconditionally blows up when running an ARCH_MULTIPLATFORM kernel on a different platform. Don't do it.
Reported-by: Paolo Pisati p.pisati@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Marc Gonzalez marc.w.gonzalez@free.fr Acked-by: Pavel Machek pavel@ucw.cz Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.8+ Fixes: a30eceb7a59d ("ARM: tango: add Suspend-to-RAM support") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- arch/arm/mach-tango/pm.c | 6 ++---- arch/arm/mach-tango/pm.h | 7 +++++++ arch/arm/mach-tango/setup.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/mach-tango/pm.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-tango/pm.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #include <linux/suspend.h> #include <asm/suspend.h> #include "smc.h" +#include "pm.h"
static int tango_pm_powerdown(unsigned long arg) { @@ -23,10 +24,7 @@ static const struct platform_suspend_ops .valid = suspend_valid_only_mem, };
-static int __init tango_pm_init(void) +void __init tango_pm_init(void) { suspend_set_ops(&tango_pm_ops); - return 0; } - -late_initcall(tango_pm_init); --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm/mach-tango/pm.h @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SUSPEND +void __init tango_pm_init(void); +#else +#define tango_pm_init NULL +#endif --- a/arch/arm/mach-tango/setup.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-tango/setup.c @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ #include <asm/mach/arch.h> #include <asm/hardware/cache-l2x0.h> #include "smc.h" +#include "pm.h"
static void tango_l2c_write(unsigned long val, unsigned int reg) { @@ -14,4 +15,5 @@ DT_MACHINE_START(TANGO_DT, "Sigma Tango .dt_compat = tango_dt_compat, .l2c_aux_mask = ~0, .l2c_write_sec = tango_l2c_write, + .init_late = tango_pm_init, MACHINE_END
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Fietkau nbd@nbd.name
commit 9d0f50b80222dc273e67e4e14410fcfa4130a90c upstream.
Some drivers use IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SW_MGMT_TX to indicate that management frames need to be software encrypted. Since normal data packets are still encrypted by the hardware, crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt gets decremented after key upload to hw. This can lead to passing skbs to ccmp_encrypt_skb, which don't have the necessary tailroom for software encryption.
Change the code to add tailroom for encrypted management packets, even if crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is 0.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- net/mac80211/tx.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -1852,9 +1852,16 @@ static int ieee80211_skb_resize(struct i int head_need, bool may_encrypt) { struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; + bool enc_tailroom; int tail_need = 0;
- if (may_encrypt && sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt) { + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; + enc_tailroom = may_encrypt && + (sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt || + ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)); + + if (enc_tailroom) { tail_need = IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM; tail_need -= skb_tailroom(skb); tail_need = max_t(int, tail_need, 0); @@ -1862,8 +1869,7 @@ static int ieee80211_skb_resize(struct i
if (skb_cloned(skb) && (!ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, SUPPORTS_CLONED_SKBS) || - !skb_clone_writable(skb, ETH_HLEN) || - (may_encrypt && sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt))) + !skb_clone_writable(skb, ETH_HLEN) || enc_tailroom)) I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head_cloned); else if (head_need || tail_need) I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tina Zhang tina.zhang@intel.com
commit a2fcd5c84f7a7825e028381b10182439067aa90d upstream.
This patch prevents division by zero htotal.
