From: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com

commit e95df4ec0c0c9791941f112db699fae794b9862a upstream.

Currently MMIO Stale Data mitigation for CPUs not affected by MDS/TAA is to only deploy VERW at VMentry by enabling mmio_stale_data_clear static branch. No mitigation is needed for kernel->user transitions. If such CPUs are also affected by RFDS, its mitigation may set X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF to deploy VERW at kernel->user and VMentry. This could result in duplicate VERW at VMentry.

Fix this by disabling mmio_stale_data_clear static branch when X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 48d049cd74e71..cd6ac89c1a0df 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -422,6 +422,13 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void) if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF); + + /* + * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF could be enabled by other VERW based + * mitigations, disable KVM-only mitigation in that case. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF)) + static_branch_disable(&mmio_stale_data_clear); else static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);

@@ -498,8 +505,11 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void) taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW; taa_select_mitigation(); } - if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF && - boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) { + /* + * MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF is not checked here so that mmio_stale_data_clear + * gets updated correctly as per X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF state. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) { mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW; mmio_select_mitigation(); }

From: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com

commit 8076fcde016c9c0e0660543e67bff86cb48a7c9c upstream.

RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel stale data previously used in floating point registers, vector registers and integer registers. RFDS only affects certain Intel Atom processors.

Intel released a microcode update that uses VERW instruction to clear the affected CPU buffers. Unlike MDS, none of the affected cores support SMT.

Add RFDS bug infrastructure and enable the VERW based mitigation by default, that clears the affected buffers just before exiting to userspace. Also add sysfs reporting and cmdline parameter "reg_file_data_sampling" to control the mitigation.

For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 21 +++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 11 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 8 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 38 ++++++++- drivers/base/cpu.c | 3 + include/linux/cpu.h | 2 + 9 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu index a1db6db475055..710d47be11e04 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu @@ -516,6 +516,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index b72e2049c4876..40b89dd7c0bb3 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1137,6 +1137,26 @@ The filter can be disabled or changed to another driver later using sysfs.

+ reg_file_data_sampling= + [X86] Controls mitigation for Register File Data + Sampling (RFDS) vulnerability. RFDS is a CPU + vulnerability which may allow userspace to infer + kernel data values previously stored in floating point + registers, vector registers, or integer registers. + RFDS only affects Intel Atom processors. + + on: Turns ON the mitigation. + off: Turns OFF the mitigation. + + This parameter overrides the compile time default set + by CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS. Mitigation cannot be + disabled when other VERW based mitigations (like MDS) + are enabled. In order to disable RFDS mitigation all + VERW based mitigations need to be disabled. + + For details see: + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst + driver_async_probe= [KNL] List of driver names to be probed asynchronously. * matches with all driver names. If * is specified, the @@ -3385,6 +3405,7 @@ nospectre_bhb [ARM64] nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] + reg_file_data_sampling=off [X86] retbleed=off [X86] spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] spectre_v2_user=off [X86] diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 1566748f16c42..d2003865b7cf6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2609,6 +2609,17 @@ config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION

If in doubt, say N.

+config MITIGATION_RFDS + bool "RFDS Mitigation" + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL + default y + help + Enable mitigation for Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) by default. + RFDS is a hardware vulnerability which affects Intel Atom CPUs. It + allows unprivileged speculative access to stale data previously + stored in floating point, vector and integer registers. + See also file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst + endif

config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index caf4cf2e1036f..0e4f2da9f618a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -499,4 +499,5 @@ /* BUG word 2 */ #define X86_BUG_SRSO X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */ #define X86_BUG_DIV0 X86_BUG(1*32 + 1) /* AMD DIV0 speculation bug */ +#define X86_BUG_RFDS X86_BUG(1*32 + 2) /* CPU is vulnerable to Register File Data Sampling */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 1d51e1850ed03..857839df66dfb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -165,6 +165,14 @@ * CPU is not vulnerable to Gather * Data Sampling (GDS). */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO BIT(27) /* + * Not susceptible to Register + * File Data Sampling. + */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR BIT(28) /* + * VERW clears CPU Register + * File. + */

#define ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE BIT(21) /* * IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS MSR diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index cd6ac89c1a0df..01ac18f56147f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -480,6 +480,57 @@ static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);

+#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Register File Data Sampling: " fmt + +enum rfds_mitigations { + RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF, + RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW, + RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, +}; + +/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */ +static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init = + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + +static const char * const rfds_strings[] = { + [RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", + [RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear Register File", + [RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode", +}; + +static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) { + rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + return; + } + if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF) + return; + + if (x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF); + else + rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; +} + +static __init int rfds_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS)) + return 0; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) + rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW; + + return 0; +} +early_param("reg_file_data_sampling", rfds_parse_cmdline); + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "" fmt

@@ -513,6 +564,11 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void) mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW; mmio_select_mitigation(); } + if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF && + boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS)) { + rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW; + rfds_select_mitigation(); + } out: if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]); @@ -522,6 +578,8 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void) pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]); else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN)) pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n"); + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS)) + pr_info("Register File Data Sampling: %s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]); }

static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void) @@ -529,11 +587,12 @@ static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void) mds_select_mitigation(); taa_select_mitigation(); mmio_select_mitigation(); + rfds_select_mitigation();

/* - * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update - * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data - * mitigation selection is done. + * As these mitigations are inter-related and rely on VERW instruction + * to clear the microarchitural buffers, update and print their status + * after mitigation selection is done for each of these vulnerabilities. */ md_clear_update_mitigation(); } @@ -2622,6 +2681,11 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf) sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled"); }

+static ssize_t rfds_show_state(char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]); +} + static char *stibp_state(void) { if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) && @@ -2781,6 +2845,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr case X86_BUG_GDS: return gds_show_state(buf);

+ case X86_BUG_RFDS: + return rfds_show_state(buf); + default: break; } @@ -2855,4 +2922,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *bu { return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_GDS); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RFDS); +} #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 34cac9ea19171..97ea52a4e8a39 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1274,6 +1274,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { #define SRSO BIT(5) /* CPU is affected by GDS */ #define GDS BIT(6) +/* CPU is affected by Register File Data Sampling */ +#define RFDS BIT(7)

static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), @@ -1301,9 +1303,18 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE_P, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE_S, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GRACEMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),

VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), @@ -1337,6 +1348,24 @@ static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap) ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO); }

+static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 ia32_cap) +{ + /* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */ + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO) + return false; + + /* + * VMMs set ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR for processors not in the blacklist to + * indicate that mitigation is needed because guest is running on a + * vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such hardware: + */ + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR) + return true; + + /* Only consult the blacklist when there is no enumeration: */ + return cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS); +} + static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); @@ -1448,6 +1477,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS);

+ if (vulnerable_to_rfds(ia32_cap)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return;

diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c index 548491de818ef..ef427ee787a99 100644 --- a/drivers/base/cpu.c +++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c @@ -565,6 +565,7 @@ CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(mmio_stale_data); CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(retbleed); CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(spec_rstack_overflow); CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(gds); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(reg_file_data_sampling);

static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); @@ -579,6 +580,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_rstack_overflow, 0444, cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(gather_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_gds, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(reg_file_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling, NULL);

static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, @@ -594,6 +596,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_retbleed.attr, &dev_attr_spec_rstack_overflow.attr, &dev_attr_gather_data_sampling.attr, + &dev_attr_reg_file_data_sampling.attr, NULL };

diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h index fc8094419084f..e990c180282e7 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); +extern ssize_t cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);

extern __printf(4, 5) struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,

From: Frank Li Frank.Li@nxp.com

[ Upstream commit 1e9b05258271b76ccc04a4b535009d2cb596506a ]

Introduce a common dt-bindings header file, fsl-edma.h, shared between the driver and dts files. This addition aims to eliminate hardcoded values in dts files, promoting maintainability and consistency.

