tpm2_key_decode() overrides the explicit keyhandle parameter, which can lead to problems, if the loaded parent handle does not match the handle stored to the key file. This can easily happen as handle by definition is an ambiguous attribute.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index fb76c4ea496f..950684e54c71 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -121,7 +121,9 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, return -ENOMEM;
*buf = blob; - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; + + if (!options->keyhandle) + options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); blob += ctx.priv_len;
On Mon, Dec 08, 2025 at 04:54:35PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
tpm2_key_decode() overrides the explicit keyhandle parameter, which can lead to problems, if the loaded parent handle does not match the handle stored to the key file. This can easily happen as handle by definition is an ambiguous attribute.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org
What this means in practice is that sometimes you need either to:
1. Binary patch the key file. 2. Decompose/compose a key file
BR, Jarkko
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