From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
[ Upstream commit 0ee4d55534f82a0624701d0bb9fc2304d4529086 ]
Syzbot reports that it's possible to hit this from userspace, by trying to add a station before any other connection setup has been done. Instead of trying to catch this in some other way simply remove the warning, that will appropriately reject the call from userspace.
Reported-by: syzbot+7716dbc401d9a437890d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210517164715.f537da276d17.Id05f40ec8761d6a8cc2df... Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index 21b35255ecc2..f5532a3ce72e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -1391,7 +1391,7 @@ ieee80211_get_sband(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) rcu_read_lock(); chanctx_conf = rcu_dereference(sdata->vif.chanctx_conf);
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!chanctx_conf)) { + if (!chanctx_conf) { rcu_read_unlock(); return NULL; }
From: Du Cheng ducheng2@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit a64b6a25dd9f984ed05fade603a00e2eae787d2f ]
If the userland switches back-and-forth between NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB and NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC via send_msg(NL80211_CMD_SET_INTERFACE), there is a chance where the cleanup cfg80211_leave_ocb() is not called. This leads to initialization of in-use memory (e.g. init u.ibss while in-use by u.ocb) due to a shared struct/union within ieee80211_sub_if_data:
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data { ... union { struct ieee80211_if_ap ap; struct ieee80211_if_vlan vlan; struct ieee80211_if_managed mgd; struct ieee80211_if_ibss ibss; // <- shares address struct ieee80211_if_mesh mesh; struct ieee80211_if_ocb ocb; // <- shares address struct ieee80211_if_mntr mntr; struct ieee80211_if_nan nan; } u; ... }
Therefore add handling of otype == NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB, during cfg80211_change_iface() to perform cleanup when leaving OCB mode.
link to syzkaller bug: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=0612dbfa595bf4b9b680ff7b4948257b8e3732d...
Reported-by: syzbot+105896fac213f26056f9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Du Cheng ducheng2@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210428063941.105161-1-ducheng2@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/wireless/util.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 939320571d71..a16e805c4857 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -1050,6 +1050,9 @@ int cfg80211_change_iface(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev, case NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT: /* mesh should be handled? */ break; + case NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB: + cfg80211_leave_ocb(rdev, dev); + break; default: break; }
From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com
[ Upstream commit a9799541ca34652d9996e45f80e8e03144c12949 ]
These are not permitted by the spec, just drop them.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210609161305.23def022b750.Ibd6dd3cdce573dae262fc... Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 721caa5a5430..3a069cb188b7 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -1988,17 +1988,15 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) sc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl); frag = sc & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG;
- if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) { - I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount); - goto out_no_led; - } - if (rx->sta) cache = &rx->sta->frags;
if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0)) goto out;
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) + return RX_DROP_MONITOR; + I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_fragments);
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) @@ -2127,7 +2125,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
out: ieee80211_led_rx(rx->local); - out_no_led: if (rx->sta) rx->sta->rx_stats.packets++; return RX_CONTINUE;
From: Zheng Yongjun zhengyongjun3@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit 9d44fa3e50cc91691896934d106c86e4027e61ca ]
Function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb' not always return success, which will also return fail. If not check the wrong return value of it, lead to function `ping_rcv` return success.
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun zhengyongjun3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/ipv4/ping.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c index 4fda9abf38ee..dd4e46af1e53 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ping.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c @@ -976,6 +976,7 @@ bool ping_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) struct sock *sk; struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev); struct icmphdr *icmph = icmp_hdr(skb); + bool rc = false;
/* We assume the packet has already been checked by icmp_rcv */
@@ -990,14 +991,15 @@ bool ping_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) struct sk_buff *skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
pr_debug("rcv on socket %p\n", sk); - if (skb2) - ping_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb2); + if (skb2 && !ping_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb2)) + rc = true; sock_put(sk); - return true; } - pr_debug("no socket, dropping\n");
- return false; + if (!rc) + pr_debug("no socket, dropping\n"); + + return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ping_rcv);
From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com
[ Upstream commit b71eaed8c04f72a919a9c44e83e4ee254e69e7f3 ]
UDP sendmsg() path can be lockless, it is possible for another thread to re-connect an change sk->sk_txhash under us.