In a follow-up mail Tina writes:
How did you manage to get here with htotal == 0? This needs backtraces (or if this is just about static checkers, a mention of that). -Daniel
In GVT-g, we are trying to enable a virtual display w/o setting timings for a pipe (a.k.a htotal=0), then we met the following kernel panic:
[ 32.832048] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 32.833614] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc4-sriov+ #33 [ 32.834438] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.10.1-0-g8891697-dirty-20180511_165818-tinazhang-linux-1 04/01/2014 [ 32.835901] RIP: 0010:drm_mode_hsync+0x1e/0x40 [ 32.836004] Code: 31 c0 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 85 c0 75 22 8b 4f 68 85 c9 78 1b 69 47 58 e8 03 00 00 99 <f7> f9 b9 d3 4d 62 10 05 f4 01 00 00 f7 e1 89 d0 c1 e8 06 f3 c3 66 [ 32.836004] RSP: 0000:ffffc900000ebb90 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 32.836004] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88001c67c8a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 32.836004] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88001c67c000 RDI: ffff88001c67c8a0 [ 32.836004] RBP: ffff88001c7d03a0 R08: ffff88001c67c8a0 R09: ffff88001c7d0330 [ 32.836004] R10: ffffffff822c3a98 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88001c67c000 [ 32.836004] R13: ffff88001c7d0370 R14: ffffffff8207eb78 R15: ffff88001c67c800 [ 32.836004] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 32.836004] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 32.836004] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000000220a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 32.836004] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 32.836004] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 32.836004] Call Trace: [ 32.836004] intel_mode_from_pipe_config+0x72/0x90 [ 32.836004] intel_modeset_setup_hw_state+0x569/0xf90 [ 32.836004] intel_modeset_init+0x905/0x1db0 [ 32.836004] i915_driver_load+0xb8c/0x1120 [ 32.836004] i915_pci_probe+0x4d/0xb0 [ 32.836004] local_pci_probe+0x44/0xa0 [ 32.836004] ? pci_assign_irq+0x27/0x130 [ 32.836004] pci_device_probe+0x102/0x1c0 [ 32.836004] driver_probe_device+0x2b8/0x480 [ 32.836004] __driver_attach+0x109/0x110 [ 32.836004] ? driver_probe_device+0x480/0x480 [ 32.836004] bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0xc0 [ 32.836004] ? klist_add_tail+0x3b/0x70 [ 32.836004] bus_add_driver+0x1e8/0x260 [ 32.836004] driver_register+0x5b/0xe0 [ 32.836004] ? mipi_dsi_bus_init+0x11/0x11 [ 32.836004] do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x1eb [ 32.836004] kernel_init_freeable+0x197/0x237 [ 32.836004] ? rest_init+0xd0/0xd0 [ 32.836004] kernel_init+0xa/0x110 [ 32.836004] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 32.836004] Modules linked in: [ 32.859183] ---[ end trace 525608b0ed0e8665 ]--- [ 32.859722] RIP: 0010:drm_mode_hsync+0x1e/0x40 [ 32.860287] Code: 31 c0 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 85 c0 75 22 8b 4f 68 85 c9 78 1b 69 47 58 e8 03 00 00 99 <f7> f9 b9 d3 4d 62 10 05 f4 01 00 00 f7 e1 89 d0 c1 e8 06 f3 c3 66 [ 32.862680] RSP: 0000:ffffc900000ebb90 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 32.863309] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88001c67c8a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 32.864182] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88001c67c000 RDI: ffff88001c67c8a0 [ 32.865206] RBP: ffff88001c7d03a0 R08: ffff88001c67c8a0 R09: ffff88001c7d0330 [ 32.866359] R10: ffffffff822c3a98 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88001c67c000 [ 32.867213] R13: ffff88001c7d0370 R14: ffffffff8207eb78 R15: ffff88001c67c800 [ 32.868075] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 32.868983] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 32.869659] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000000220a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 32.870599] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 32.871598] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 32.872549] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
Since drm_mode_hsync() has the logic to check mode->htotal, I just extend it to cover the case htotal==0.
Signed-off-by: Tina Zhang tina.zhang@intel.com Cc: Adam Jackson ajax@redhat.com Cc: Dave Airlie airlied@redhat.com Cc: Daniel Vetter daniel@ffwll.ch [danvet: Add additional explanations + cc: stable.] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1548228539-3061-1-git-send-ema... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c @@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ int drm_mode_hsync(const struct drm_disp if (mode->hsync) return mode->hsync;
- if (mode->htotal < 0) + if (mode->htotal <= 0) return 0;
calc_val = (mode->clock * 1000) / mode->htotal; /* hsync in Hz */
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Hellstrom thellstrom@vmware.com
commit 4cbfa1e6c09e98450aab3240e5119b0ab2c9795b upstream.
Previously we set only the dma mask and not the coherent mask. Fix that. Also, for clarity, make sure both are initially set to 64 bits.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0d00c488f3de: ("drm/vmwgfx: Fix the driver for large dma addresses") Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellstrom thellstrom@vmware.com Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat drawat@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c @@ -605,13 +605,16 @@ out_fixup: static int vmw_dma_masks(struct vmw_private *dev_priv) { struct drm_device *dev = dev_priv->dev; + int ret = 0;
- if (intel_iommu_enabled && + ret = dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64)); + if (dev_priv->map_mode != vmw_dma_phys && (sizeof(unsigned long) == 4 || vmw_restrict_dma_mask)) { DRM_INFO("Restricting DMA addresses to 44 bits.\n"); - return dma_set_mask(dev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(44)); + return dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(44)); } - return 0; + + return ret; } #else static int vmw_dma_masks(struct vmw_private *dev_priv)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Hellstrom thellstrom@vmware.com
commit 728354c005c36eaf44b6e5552372b67e60d17f56 upstream.