DTS header file not support BIT() macro yet. Directly use 2^n number.

Signed-off-by: Frank Li Frank.Li@nxp.com Reviewed-by: Rob Herring robh@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231114154824.3617255-3-Frank.Li@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul vkoul@kernel.org Stable-dep-of: a79f949a5ce1 ("dmaengine: fsl-edma: correct max_segment_size setting") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h

diff --git a/include/dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h b/include/dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..fd11478cfe9cc --- /dev/null +++ b/include/dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause */ + +#ifndef _FSL_EDMA_DT_BINDING_H_ +#define _FSL_EDMA_DT_BINDING_H_ + +/* Receive Channel */ +#define FSL_EDMA_RX 0x1 + +/* iMX8 audio remote DMA */ +#define FSL_EDMA_REMOTE 0x2 + +/* FIFO is continue memory region */ +#define FSL_EDMA_MULTI_FIFO 0x4 + +/* Channel need stick to even channel */ +#define FSL_EDMA_EVEN_CH 0x8 + +/* Channel need stick to odd channel */ +#define FSL_EDMA_ODD_CH 0x10 + +#endif

From: Frank Li Frank.Li@nxp.com

[ Upstream commit a79f949a5ce1d45329d63742c2a995f2b47f9852 ]

Correcting the previous setting of 0x3fff to the actual value of 0x7fff.

Introduced new macro 'EDMA_TCD_ITER_MASK' for improved code clarity and utilization of FIELD_GET to obtain the accurate maximum value.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e06748539432 ("dmaengine: fsl-edma: support edma memcpy") Signed-off-by: Frank Li Frank.Li@nxp.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240207194733.2112870-1-Frank.Li@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul vkoul@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.h | 5 +++-- drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.h b/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.h index bb5221158a770..f5e216b157c75 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.h +++ b/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-common.h @@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ #define EDMA_TCD_ATTR_SSIZE(x) (((x) & GENMASK(2, 0)) << 8) #define EDMA_TCD_ATTR_SMOD(x) (((x) & GENMASK(4, 0)) << 11)

-#define EDMA_TCD_CITER_CITER(x) ((x) & GENMASK(14, 0)) -#define EDMA_TCD_BITER_BITER(x) ((x) & GENMASK(14, 0)) +#define EDMA_TCD_ITER_MASK GENMASK(14, 0) +#define EDMA_TCD_CITER_CITER(x) ((x) & EDMA_TCD_ITER_MASK) +#define EDMA_TCD_BITER_BITER(x) ((x) & EDMA_TCD_ITER_MASK)

#define EDMA_TCD_CSR_START BIT(0) #define EDMA_TCD_CSR_INT_MAJOR BIT(1) diff --git a/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c b/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c index 45cc419b1b4ac..d36e28b9c767a 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c +++ b/drivers/dma/fsl-edma-main.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ */

#include <dt-bindings/dma/fsl-edma.h> +#include <linux/bitfield.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/clk.h> @@ -582,7 +583,8 @@ static int fsl_edma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) DMAENGINE_ALIGN_32_BYTES;

/* Per worst case 'nbytes = 1' take CITER as the max_seg_size */ - dma_set_max_seg_size(fsl_edma->dma_dev.dev, 0x3fff); + dma_set_max_seg_size(fsl_edma->dma_dev.dev, + FIELD_GET(EDMA_TCD_ITER_MASK, EDMA_TCD_ITER_MASK));

fsl_edma->dma_dev.residue_granularity = DMA_RESIDUE_GRANULARITY_SEGMENT;

From: Leon Romanovsky leonro@nvidia.com

[ Upstream commit 983a73da1f996faee9997149eb05b12fa7bd8cbf ]

In addition to citied commit in Fixes line, allow UDP encapsulation in TX path too.

Fixes: 89edf40220be ("xfrm: Support UDP encapsulation in packet offload mode") CC: Steffen Klassert steffen.klassert@secunet.com Reported-by: Mike Yu yumike@google.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky leonro@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed saeedm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert steffen.klassert@secunet.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c index 3784534c91855..653e51ae39648 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ bool xfrm_dev_offload_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x) struct xfrm_dst *xdst = (struct xfrm_dst *)dst; struct net_device *dev = x->xso.dev;

- if (!x->type_offload || x->encap) + if (!x->type_offload) return false;

if (x->xso.type == XFRM_DEV_OFFLOAD_PACKET ||

From: Maciej Fijalkowski maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com

[ Upstream commit cbf996f52c4e658b3fb4349a869a62fd2d4c3c1c ]

Currently routines that are supposed to toggle state of ring pair do not take care of associated interrupt with queue vector that these rings belong to. This causes funky issues such as dead interface due to irq misconfiguration, as per Pavel's report from Closes: tag.

Add a function responsible for disabling single IRQ in EIMC register and call this as a very first thing when disabling ring pair during xsk_pool setup. For enable let's reuse ixgbe_irq_enable_queues(). Besides this, disable/enable NAPI as first/last thing when dealing with closing or opening ring pair that xsk_pool is being configured on.

Reported-by: Pavel Vazharov pavel@x3me.net Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAJEV1ijxNyPTwASJER1bcZzS9nMoZJqfR86nu_3jFFVX... Fixes: 024aa5800f32 ("ixgbe: added Rx/Tx ring disable/enable functions") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson magnus.karlsson@intel.com Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout chandanx.rout@intel.com (A Contingent Worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c index 6a3f633406c4b..ce234e76ea236 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c @@ -2939,8 +2939,8 @@ static void ixgbe_check_lsc(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter) static inline void ixgbe_irq_enable_queues(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, u64 qmask) { - u32 mask; struct ixgbe_hw *hw = &adapter->hw; + u32 mask;

switch (hw->mac.type) { case ixgbe_mac_82598EB: @@ -10524,6 +10524,44 @@ static void ixgbe_reset_rxr_stats(struct ixgbe_ring *rx_ring) memset(&rx_ring->rx_stats, 0, sizeof(rx_ring->rx_stats)); }

+/** + * ixgbe_irq_disable_single - Disable single IRQ vector + * @adapter: adapter structure + * @ring: ring index + **/ +static void ixgbe_irq_disable_single(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, u32 ring) +{ + struct ixgbe_hw *hw = &adapter->hw; + u64 qmask = BIT_ULL(ring); + u32 mask; + + switch (adapter->hw.mac.type) { + case ixgbe_mac_82598EB: + mask = qmask & IXGBE_EIMC_RTX_QUEUE; + IXGBE_WRITE_REG(&adapter->hw, IXGBE_EIMC, mask); + break; + case ixgbe_mac_82599EB: + case ixgbe_mac_X540: + case ixgbe_mac_X550: + case ixgbe_mac_X550EM_x: + case ixgbe_mac_x550em_a: + mask = (qmask & 0xFFFFFFFF); + if (mask) + IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_EIMS_EX(0), mask); + mask = (qmask >> 32); + if (mask) + IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_EIMS_EX(1), mask); + break; + default: + break; + } + IXGBE_WRITE_FLUSH(&adapter->hw); + if (adapter->flags & IXGBE_FLAG_MSIX_ENABLED) + synchronize_irq(adapter->msix_entries[ring].vector); + else + synchronize_irq(adapter->pdev->irq); +} + /** * ixgbe_txrx_ring_disable - Disable Rx/Tx/XDP Tx rings * @adapter: adapter structure @@ -10540,6 +10578,11 @@ void ixgbe_txrx_ring_disable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, int ring) tx_ring = adapter->tx_ring[ring]; xdp_ring = adapter->xdp_ring[ring];

