From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

[ Upstream commit ec4fbd64751de18729eaa816ec69e4b504b5a7a2 ]

Dmitry reported a lockdep splat [1] (false positive) that we can fix by releasing the spinlock before calling icmp_send() from ip_expire()

This is a false positive because sending an ICMP message can not possibly re-enter the IP frag engine.

[1] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.10.0+ #29 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- modprobe/12392 is trying to acquire lock: (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff837a8182>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff837a8182>] __netif_tx_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:3486 [inline] (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff837a8182>] sch_direct_xmit+0x282/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:180

but task is already holding lock: (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] ip_expire+0x51/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:201

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}: validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2267 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2149/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] ip_defrag+0x3a2/0x4130 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:669 ip_check_defrag+0x4e3/0x8b0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:713 packet_rcv_fanout+0x282/0x800 net/packet/af_packet.c:1459 deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:1834 [inline] dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x294/0xa90 net/core/dev.c:1890 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:2903 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x16b/0xab0 net/core/dev.c:2923 sch_direct_xmit+0x31f/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:182 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3092 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13e5/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3358 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 neigh_resolve_output+0x6b9/0xb10 net/core/neighbour.c:1308 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:478 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x8b8/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 ip_do_fragment+0x1d93/0x2720 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:672 ip_fragment.constprop.54+0x145/0x200 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:545 ip_finish_output+0x82d/0xe10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:314 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f0/0x7a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x3c/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 ip_push_pending_frames+0x64/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1512 raw_sendmsg+0x26de/0x3a00 net/ipv4/raw.c:655 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:761 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a3/0x9f0 net/socket.c:1985 __sys_sendmmsg+0x25c/0x750 net/socket.c:2075 SYSC_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2106 [inline] SyS_sendmmsg+0x35/0x60 net/socket.c:2101 do_syscall_64+0x2e8/0x930 arch/x86/entry/common.c:281 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a

-> #0 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1830 [inline] check_prevs_add+0xa8f/0x19f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1940 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2267 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2149/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] __netif_tx_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:3486 [inline] sch_direct_xmit+0x282/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:180 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3092 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13e5/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3358 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:468 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:476 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xf6c/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 ip_finish_output+0xa29/0xe10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:316 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f0/0x7a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x3c/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 ip_push_pending_frames+0x64/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1512 icmp_push_reply+0x372/0x4d0 net/ipv4/icmp.c:394 icmp_send+0x156c/0x1c80 net/ipv4/icmp.c:754 ip_expire+0x40e/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:239 call_timer_fn+0x241/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1268 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1307 [inline] __run_timers+0x960/0xcf0 kernel/time/timer.c:1601 run_timer_softirq+0x21/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1614 __do_softirq+0x31f/0xbe7 kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:657 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:962 apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:707 __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:254 [inline] atomic_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:26 [inline] rcu_dynticks_curr_cpu_in_eqs kernel/rcu/tree.c:350 [inline] __rcu_is_watching kernel/rcu/tree.c:1133 [inline] rcu_is_watching+0x83/0x110 kernel/rcu/tree.c:1147 rcu_read_lock_held+0x87/0xc0 kernel/rcu/update.c:293 radix_tree_deref_slot include/linux/radix-tree.h:238 [inline] filemap_map_pages+0x6d4/0x1570 mm/filemap.c:2335 do_fault_around mm/memory.c:3231 [inline] do_read_fault mm/memory.c:3265 [inline] do_fault+0xbd5/0x2080 mm/memory.c:3370 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:3600 [inline] __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x2cb0 mm/memory.c:3714 handle_mm_fault+0x1e2/0x480 mm/memory.c:3751 __do_page_fault+0x4f6/0xb60 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1397 do_page_fault+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1460 page_fault+0x28/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1011

other info that might help us debug this:

Possible unsafe locking scenario:

CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&(&q->lock)->rlock); lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); lock(&(&q->lock)->rlock); lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);

*** DEADLOCK ***

10 locks held by modprobe/12392: #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff81329758>] __do_page_fault+0x2b8/0xb60 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1336 #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8188cab6>] filemap_map_pages+0x1e6/0x1570 mm/filemap.c:2324 #2: (&(ptlock_ptr(page))->rlock#2){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81984a78>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] #2: (&(ptlock_ptr(page))->rlock#2){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81984a78>] pte_alloc_one_map mm/memory.c:2944 [inline] #2: (&(ptlock_ptr(page))->rlock#2){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81984a78>] alloc_set_pte+0x13b8/0x1b90 mm/memory.c:3072 #3: (((&q->timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81627e72>] lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:175 [inline] #3: (((&q->timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81627e72>] call_timer_fn+0x1c2/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1258 #4: (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] #4: (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] ip_expire+0x51/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:201 #5: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8389a633>] ip_expire+0x1b3/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:216 #6: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff839b3313>] spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock.h:309 [inline] #6: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff839b3313>] icmp_xmit_lock net/ipv4/icmp.c:219 [inline] #6: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff839b3313>] icmp_send+0x803/0x1c80 net/ipv4/icmp.c:681 #7: (rcu_read_lock_bh){......}, at: [<ffffffff838ab9a1>] ip_finish_output2+0x2c1/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:198 #8: (rcu_read_lock_bh){......}, at: [<ffffffff836d1dee>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x23e/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3324 #9: (dev->qdisc_running_key ?: &qdisc_running_key){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff836d3a27>] dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423

stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 12392 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.10.0+ #29 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:52 print_circular_bug+0x307/0x3b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1204 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1830 [inline] check_prevs_add+0xa8f/0x19f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1940 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2267 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2149/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] __netif_tx_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:3486 [inline] sch_direct_xmit+0x282/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:180 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3092 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13e5/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3358 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:468 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:476 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xf6c/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 ip_finish_output+0xa29/0xe10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:316 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f0/0x7a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x3c/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 ip_push_pending_frames+0x64/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1512 icmp_push_reply+0x372/0x4d0 net/ipv4/icmp.c:394 icmp_send+0x156c/0x1c80 net/ipv4/icmp.c:754 ip_expire+0x40e/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:239 call_timer_fn+0x241/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1268 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1307 [inline] __run_timers+0x960/0xcf0 kernel/time/timer.c:1601 run_timer_softirq+0x21/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1614 __do_softirq+0x31f/0xbe7 kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:657 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:962 apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:707 RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:254 [inline] RIP: 0010:atomic_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:26 [inline] RIP: 0010:rcu_dynticks_curr_cpu_in_eqs kernel/rcu/tree.c:350 [inline] RIP: 0010:__rcu_is_watching kernel/rcu/tree.c:1133 [inline] RIP: 0010:rcu_is_watching+0x83/0x110 kernel/rcu/tree.c:1147 RSP: 0000:ffff8801c391f120 EFLAGS: 00000a03 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff10 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801c391f148 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055edd4374000 RDI: ffff8801dbe1ae0c RBP: ffff8801c391f1a0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 1ffff10038723e25 R13: ffff8801dbe1ae00 R14: ffff8801c391f680 R15: dffffc0000000000 </IRQ> rcu_read_lock_held+0x87/0xc0 kernel/rcu/update.c:293 radix_tree_deref_slot include/linux/radix-tree.h:238 [inline] filemap_map_pages+0x6d4/0x1570 mm/filemap.c:2335 do_fault_around mm/memory.c:3231 [inline] do_read_fault mm/memory.c:3265 [inline] do_fault+0xbd5/0x2080 mm/memory.c:3370 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:3600 [inline] __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x2cb0 mm/memory.c:3714 handle_mm_fault+0x1e2/0x480 mm/memory.c:3751 __do_page_fault+0x4f6/0xb60 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1397 do_page_fault+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1460 page_fault+0x28/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1011 RIP: 0033:0x7f83172f2786 RSP: 002b:00007fffe859ae80 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 000055edd4373040 RBX: 00007f83175111c8 RCX: 000055edd4373238 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007f8317510970 RBP: 00007fffe859afd0 R08: 0000000000000009 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000064 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000055edd4373040 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffe859afe8 R15: 0000000000000000

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c index 453db950dc9f..4bf3b8af0257 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c @@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ static void ip_expire(unsigned long arg) qp = container_of((struct inet_frag_queue *) arg, struct ipq, q); net = container_of(qp->q.net, struct net, ipv4.frags);

+ rcu_read_lock(); spin_lock(&qp->q.lock);

if (qp->q.flags & INET_FRAG_COMPLETE) @@ -207,7 +208,7 @@ static void ip_expire(unsigned long arg) __IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMFAILS);

if (!inet_frag_evicting(&qp->q)) { - struct sk_buff *head = qp->q.fragments; + struct sk_buff *clone, *head = qp->q.fragments; const struct iphdr *iph; int err;

@@ -216,32 +217,40 @@ static void ip_expire(unsigned long arg) if (!(qp->q.flags & INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN) || !qp->q.fragments) goto out;

- rcu_read_lock(); head->dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, qp->iif); if (!head->dev) - goto out_rcu_unlock; + goto out; +

/* skb has no dst, perform route lookup again */ iph = ip_hdr(head); err = ip_route_input_noref(head, iph->daddr, iph->saddr, iph->tos, head->dev); if (err) - goto out_rcu_unlock; + goto out;

/* Only an end host needs to send an ICMP * "Fragment Reassembly Timeout" message, per RFC792. */ if (frag_expire_skip_icmp(qp->user) && (skb_rtable(head)->rt_type != RTN_LOCAL)) - goto out_rcu_unlock; + goto out; + + clone = skb_clone(head, GFP_ATOMIC);

/* Send an ICMP "Fragment Reassembly Timeout" message. */ - icmp_send(head, ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED, ICMP_EXC_FRAGTIME, 0); -out_rcu_unlock: - rcu_read_unlock(); + if (clone) { + spin_unlock(&qp->q.lock); + icmp_send(clone, ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED, + ICMP_EXC_FRAGTIME, 0); + consume_skb(clone); + goto out_rcu_unlock; + } } out: spin_unlock(&qp->q.lock); +out_rcu_unlock: + rcu_read_unlock(); ipq_put(qp); }

From: Jim Mattson jmattson@google.com

[ Upstream commit fb6c8198431311027c3434d4e94ab8bc040f7aea ]

Quoting from the Intel SDM, volume 3, section 28.3.3.4: Guidelines for Use of the INVEPT Instruction:

If EPT was in use on a logical processor at one time with EPTP X, it is recommended that software use the INVEPT instruction with the "single-context" INVEPT type and with EPTP X in the INVEPT descriptor before a VM entry on the same logical processor that enables EPT with EPTP X and either (a) the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control was changed from 0 to 1; or (b) the value of the APIC-access address was changed.

In the nested case, the burden falls on L1, unless L0 enables EPT in vmcs02 when L1 doesn't enable EPT in vmcs12.

Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson jmattson@google.com Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář rkrcmar@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index f0d3de153e29..3ec670af9cae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -3816,6 +3816,12 @@ static void vmx_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) __vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, to_vmx(vcpu)->vpid); }

+static void vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + if (enable_ept) + vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu); +} + static void vmx_decache_cr0_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { ulong cr0_guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits; @@ -8513,6 +8519,7 @@ static void vmx_set_virtual_x2apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool set) } else { sec_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE; sec_exec_control |= SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES; + vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(vcpu); } vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, sec_exec_control);

@@ -8538,8 +8545,10 @@ static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t hpa) */ if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) || !nested_cpu_has2(get_vmcs12(&vmx->vcpu), - SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) { vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, hpa); + vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(vcpu); + } }

static void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_isr) @@ -10114,6 +10123,9 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) if (nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12)) { kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu); nested_ept_init_mmu_context(vcpu); + } else if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) { + vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(vcpu); }

if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER) @@ -10854,6 +10866,10 @@ static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason, vmx->nested.change_vmcs01_virtual_x2apic_mode = false; vmx_set_virtual_x2apic_mode(vcpu, vcpu->arch.apic_base & X2APIC_ENABLE); + } else if (!nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12) && + nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) { + vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(vcpu); }

/* This is needed for same reason as it was needed in prepare_vmcs02 */

From: Wanpeng Li wanpeng.li@hotmail.com

[ Upstream commit 08d839c4b134b8328ec42f2157a9ca4b93227c03 ]

This can be reproduced by running L2 on L1, and disable VPID on L0 if w/o commit "KVM: nVMX: Fix nested VPID vmx exec control", the L2 crash as below:

KVM: entry failed, hardware error 0x7 EAX=00000000 EBX=00000000 ECX=00000000 EDX=000306c3 ESI=00000000 EDI=00000000 EBP=00000000 ESP=00000000 EIP=0000fff0 EFL=00000002 [-------] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0 ES =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 CS =f000 ffff0000 0000ffff 00009b00 SS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 DS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 FS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 GS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300 LDT=0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008200 TR =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008b00 GDT= 00000000 0000ffff IDT= 00000000 0000ffff CR0=60000010 CR2=00000000 CR3=00000000 CR4=00000000 DR0=0000000000000000 DR1=0000000000000000 DR2=0000000000000000 DR3=0000000000000000 DR6=00000000ffff0ff0 DR7=0000000000000400 EFER=0000000000000000

Reference SDM 30.3 INVVPID:

Protected Mode Exceptions - #UD - If not in VMX operation. - If the logical processor does not support VPIDs (IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2[37]=0). - If the logical processor supports VPIDs (IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2[37]=1) but does not support the INVVPID instruction (IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP[32]=0).

So we should check both VPID enable bit in vmx exec control and INVVPID support bit in vmx capability MSRs to enable VPID. This patch adds the guarantee to not enable VPID if either INVVPID or single-context/all-context invalidation is not exposed in vmx capability MSRs.

Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson jmattson@google.com Cc: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: Radim Krčmář rkrcmar@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li wanpeng.li@hotmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index 3ec670af9cae..221ccd8f9ab0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -1199,6 +1199,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global(void) return vmx_capability.vpid & VMX_VPID_EXTENT_GLOBAL_CONTEXT_BIT; }

+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invvpid(void) +{ + return vmx_capability.vpid & VMX_VPID_INVVPID_BIT; +} + static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept(void) { return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & @@ -6439,8 +6444,10 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX)) kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_NX);

- if (!cpu_has_vmx_vpid()) + if (!cpu_has_vmx_vpid() || !cpu_has_vmx_invvpid() || + !(cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single() || cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global())) enable_vpid = 0; + if (!cpu_has_vmx_shadow_vmcs()) enable_shadow_vmcs = 0; if (enable_shadow_vmcs)

From: Wanpeng Li wanpeng.li@hotmail.com

[ Upstream commit 24dccf83a121b8a4ad5c2ad383a8184ef6c266ee ]

After async pf setup successfully, there is a broadcast wakeup w/ special token 0xffffffff which tells vCPU that it should wake up all processes waiting for APFs though there is no real process waiting at the moment.

The async page present tracepoint print prematurely and fails to catch the special token setup. This patch fixes it by moving the async page present tracepoint after the special token setup.

Before patch:

qemu-system-x86-8499 [006] ...1 5973.473292: kvm_async_pf_ready: token 0x0 gva 0x0

After patch:

qemu-system-x86-8499 [006] ...1 5973.473292: kvm_async_pf_ready: token 0xffffffff gva 0x0

Cc: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: Radim Krčmář rkrcmar@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li wanpeng.li@hotmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 02d45296a97c..c568066b3ae8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -8429,11 +8429,11 @@ void kvm_arch_async_page_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, { struct x86_exception fault;

- trace_kvm_async_pf_ready(work->arch.token, work->gva); if (work->wakeup_all) work->arch.token = ~0; /* broadcast wakeup */ else kvm_del_async_pf_gfn(vcpu, work->arch.gfn); + trace_kvm_async_pf_ready(work->arch.token, work->gva);

if ((vcpu->arch.apf.msr_val & KVM_ASYNC_PF_ENABLED) && !apf_put_user(vcpu, KVM_PV_REASON_PAGE_READY)) {

From: Arnaud Pouliquen arnaud.pouliquen@st.com

[ Upstream commit 3c9d3f1bc2defd418b5933bbc928096c9c686d3b ]

reader->substream is used in IRQ handler for error case but is never set. Set value to pcm substream on DAI startup and clean it on dai shutdown.