The function was unconditionally returning 0, and a caller would have to rely on the returned fence pointer being NULL to detect errors. However, the function vmw_execbuf_copy_fence_user() would expect a non-zero error code in that case and would BUG otherwise.
So make sure we return a proper non-zero error code if the fence pointer returned is NULL.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ae2a104058e2: ("vmwgfx: Implement fence objects") Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellstrom thellstrom@vmware.com Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat drawat@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c @@ -3769,7 +3769,7 @@ int vmw_execbuf_fence_commands(struct dr *p_fence = NULL; }
- return 0; + return ret; }
/**
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: J. Bruce Fields bfields@redhat.com
commit 085def3ade52f2ffe3e31f42e98c27dcc222dd37 upstream.
Currently our handling of 4.1+ requests without "cachethis" set is confusing and not quite correct.
Suppose a client sends a compound consisting of only a single SEQUENCE op, and it matches the seqid in a session slot (so it's a retry), but the previous request with that seqid did not have "cachethis" set.
The obvious thing to do might be to return NFS4ERR_RETRY_UNCACHED_REP, but the protocol only allows that to be returned on the op following the SEQUENCE, and there is no such op in this case.
The protocol permits us to cache replies even if the client didn't ask us to. And it's easy to do so in the case of solo SEQUENCE compounds.
So, when we get a solo SEQUENCE, we can either return the previously cached reply or NFSERR_SEQ_FALSE_RETRY if we notice it differs in some way from the original call.
Currently, we're returning a corrupt reply in the case a solo SEQUENCE matches a previous compound with more ops. This actually matters because the Linux client recently started doing this as a way to recover from lost replies to idempotent operations in the case the process doing the original reply was killed: in that case it's difficult to keep the original arguments around to do a real retry, and the client no longer cares what the result is anyway, but it would like to make sure that the slot's sequence id has been incremented, and the solo SEQUENCE assures that: if the server never got the original reply, it will increment the sequence id. If it did get the original reply, it won't increment, and nothing else that about the reply really matters much. But we can at least attempt to return valid xdr!
Tested-by: Olga Kornievskaia aglo@umich.edu Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields bfields@redhat.com Cc: Salvatore Bonaccorso carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- fs/nfsd/state.h | 1 + fs/nfsd/xdr4.h | 13 +++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -2344,14 +2344,16 @@ nfsd4_store_cache_entry(struct nfsd4_com
dprintk("--> %s slot %p\n", __func__, slot);
+ slot->sl_flags |= NFSD4_SLOT_INITIALIZED; slot->sl_opcnt = resp->opcnt; slot->sl_status = resp->cstate.status;
- slot->sl_flags |= NFSD4_SLOT_INITIALIZED; - if (nfsd4_not_cached(resp)) { - slot->sl_datalen = 0; + if (!nfsd4_cache_this(resp)) { + slot->sl_flags &= ~NFSD4_SLOT_CACHED; return; } + slot->sl_flags |= NFSD4_SLOT_CACHED; + base = resp->cstate.data_offset; slot->sl_datalen = buf->len - base; if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, base, slot->sl_data, slot->sl_datalen)) @@ -2378,8 +2380,16 @@ nfsd4_enc_sequence_replay(struct nfsd4_c op = &args->ops[resp->opcnt - 1]; nfsd4_encode_operation(resp, op);
- /* Return nfserr_retry_uncached_rep in next operation. */ - if (args->opcnt > 1 && !(slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_CACHETHIS)) { + if (slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_CACHED) + return op->status; + if (args->opcnt == 1) { + /* + * The original operation wasn't a solo sequence--we + * always cache those--so this retry must not match the + * original: + */ + op->status = nfserr_seq_false_retry; + } else { op = &args->ops[resp->opcnt++]; op->status = nfserr_retry_uncached_rep; nfsd4_encode_operation(resp, op); --- a/fs/nfsd/state.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/state.h @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ struct nfsd4_slot { #define NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE (1 << 0) #define NFSD4_SLOT_CACHETHIS (1 << 1) #define NFSD4_SLOT_INITIALIZED (1 << 2) +#define NFSD4_SLOT_CACHED (1 << 3) u8 sl_flags; char sl_data[]; }; --- a/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h @@ -645,9 +645,18 @@ static inline bool nfsd4_is_solo_sequenc return resp->opcnt == 1 && args->ops[0].opnum == OP_SEQUENCE; }
-static inline bool nfsd4_not_cached(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp) +/* + * The session reply cache only needs to cache replies that the client + * actually asked us to. But it's almost free for us to cache compounds + * consisting of only a SEQUENCE op, so we may as well cache those too. + * Also, the protocol doesn't give us a convenient response in the case + * of a replay of a solo SEQUENCE op that wasn't cached + * (RETRY_UNCACHED_REP can only be returned in the second op of a + * compound). + */ +static inline bool nfsd4_cache_this(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp) { - return !(resp->cstate.slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_CACHETHIS) + return (resp->cstate.slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_CACHETHIS) || nfsd4_is_solo_sequence(resp); }
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: J. Bruce Fields bfields@redhat.com
commit 53da6a53e1d414e05759fa59b7032ee08f4e22d7 upstream.
