Kyungtae Kim detected a potential integer overflow in bcm_[rx|tx]_setup() when the conversion into ktime multiplies the given value with NSEC_PER_USEC (1000).
Reference: https://marc.info/?l=linux-can&m=154732118819828&w=2
Add a check for the given tv_usec, so that the value stays below one second. Additionally limit the tv_sec value to a reasonable value for CAN related use-cases of 400 days and ensure all values to be positive.
Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim kt0755@gmail.com Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: linux-stable stable@vger.kernel.org # >= 2.6.26 --- net/can/bcm.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 0af8f0db892a..d4ae0a1471f3 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ */ #define MAX_NFRAMES 256
+/* limit timers to 400 days for sending/timeouts */ +#define BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX (400*24*60*60) + /* use of last_frames[index].flags */ #define RX_RECV 0x40 /* received data for this element */ #define RX_THR 0x80 /* element not been sent due to throttle feature */ @@ -140,6 +143,22 @@ static inline ktime_t bcm_timeval_to_ktime(struct bcm_timeval tv) return ktime_set(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec * NSEC_PER_USEC); }
+/* check limitations for timeval provided by user */ +static int bcm_is_invalid_tv(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head) +{ + if ((msg_head->ival1.tv_sec < 0) || + (msg_head->ival1.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) || + (msg_head->ival1.tv_usec < 0) || + (msg_head->ival1.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC) || + (msg_head->ival2.tv_sec < 0) || + (msg_head->ival2.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) || + (msg_head->ival2.tv_usec < 0) || + (msg_head->ival2.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + #define CFSIZ(flags) ((flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) ? CANFD_MTU : CAN_MTU) #define OPSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_op) #define MHSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_msg_head) @@ -873,6 +892,10 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, if (msg_head->nframes < 1 || msg_head->nframes > MAX_NFRAMES) return -EINVAL;
+ /* check timeval limitations */ + if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head)) + return -EINVAL; + /* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) { @@ -1053,6 +1076,10 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, (!(msg_head->can_id & CAN_RTR_FLAG)))) return -EINVAL;
+ /* check timeval limitations */ + if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head)) + return -EINVAL; + /* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) {
On Sun, Jan 13, 2019 at 1:31 PM Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net wrote:
Kyungtae Kim detected a potential integer overflow in bcm_[rx|tx]_setup() when the conversion into ktime multiplies the given value with NSEC_PER_USEC (1000).
Reference: https://marc.info/?l=linux-can&m=154732118819828&w=2
Add a check for the given tv_usec, so that the value stays below one second. Additionally limit the tv_sec value to a reasonable value for CAN related use-cases of 400 days and ensure all values to be positive.
Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim kt0755@gmail.com Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net
Tested-by: Kyungtae Kim kt0755@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: linux-stable stable@vger.kernel.org # >= 2.6.26
net/can/bcm.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 0af8f0db892a..d4ae0a1471f3 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ */ #define MAX_NFRAMES 256
+/* limit timers to 400 days for sending/timeouts */ +#define BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX (400*24*60*60)
/* use of last_frames[index].flags */ #define RX_RECV 0x40 /* received data for this element */ #define RX_THR 0x80 /* element not been sent due to throttle feature */ @@ -140,6 +143,22 @@ static inline ktime_t bcm_timeval_to_ktime(struct bcm_timeval tv) return ktime_set(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec * NSEC_PER_USEC); }
+/* check limitations for timeval provided by user */ +static int bcm_is_invalid_tv(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head) +{
if ((msg_head->ival1.tv_sec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival1.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) ||(msg_head->ival1.tv_usec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival1.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_sec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_usec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC))return 1;return 0;+}
#define CFSIZ(flags) ((flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) ? CANFD_MTU : CAN_MTU) #define OPSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_op) #define MHSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_msg_head) @@ -873,6 +892,10 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, if (msg_head->nframes < 1 || msg_head->nframes > MAX_NFRAMES) return -EINVAL;
/* check timeval limitations */if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head))return -EINVAL;/* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) {@@ -1053,6 +1076,10 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, (!(msg_head->can_id & CAN_RTR_FLAG)))) return -EINVAL;
/* check timeval limitations */if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head))return -EINVAL;/* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) {-- 2.20.1
Am 13.01.19 um 19:31 schrieb Oliver Hartkopp:
Kyungtae Kim detected a potential integer overflow in bcm_[rx|tx]_setup() when the conversion into ktime multiplies the given value with NSEC_PER_USEC (1000).
Reference: https://marc.info/?l=linux-can&m=154732118819828&w=2
Add a check for the given tv_usec, so that the value stays below one second. Additionally limit the tv_sec value to a reasonable value for CAN related use-cases of 400 days and ensure all values to be positive.
Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim kt0755@gmail.com Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: linux-stable stable@vger.kernel.org # >= 2.6.26
Acked-by: Andre Naujoks nautsch2@gmail.com
Sorry for the late reply, but I seem to have missed the initial send of v2 of this. I wanted to at least ack it, since I made such a fuss about the timeouts. :-)
Regards Andre
net/can/bcm.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 0af8f0db892a..d4ae0a1471f3 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ */ #define MAX_NFRAMES 256 +/* limit timers to 400 days for sending/timeouts */ +#define BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX (400*24*60*60)
/* use of last_frames[index].flags */ #define RX_RECV 0x40 /* received data for this element */ #define RX_THR 0x80 /* element not been sent due to throttle feature */ @@ -140,6 +143,22 @@ static inline ktime_t bcm_timeval_to_ktime(struct bcm_timeval tv) return ktime_set(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec * NSEC_PER_USEC); } +/* check limitations for timeval provided by user */ +static int bcm_is_invalid_tv(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head) +{
- if ((msg_head->ival1.tv_sec < 0) ||
(msg_head->ival1.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) ||(msg_head->ival1.tv_usec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival1.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_sec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_usec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC))return 1;- return 0;
+}
#define CFSIZ(flags) ((flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) ? CANFD_MTU : CAN_MTU) #define OPSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_op) #define MHSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_msg_head) @@ -873,6 +892,10 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, if (msg_head->nframes < 1 || msg_head->nframes > MAX_NFRAMES) return -EINVAL;
- /* check timeval limitations */
- if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head))
return -EINVAL;- /* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) {
@@ -1053,6 +1076,10 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, (!(msg_head->can_id & CAN_RTR_FLAG)))) return -EINVAL;
- /* check timeval limitations */
- if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head))
return -EINVAL;- /* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) {
Hello Marc,
I would like to provide a stable patch for pre-4.18 kernels and need a commit hash as reference.
Would you like to take that patch into upstream?
Best regards, Oliver
On 1/16/19 2:31 PM, Andre Naujoks wrote:
Am 13.01.19 um 19:31 schrieb Oliver Hartkopp:
Kyungtae Kim detected a potential integer overflow in bcm_[rx|tx]_setup() when the conversion into ktime multiplies the given value with NSEC_PER_USEC (1000).
Reference: https://marc.info/?l=linux-can&m=154732118819828&w=2
Add a check for the given tv_usec, so that the value stays below one second. Additionally limit the tv_sec value to a reasonable value for CAN related use-cases of 400 days and ensure all values to be positive.
Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim kt0755@gmail.com Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: linux-stable stable@vger.kernel.org # >= 2.6.26
Acked-by: Andre Naujoks nautsch2@gmail.com
Sorry for the late reply, but I seem to have missed the initial send of v2 of this. I wanted to at least ack it, since I made such a fuss about the timeouts. :-)
Regards Andre
net/can/bcm.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 0af8f0db892a..d4ae0a1471f3 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ */ #define MAX_NFRAMES 256 +/* limit timers to 400 days for sending/timeouts */ +#define BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX (400*24*60*60)
- /* use of last_frames[index].flags */ #define RX_RECV 0x40 /* received data for this element */ #define RX_THR 0x80 /* element not been sent due to throttle feature */
@@ -140,6 +143,22 @@ static inline ktime_t bcm_timeval_to_ktime(struct bcm_timeval tv) return ktime_set(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec * NSEC_PER_USEC); } +/* check limitations for timeval provided by user */ +static int bcm_is_invalid_tv(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head) +{
- if ((msg_head->ival1.tv_sec < 0) ||
(msg_head->ival1.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) ||(msg_head->ival1.tv_usec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival1.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_sec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_usec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC))return 1;- return 0;
+}
- #define CFSIZ(flags) ((flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) ? CANFD_MTU : CAN_MTU) #define OPSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_op) #define MHSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_msg_head)
@@ -873,6 +892,10 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, if (msg_head->nframes < 1 || msg_head->nframes > MAX_NFRAMES) return -EINVAL;
- /* check timeval limitations */
- if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head))
return -EINVAL;- /* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) {
@@ -1053,6 +1076,10 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, (!(msg_head->can_id & CAN_RTR_FLAG)))) return -EINVAL;
- /* check timeval limitations */
- if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head))
return -EINVAL;- /* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) {
Ping?
If you have no time I can just ask Dave. But please drop me a short note.
Thanks, Oliver
On 17.01.19 17:04, Oliver Hartkopp wrote:
Hello Marc,
I would like to provide a stable patch for pre-4.18 kernels and need a commit hash as reference.
Would you like to take that patch into upstream?
Best regards, Oliver
On 1/16/19 2:31 PM, Andre Naujoks wrote:
Am 13.01.19 um 19:31 schrieb Oliver Hartkopp:
Kyungtae Kim detected a potential integer overflow in bcm_[rx|tx]_setup() when the conversion into ktime multiplies the given value with NSEC_PER_USEC (1000).