Signed-off-by: Arnaud Pouliquen arnaud.pouliquen@st.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- sound/soc/sti/uniperif_reader.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sound/soc/sti/uniperif_reader.c b/sound/soc/sti/uniperif_reader.c index 0e1c3ee56675..9735b4caaed3 100644 --- a/sound/soc/sti/uniperif_reader.c +++ b/sound/soc/sti/uniperif_reader.c @@ -364,6 +364,8 @@ static int uni_reader_startup(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, struct uniperif *reader = priv->dai_data.uni; int ret;

+ reader->substream = substream; + if (!UNIPERIF_TYPE_IS_TDM(reader)) return 0;

@@ -393,6 +395,7 @@ static void uni_reader_shutdown(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, /* Stop the reader */ uni_reader_stop(reader); } + reader->substream = NULL; }

static const struct snd_soc_dai_ops uni_reader_dai_ops = {

From: Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de

[ Upstream commit a2125d02443e9a4e68bcfd9f8004fa23239e8329 ]

The latest gcc-7 snapshot adds a warning to point out that when atk_read_value_old or atk_read_value_new fails, we copy uninitialized data into sensor->cached_value:

drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c: In function 'atk_input_show': drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c:651:26: error: 'value' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]

Adding an error check avoids this. All versions of the driver are affected.

Fixes: 2c03d07ad54d ("hwmon: Add Asus ATK0110 support") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de Reviewed-by: Luca Tettamanti kronos.it@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c b/drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c index cccef87963e0..975c43d446f8 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c @@ -646,6 +646,9 @@ static int atk_read_value(struct atk_sensor_data *sensor, u64 *value) else err = atk_read_value_new(sensor, value);

+ if (err) + return err; + sensor->is_valid = true; sensor->last_updated = jiffies; sensor->cached_value = *value;

From: Julian Wiedmann jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com

[ Upstream commit acd9776b5c45ef02d1a210969a6fcc058afb76e3 ]

With AF_IUCV traffic, the skb passed to hard_start_xmit() has a 14 byte slot at skb->data, intended for an ETH header. qeth_l3_fill_af_iucv_hdr() fills this ETH header... and then immediately moves it to the skb's headroom, where it disappears and is never seen again.

But it's still possible for us to return NETDEV_TX_BUSY after the skb has been modified. Since we didn't get a private copy of the skb, the next time the skb is delivered to hard_start_xmit() it no longer has the expected layout (we moved the ETH header to the headroom, so skb->data now starts at the IUCV_TRANS header). So when qeth_l3_fill_af_iucv_hdr() does another round of rebuilding, the resulting qeth header ends up all wrong. On transmission, the buffer is then rejected by the HiperSockets device with SBALF15 = x'04'. When this error is passed back to af_iucv as TX_NOTIFY_UNREACHABLE, it tears down the offending socket.

As the ETH header for AF_IUCV serves no purpose, just align the code to what we do for IP traffic on L3 HiperSockets: keep the ETH header at skb->data, and pass down data_offset = ETH_HLEN to qeth_fill_buffer(). When mapping the payload into the SBAL elements, the ETH header is then stripped off. This avoids the skb manipulations in qeth_l3_fill_af_iucv_hdr(), and any buffer re-entering hard_start_xmit() after NETDEV_TX_BUSY is now processed properly.

Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun ubraun@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c | 15 ++++----------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c index 98aac5cbce58..6eb9e2610414 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c +++ b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c @@ -2609,17 +2609,13 @@ static void qeth_l3_fill_af_iucv_hdr(struct qeth_card *card, char daddr[16]; struct af_iucv_trans_hdr *iucv_hdr;

- skb_pull(skb, 14); - card->dev->header_ops->create(skb, card->dev, 0, - card->dev->dev_addr, card->dev->dev_addr, - card->dev->addr_len); - skb_pull(skb, 14); - iucv_hdr = (struct af_iucv_trans_hdr *)skb->data; memset(hdr, 0, sizeof(struct qeth_hdr)); hdr->hdr.l3.id = QETH_HEADER_TYPE_LAYER3; hdr->hdr.l3.ext_flags = 0; - hdr->hdr.l3.length = skb->len; + hdr->hdr.l3.length = skb->len - ETH_HLEN; hdr->hdr.l3.flags = QETH_HDR_IPV6 | QETH_CAST_UNICAST; + + iucv_hdr = (struct af_iucv_trans_hdr *) (skb->data + ETH_HLEN); memset(daddr, 0, sizeof(daddr)); daddr[0] = 0xfe; daddr[1] = 0x80; @@ -2823,10 +2819,7 @@ static int qeth_l3_hard_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) if ((card->info.type == QETH_CARD_TYPE_IQD) && !skb_is_nonlinear(skb)) { new_skb = skb; - if (new_skb->protocol == ETH_P_AF_IUCV) - data_offset = 0; - else - data_offset = ETH_HLEN; + data_offset = ETH_HLEN; hdr = kmem_cache_alloc(qeth_core_header_cache, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!hdr) goto tx_drop;

From: Shiraz Saleem shiraz.saleem@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 871a8623d3b40221ad1103aff715dfee0aa4dacf ]

Netdev notification events are de-registered only when all client iwdev instances are removed. If a single client is closed and re-opened, netdev events could arrive even before the Control Queue-Pair (CQP) is created, causing a NULL pointer dereference crash in i40iw_get_cqp_request. Fix this by allowing netdev event notification only after we have reached the INET_NOTIFIER state with respect to device initialization.