The spec allows us to return NFS4ERR_SEQ_FALSE_RETRY if we notice that the client is making a call that matches a previous (slot, seqid) pair but that *isn't* actually a replay, because some detail of the call doesn't actually match the previous one.
Catching every such case is difficult, but we may as well catch a few easy ones. This also handles the case described in the previous patch, in a different way.
The spec does however require us to catch the case where the difference is in the rpc credentials. This prevents somebody from snooping another user's replies by fabricating retries.
(But the practical value of the attack is limited by the fact that the replies with the most sensitive data are READ replies, which are not normally cached.)
Tested-by: Olga Kornievskaia aglo@umich.edu Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields bfields@redhat.com Cc: Salvatore Bonaccorso carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- fs/nfsd/state.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -1472,8 +1472,10 @@ free_session_slots(struct nfsd4_session { int i;
- for (i = 0; i < ses->se_fchannel.maxreqs; i++) + for (i = 0; i < ses->se_fchannel.maxreqs; i++) { + free_svc_cred(&ses->se_slots[i]->sl_cred); kfree(ses->se_slots[i]); + } }
/* @@ -2347,6 +2349,8 @@ nfsd4_store_cache_entry(struct nfsd4_com slot->sl_flags |= NFSD4_SLOT_INITIALIZED; slot->sl_opcnt = resp->opcnt; slot->sl_status = resp->cstate.status; + free_svc_cred(&slot->sl_cred); + copy_cred(&slot->sl_cred, &resp->rqstp->rq_cred);
if (!nfsd4_cache_this(resp)) { slot->sl_flags &= ~NFSD4_SLOT_CACHED; @@ -3049,6 +3053,34 @@ static bool nfsd4_request_too_big(struct return xb->len > session->se_fchannel.maxreq_sz; }
+static bool replay_matches_cache(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, + struct nfsd4_sequence *seq, struct nfsd4_slot *slot) +{ + struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp = rqstp->rq_argp; + + if ((bool)(slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_CACHETHIS) != + (bool)seq->cachethis) + return false; + /* + * If there's an error than the reply can have fewer ops than + * the call. But if we cached a reply with *more* ops than the + * call you're sending us now, then this new call is clearly not + * really a replay of the old one: + */ + if (slot->sl_opcnt < argp->opcnt) + return false; + /* This is the only check explicitly called by spec: */ + if (!same_creds(&rqstp->rq_cred, &slot->sl_cred)) + return false; + /* + * There may be more comparisons we could actually do, but the + * spec doesn't require us to catch every case where the calls + * don't match (that would require caching the call as well as + * the reply), so we don't bother. + */ + return true; +} + __be32 nfsd4_sequence(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, @@ -3108,6 +3140,9 @@ nfsd4_sequence(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, status = nfserr_seq_misordered; if (!(slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_INITIALIZED)) goto out_put_session; + status = nfserr_seq_false_retry; + if (!replay_matches_cache(rqstp, seq, slot)) + goto out_put_session; cstate->slot = slot; cstate->session = session; cstate->clp = clp; --- a/fs/nfsd/state.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/state.h @@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ static inline struct nfs4_delegation *de struct nfsd4_slot { u32 sl_seqid; __be32 sl_status; + struct svc_cred sl_cred; u32 sl_datalen; u16 sl_opcnt; #define NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE (1 << 0)
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vladis Dronov vdronov@redhat.com
commit 13054abbaa4f1fd4e6f3b4b63439ec033b4c8035 upstream.