+ ixgbe_irq_disable_single(adapter, ring); + + /* Rx/Tx/XDP Tx share the same napi context. */ + napi_disable(&rx_ring->q_vector->napi); + ixgbe_disable_txr(adapter, tx_ring); if (xdp_ring) ixgbe_disable_txr(adapter, xdp_ring); @@ -10548,9 +10591,6 @@ void ixgbe_txrx_ring_disable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, int ring) if (xdp_ring) synchronize_rcu();

- /* Rx/Tx/XDP Tx share the same napi context. */ - napi_disable(&rx_ring->q_vector->napi); - ixgbe_clean_tx_ring(tx_ring); if (xdp_ring) ixgbe_clean_tx_ring(xdp_ring); @@ -10578,9 +10618,6 @@ void ixgbe_txrx_ring_enable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, int ring) tx_ring = adapter->tx_ring[ring]; xdp_ring = adapter->xdp_ring[ring];

- /* Rx/Tx/XDP Tx share the same napi context. */ - napi_enable(&rx_ring->q_vector->napi); - ixgbe_configure_tx_ring(adapter, tx_ring); if (xdp_ring) ixgbe_configure_tx_ring(adapter, xdp_ring); @@ -10589,6 +10626,11 @@ void ixgbe_txrx_ring_enable(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, int ring) clear_bit(__IXGBE_TX_DISABLED, &tx_ring->state); if (xdp_ring) clear_bit(__IXGBE_TX_DISABLED, &xdp_ring->state); + + /* Rx/Tx/XDP Tx share the same napi context. */ + napi_enable(&rx_ring->q_vector->napi); + ixgbe_irq_enable_queues(adapter, BIT_ULL(ring)); + IXGBE_WRITE_FLUSH(&adapter->hw); }

/**

From: Maciej Fijalkowski maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 99099c6bc75a30b76bb5d6774a0509ab6f06af05 ]

ice_qp_dis() currently does things in very mixed way. Tx is stopped before disabling IRQ on related queue vector, then it takes care of disabling Rx and finally NAPI is disabled.

Let us start with disabling IRQs in the first place followed by turning off NAPI. Then it is safe to handle queues.

One subtle change on top of that is that even though ice_qp_ena() looks more sane, clear ICE_CFG_BUSY as the last thing there.

Fixes: 2d4238f55697 ("ice: Add support for AF_XDP") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout chandanx.rout@intel.com (A Contingent Worker at Intel) Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson magnus.karlsson@intel.com Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c index f3663b3f6390e..0fd5551b108ce 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c @@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ static int ice_qp_dis(struct ice_vsi *vsi, u16 q_idx) return -EBUSY; usleep_range(1000, 2000); } + + ice_qvec_dis_irq(vsi, rx_ring, q_vector); + ice_qvec_toggle_napi(vsi, q_vector, false); + netif_tx_stop_queue(netdev_get_tx_queue(vsi->netdev, q_idx));

ice_fill_txq_meta(vsi, tx_ring, &txq_meta); @@ -195,13 +199,10 @@ static int ice_qp_dis(struct ice_vsi *vsi, u16 q_idx) if (err) return err; } - ice_qvec_dis_irq(vsi, rx_ring, q_vector); - err = ice_vsi_ctrl_one_rx_ring(vsi, false, q_idx, true); if (err) return err;

- ice_qvec_toggle_napi(vsi, q_vector, false); ice_qp_clean_rings(vsi, q_idx); ice_qp_reset_stats(vsi, q_idx);

@@ -259,11 +260,11 @@ static int ice_qp_ena(struct ice_vsi *vsi, u16 q_idx) if (err) return err;

- clear_bit(ICE_CFG_BUSY, vsi->state); ice_qvec_toggle_napi(vsi, q_vector, true); ice_qvec_ena_irq(vsi, q_vector);

netif_tx_start_queue(netdev_get_tx_queue(vsi->netdev, q_idx)); + clear_bit(ICE_CFG_BUSY, vsi->state);

return 0; }

From: Michal Swiatkowski michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com

[ Upstream commit 4035c72dc1ba81a96f94de84dfd5409056c1d9c9 ]

During VSI reconfiguration filters and VSI config which is set in ice_vf_init_host_cfg() are lost. Recall the host configuration function to restore them.

Without this config VF on which MSI-X amount was changed might had a connection problems.

Fixes: 4d38cb44bd32 ("ice: manage VFs MSI-X using resource tracking") Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller jacob.e.keller@intel.com Signed-off-by: Michal Swiatkowski michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Simon Horman horms@kernel.org Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski rafal.romanowski@intel.com Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c index c4caa9df473b5..cd61928700211 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c @@ -1074,6 +1074,7 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count) struct ice_pf *pf = pci_get_drvdata(pdev); u16 prev_msix, prev_queues, queues; bool needs_rebuild = false; + struct ice_vsi *vsi; struct ice_vf *vf; int id;

@@ -1108,6 +1109,10 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count) if (!vf) return -ENOENT;

+ vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); + if (!vsi) + return -ENOENT; + prev_msix = vf->num_msix; prev_queues = vf->num_vf_qs;

@@ -1128,7 +1133,7 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count) if (vf->first_vector_idx < 0) goto unroll;

- if (ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(vf)) { + if (ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(vf) || ice_vf_init_host_cfg(vf, vsi)) { /* Try to rebuild with previous values */ needs_rebuild = true; goto unroll; @@ -1154,8 +1159,10 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count) if (vf->first_vector_idx < 0) return -EINVAL;

- if (needs_rebuild) + if (needs_rebuild) { ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(vf); + ice_vf_init_host_cfg(vf, vsi); + }

ice_ena_vf_mappings(vf); ice_put_vf(vf);

From: Saeed Mahameed saeedm@nvidia.com

[ Upstream commit b7bbd698c90591546d22093181e266785f08c18b ]

This reverts commit 4e25b661f484df54b6751b65f9ea2434a3b67539.

This Commit was mistakenly applied by pulling the wrong tag, remove it.

Fixes: 4e25b661f484 ("net/mlx5e: Check the number of elements before walk TC rhashtable") Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed saeedm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/ipsec_fs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/ipsec_fs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/ipsec_fs.c index 190f10aba1702..5a0047bdcb510 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/ipsec_fs.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/esw/ipsec_fs.c @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void mlx5_esw_ipsec_restore_dest_uplink(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev)

xa_for_each(&esw->offloads.vport_reps, i, rep) { rpriv = rep->rep_data[REP_ETH].priv; - if (!rpriv || !rpriv->netdev || !atomic_read(&rpriv->tc_ht.nelems)) + if (!rpriv || !rpriv->netdev) continue;

rhashtable_walk_enter(&rpriv->tc_ht, &iter);

From: Aya Levin ayal@nvidia.com

[ Upstream commit ac8082a3c7a158640a2c493ec437dd9da881a6a7 ]

Restore fw reporter diagnose to print the syndrome even if it is zero. Following the cited commit, in this case (syndrome == 0) command returns no output at all.