Reported-by: Stefan Assmann sassmann@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Shiraz Saleem shiraz.saleem@intel.com Reviewed-by: Yuval Shaia yuval.shaia@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford dledford@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/infiniband/hw/i40iw/i40iw_utils.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/i40iw/i40iw_utils.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/i40iw/i40iw_utils.c index 6fd043b1d714..7db2001775cb 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/i40iw/i40iw_utils.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/i40iw/i40iw_utils.c @@ -159,6 +159,9 @@ int i40iw_inetaddr_event(struct notifier_block *notifier, return NOTIFY_DONE;

iwdev = &hdl->device; + if (iwdev->init_state < INET_NOTIFIER) + return NOTIFY_DONE; + netdev = iwdev->ldev->netdev; upper_dev = netdev_master_upper_dev_get(netdev); if (netdev != event_netdev) @@ -231,6 +234,9 @@ int i40iw_inet6addr_event(struct notifier_block *notifier, return NOTIFY_DONE;

iwdev = &hdl->device; + if (iwdev->init_state < INET_NOTIFIER) + return NOTIFY_DONE; + netdev = iwdev->ldev->netdev; if (netdev != event_netdev) return NOTIFY_DONE; @@ -280,6 +286,8 @@ int i40iw_net_event(struct notifier_block *notifier, unsigned long event, void * if (!iwhdl) return NOTIFY_DONE; iwdev = &iwhdl->device; + if (iwdev->init_state < INET_NOTIFIER) + return NOTIFY_DONE; p = (__be32 *)neigh->primary_key; i40iw_copy_ip_ntohl(local_ipaddr, p); if (neigh->nud_state & NUD_VALID) {

From: Jason Gunthorpe jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com

[ Upstream commit cb8864559631754ac93d5734b165ccd0cad4728c ]

When vmalloc_user is used to create memory that is supposed to be mmap'd to user space, it is necessary for the mmap cookie (eg the offset) to be aligned to SHMLBA.

This creates a situation where all virtual mappings of the same physical page share the same virtual cache index and guarantees VIPT coherence. Otherwise the cache is non-coherent and the kernel will not see writes by userspace when reading the shared page (or vice-versa).

Reported-by: Josh Beavers josh.beavers@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford dledford@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/mmap.c | 4 ++-- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mmap.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/mmap.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/mmap.c index e202b8142759..6b712eecbd37 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/mmap.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/mmap.c @@ -170,9 +170,9 @@ struct rvt_mmap_info *rvt_create_mmap_info(struct rvt_dev_info *rdi,

spin_lock_irq(&rdi->mmap_offset_lock); if (rdi->mmap_offset == 0) - rdi->mmap_offset = PAGE_SIZE; + rdi->mmap_offset = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE, SHMLBA); ip->offset = rdi->mmap_offset; - rdi->mmap_offset += size; + rdi->mmap_offset += ALIGN(size, SHMLBA); spin_unlock_irq(&rdi->mmap_offset_lock);

INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ip->pending_mmaps); diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mmap.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mmap.c index c572a4c09359..bd812e00988e 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mmap.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mmap.c @@ -156,10 +156,10 @@ struct rxe_mmap_info *rxe_create_mmap_info(struct rxe_dev *rxe, spin_lock_bh(&rxe->mmap_offset_lock);

if (rxe->mmap_offset == 0) - rxe->mmap_offset = PAGE_SIZE; + rxe->mmap_offset = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE, SHMLBA);

ip->info.offset = rxe->mmap_offset; - rxe->mmap_offset += size; + rxe->mmap_offset += ALIGN(size, SHMLBA);

spin_unlock_bh(&rxe->mmap_offset_lock);

From: David Marchand david.marchand@6wind.com

[ Upstream commit 9fcd67d1772c43d2f23e8fca56acc7219e991676 ]

According to C9-147, MSN should only be incremented when the last packet of a multi packet request has been received.

"Logically, the requester associates a sequential Send Sequence Number (SSN) with each WQE posted to the send queue. The SSN bears a one- to-one relationship to the MSN returned by the responder in each re- sponse packet. Therefore, when the requester receives a response, it in- terprets the MSN as representing the SSN of the most recent request completed by the responder to determine which send WQE(s) can be completed."

Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")

Signed-off-by: David Marchand david.marchand@6wind.com Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford dledford@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c index 7705820cdac6..8c0ddd7165ae 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c @@ -799,18 +799,17 @@ static enum resp_states execute(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct rxe_pkt_info *pkt) /* Unreachable */ WARN_ON(1);

- /* We successfully processed this new request. */ - qp->resp.msn++; - /* next expected psn, read handles this separately */ qp->resp.psn = (pkt->psn + 1) & BTH_PSN_MASK;

qp->resp.opcode = pkt->opcode; qp->resp.status = IB_WC_SUCCESS;

- if (pkt->mask & RXE_COMP_MASK) + if (pkt->mask & RXE_COMP_MASK) { + /* We successfully processed this new request. */ + qp->resp.msn++; return RESPST_COMPLETE; - else if (qp_type(qp) == IB_QPT_RC) + } else if (qp_type(qp) == IB_QPT_RC) return RESPST_ACKNOWLEDGE; else return RESPST_CLEANUP;

From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit ded260235308f340b979258a4c736e06ba12c747 ]

"goto err;" has it's own kfree_skb() call so it's a double free. We only need to free on the "goto exit;" path.

Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford dledford@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c index 9d084780ac91..5b0ca35c06ab 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c @@ -726,11 +726,11 @@ int rxe_requester(void *arg) ret = rxe_xmit_packet(to_rdev(qp->ibqp.device), qp, &pkt, skb); if (ret) { qp->need_req_skb = 1; - kfree_skb(skb);

rollback_state(wqe, qp, &rollback_wqe, rollback_psn);

if (ret == -EAGAIN) { + kfree_skb(skb); rxe_run_task(&qp->req.task, 1); goto exit; }

From: Alexander Duyck alexander.h.duyck@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 13a8cd191a2b470cfd435b3b57dbd21aa65ff78c ]

When testing the epoll w/ busy poll code I found that I could get into a state where the i40e driver had q_vectors w/ active NAPI that had no rings. This was resulting in a divide by zero error. To correct it I am updating the driver code so that we only support NAPI on q_vectors that have 1 or more rings allocated to them.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck alexander.h.duyck@intel.com Tested-by: Andrew Bowers andrewx.bowers@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c index 2caafebb0295..becffd15c092 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c @@ -4217,8 +4217,12 @@ static void i40e_napi_enable_all(struct i40e_vsi *vsi) if (!vsi->netdev) return;

- for (q_idx = 0; q_idx < vsi->num_q_vectors; q_idx++) - napi_enable(&vsi->q_vectors[q_idx]->napi); + for (q_idx = 0; q_idx < vsi->num_q_vectors; q_idx++) { + struct i40e_q_vector *q_vector = vsi->q_vectors[q_idx]; + + if (q_vector->rx.ring || q_vector->tx.ring) + napi_enable(&q_vector->napi); + } }

/** @@ -4232,8 +4236,12 @@ static void i40e_napi_disable_all(struct i40e_vsi *vsi) if (!vsi->netdev) return;

- for (q_idx = 0; q_idx < vsi->num_q_vectors; q_idx++) - napi_disable(&vsi->q_vectors[q_idx]->napi); + for (q_idx = 0; q_idx < vsi->num_q_vectors; q_idx++) { + struct i40e_q_vector *q_vector = vsi->q_vectors[q_idx]; + + if (q_vector->rx.ring || q_vector->tx.ring) + napi_disable(&q_vector->napi); + } }

/**

From: Liping Zhang zlpnobody@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 83d90219a5df8d950855ce73229a97b63605c317 ]

The nf_ct_helper_hash table is protected by nf_ct_helper_mutex, while nfct_helper operation is protected by nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTHELPER). So it's possible that one CPU is walking the nf_ct_helper_hash for cthelper add/get/del, another cpu is doing nf_conntrack_helpers_unregister at the same time. This is dangrous, and may cause use after free error.

Note, delete operation will flush all cthelpers added via nfnetlink, so using rcu to do protect is not easy.

Now introduce a dummy list to record all the cthelpers added via nfnetlink, then we can walk the dummy list instead of walking the nf_ct_helper_hash. Also, keep nfnl_cthelper_dump_table unchanged, it may be invoked without nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTHELPER) held.

Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang zlpnobody@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c | 177 +++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c index ad65eb548157..28d065394c09 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c @@ -32,6 +32,13 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("nfnl_cthelper: User-space connection tracking helpers");

+struct nfnl_cthelper { + struct list_head list; + struct nf_conntrack_helper helper; +}; + +static LIST_HEAD(nfnl_cthelper_list); + static int nfnl_userspace_cthelper(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff, struct nf_conn *ct, enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo) @@ -205,14 +212,16 @@ nfnl_cthelper_create(const struct nlattr * const tb[], struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) { struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper; + struct nfnl_cthelper *nfcth; int ret;

if (!tb[NFCTH_TUPLE] || !tb[NFCTH_POLICY] || !tb[NFCTH_PRIV_DATA_LEN]) return -EINVAL;

- helper = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nf_conntrack_helper), GFP_KERNEL); - if (helper == NULL) + nfcth = kzalloc(sizeof(*nfcth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (nfcth == NULL) return -ENOMEM; + helper = &nfcth->helper;

ret = nfnl_cthelper_parse_expect_policy(helper, tb[NFCTH_POLICY]); if (ret < 0) @@ -249,11 +258,12 @@ nfnl_cthelper_create(const struct nlattr * const tb[], if (ret < 0) goto err2;

+ list_add_tail(&nfcth->list, &nfnl_cthelper_list); return 0; err2: kfree(helper->expect_policy); err1: - kfree(helper); + kfree(nfcth); return ret; }

@@ -379,7 +389,8 @@ static int nfnl_cthelper_new(struct net *net, struct sock *nfnl, const char *helper_name; struct nf_conntrack_helper *cur, *helper = NULL; struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple; - int ret = 0, i; + struct nfnl_cthelper *nlcth; + int ret = 0;

if (!tb[NFCTH_NAME] || !tb[NFCTH_TUPLE]) return -EINVAL; @@ -390,31 +401,22 @@ static int nfnl_cthelper_new(struct net *net, struct sock *nfnl, if (ret < 0) return ret;

- rcu_read_lock(); - for (i = 0; i < nf_ct_helper_hsize && !helper; i++) { - hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(cur, &nf_ct_helper_hash[i], hnode) { + list_for_each_entry(nlcth, &nfnl_cthelper_list, list) { + cur = &nlcth->helper;

- /* skip non-userspace conntrack helpers. */ - if (!(cur->flags & NF_CT_HELPER_F_USERSPACE)) - continue; + if (strncmp(cur->name, helper_name, NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN)) + continue;

- if (strncmp(cur->name, helper_name, - NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN) != 0) - continue; + if ((tuple.src.l3num != cur->tuple.src.l3num || + tuple.dst.protonum != cur->tuple.dst.protonum)) + continue;