There is no serious impact, but we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() pair to document the race.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __ip4_datagram_connect / skb_set_owner_w
write to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 30997 on cpu 1: sk_set_txhash include/net/sock.h:1937 [inline] __ip4_datagram_connect+0x69e/0x710 net/ipv4/datagram.c:75 __ip6_datagram_connect+0x551/0x840 net/ipv6/datagram.c:189 ip6_datagram_connect+0x2a/0x40 net/ipv6/datagram.c:272 inet_dgram_connect+0xfd/0x180 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:580 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1837 [inline] __sys_connect+0x245/0x280 net/socket.c:1854 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1864 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1861 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1861 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 31039 on cpu 0: skb_set_hash_from_sk include/net/sock.h:2211 [inline] skb_set_owner_w+0x118/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2101 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x452/0x4e0 net/core/sock.c:2359 sock_alloc_send_skb+0x2d/0x40 net/core/sock.c:2373 __ip6_append_data+0x1743/0x21a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1621 ip6_make_skb+0x258/0x420 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1983 udpv6_sendmsg+0x160a/0x16b0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1527 inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:642 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0xbca3c43d -> 0xfdb309e0
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 31039 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/net/sock.h | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index d0e18917d8be..cf27f3688c39 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -1681,7 +1681,8 @@ static inline u32 net_tx_rndhash(void)
static inline void sk_set_txhash(struct sock *sk) { - sk->sk_txhash = net_tx_rndhash(); + /* This pairs with READ_ONCE() in skb_set_hash_from_sk() */ + WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_txhash, net_tx_rndhash()); }
static inline void sk_rethink_txhash(struct sock *sk) @@ -1936,9 +1937,12 @@ static inline void sock_poll_wait(struct file *filp,
static inline void skb_set_hash_from_sk(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk) { - if (sk->sk_txhash) { + /* This pairs with WRITE_ONCE() in sk_set_txhash() */ + u32 txhash = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_txhash); + + if (txhash) { skb->l4_hash = 1; - skb->hash = sk->sk_txhash; + skb->hash = txhash; } }
From: Pavel Skripkin paskripkin@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 58af3d3d54e87bfc1f936e16c04ade3369d34011 ]
Syzbot reported memory leak in tty_init_dev(). The problem was in unputted tty in ldisc_open()
static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty) { ... ser->tty = tty_kref_get(tty); ... result = register_netdevice(dev); if (result) { rtnl_unlock(); free_netdev(dev); return -ENODEV; } ... }
Ser pointer is netdev private_data, so after free_netdev() this pointer goes away with unputted tty reference. So, fix it by adding tty_kref_put() before freeing netdev.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+f303e045423e617d2cad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin paskripkin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c b/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c index 32834dad0b83..1243c2e5a86a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c +++ b/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c @@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty) rtnl_lock(); result = register_netdevice(dev); if (result) { + tty_kref_put(tty); rtnl_unlock(); free_netdev(dev); return -ENODEV;
From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com
[ Upstream commit c7d2ef5dd4b03ed0ee1d13bc0c55f9cf62d49bd6 ]
tpacket_snd(), packet_snd(), packet_getname() and packet_seq_show() can read po->num without holding a lock. This means other threads can change po->num at the same time.
KCSAN complained about this known fact [1] Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to address the issue.
