From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" bp@alien8.de

[ Commit da86eb9611840772a459693832e54c63cbcc040a upstream ]

cc_vendor is __ro_after_init and thus can be used directly.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) bp@alien8.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230508121957.32341-1-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org --- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h | 19 +------------------ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c index 684f0a910475..1e73254336a6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include <asm/coco.h> #include <asm/processor.h>

-enum cc_vendor cc_vendor __ro_after_init; +enum cc_vendor cc_vendor __ro_after_init = CC_VENDOR_NONE; static u64 cc_mask __ro_after_init;

static bool intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c index d0565a9e7d8c..4692450aeb4d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c @@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)

setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST);

- cc_set_vendor(CC_VENDOR_INTEL); + cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_INTEL; tdx_parse_tdinfo(&cc_mask); cc_set_mask(cc_mask);

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h index 91b9448ffe76..75a0d7b1a906 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h @@ -11,30 +11,13 @@ enum cc_vendor { CC_VENDOR_INTEL, };

-#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM extern enum cc_vendor cc_vendor;

-static inline enum cc_vendor cc_get_vendor(void) -{ - return cc_vendor; -} - -static inline void cc_set_vendor(enum cc_vendor vendor) -{ - cc_vendor = vendor; -} - +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM void cc_set_mask(u64 mask); u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val); u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val); #else -static inline enum cc_vendor cc_get_vendor(void) -{ - return CC_VENDOR_NONE; -} - -static inline void cc_set_vendor(enum cc_vendor vendor) { } - static inline u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val) { return val; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c index 34d9e899e471..9b039e9635e4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void) /* Isolation VMs are unenlightened SEV-based VMs, thus this check: */ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { if (hv_get_isolation_type() != HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE) - cc_set_vendor(CC_VENDOR_HYPERV); + cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_HYPERV; } }

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index a11a6ebbf5ec..4daeefa011ed 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) out: if (sme_me_mask) { physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask; - cc_set_vendor(CC_VENDOR_AMD); + cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD; cc_set_mask(sme_me_mask); } }

From: Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org

[ Commit efec46b78cf062b7eab009c624cf32dfdab99aa7 upstream ]

The early startup code executes from a 1:1 mapping of memory, which differs from the mapping that the code was linked and/or relocated to run at. The latter mapping is not active yet at this point, and so symbol references that rely on it will fault.

Given that the core kernel is built without -fPIC, symbol references are typically emitted as absolute, and so any such references occuring in the early startup code will therefore crash the kernel.

While an attempt was made to work around this for the early SEV/SME startup code, by forcing RIP-relative addressing for certain global SEV/SME variables via inline assembly (see snp_cpuid_get_table() for example), RIP-relative addressing must be pervasively enforced for SEV/SME global variables when accessed prior to page table fixups.

__startup_64() already handles this issue for select non-SEV/SME global variables using fixup_pointer(), which adjusts the pointer relative to a `physaddr` argument. To avoid having to pass around this `physaddr` argument across all functions needing to apply pointer fixups, introduce a macro RIP_RELATIVE_REF() which generates a RIP-relative reference to a given global variable. It is used where necessary to force RIP-relative accesses to global variables.

For backporting purposes, this patch makes no attempt at cleaning up other occurrences of this pattern, involving either inline asm or fixup_pointer(). Those will be addressed later.

[ bp: Call it "rip_rel_ref" everywhere like other code shortens "rIP-relative reference" and make the asm wrapper __always_inline. ]

Co-developed-by: Kevin Loughlin kevinloughlin@google.com Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin kevinloughlin@google.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) bp@alien8.de Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240130220845.1978329-1-kevinloughlin@google.co... Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org --- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 7 +---- arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 14 ++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h | 8 +++++- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 15 ++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 12 ++++----- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 4 +-- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 27 +++++++++----------- 7 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c index 1e73254336a6..1d3ad275c366 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #include <asm/processor.h>

enum cc_vendor cc_vendor __ro_after_init = CC_VENDOR_NONE; -static u64 cc_mask __ro_after_init; +u64 cc_mask __ro_after_init;

static bool intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) { @@ -128,8 +128,3 @@ u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val) } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cc_mkdec); - -__init void cc_set_mask(u64 mask) -{ - cc_mask = mask; -} diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h index fbcfec4dc4cc..ca8eed1d496a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h @@ -113,6 +113,20 @@