Ring buffer implementation in hid_debug_event() and hid_debug_events_read() is strange allowing lost or corrupted data. After commit 717adfdaf147 ("HID: debug: check length before copy_to_user()") it is possible to enter an infinite loop in hid_debug_events_read() by providing 0 as count, this locks up a system. Fix this by rewriting the ring buffer implementation with kfifo and simplify the code.
This fixes CVE-2019-3819.
v2: fix an execution logic and add a comment v3: use __set_current_state() instead of set_current_state()
Backport to v4.9: some tree-wide patches are missing in v4.9 so cherry-pick relevant pieces from: * 6396bb22151 ("treewide: kzalloc() -> kcalloc()") * a9a08845e9ac ("vfs: do bulk POLL* -> EPOLL* replacement") * 174cd4b1e5fb ("sched/headers: Prepare to move signal wakeup & sigpending methods from <linux/sched.h> into <linux/sched/signal.h>")
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1669187 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.18+ Fixes: cd667ce24796 ("HID: use debugfs for events/reports dumping") Fixes: 717adfdaf147 ("HID: debug: check length before copy_to_user()") Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov vdronov@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov oleg@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/hid/hid-debug.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- include/linux/hid-debug.h | 9 +-- 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-debug.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-debug.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <linux/kfifo.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -455,7 +456,7 @@ static char *resolv_usage_page(unsigned char *buf = NULL;
if (!f) { - buf = kzalloc(sizeof(char) * HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE, GFP_ATOMIC); + buf = kzalloc(HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!buf) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } @@ -659,17 +660,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hid_dump_device); /* enqueue string to 'events' ring buffer */ void hid_debug_event(struct hid_device *hdev, char *buf) { - unsigned i; struct hid_debug_list *list; unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&hdev->debug_list_lock, flags); - list_for_each_entry(list, &hdev->debug_list, node) { - for (i = 0; buf[i]; i++) - list->hid_debug_buf[(list->tail + i) % HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE] = - buf[i]; - list->tail = (list->tail + i) % HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE; - } + list_for_each_entry(list, &hdev->debug_list, node) + kfifo_in(&list->hid_debug_fifo, buf, strlen(buf)); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hdev->debug_list_lock, flags);
wake_up_interruptible(&hdev->debug_wait); @@ -720,8 +716,7 @@ void hid_dump_input(struct hid_device *h hid_debug_event(hdev, buf);
kfree(buf); - wake_up_interruptible(&hdev->debug_wait); - + wake_up_interruptible(&hdev->debug_wait); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hid_dump_input);
@@ -1086,8 +1081,8 @@ static int hid_debug_events_open(struct goto out; }
- if (!(list->hid_debug_buf = kzalloc(sizeof(char) * HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL))) { - err = -ENOMEM; + err = kfifo_alloc(&list->hid_debug_fifo, HID_DEBUG_FIFOSIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (err) { kfree(list); goto out; } @@ -1107,77 +1102,57 @@ static ssize_t hid_debug_events_read(str size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { struct hid_debug_list *list = file->private_data; - int ret = 0, len; + int ret = 0, copied; DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
mutex_lock(&list->read_mutex); - while (ret == 0) { - if (list->head == list->tail) { - add_wait_queue(&list->hdev->debug_wait, &wait); - set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); - - while (list->head == list->tail) { - if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) { - ret = -EAGAIN; - break; - } - if (signal_pending(current)) { - ret = -ERESTARTSYS; - break; - } - - if (!list->hdev || !list->hdev->debug) { - ret = -EIO; - set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); - goto out; - } - - /* allow O_NONBLOCK from other threads */ - mutex_unlock(&list->read_mutex); - schedule(); - mutex_lock(&list->read_mutex); - set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + if (kfifo_is_empty(&list->hid_debug_fifo)) { + add_wait_queue(&list->hdev->debug_wait, &wait); + set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + + while (kfifo_is_empty(&list->hid_debug_fifo)) { + if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) { + ret = -EAGAIN; + break; }
- set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); - remove_wait_queue(&list->hdev->debug_wait, &wait); - } - - if (ret) - goto out; - - /* pass the ringbuffer contents to userspace */ -copy_rest: - if (list->tail == list->head) - goto out; - if (list->tail > list->head) { - len = list->tail - list->head; - if (len > count) - len = count; - - if (copy_to_user(buffer + ret, &list->hid_debug_buf[list->head], len)) { - ret = -EFAULT; - goto out; + if (signal_pending(current)) { + ret = -ERESTARTSYS; + break; } - ret += len; - list->head += len; - } else { - len = HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE - list->head; - if (len > count) - len = count;