[1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_sendmsg
write to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24714 on cpu 0: packet_do_bind+0x3ab/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3181 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24719 on cpu 1: packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2899 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x317/0x3570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3040 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x1ed/0x270 net/socket.c:2433 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2440 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2440 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x0000 -> 0x1200
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 24719 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index b5b79f501541..5f9007e7c28d 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -2674,7 +2674,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg) } if (likely(saddr == NULL)) { dev = packet_cached_dev_get(po); - proto = po->num; + proto = READ_ONCE(po->num); } else { err = -EINVAL; if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll)) @@ -2886,7 +2886,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
if (likely(saddr == NULL)) { dev = packet_cached_dev_get(po); - proto = po->num; + proto = READ_ONCE(po->num); } else { err = -EINVAL; if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll)) @@ -3157,7 +3157,7 @@ static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex, /* prevents packet_notifier() from calling * register_prot_hook() */ - po->num = 0; + WRITE_ONCE(po->num, 0); __unregister_prot_hook(sk, true); rcu_read_lock(); dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev; @@ -3167,7 +3167,7 @@ static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex, }
BUG_ON(po->running); - po->num = proto; + WRITE_ONCE(po->num, proto); po->prot_hook.type = proto;
if (unlikely(unlisted)) { @@ -3514,7 +3514,7 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
sll->sll_family = AF_PACKET; sll->sll_ifindex = po->ifindex; - sll->sll_protocol = po->num; + sll->sll_protocol = READ_ONCE(po->num); sll->sll_pkttype = 0; rcu_read_lock(); dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), po->ifindex); @@ -4400,7 +4400,7 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u, was_running = po->running; num = po->num; if (was_running) { - po->num = 0; + WRITE_ONCE(po->num, 0); __unregister_prot_hook(sk, false); } spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock); @@ -4433,7 +4433,7 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock); if (was_running) { - po->num = num; + WRITE_ONCE(po->num, num); register_prot_hook(sk); } spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock); @@ -4602,7 +4602,7 @@ static int packet_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) s, atomic_read(&s->sk_refcnt), s->sk_type, - ntohs(po->num), + ntohs(READ_ONCE(po->num)), po->ifindex, po->running, atomic_read(&s->sk_rmem_alloc),
From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com
[ Upstream commit e032f7c9c7cefffcfb79b9fc16c53011d2d9d11f ]
Like prior patch, we need to annotate lockless accesses to po->ifindex For instance, packet_getname() is reading po->ifindex (twice) while another thread is able to change po->ifindex.
KCSAN reported:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_getname
write to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25573 on cpu 1: packet_do_bind+0x420/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3191 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25578 on cpu 0: packet_getname+0x5b/0x1a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3525 __sys_getsockname+0x10e/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1887 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1902 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1899 [inline] __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1899 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 25578 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 16 +++++++++------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 5f9007e7c28d..370d0a4af1f9 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -3173,11 +3173,11 @@ static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex, if (unlikely(unlisted)) { dev_put(dev); po->prot_hook.dev = NULL; - po->ifindex = -1; + WRITE_ONCE(po->ifindex, -1); packet_cached_dev_reset(po); } else { po->prot_hook.dev = dev; - po->ifindex = dev ? dev->ifindex : 0; + WRITE_ONCE(po->ifindex, dev ? dev->ifindex : 0); packet_cached_dev_assign(po, dev); } } @@ -3492,7 +3492,7 @@ static int packet_getname_spkt(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, uaddr->sa_family = AF_PACKET; memset(uaddr->sa_data, 0, sizeof(uaddr->sa_data)); rcu_read_lock(); - dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex); + dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), READ_ONCE(pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex)); if (dev) strlcpy(uaddr->sa_data, dev->name, sizeof(uaddr->sa_data)); rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -3508,16 +3508,18 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk); DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_ll *, sll, uaddr); + int ifindex;
if (peer) return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ ifindex = READ_ONCE(po->ifindex); sll->sll_family = AF_PACKET; - sll->sll_ifindex = po->ifindex; + sll->sll_ifindex = ifindex; sll->sll_protocol = READ_ONCE(po->num); sll->sll_pkttype = 0; rcu_read_lock(); - dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), po->ifindex); + dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), ifindex); if (dev) { sll->sll_hatype = dev->type; sll->sll_halen = dev->addr_len; @@ -4097,7 +4099,7 @@ static int packet_notifier(struct notifier_block *this, } if (msg == NETDEV_UNREGISTER) { packet_cached_dev_reset(po); - po->ifindex = -1; + WRITE_ONCE(po->ifindex, -1); if (po->prot_hook.dev) dev_put(po->prot_hook.dev); po->prot_hook.dev = NULL; @@ -4603,7 +4605,7 @@ static int packet_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) atomic_read(&s->sk_refcnt), s->sk_type, ntohs(READ_ONCE(po->num)), - po->ifindex, + READ_ONCE(po->ifindex), po->running, atomic_read(&s->sk_rmem_alloc), from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(seq), sock_i_uid(s)),
From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
[ Upstream commit 99718abdc00e86e4f286dd836408e2834886c16e ]
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid intentionally reading across neighboring array fields.