Reference: https://marc.info/?l=linux-can&m=154732118819828&w=2
Add a check for the given tv_usec, so that the value stays below one second. Additionally limit the tv_sec value to a reasonable value for CAN related use-cases of 400 days and ensure all values to be positive.
Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim kt0755@gmail.com Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: linux-stable stable@vger.kernel.org # >= 2.6.26
Acked-by: Andre Naujoks nautsch2@gmail.com
Sorry for the late reply, but I seem to have missed the initial send of v2 of this. I wanted to at least ack it, since I made such a fuss about the timeouts. :-)
Regards Andre
net/can/bcm.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 0af8f0db892a..d4ae0a1471f3 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ */ #define MAX_NFRAMES 256 +/* limit timers to 400 days for sending/timeouts */ +#define BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX (400*24*60*60)
/* use of last_frames[index].flags */ #define RX_RECV 0x40 /* received data for this element */ #define RX_THR 0x80 /* element not been sent due to throttle feature */ @@ -140,6 +143,22 @@ static inline ktime_t bcm_timeval_to_ktime(struct bcm_timeval tv) return ktime_set(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec * NSEC_PER_USEC); } +/* check limitations for timeval provided by user */ +static int bcm_is_invalid_tv(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head) +{ + if ((msg_head->ival1.tv_sec < 0) || + (msg_head->ival1.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) || + (msg_head->ival1.tv_usec < 0) || + (msg_head->ival1.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC) || + (msg_head->ival2.tv_sec < 0) || + (msg_head->ival2.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) || + (msg_head->ival2.tv_usec < 0) || + (msg_head->ival2.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC)) + return 1;
+ return 0; +}
#define CFSIZ(flags) ((flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) ? CANFD_MTU : CAN_MTU) #define OPSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_op) #define MHSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_msg_head) @@ -873,6 +892,10 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, if (msg_head->nframes < 1 || msg_head->nframes > MAX_NFRAMES) return -EINVAL; + /* check timeval limitations */ + if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head)) + return -EINVAL;
/* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) { @@ -1053,6 +1076,10 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, (!(msg_head->can_id & CAN_RTR_FLAG)))) return -EINVAL; + /* check timeval limitations */ + if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head)) + return -EINVAL;
/* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) {
On 1/22/19 11:16 AM, Oliver Hartkopp wrote:
Ping?
If you have no time I can just ask Dave. But please drop me a short note.
Pong. I'll take the patch now.
Marc
On 1/13/19 7:31 PM, Oliver Hartkopp wrote:
Kyungtae Kim detected a potential integer overflow in bcm_[rx|tx]_setup() when the conversion into ktime multiplies the given value with NSEC_PER_USEC (1000).
Reference: https://marc.info/?l=linux-can&m=154732118819828&w=2
Add a check for the given tv_usec, so that the value stays below one second. Additionally limit the tv_sec value to a reasonable value for CAN related use-cases of 400 days and ensure all values to be positive.
Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim kt0755@gmail.com Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: linux-stable stable@vger.kernel.org # >= 2.6.26
net/can/bcm.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 0af8f0db892a..d4ae0a1471f3 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ */ #define MAX_NFRAMES 256 +/* limit timers to 400 days for sending/timeouts */ +#define BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX (400*24*60*60)
I've added spaces around the * while applying the patch.
/* use of last_frames[index].flags */ #define RX_RECV 0x40 /* received data for this element */ #define RX_THR 0x80 /* element not been sent due to throttle feature */ @@ -140,6 +143,22 @@ static inline ktime_t bcm_timeval_to_ktime(struct bcm_timeval tv) return ktime_set(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec * NSEC_PER_USEC); } +/* check limitations for timeval provided by user */ +static int bcm_is_invalid_tv(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head)
I've converted this into a bool function.
+{
- if ((msg_head->ival1.tv_sec < 0) ||
(msg_head->ival1.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) ||(msg_head->ival1.tv_usec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival1.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_sec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_usec < 0) ||(msg_head->ival2.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC))return 1;
return true;
- return 0;
return false;
+}
#define CFSIZ(flags) ((flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) ? CANFD_MTU : CAN_MTU) #define OPSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_op) #define MHSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_msg_head) @@ -873,6 +892,10 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, if (msg_head->nframes < 1 || msg_head->nframes > MAX_NFRAMES) return -EINVAL;
- /* check timeval limitations */
- if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head))
return -EINVAL;- /* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) {
@@ -1053,6 +1076,10 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, (!(msg_head->can_id & CAN_RTR_FLAG)))) return -EINVAL;
- /* check timeval limitations */
- if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head))
return -EINVAL;- /* check the given can_id */ op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head, ifindex); if (op) {
Marc
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Andre Naujoks -
Kyungtae Kim -
Marc Kleine-Budde -
Oliver Hartkopp