- if ((tuple.src.l3num != cur->tuple.src.l3num || - tuple.dst.protonum != cur->tuple.dst.protonum)) - continue; + if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL) + return -EEXIST;

- if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL) { - ret = -EEXIST; - goto err; - } - helper = cur; - break; - } + helper = cur; + break; } - rcu_read_unlock();

if (helper == NULL) ret = nfnl_cthelper_create(tb, &tuple); @@ -422,9 +424,6 @@ static int nfnl_cthelper_new(struct net *net, struct sock *nfnl, ret = nfnl_cthelper_update(tb, helper);

return ret; -err: - rcu_read_unlock(); - return ret; }

static int @@ -588,11 +587,12 @@ static int nfnl_cthelper_get(struct net *net, struct sock *nfnl, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, const struct nlattr * const tb[]) { - int ret = -ENOENT, i; + int ret = -ENOENT; struct nf_conntrack_helper *cur; struct sk_buff *skb2; char *helper_name = NULL; struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple; + struct nfnl_cthelper *nlcth; bool tuple_set = false;

if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) { @@ -613,45 +613,39 @@ static int nfnl_cthelper_get(struct net *net, struct sock *nfnl, tuple_set = true; }

- for (i = 0; i < nf_ct_helper_hsize; i++) { - hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(cur, &nf_ct_helper_hash[i], hnode) { + list_for_each_entry(nlcth, &nfnl_cthelper_list, list) { + cur = &nlcth->helper; + if (helper_name && + strncmp(cur->name, helper_name, NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN)) + continue;

- /* skip non-userspace conntrack helpers. */ - if (!(cur->flags & NF_CT_HELPER_F_USERSPACE)) - continue; + if (tuple_set && + (tuple.src.l3num != cur->tuple.src.l3num || + tuple.dst.protonum != cur->tuple.dst.protonum)) + continue;

- if (helper_name && strncmp(cur->name, helper_name, - NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN) != 0) { - continue; - } - if (tuple_set && - (tuple.src.l3num != cur->tuple.src.l3num || - tuple.dst.protonum != cur->tuple.dst.protonum)) - continue; - - skb2 = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (skb2 == NULL) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - break; - } + skb2 = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (skb2 == NULL) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + break; + }

- ret = nfnl_cthelper_fill_info(skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, - nlh->nlmsg_seq, - NFNL_MSG_TYPE(nlh->nlmsg_type), - NFNL_MSG_CTHELPER_NEW, cur); - if (ret <= 0) { - kfree_skb(skb2); - break; - } + ret = nfnl_cthelper_fill_info(skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, + nlh->nlmsg_seq, + NFNL_MSG_TYPE(nlh->nlmsg_type), + NFNL_MSG_CTHELPER_NEW, cur); + if (ret <= 0) { + kfree_skb(skb2); + break; + }

- ret = netlink_unicast(nfnl, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, - MSG_DONTWAIT); - if (ret > 0) - ret = 0; + ret = netlink_unicast(nfnl, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, + MSG_DONTWAIT); + if (ret > 0) + ret = 0;

- /* this avoids a loop in nfnetlink. */ - return ret == -EAGAIN ? -ENOBUFS : ret; - } + /* this avoids a loop in nfnetlink. */ + return ret == -EAGAIN ? -ENOBUFS : ret; } return ret; } @@ -662,10 +656,10 @@ static int nfnl_cthelper_del(struct net *net, struct sock *nfnl, { char *helper_name = NULL; struct nf_conntrack_helper *cur; - struct hlist_node *tmp; struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple; bool tuple_set = false, found = false; - int i, j = 0, ret; + struct nfnl_cthelper *nlcth, *n; + int j = 0, ret;

if (tb[NFCTH_NAME]) helper_name = nla_data(tb[NFCTH_NAME]); @@ -678,30 +672,27 @@ static int nfnl_cthelper_del(struct net *net, struct sock *nfnl, tuple_set = true; }

- for (i = 0; i < nf_ct_helper_hsize; i++) { - hlist_for_each_entry_safe(cur, tmp, &nf_ct_helper_hash[i], - hnode) { - /* skip non-userspace conntrack helpers. */ - if (!(cur->flags & NF_CT_HELPER_F_USERSPACE)) - continue; + list_for_each_entry_safe(nlcth, n, &nfnl_cthelper_list, list) { + cur = &nlcth->helper; + j++;

- j++; + if (helper_name && + strncmp(cur->name, helper_name, NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN)) + continue;

- if (helper_name && strncmp(cur->name, helper_name, - NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN) != 0) { - continue; - } - if (tuple_set && - (tuple.src.l3num != cur->tuple.src.l3num || - tuple.dst.protonum != cur->tuple.dst.protonum)) - continue; + if (tuple_set && + (tuple.src.l3num != cur->tuple.src.l3num || + tuple.dst.protonum != cur->tuple.dst.protonum)) + continue;

- found = true; - nf_conntrack_helper_unregister(cur); - kfree(cur->expect_policy); - kfree(cur); - } + found = true; + nf_conntrack_helper_unregister(cur); + kfree(cur->expect_policy); + + list_del(&nlcth->list); + kfree(nlcth); } + /* Make sure we return success if we flush and there is no helpers */ return (found || j == 0) ? 0 : -ENOENT; } @@ -750,22 +741,16 @@ static int __init nfnl_cthelper_init(void) static void __exit nfnl_cthelper_exit(void) { struct nf_conntrack_helper *cur; - struct hlist_node *tmp; - int i; + struct nfnl_cthelper *nlcth, *n;

nfnetlink_subsys_unregister(&nfnl_cthelper_subsys);