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, &list->hid_debug_buf[list->head], len)) { - ret = -EFAULT; + /* if list->hdev is NULL we cannot remove_wait_queue(). + * if list->hdev->debug is 0 then hid_debug_unregister() + * was already called and list->hdev is being destroyed. + * if we add remove_wait_queue() here we can hit a race. + */ + if (!list->hdev || !list->hdev->debug) { + ret = -EIO; + set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); goto out; } - list->head = 0; - ret += len; - count -= len; - if (count > 0) - goto copy_rest; + + /* allow O_NONBLOCK from other threads */ + mutex_unlock(&list->read_mutex); + schedule(); + mutex_lock(&list->read_mutex); + set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); }
+ __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); + remove_wait_queue(&list->hdev->debug_wait, &wait); + + if (ret) + goto out; } + + /* pass the fifo content to userspace, locking is not needed with only + * one concurrent reader and one concurrent writer + */ + ret = kfifo_to_user(&list->hid_debug_fifo, buffer, count, &copied); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = copied; out: mutex_unlock(&list->read_mutex); return ret; @@ -1188,7 +1163,7 @@ static unsigned int hid_debug_events_pol struct hid_debug_list *list = file->private_data;
poll_wait(file, &list->hdev->debug_wait, wait); - if (list->head != list->tail) + if (!kfifo_is_empty(&list->hid_debug_fifo)) return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; if (!list->hdev->debug) return POLLERR | POLLHUP; @@ -1203,7 +1178,7 @@ static int hid_debug_events_release(stru spin_lock_irqsave(&list->hdev->debug_list_lock, flags); list_del(&list->node); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&list->hdev->debug_list_lock, flags); - kfree(list->hid_debug_buf); + kfifo_free(&list->hid_debug_fifo); kfree(list);
return 0; @@ -1254,4 +1229,3 @@ void hid_debug_exit(void) { debugfs_remove_recursive(hid_debug_root); } - --- a/include/linux/hid-debug.h +++ b/include/linux/hid-debug.h @@ -24,7 +24,10 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
+#include <linux/kfifo.h> + #define HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE 512 +#define HID_DEBUG_FIFOSIZE 512
void hid_dump_input(struct hid_device *, struct hid_usage *, __s32); void hid_dump_report(struct hid_device *, int , u8 *, int); @@ -37,11 +40,8 @@ void hid_debug_init(void); void hid_debug_exit(void); void hid_debug_event(struct hid_device *, char *);
- struct hid_debug_list { - char *hid_debug_buf; - int head; - int tail; + DECLARE_KFIFO_PTR(hid_debug_fifo, char); struct fasync_struct *fasync; struct hid_device *hdev; struct list_head node; @@ -64,4 +64,3 @@ struct hid_debug_list { #endif
#endif -
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
This reverts commit 4cd376638c893cf5bf1072eeaac884f62b7ac71e which is commit 6e785302dad32228819d8066e5376acd15d0e6ba upstream.
Yi writes: I notice that 4.4.169 merged 60da90b224ba7 ("cifs: In Kconfig CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX needs depends on legacy (insecure cifs)") add a Kconfig dependency CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY, which was not defined in 4.4 stable, so after this patch we are not able to enable CIFS_POSIX anymore. Linux 4.4 stable didn't merge the legacy dialects codes, so do we really need this patch for 4.4?
So revert this patch in 4.9 as well.
Reported-by: "zhangyi (F)" yi.zhang@huawei.com Cc: Steve French stfrench@microsoft.com Cc: Pavel Shilovsky pshilov@microsoft.com Cc: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/cifs/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/cifs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/cifs/Kconfig @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ config CIFS_XATTR
config CIFS_POSIX bool "CIFS POSIX Extensions" - depends on CIFS && CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY && CIFS_XATTR + depends on CIFS_XATTR help Enabling this option will cause the cifs client to attempt to negotiate a newer dialect with servers, such as Samba 3.0.5
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com
commit 4aac9228d16458cedcfd90c7fb37211cf3653ac3 upstream.
con_fault() can transition the connection into STANDBY right after ceph_con_keepalive() clears STANDBY in clear_standby():
libceph user thread ceph-msgr worker
ceph_con_keepalive() mutex_lock(&con->mutex) clear_standby(con) mutex_unlock(&con->mutex) mutex_lock(&con->mutex) con_fault() ... if KEEPALIVE_PENDING isn't set set state to STANDBY ... mutex_unlock(&con->mutex) set KEEPALIVE_PENDING set WRITE_PENDING
This triggers warnings in clear_standby() when either ceph_con_send() or ceph_con_keepalive() get to clearing STANDBY next time.