The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array. Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds checking.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/usb/r8152.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c b/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c index 6e74965d26a0..64fdea332886 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c @@ -3938,7 +3938,7 @@ static void rtl8152_get_strings(struct net_device *dev, u32 stringset, u8 *data) { switch (stringset) { case ETH_SS_STATS: - memcpy(data, *rtl8152_gstrings, sizeof(rtl8152_gstrings)); + memcpy(data, rtl8152_gstrings, sizeof(rtl8152_gstrings)); break; } }
From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
[ Upstream commit 224004fbb033600715dbd626bceec10bfd9c58bc ]
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid intentionally reading across neighboring array fields.
The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array. Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds checking.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c index 0e5b1935af50..468f02beccee 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c @@ -2117,7 +2117,7 @@ static void sh_eth_get_strings(struct net_device *ndev, u32 stringset, u8 *data) { switch (stringset) { case ETH_SS_STATS: - memcpy(data, *sh_eth_gstrings_stats, + memcpy(data, sh_eth_gstrings_stats, sizeof(sh_eth_gstrings_stats)); break; }
From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
[ Upstream commit da5ac772cfe2a03058b0accfac03fad60c46c24d ]
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid intentionally reading across neighboring array fields.
The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array. Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds checking.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c index 3521e3a77556..f321b115719a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c @@ -2338,7 +2338,7 @@ static void rtl8169_get_strings(struct net_device *dev, u32 stringset, u8 *data) { switch(stringset) { case ETH_SS_STATS: - memcpy(data, *rtl8169_gstrings, sizeof(rtl8169_gstrings)); + memcpy(data, rtl8169_gstrings, sizeof(rtl8169_gstrings)); break; } }
From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
[ Upstream commit 1c200f832e14420fa770193f9871f4ce2df00d07 ]
The source (&dcbx_info->operational.params) and dest (&p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params) are both struct qed_dcbx_params (560 bytes), not struct qed_dcbx_admin_params (564 bytes), which is used as the memcpy() size.
However it seems that struct qed_dcbx_operational_params (dcbx_info->operational)'s layout matches struct qed_dcbx_admin_params (p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config)'s 4 byte difference (3 padding, 1 byte for "valid").
On the assumption that the size is wrong (rather than the source structure type), adjust the memcpy() size argument to be 4 bytes smaller and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to validate any changes to the structure sizes.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c index 7b6824e560d2..59e59878a3a7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c @@ -1205,9 +1205,11 @@ int qed_dcbx_get_config_params(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn, p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.ver_num |= DCBX_CONFIG_VERSION_IEEE;
p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.enabled = dcbx_info->operational.enabled; + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(dcbx_info->operational.params) != + sizeof(p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params)); memcpy(&p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params, &dcbx_info->operational.params, - sizeof(struct qed_dcbx_admin_params)); + sizeof(p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params)); p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.valid = true;
memcpy(params, &p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set, sizeof(struct qed_dcbx_set));
From: Esben Haabendal esben@geanix.com
[ Upstream commit f6396341194234e9b01cd7538bc2c6ac4501ab14 ]
As documented in Documentation/networking/driver.rst, the ndo_start_xmit method must not return NETDEV_TX_BUSY under any normal circumstances, and as recommended, we simply stop the tx queue in advance, when there is a risk that the next xmit would cause a NETDEV_TX_BUSY return.
Signed-off-by: Esben Haabendal esben@geanix.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c index 545f60877bb7..9ba36c930ce3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c @@ -735,6 +735,11 @@ temac_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev) /* Kick off the transfer */ lp->dma_out(lp, TX_TAILDESC_PTR, tail_p); /* DMA start */
+ if (temac_check_tx_bd_space(lp, MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1)) { + netdev_info(ndev, "%s -> netif_stop_queue\n", __func__); + netif_stop_queue(ndev); + } + return NETDEV_TX_OK; }
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
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Sasha Levin