This fix restores command output in case syndrome is cleared: $ devlink health diagnose pci/0000:82:00.0 reporter fw Syndrome: 0

Fixes: d17f98bf7cc9 ("net/mlx5: devlink health: use retained error fmsg API") Signed-off-by: Aya Levin ayal@nvidia.com Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh moshe@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed saeedm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c index 8ff6dc9bc8033..b5c709bba1553 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c @@ -452,10 +452,10 @@ mlx5_fw_reporter_diagnose(struct devlink_health_reporter *reporter, struct health_buffer __iomem *h = health->health; u8 synd = ioread8(&h->synd);

+ devlink_fmsg_u8_pair_put(fmsg, "Syndrome", synd); if (!synd) return 0;

- devlink_fmsg_u8_pair_put(fmsg, "Syndrome", synd); devlink_fmsg_string_pair_put(fmsg, "Description", hsynd_str(synd));

return 0;

From: Jianbo Liu jianbol@nvidia.com

[ Upstream commit dd238b702064b21d25b4fc39a19699319746d655 ]

Downgrade the print from mlx5_core_warn() to mlx5_core_dbg(), as it is just a statement of fact that firmware doesn't support ignore flow level.

And change the wording to "firmware flow level support is missing", to make it more accurate.

Fixes: ae2ee3be99a8 ("net/mlx5: CT: Remove warning of ignore_flow_level support for VFs") Signed-off-by: Jianbo Liu jianbol@nvidia.com Suggested-by: Elliott, Robert (Servers) elliott@hpe.com Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan roid@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed saeedm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc/post_act.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc/post_act.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc/post_act.c index 86bf007fd05b7..b500cc2c9689d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc/post_act.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc/post_act.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ mlx5e_tc_post_act_init(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct mlx5_fs_chains *chains,

if (!MLX5_CAP_FLOWTABLE_TYPE(priv->mdev, ignore_flow_level, table_type)) { if (priv->mdev->coredev_type == MLX5_COREDEV_PF) - mlx5_core_warn(priv->mdev, "firmware level support is missing\n"); + mlx5_core_dbg(priv->mdev, "firmware flow level support is missing\n"); err = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto err_check; }

From: Rahul Rameshbabu rrameshbabu@nvidia.com

[ Upstream commit b7cf07586c40f926063d4d09f7de28ff82f62b2a ]

Just simply reordering the functions mlx5e_ptp_metadata_map_put and mlx5e_ptpsq_track_metadata in the mlx5e_txwqe_complete context is not good enough since both the compiler and CPU are free to reorder these two functions. If reordering does occur, the issue that was supposedly fixed by 7e3f3ba97e6c ("net/mlx5e: Track xmit submission to PTP WQ after populating metadata map") will be seen. This will lead to NULL pointer dereferences in mlx5e_ptpsq_mark_ts_cqes_undelivered in the NAPI polling context due to the tracking list being populated before the metadata map.

Fixes: 7e3f3ba97e6c ("net/mlx5e: Track xmit submission to PTP WQ after populating metadata map") Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu rrameshbabu@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed saeedm@nvidia.com CC: Vadim Fedorenko vadfed@meta.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c index f0b506e562df3..1ead69c5f5fa3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c @@ -401,6 +401,8 @@ mlx5e_txwqe_complete(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq, struct sk_buff *skb, mlx5e_skb_cb_hwtstamp_init(skb); mlx5e_ptp_metadata_map_put(&sq->ptpsq->metadata_map, skb, metadata_index); + /* ensure skb is put on metadata_map before tracking the index */ + wmb(); mlx5e_ptpsq_track_metadata(sq->ptpsq, metadata_index); if (!netif_tx_queue_stopped(sq->txq) && mlx5e_ptpsq_metadata_freelist_empty(sq->ptpsq)) {

From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" rostedt@goodmis.org

[ Upstream commit 51270d573a8d9dd5afdc7934de97d66c0e14b5fd ]

I'm updating __assign_str() and will be removing the second parameter. To make sure that it does not break anything, I make sure that it matches the __string() field, as that is where the string is actually going to be saved in. To make sure there's nothing that breaks, I added a WARN_ON() to make sure that what was used in __string() is the same that is used in __assign_str().

In doing this change, an error was triggered as __assign_str() now expects the string passed in to be a char * value. I instead had the following warning:

include/trace/events/qdisc.h: In function ‘trace_event_raw_event_qdisc_reset’: include/trace/events/qdisc.h:91:35: error: passing argument 1 of 'strcmp' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types] 91 | __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q));

That's because the qdisc_enqueue() and qdisc_reset() pass in qdisc_dev(q) to __assign_str() and to __string(). But that function returns a pointer to struct net_device and not a string.

It appears that these events are just saving the pointer as a string and then reading it as a string as well.

Use qdisc_dev(q)->name to save the device instead.

Fixes: a34dac0b90552 ("net_sched: add tracepoints for qdisc_reset() and qdisc_destroy()") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) rostedt@goodmis.org Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim jhs@mojatatu.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/trace/events/qdisc.h | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/trace/events/qdisc.h b/include/trace/events/qdisc.h index a3995925cb057..1f4258308b967 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/qdisc.h +++ b/include/trace/events/qdisc.h @@ -81,14 +81,14 @@ TRACE_EVENT(qdisc_reset, TP_ARGS(q),

TP_STRUCT__entry( - __string( dev, qdisc_dev(q) ) - __string( kind, q->ops->id ) - __field( u32, parent ) - __field( u32, handle ) + __string( dev, qdisc_dev(q)->name ) + __string( kind, q->ops->id ) + __field( u32, parent ) + __field( u32, handle ) ),

TP_fast_assign( - __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q)); + __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q)->name); __assign_str(kind, q->ops->id); __entry->parent = q->parent; __entry->handle = q->handle; @@ -106,14 +106,14 @@ TRACE_EVENT(qdisc_destroy, TP_ARGS(q),

TP_STRUCT__entry( - __string( dev, qdisc_dev(q) ) - __string( kind, q->ops->id ) - __field( u32, parent ) - __field( u32, handle ) + __string( dev, qdisc_dev(q)->name ) + __string( kind, q->ops->id ) + __field( u32, parent ) + __field( u32, handle ) ),

TP_fast_assign( - __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q)); + __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q)->name); __assign_str(kind, q->ops->id); __entry->parent = q->parent; __entry->handle = q->handle;

From: Horatiu Vultur horatiu.vultur@microchip.com

[ Upstream commit 89d72d4125e94aa3c2140fedd97ce07ba9e37674 ]

Based on the static analyzis of the code it looks like when an entry from the MAC table was removed, the entry was still used after being freed. More precise the vid of the mac_entry was used after calling devm_kfree on the mac_entry. The fix consists in first using the vid of the mac_entry to delete the entry from the HW and after that to free it.

Fixes: b37a1bae742f ("net: sparx5: add mactable support") Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur horatiu.vultur@microchip.com Reviewed-by: Simon Horman horms@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240301080608.3053468-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.... Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c index 4af285918ea2a..75868b3f548ec 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_mactable.c @@ -347,10 +347,10 @@ int sparx5_del_mact_entry(struct sparx5 *sparx5, list) { if ((vid == 0 || mact_entry->vid == vid) && ether_addr_equal(addr, mact_entry->mac)) { + sparx5_mact_forget(sparx5, addr, mact_entry->vid); + list_del(&mact_entry->list); devm_kfree(sparx5->dev, mact_entry); - - sparx5_mact_forget(sparx5, addr, mact_entry->vid); } } mutex_unlock(&sparx5->mact_lock);

From: Jacob Keller jacob.e.keller@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 2652b99e43403dc464f3648483ffb38e48872fe4 ]

The E800 series hardware uses the same iAVF driver as older devices, including the virtchnl negotiation scheme.

This negotiation scheme includes a mechanism to determine what type of RSS should be supported, including RSS over PF virtchnl messages, RSS over firmware AdminQ messages, and RSS via direct register access.