I don't see a reason to condition queue_con() call on the previous value of KEEPALIVE_PENDING, so move the setting of KEEPALIVE_PENDING into the critical section -- unlike WRITE_PENDING, KEEPALIVE_PENDING could have been a non-atomic flag.
Reported-by: syzbot+acdeb633f6211ccdf886@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com Tested-by: Myungho Jung mhjungk@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- net/ceph/messenger.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c @@ -3186,9 +3186,10 @@ void ceph_con_keepalive(struct ceph_conn dout("con_keepalive %p\n", con); mutex_lock(&con->mutex); clear_standby(con); + con_flag_set(con, CON_FLAG_KEEPALIVE_PENDING); mutex_unlock(&con->mutex); - if (con_flag_test_and_set(con, CON_FLAG_KEEPALIVE_PENDING) == 0 && - con_flag_test_and_set(con, CON_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING) == 0) + + if (con_flag_test_and_set(con, CON_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING) == 0) queue_con(con); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_con_keepalive);
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de
commit 35e6103861a3a970de6c84688c6e7a1f65b164ca upstream.
The check assumes that in transport mode, the first templates family must match the address family of the policy selector.
Syzkaller managed to build a template using MODE_ROUTEOPTIMIZATION, with ipv4-in-ipv6 chain, leading to following splat:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in xfrm_state_find+0x1db/0x1854 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888063e57aa0 by task a.out/2050 xfrm_state_find+0x1db/0x1854 xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x100/0x1d0 xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x108/0x1000 [..]
Problem is that addresses point into flowi4 struct, but xfrm_state_find treats them as being ipv6 because it uses templ->encap_family is used (AF_INET6 in case of reproducer) rather than family (AF_INET).
This patch inverts the logic: Enforce 'template family must match selector' EXCEPT for tunnel and BEET mode.
In BEET and Tunnel mode, xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one will have remote/local address pointers changed to point at the addresses found in the template, rather than the flowi ones, so no oob read will occur.
Reported-by: 3ntr0py1337@gmail.com Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert steffen.klassert@secunet.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -1408,10 +1408,15 @@ static int validate_tmpl(int nr, struct if (!ut[i].family) ut[i].family = family;
- if ((ut[i].mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) && - (ut[i].family != prev_family)) - return -EINVAL; - + switch (ut[i].mode) { + case XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL: + case XFRM_MODE_BEET: + break; + default: + if (ut[i].family != prev_family) + return -EINVAL; + break; + } if (ut[i].mode >= XFRM_MODE_MAX) return -EINVAL;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org
commit 955d3411a17f590364238bd0d3329b61f20c1cd2 upstream.
It is not allowed to use WARN* helpers on potential incorrect input from the user or transient problems because systems configured as panic_on_warn will reboot due to such a problem.
A NULL return value of __dev_get_by_index can be caused by various problems which can either be related to the system configuration or problems (incorrectly returned network namespaces) in other (virtual) net_device drivers. batman-adv should not cause a (harmful) WARN in this situation and instead only report it via a simple message.
Fixes: b7eddd0b3950 ("batman-adv: prevent using any virtual device created on batman-adv as hard-interface") Reported-by: syzbot+c764de0fcfadca9a8595@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich sw@simonwunderlich.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ #include "main.h"
#include <linux/atomic.h> -#include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/byteorder/generic.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/fs.h> @@ -172,8 +171,10 @@ static bool batadv_is_on_batman_iface(co parent_dev = __dev_get_by_index((struct net *)parent_net, dev_get_iflink(net_dev)); /* if we got a NULL parent_dev there is something broken.. */ - if (WARN(!parent_dev, "Cannot find parent device")) + if (!parent_dev) { + pr_err("Cannot find parent device\n"); return false; + }
if (batadv_mutual_parents(net_dev, net, parent_dev, parent_net)) return false;
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org
commit 9114daa825fc3f335f9bea3313ce667090187280 upstream.