#endif

+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#ifndef __pic__ +static __always_inline __pure void *rip_rel_ptr(void *p) +{ + asm("leaq %c1(%%rip), %0" : "=r"(p) : "i"(p)); + + return p; +} +#define RIP_REL_REF(var) (*(typeof(&(var)))rip_rel_ptr(&(var))) +#else +#define RIP_REL_REF(var) (var) +#endif +#endif + /* * Macros to generate condition code outputs from inline assembly, * The output operand must be type "bool". diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h index 75a0d7b1a906..60bb26097da1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_COCO_H #define _ASM_X86_COCO_H

+#include <asm/asm.h> #include <asm/types.h>

enum cc_vendor { @@ -12,9 +13,14 @@ enum cc_vendor { };

extern enum cc_vendor cc_vendor; +extern u64 cc_mask;

#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM -void cc_set_mask(u64 mask); +static inline void cc_set_mask(u64 mask) +{ + RIP_REL_REF(cc_mask) = mask; +} + u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val); u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val); #else diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h index c91326593e74..41d06822bc8c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/cc_platform.h>

-#include <asm/bootparam.h> +#include <asm/asm.h> +struct boot_params;

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); @@ -57,6 +58,11 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);

void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);

+static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void) +{ + return RIP_REL_REF(sme_me_mask); +} + #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")

#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ @@ -88,6 +94,8 @@ early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size, bool en

static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }

+static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void) { return 0; } + #define __bss_decrypted

#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ @@ -105,11 +113,6 @@ void add_encrypt_protection_map(void);

extern char __start_bss_decrypted[], __end_bss_decrypted[], __start_bss_decrypted_unused[];

-static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void) -{ - return sme_me_mask; -} - #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */

#endif /* __X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c index 71d8698702ce..271e70d5748e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c @@ -553,9 +553,9 @@ static int snp_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_le leaf->eax = leaf->ebx = leaf->ecx = leaf->edx = 0;

/* Skip post-processing for out-of-range zero leafs. */ - if (!(leaf->fn <= cpuid_std_range_max || - (leaf->fn >= 0x40000000 && leaf->fn <= cpuid_hyp_range_max) || - (leaf->fn >= 0x80000000 && leaf->fn <= cpuid_ext_range_max))) + if (!(leaf->fn <= RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_std_range_max) || + (leaf->fn >= 0x40000000 && leaf->fn <= RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_hyp_range_max)) || + (leaf->fn >= 0x80000000 && leaf->fn <= RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_ext_range_max)))) return 0; }

@@ -1060,10 +1060,10 @@ static void __init setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info) const struct snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_table->fn[i];

if (fn->eax_in == 0x0) - cpuid_std_range_max = fn->eax; + RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_std_range_max) = fn->eax; else if (fn->eax_in == 0x40000000) - cpuid_hyp_range_max = fn->eax; + RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_hyp_range_max) = fn->eax; else if (fn->eax_in == 0x80000000) - cpuid_ext_range_max = fn->eax; + RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_ext_range_max) = fn->eax; } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c index c8dfb0fdde7f..f93ff4794e38 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c @@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long padd * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data * in the cc_platform_has() function. */ - if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) + if (!(RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) return;

/* @@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data * in the cc_platform_has() function. */ - if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) + if (!(RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) return;

/* Invalidate the memory pages before they are marked shared in the RMP table. */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index 7d96904230af..06ccbd36e8dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) * instrumentation or checking boot_cpu_data in the cc_platform_has() * function. */ - if (!sme_get_me_mask() || sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) + if (!sme_get_me_mask() || + RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) return;

/* @@ -541,11 +542,11 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);

/* Check the SEV MSR whether SEV or SME is enabled */ - sev_status = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV); - feature_mask = (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) ? AMD_SEV_BIT : AMD_SME_BIT; + RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) = msr = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV); + feature_mask = (msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) ? AMD_SEV_BIT : AMD_SME_BIT;

/* The SEV-SNP CC blob should never be present unless SEV-SNP is enabled. */ - if (snp && !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) + if (snp && !(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) snp_abort();

/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */ @@ -571,7 +572,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) return; } else { /* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ - sme_me_mask = me_mask; goto out; }

@@ -590,16 +590,13 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));

- if (cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < 0) - goto out; - - if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer))) - sme_me_mask = me_mask; + if (cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < 0 || + strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer))) + return;

out: - if (sme_me_mask) { - physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask; - cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD; - cc_set_mask(sme_me_mask); - } + RIP_REL_REF(sme_me_mask) = me_mask; + physical_mask &= ~me_mask; + cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD; + cc_set_mask(me_mask); }