The PF driver will always prefer VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_PF if its supported by the VF driver. However, if an older VF driver is loaded, it may request only VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_REG or VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_AQ.

The ice driver happily agrees to support these methods. Unfortunately, the underlying hardware does not support these mechanisms. The E800 series VFs don't have the appropriate registers for RSS_REG. The mailbox queue used by VFs for VF to PF communication blocks messages which do not have the VF-to-PF opcode.

Stop lying to the VF that it could support RSS over AdminQ or registers, as these interfaces do not work when the hardware is operating on an E800 series device.

In practice this is unlikely to be hit by any normal user. The iAVF driver has supported RSS over PF virtchnl commands since 2016, and always defaults to using RSS_PF if possible.

In principle, nothing actually stops the existing VF from attempting to access the registers or send an AQ command. However a properly coded VF will check the capability flags and will report a more useful error if it detects a case where the driver does not support the RSS offloads that it does.

Fixes: 1071a8358a28 ("ice: Implement virtchnl commands for AVF support") Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller jacob.e.keller@intel.com Reviewed-by: Alan Brady alan.brady@intel.com Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski rafal.romanowski@intel.com Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c | 9 +-------- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c index 8872f7a4f4320..d6348f20822e8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c @@ -440,7 +440,6 @@ static int ice_vc_get_vf_res_msg(struct ice_vf *vf, u8 *msg) vf->driver_caps = *(u32 *)msg; else vf->driver_caps = VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_L2 | - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_REG | VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_VLAN;

vfres->vf_cap_flags = VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_L2; @@ -453,14 +452,8 @@ static int ice_vc_get_vf_res_msg(struct ice_vf *vf, u8 *msg) vfres->vf_cap_flags |= ice_vc_get_vlan_caps(hw, vf, vsi, vf->driver_caps);

- if (vf->driver_caps & VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_PF) { + if (vf->driver_caps & VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_PF) vfres->vf_cap_flags |= VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_PF; - } else { - if (vf->driver_caps & VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_AQ) - vfres->vf_cap_flags |= VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_AQ; - else - vfres->vf_cap_flags |= VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_REG; - }

if (vf->driver_caps & VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RX_FLEX_DESC) vfres->vf_cap_flags |= VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RX_FLEX_DESC; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c index 7d547fa616fa6..588b77f1a4bf6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_allowlist.c @@ -13,8 +13,6 @@ * - opcodes needed by VF when caps are activated * * Caps that don't use new opcodes (no opcodes should be allowed): - * - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_AQ - * - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RSS_REG * - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_WB_ON_ITR * - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_CRC * - VIRTCHNL_VF_OFFLOAD_RX_POLLING

From: Michal Schmidt mschmidt@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 9224fc86f1776193650a33a275cac628952f80a9 ]

The pf->dplls.lock mutex is initialized too late, after its first use. Move it to the top of ice_dpll_init. Note that the "err_exit" error path destroys the mutex. And the mutex is the last thing destroyed in ice_dpll_deinit. This fixes the following warning with CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES:

ice 0000:10:00.0: The DDP package was successfully loaded: ICE OS Default Package version 1.3.36.0 ice 0000:10:00.0: 252.048 Gb/s available PCIe bandwidth (16.0 GT/s PCIe x16 link) ice 0000:10:00.0: PTP init successful ------------[ cut here ]------------ DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 410 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 __mutex_lock+0x773/0xd40 Modules linked in: crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ice(+) nvme nvme_c> CPU: 0 PID: 410 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc5+ #3 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL110 Gen10 Plus/ProLiant DL110 Gen10 Plus, BIOS U56 10/19/2023 Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x773/0xd40 Code: c0 0f 84 1d f9 ff ff 44 8b 35 0d 9c 69 01 45 85 f6 0f 85 0d f9 ff ff 48 c7 c6 12 a2 a9 85 48 c7 c7 12 f1 a> RSP: 0018:ff7eb1a3417a7ae0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff85ac2bff RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ff7eb1a3417a7b80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffbfff R10: ff7eb1a3417a7978 R11: ff32b80f7fd2e568 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff32b7f02c50e0d8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff32b80efe800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055b5852cc000 CR3: 000000003c43a004 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x84/0x170 ? __mutex_lock+0x773/0xd40 ? report_bug+0x1c7/0x1d0 ? prb_read_valid+0x1b/0x30 ? handle_bug+0x42/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? __mutex_lock+0x773/0xd40 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50 ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x346/0x490 ? ice_dpll_lock_status_get+0x28/0x50 [ice] ? __pfx_ice_dpll_lock_status_get+0x10/0x10 [ice] ? ice_dpll_lock_status_get+0x28/0x50 [ice] ice_dpll_lock_status_get+0x28/0x50 [ice] dpll_device_get_one+0x14f/0x2e0 dpll_device_event_send+0x7d/0x150 dpll_device_register+0x124/0x180 ice_dpll_init_dpll+0x7b/0xd0 [ice] ice_dpll_init+0x224/0xa40 [ice] ? _dev_info+0x70/0x90 ice_load+0x468/0x690 [ice] ice_probe+0x75b/0xa10 [ice] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4f/0x80 ? process_one_work+0x1a3/0x500 local_pci_probe+0x47/0xa0 work_for_cpu_fn+0x17/0x30 process_one_work+0x20d/0x500 worker_thread+0x1df/0x3e0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x103/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> irq event stamp: 125197 hardirqs last enabled at (125197): [<ffffffff8416409d>] finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x12d/0x3d0 hardirqs last disabled at (125196): [<ffffffff85134044>] __schedule+0xea4/0x19f0 softirqs last enabled at (105334): [<ffffffff84e1e65a>] napi_get_frags_check+0x1a/0x60 softirqs last disabled at (105332): [<ffffffff84e1e65a>] napi_get_frags_check+0x1a/0x60 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: d7999f5ea64b ("ice: implement dpll interface to control cgu") Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt mschmidt@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Maciej Fijalkowski maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_dpll.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_dpll.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_dpll.c index 2b657d43c769d..68b894bb68fe7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_dpll.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_dpll.c @@ -2146,6 +2146,7 @@ void ice_dpll_init(struct ice_pf *pf) struct ice_dplls *d = &pf->dplls; int err = 0;

+ mutex_init(&d->lock); err = ice_dpll_init_info(pf, cgu); if (err) goto err_exit; @@ -2158,7 +2159,6 @@ void ice_dpll_init(struct ice_pf *pf) err = ice_dpll_init_pins(pf, cgu); if (err) goto deinit_pps; - mutex_init(&d->lock); if (cgu) { err = ice_dpll_init_worker(pf); if (err)

From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

[ Upstream commit 685f7d531264599b3f167f1e94bbd22f120e5fab ]

syzbot found another use-after-free in ip6_route_mpath_notify() [1]

Commit f7225172f25a ("net/ipv6: prevent use after free in ip6_route_mpath_notify") was not able to fix the root cause.

We need to defer the fib6_info_release() calls after ip6_route_mpath_notify(), in the cleanup phase.