The caller of ndo_start_xmit may not already have called skb_reset_mac_header. The returned value of skb_mac_header/eth_hdr therefore can be in the wrong position and even outside the current skbuff. This for example happens when the user binds to the device using a PF_PACKET-SOCK_RAW with enabled qdisc-bypass:
int opt = 4; setsockopt(sock, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS, &opt, sizeof(opt));
Since eth_hdr is used all over the codebase, the batadv_interface_tx function must always take care of resetting it.
Fixes: c6c8fea29769 ("net: Add batman-adv meshing protocol") Reported-by: syzbot+9d7405c7faa390e60b4e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+7d20bc3f1ddddc0f9079@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich sw@simonwunderlich.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c @@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ static int batadv_interface_tx(struct sk
netif_trans_update(soft_iface); vid = batadv_get_vid(skb, 0); + + skb_reset_mac_header(skb); ethhdr = eth_hdr(skb);
switch (ntohs(ethhdr->h_proto)) {
stable-rc/linux-4.9.y boot: 83 boots: 0 failed, 73 passed with 10 offline (v4.9.156-25-gfaa3b6b1ed9c)
Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.9.y/kernel/v4.9.1... Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.9.y/kernel/v4.9.156-25-g...
Tree: stable-rc Branch: linux-4.9.y Git Describe: v4.9.156-25-gfaa3b6b1ed9c Git Commit: faa3b6b1ed9c5a1671bf42cf23aff7c202b7d360 Git URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git Tested: 44 unique boards, 20 SoC families, 13 builds out of 193
Offline Platforms:
arm:
sunxi_defconfig: gcc-7 sun5i-r8-chip: 1 offline lab sun7i-a20-bananapi: 1 offline lab
multi_v7_defconfig: gcc-7 qcom-apq8064-cm-qs600: 1 offline lab qcom-apq8064-ifc6410: 1 offline lab sun5i-r8-chip: 1 offline lab sun7i-a20-bananapi: 1 offline lab
qcom_defconfig: gcc-7 qcom-apq8064-cm-qs600: 1 offline lab qcom-apq8064-ifc6410: 1 offline lab
arm64:
defconfig: gcc-7 apq8016-sbc: 1 offline lab meson-gxbb-odroidc2: 1 offline lab
--- For more info write to info@kernelci.org
On 13/02/2019 18:37, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.157 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Fri Feb 15 18:36:26 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.157-rc1... or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
All tests are passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v4.9: 8 builds: 8 pass, 0 fail 16 boots: 16 pass, 0 fail 14 tests: 14 pass, 0 fail
Linux version: 4.9.157-rc1-ge9f66e4 Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana, tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04
Cheers Jon
On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 07:37:57PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.157 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Fri Feb 15 18:36:26 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Results from Linaro’s test farm. No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Summary ------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.9.157-rc1 git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git git branch: linux-4.9.y git commit: faa3b6b1ed9c5a1671bf42cf23aff7c202b7d360 git describe: v4.9.156-25-gfaa3b6b1ed9c Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.9-oe/build/v4.9.156-25-...
No regressions (compared to build v4.9.156)
No Fixes (compared to build v4.9.156)
Ran 22192 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments -------------- - dragonboard-410c - arm64 - hi6220-hikey - arm64 - i386 - juno-r2 - arm64 - qemu_arm - qemu_arm64 - qemu_i386 - qemu_x86_64 - x15 - arm - x86_64
Test Suites ----------- * boot * install-android-platform-tools-r2600 * kselftest * libhugetlbfs * ltp-cap_bounds-tests * ltp-containers-tests * ltp-cpuhotplug-tests * ltp-cve-tests * ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests * ltp-filecaps-tests * ltp-fs-tests * ltp-fs_bind-tests * ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests * ltp-fsx-tests * ltp-hugetlb-tests * ltp-io-tests * ltp-ipc-tests * ltp-math-tests * ltp-mm-tests * ltp-nptl-tests * ltp-pty-tests * ltp-sched-tests * ltp-securebits-tests * ltp-syscalls-tests * ltp-timers-tests * spectre-meltdown-checker-test * ltp-open-posix-tests * kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native * kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 07:37:57PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.157 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Fri Feb 15 18:36:26 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results: total: 172 pass: 172 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 315 pass: 315 fail: 0
Guenter
On 2/13/19 11:37 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.157 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Fri Feb 15 18:36:26 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.157-rc1... or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks, -- Shuah
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
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Dan Rue -
Greg Kroah-Hartman -
Guenter Roeck -
Jon Hunter -
kernelci.org bot -
shuah