[1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_fill_node+0x1460/0x1ac0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88809a07fc64 by task syz-executor.2/23037

CPU: 0 PID: 23037 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-01035-gea7f3cfaa588 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2e0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x167/0x540 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x142/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 rt6_fill_node+0x1460/0x1ac0 inet6_rt_notify+0x13b/0x290 net/ipv6/route.c:6184 ip6_route_mpath_notify net/ipv6/route.c:5198 [inline] ip6_route_multipath_add net/ipv6/route.c:5404 [inline] inet6_rtm_newroute+0x1d0f/0x2300 net/ipv6/route.c:5517 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6597 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367 netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 RIP: 0033:0x7f73dd87dda9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f73de6550c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f73dd9ac050 RCX: 00007f73dd87dda9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f73dd8ca47a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f73dd9ac050 R15: 00007ffdbdeb7858 </TASK>

Allocated by task 23037: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:372 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:389 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3981 [inline] __kmalloc+0x22e/0x490 mm/slub.c:3994 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:594 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline] fib6_info_alloc+0x2e/0xf0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:155 ip6_route_info_create+0x445/0x12b0 net/ipv6/route.c:3758 ip6_route_multipath_add net/ipv6/route.c:5298 [inline] inet6_rtm_newroute+0x744/0x2300 net/ipv6/route.c:5517 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6597 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367 netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77

Freed by task 16: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x4e/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:640 poison_slab_object+0xa6/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:241 __kasan_slab_free+0x34/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:257 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4299 [inline] kfree+0x14a/0x380 mm/slub.c:4409 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2190 [inline] rcu_core+0xd76/0x1810 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2465 __do_softirq+0x2bb/0x942 kernel/softirq.c:553

Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xae/0x100 mm/kasan/generic.c:586 __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:2715 [inline] call_rcu+0x167/0xa80 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2829 fib6_info_release include/net/ip6_fib.h:341 [inline] ip6_route_multipath_add net/ipv6/route.c:5344 [inline] inet6_rtm_newroute+0x114d/0x2300 net/ipv6/route.c:5517 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6597 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367 netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88809a07fc00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 The buggy address is located 100 bytes inside of freed 512-byte region [ffff88809a07fc00, ffff88809a07fe00)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0002681f00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9a07c head:ffffea0002681f00 order:2 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0xfff00000000840(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 00fff00000000840 ffff888014c41c80 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x1d20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 23028, tgid 23027 (syz-executor.4), ts 2340253595219, free_ts 2339107097036 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x33ea/0x3580 mm/page_alloc.c:3311 __alloc_pages+0x255/0x680 mm/page_alloc.c:4567 __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline] alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline] alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x160 mm/slub.c:2190 allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2354 [inline] new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2407 ___slab_alloc+0xd17/0x13e0 mm/slub.c:3540 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3625 [inline] __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3678 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3850 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline] __kmalloc+0x2e0/0x490 mm/slub.c:3994 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:594 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline] new_dir fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:956 [inline] get_subdir fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1000 [inline] sysctl_mkdir_p fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1295 [inline] __register_sysctl_table+0xb30/0x1440 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1376 neigh_sysctl_register+0x416/0x500 net/core/neighbour.c:3859 devinet_sysctl_register+0xaf/0x1f0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:2644 inetdev_init+0x296/0x4d0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:286 inetdev_event+0x338/0x15c0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1555 notifier_call_chain+0x18f/0x3b0 kernel/notifier.c:93 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1987 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2001 [inline] register_netdevice+0x15b2/0x1a20 net/core/dev.c:10340 br_dev_newlink+0x27/0x100 net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1563 rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3497 [inline] __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3717 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x158f/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3730 page last free pid 11583 tgid 11583 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1140 [inline] free_unref_page_prepare+0x968/0xa90 mm/page_alloc.c:2346 free_unref_page+0x37/0x3f0 mm/page_alloc.c:2486 kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte+0x74/0x90 mm/kasan/shadow.c:415 apply_to_pte_range mm/memory.c:2619 [inline] apply_to_pmd_range mm/memory.c:2663 [inline] apply_to_pud_range mm/memory.c:2699 [inline] apply_to_p4d_range mm/memory.c:2735 [inline] __apply_to_page_range+0x8ec/0xe40 mm/memory.c:2769 kasan_release_vmalloc+0x9a/0xb0 mm/kasan/shadow.c:532 __purge_vmap_area_lazy+0x163f/0x1a10 mm/vmalloc.c:1770 drain_vmap_area_work+0x40/0xd0 mm/vmalloc.c:1804 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x913/0x1420 kernel/workqueue.c:2706 worker_thread+0xa5f/0x1000 kernel/workqueue.c:2787 kthread+0x2ef/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242

Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88809a07fb00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88809a07fb80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

ffff88809a07fc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

^ ffff88809a07fc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88809a07fd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Fixes: 3b1137fe7482 ("net: ipv6: Change notifications for multipath add to RTA_MULTIPATH") Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reviewed-by: David Ahern dsahern@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240303144801.702646-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/ipv6/route.c | 21 +++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index ea1dec8448fce..ef815ba583a8f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -5332,19 +5332,7 @@ static int ip6_route_multipath_add(struct fib6_config *cfg, err_nh = NULL; list_for_each_entry(nh, &rt6_nh_list, next) { err = __ip6_ins_rt(nh->fib6_info, info, extack); - fib6_info_release(nh->fib6_info); - - if (!err) { - /* save reference to last route successfully inserted */ - rt_last = nh->fib6_info; - - /* save reference to first route for notification */ - if (!rt_notif) - rt_notif = nh->fib6_info; - }

- /* nh->fib6_info is used or freed at this point, reset to NULL*/ - nh->fib6_info = NULL; if (err) { if (replace && nhn) NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, @@ -5352,6 +5340,12 @@ static int ip6_route_multipath_add(struct fib6_config *cfg, err_nh = nh; goto add_errout; } + /* save reference to last route successfully inserted */ + rt_last = nh->fib6_info; + + /* save reference to first route for notification */ + if (!rt_notif) + rt_notif = nh->fib6_info;

/* Because each route is added like a single route we remove * these flags after the first nexthop: if there is a collision, @@ -5412,8 +5406,7 @@ static int ip6_route_multipath_add(struct fib6_config *cfg,

cleanup: list_for_each_entry_safe(nh, nh_safe, &rt6_nh_list, next) { - if (nh->fib6_info) - fib6_info_release(nh->fib6_info); + fib6_info_release(nh->fib6_info); list_del(&nh->next); kfree(nh); }

From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net

[ Upstream commit f267f262815033452195f46c43b572159262f533 ]

Commit 9b0ed890ac2a ("bonding: do not report NETDEV_XDP_ACT_XSK_ZEROCOPY") changed the driver from reporting everything as supported before a device was bonded into having the driver report that no XDP feature is supported until a real device is bonded as it seems to be more truthful given eventually real underlying devices decide what XDP features are supported.

The change however did not take into account when all slave devices get removed from the bond device. In this case after 9b0ed890ac2a, the driver keeps reporting a feature mask of 0x77, that is, NETDEV_XDP_ACT_MASK & ~NETDEV_XDP_ACT_XSK_ZEROCOPY whereas it should have reported a feature mask of 0.

Fix it by resetting XDP feature flags in the same way as if no XDP program is attached to the bond device. This was uncovered by the XDP bond selftest which let BPF CI fail. After adjusting the starting masks on the latter to 0 instead of NETDEV_XDP_ACT_MASK the test passes again together with this fix.

Fixes: 9b0ed890ac2a ("bonding: do not report NETDEV_XDP_ACT_XSK_ZEROCOPY") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Cc: Magnus Karlsson magnus.karlsson@intel.com Cc: Prashant Batra prbatra.mail@gmail.com Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen toke@redhat.com Cc: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen toke@redhat.com Message-ID: 20240305090829.17131-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c index 6cf7f364704e8..b094c48bebc30 100644 --- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c @@ -1811,7 +1811,7 @@ void bond_xdp_set_features(struct net_device *bond_dev)

ASSERT_RTNL();

- if (!bond_xdp_check(bond)) { + if (!bond_xdp_check(bond) || !bond_has_slaves(bond)) { xdp_clear_features_flag(bond_dev); return; }

From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen toke@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 2487007aa3b9fafbd2cb14068f49791ce1d7ede5 ]

When running an XDP program that is attached to a cpumap entry, we don't initialise the xdp_rxq_info data structure being used in the xdp_buff that backs the XDP program invocation. Tobias noticed that this leads to random values being returned as the xdp_md->rx_queue_index value for XDP programs running in a cpumap.

This means we're basically returning the contents of the uninitialised memory, which is bad. Fix this by zero-initialising the rxq data structure before running the XDP program.

Fixes: 9216477449f3 ("bpf: cpumap: Add the possibility to attach an eBPF program to cpumap") Reported-by: Tobias Böhm tobias@aibor.de Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen toke@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240305213132.11955-1-toke@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau martin.lau@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/bpf/cpumap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c index 8a0bb80fe48a3..ef82ffc90cbe9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static int cpu_map_bpf_prog_run_xdp(struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *rcpu, void **frames, int n, struct xdp_cpumap_stats *stats) { - struct xdp_rxq_info rxq; + struct xdp_rxq_info rxq = {}; struct xdp_buff xdp; int i, nframes = 0;

From: Edward Adam Davis eadavis@qq.com

[ Upstream commit c055fc00c07be1f0df7375ab0036cebd1106ed38 ]

If connection isn't established yet, get_mr() will fail, trigger connection after get_mr().

Fixes: 584a8279a44a ("RDS: RDMA: return appropriate error on rdma map failures") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+d4faee732755bba9838e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis eadavis@qq.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/rds/rdma.c | 3 +++ net/rds/send.c | 6 +----- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/rds/rdma.c b/net/rds/rdma.c index fba82d36593ad..a4e3c5de998be 100644 --- a/net/rds/rdma.c +++ b/net/rds/rdma.c @@ -301,6 +301,9 @@ static int __rds_rdma_map(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_get_mr_args *args, kfree(sg); } ret = PTR_ERR(trans_private); + /* Trigger connection so that its ready for the next retry */ + if (ret == -ENODEV) + rds_conn_connect_if_down(cp->cp_conn); goto out; }

diff --git a/net/rds/send.c b/net/rds/send.c index 5e57a1581dc60..2899def23865f 100644 --- a/net/rds/send.c +++ b/net/rds/send.c @@ -1313,12 +1313,8 @@ int rds_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t payload_len)

/* Parse any control messages the user may have included. */ ret = rds_cmsg_send(rs, rm, msg, &allocated_mr, &vct); - if (ret) { - /* Trigger connection so that its ready for the next retry */ - if (ret == -EAGAIN) - rds_conn_connect_if_down(conn); + if (ret) goto out; - }

if (rm->rdma.op_active && !conn->c_trans->xmit_rdma) { printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "rdma_op %p conn xmit_rdma %p\n",

From: Lena Wang lena.wang@mediatek.com

[ Upstream commit 767146637efc528b5e3d31297df115e85a2fd362 ]

UBSAN load reports an exception of BRK#5515 SHIFT_ISSUE:Bitwise shifts that are out of bounds for their data type.

vmlinux get_bitmap(b=75) + 712 <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:0> vmlinux decode_seq(bs=0xFFFFFFD008037000, f=0xFFFFFFD008037018, level=134443100) + 1956 <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:592> vmlinux decode_choice(base=0xFFFFFFD0080370F0, level=23843636) + 1216 <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:814> vmlinux decode_seq(f=0xFFFFFFD0080371A8, level=134443500) + 812 <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:576> vmlinux decode_choice(base=0xFFFFFFD008037280, level=0) + 1216 <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:814> vmlinux DecodeRasMessage() + 304 <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c:833> vmlinux ras_help() + 684 <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_main.c:1728> vmlinux nf_confirm() + 188 <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:137>

Due to abnormal data in skb->data, the extension bitmap length exceeds 32 when decoding ras message then uses the length to make a shift operation. It will change into negative after several loop. UBSAN load could detect a negative shift as an undefined behaviour and reports exception. So we add the protection to avoid the length exceeding 32. Or else it will return out of range error and stop decoding.

Fixes: 5e35941d9901 ("[NETFILTER]: Add H.323 conntrack/NAT helper") Signed-off-by: Lena Wang lena.wang@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c index e697a824b0018..540d97715bd23 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c @@ -533,6 +533,8 @@ static int decode_seq(struct bitstr *bs, const struct field_t *f, /* Get fields bitmap */ if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, 0, f->sz)) return H323_ERROR_BOUND; + if (f->sz > 32) + return H323_ERROR_RANGE; bmp = get_bitmap(bs, f->sz); if (base) *(unsigned int *)base = bmp; @@ -589,6 +591,8 @@ static int decode_seq(struct bitstr *bs, const struct field_t *f, bmp2_len = get_bits(bs, 7) + 1; if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, 0, bmp2_len)) return H323_ERROR_BOUND; + if (bmp2_len > 32) + return H323_ERROR_RANGE; bmp2 = get_bitmap(bs, bmp2_len); bmp |= bmp2 >> f->sz; if (base)

From: Jason Xing kernelxing@tencent.com

[ Upstream commit 958d6145a6d9ba9e075c921aead8753fb91c9101 ]

We need to protect the reader reading sysctl_netrom_default_path_quality because the value can be changed concurrently.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing kernelxing@tencent.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/netrom/nr_route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c index baea3cbd76ca5..6f709fdffc11f 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static int __must_check nr_add_node(ax25_address *nr, const char *mnemonic, nr_neigh->digipeat = NULL; nr_neigh->ax25 = NULL; nr_neigh->dev = dev; - nr_neigh->quality = sysctl_netrom_default_path_quality; + nr_neigh->quality = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_default_path_quality); nr_neigh->locked = 0; nr_neigh->count = 0; nr_neigh->number = nr_neigh_no++;

From: Jason Xing kernelxing@tencent.com

[ Upstream commit 119cae5ea3f9e35cdada8e572cc067f072fa825a ]

We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing kernelxing@tencent.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/netrom/nr_dev.c | 2 +- net/netrom/nr_out.c | 2 +- net/netrom/nr_subr.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_dev.c b/net/netrom/nr_dev.c index 3aaac4a22b387..2c34389c3ce6f 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_dev.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_dev.c @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static int nr_header(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, buff[6] |= AX25_SSSID_SPARE; buff += AX25_ADDR_LEN;

- *buff++ = sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser; + *buff++ = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser);

*buff++ = NR_PROTO_IP; *buff++ = NR_PROTO_IP; diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_out.c b/net/netrom/nr_out.c index 44929657f5b71..5e531394a724b 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_out.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_out.c @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ void nr_transmit_buffer(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) dptr[6] |= AX25_SSSID_SPARE; dptr += AX25_ADDR_LEN;

- *dptr++ = sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser; + *dptr++ = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser);

if (!nr_route_frame(skb, NULL)) { kfree_skb(skb); diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_subr.c b/net/netrom/nr_subr.c index e2d2af924cff4..c3bbd5880850b 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_subr.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_subr.c @@ -182,7 +182,8 @@ void nr_write_internal(struct sock *sk, int frametype) *dptr++ = nr->my_id; *dptr++ = frametype; *dptr++ = nr->window; - if (nr->bpqext) *dptr++ = sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser; + if (nr->bpqext) + *dptr++ = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser); break;

case NR_DISCREQ: @@ -236,7 +237,7 @@ void __nr_transmit_reply(struct sk_buff *skb, int mine, unsigned char cmdflags) dptr[6] |= AX25_SSSID_SPARE; dptr += AX25_ADDR_LEN;

- *dptr++ = sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser; + *dptr++ = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_network_ttl_initialiser);

if (mine) { *dptr++ = 0;

From: Jason Xing kernelxing@tencent.com

[ Upstream commit e799299aafed417cc1f32adccb2a0e5268b3f6d5 ]

We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing kernelxing@tencent.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c index 4d0e0834d527b..312fc745db7ff 100644 --- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c +++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, nr->t2 = msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_acknowledge_delay); nr->n2 = - msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries); + msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries)); nr->t4 = msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay); nr->idle =

From: Jason Xing kernelxing@tencent.com

[ Upstream commit 43547d8699439a67b78d6bb39015113f7aa360fd ]

We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing kernelxing@tencent.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c index 8ada0da3c0e08..10eee02ef99ed 100644 --- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c +++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c @@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, nr->n2 = msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_maximum_tries)); nr->t4 = - msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay); + msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay)); nr->idle = msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout); nr->window = sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size;

From: Jason Xing kernelxing@tencent.com

[ Upstream commit f99b494b40431f0ca416859f2345746199398e2b ]

We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing kernelxing@tencent.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c index e65418fb9d882..1671be042ffef 100644 --- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c +++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c @@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static int nr_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, nr->t4 = msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_busy_delay)); nr->idle = - msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout); + msecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_no_activity_timeout)); nr->window = READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_transport_requested_window_size);

nr->bpqext = 1;

From: Jason Xing kernelxing@tencent.com

[ Upstream commit bc76645ebdd01be9b9994dac39685a3d0f6f7985 ]

We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the value can be changed concurrently.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason Xing kernelxing@tencent.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/netrom/nr_route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c index 89e12e6eea2ef..70480869ad1c5 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c @@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ void nr_link_failed(ax25_cb *ax25, int reason) nr_neigh->ax25 = NULL; ax25_cb_put(ax25);

- if (++nr_neigh->failed < sysctl_netrom_link_fails_count) { + if (++nr_neigh->failed < READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_link_fails_count)) { nr_neigh_put(nr_neigh); return; }

From: Yongzhi Liu hyperlyzcs@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit ba18deddd6d502da71fd6b6143c53042271b82bd ]

When auxiliary_device_add() returns error and then calls auxiliary_device_uninit(), Callback function pdsc_auxbus_dev_release calls kfree(padev) to free memory. We shouldn't call kfree(padev) again in the error handling path.

Fix this by cleaning up the redundant kfree() and putting the error handling back to where the errors happened.

Fixes: 4569cce43bc6 ("pds_core: add auxiliary_bus devices") Signed-off-by: Yongzhi Liu hyperlyzcs@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Wojciech Drewek wojciech.drewek@intel.com Reviewed-by: Shannon Nelson shannon.nelson@amd.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240306105714.20597-1-hyperlyzcs@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pds_core/auxbus.c | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pds_core/auxbus.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pds_core/auxbus.c index 11c23a7f3172d..fd1a5149c0031 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pds_core/auxbus.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pds_core/auxbus.c @@ -160,23 +160,19 @@ static struct pds_auxiliary_dev *pdsc_auxbus_dev_register(struct pdsc *cf, if (err < 0) { dev_warn(cf->dev, "auxiliary_device_init of %s failed: %pe\n", name, ERR_PTR(err)); - goto err_out; + kfree(padev); + return ERR_PTR(err); }

err = auxiliary_device_add(aux_dev); if (err) { dev_warn(cf->dev, "auxiliary_device_add of %s failed: %pe\n", name, ERR_PTR(err)); - goto err_out_uninit; + auxiliary_device_uninit(aux_dev); + return ERR_PTR(err); }

return padev; - -err_out_uninit: - auxiliary_device_uninit(aux_dev); -err_out: - kfree(padev); - return ERR_PTR(err); }

int pdsc_auxbus_dev_del(struct pdsc *cf, struct pdsc *pf)

From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" matttbe@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 5e2f3c65af47e527ccac54060cf909e3306652ff ]

When running the simult_flow selftest in slow environments -- e.g. QEmu without KVM support --, the results can be unstable. This selftest checks if the aggregated bandwidth is (almost) fully used as expected.

To help improving the stability while still keeping the same validation in place, the BW and the delay are reduced to lower the pressure on the CPU.

Fixes: 1a418cb8e888 ("mptcp: simult flow self-tests") Fixes: 219d04992b68 ("mptcp: push pending frames when subflow has free space") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) matttbe@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131-upstream-net-20240131-mptcp-ci-issues-v1-... Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh index 9096bf5794888..25693b37f820d 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh @@ -302,12 +302,12 @@ done

setup run_test 10 10 0 0 "balanced bwidth" -run_test 10 10 1 50 "balanced bwidth with unbalanced delay" +run_test 10 10 1 25 "balanced bwidth with unbalanced delay"

# we still need some additional infrastructure to pass the following test-cases -run_test 30 10 0 0 "unbalanced bwidth" -run_test 30 10 1 50 "unbalanced bwidth with unbalanced delay" -run_test 30 10 50 1 "unbalanced bwidth with opposed, unbalanced delay" +run_test 10 3 0 0 "unbalanced bwidth" +run_test 10 3 1 25 "unbalanced bwidth with unbalanced delay" +run_test 10 3 25 1 "unbalanced bwidth with opposed, unbalanced delay"

mptcp_lib_result_print_all_tap exit $ret

From: Wang Kefeng wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com

[ Upstream commit c16af1212479570454752671a170a1756e11fdfb ]

Attempt VMA lock-based page fault handling first, and fall back to the existing mmap_lock-based handling if that fails, the ebizzy benchmark shows 25% improvement on qemu with 2 cpus.

Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk Stable-dep-of: e870920bbe68 ("arch/arm/mm: fix major fault accounting when retrying under per-VMA lock") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/arm/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig index f8567e95f98be..8f47d6762ea4b 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ config ARM select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT if CPU_V7 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW select ARCH_SUPPORTS_HUGETLBFS if ARM_LPAE + select ARCH_SUPPORTS_PER_VMA_LOCK select ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF select ARCH_USE_MEMTEST diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c index fef62e4a9edde..e96fb40b9cc32 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c @@ -278,6 +278,35 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)

perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, addr);

+ if (!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER)) + goto lock_mmap; + + vma = lock_vma_under_rcu(mm, addr); + if (!vma) + goto lock_mmap; + + if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) { + vma_end_read(vma); + goto lock_mmap; + } + fault = handle_mm_fault(vma, addr, flags | FAULT_FLAG_VMA_LOCK, regs); + if (!(fault & (VM_FAULT_RETRY | VM_FAULT_COMPLETED))) + vma_end_read(vma); + + if (!(fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY)) { + count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_SUCCESS); + goto done; + } + count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_RETRY); + + /* Quick path to respond to signals */ + if (fault_signal_pending(fault, regs)) { + if (!user_mode(regs)) + goto no_context; + return 0; + } +lock_mmap: + retry: vma = lock_mm_and_find_vma(mm, addr, regs); if (unlikely(!vma)) { @@ -316,6 +345,7 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs) }

mmap_read_unlock(mm); +done:

/* * Handle the "normal" case first - VM_FAULT_MAJOR

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- Makefile | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index f1a592b7c7bc8..76b44693956a8 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 6 PATCHLEVEL = 7 -SUBLEVEL = 9 -EXTRAVERSION = +SUBLEVEL = 10 +EXTRAVERSION = -rc1 NAME = Hurr durr I'ma ninja sloth

# *DOCUMENTATION*