- for (i=0; i<nf_ct_helper_hsize; i++) { - hlist_for_each_entry_safe(cur, tmp, &nf_ct_helper_hash[i], - hnode) { - /* skip non-userspace conntrack helpers. */ - if (!(cur->flags & NF_CT_HELPER_F_USERSPACE)) - continue; + list_for_each_entry_safe(nlcth, n, &nfnl_cthelper_list, list) { + cur = &nlcth->helper;

- nf_conntrack_helper_unregister(cur); - kfree(cur->expect_policy); - kfree(cur); - } + nf_conntrack_helper_unregister(cur); + kfree(cur->expect_policy); + kfree(nlcth); } }

From: Gao Feng fgao@ikuai8.com

[ Upstream commit 75c689dca98851d65ef5a27e5ce26b625b68751c ]

In the commit 93557f53e1fb ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: nf_conntrack snmp helper"), the snmp_helper is replaced by nf_nat_snmp_hook. So the snmp_helper is never registered. But it still tries to unregister the snmp_helper, it could cause the panic.

Now remove the useless snmp_helper and the unregister call in the error handler.

Fixes: 93557f53e1fb ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: nf_conntrack snmp helper") Signed-off-by: Gao Feng fgao@ikuai8.com Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c | 19 +------------------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c index 5a8f7c360887..53e49f5011d3 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c @@ -1260,16 +1260,6 @@ static const struct nf_conntrack_expect_policy snmp_exp_policy = { .timeout = 180, };

-static struct nf_conntrack_helper snmp_helper __read_mostly = { - .me = THIS_MODULE, - .help = help, - .expect_policy = &snmp_exp_policy, - .name = "snmp", - .tuple.src.l3num = AF_INET, - .tuple.src.u.udp.port = cpu_to_be16(SNMP_PORT), - .tuple.dst.protonum = IPPROTO_UDP, -}; - static struct nf_conntrack_helper snmp_trap_helper __read_mostly = { .me = THIS_MODULE, .help = help, @@ -1288,17 +1278,10 @@ static struct nf_conntrack_helper snmp_trap_helper __read_mostly = {

static int __init nf_nat_snmp_basic_init(void) { - int ret = 0; - BUG_ON(nf_nat_snmp_hook != NULL); RCU_INIT_POINTER(nf_nat_snmp_hook, help);

- ret = nf_conntrack_helper_register(&snmp_trap_helper); - if (ret < 0) { - nf_conntrack_helper_unregister(&snmp_helper); - return ret; - } - return ret; + return nf_conntrack_helper_register(&snmp_trap_helper); }

static void __exit nf_nat_snmp_basic_fini(void)

From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 2f0ba790df51721794c11abc7a076d407392f648 ]

The cpufreq core only tries to create symbolic links from CPU directories in sysfs to policy directories in cpufreq_add_dev(), either when a given CPU is registered or when the cpufreq driver is registered, whichever happens first. That is not sufficient, however, because cpufreq_add_dev() may be called for an offline CPU whose policy object has not been created yet and, quite obviously, the symbolic cannot be added in that case.

Fix that by making cpufreq_online() attempt to add symbolic links to policy objects for the CPUs in the related_cpus mask of every new policy object created by it.

The cpufreq_driver_lock locking around the for_each_cpu() loop in cpufreq_online() is dropped, because it is not necessary and the code is somewhat simpler without it. Moreover, failures to create a symbolic link will not be regarded as hard errors any more and the CPUs without those links will not be taken offline automatically, but that should not be problematic in practice.

Reported-and-tested-by: Prashanth Prakash pprakash@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Cc: 4.9+ stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c b/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c index 530f255a898b..35e34c0e0429 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c @@ -918,11 +918,19 @@ static struct kobj_type ktype_cpufreq = { .release = cpufreq_sysfs_release, };

-static int add_cpu_dev_symlink(struct cpufreq_policy *policy, - struct device *dev) +static void add_cpu_dev_symlink(struct cpufreq_policy *policy, unsigned int cpu) { + struct device *dev = get_cpu_device(cpu); + + if (!dev) + return; + + if (cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(cpu, policy->real_cpus)) + return; + dev_dbg(dev, "%s: Adding symlink\n", __func__); - return sysfs_create_link(&dev->kobj, &policy->kobj, "cpufreq"); + if (sysfs_create_link(&dev->kobj, &policy->kobj, "cpufreq")) + dev_err(dev, "cpufreq symlink creation failed\n"); }

static void remove_cpu_dev_symlink(struct cpufreq_policy *policy, @@ -1184,10 +1192,10 @@ static int cpufreq_online(unsigned int cpu) policy->user_policy.min = policy->min; policy->user_policy.max = policy->max;

- write_lock_irqsave(&cpufreq_driver_lock, flags); - for_each_cpu(j, policy->related_cpus) + for_each_cpu(j, policy->related_cpus) { per_cpu(cpufreq_cpu_data, j) = policy; - write_unlock_irqrestore(&cpufreq_driver_lock, flags); + add_cpu_dev_symlink(policy, j); + } } else { policy->min = policy->user_policy.min; policy->max = policy->user_policy.max; @@ -1284,13 +1292,15 @@ static int cpufreq_online(unsigned int cpu)

if (cpufreq_driver->exit) cpufreq_driver->exit(policy); + + for_each_cpu(j, policy->real_cpus) + remove_cpu_dev_symlink(policy, get_cpu_device(j)); + out_free_policy: cpufreq_policy_free(policy, !new_policy); return ret; }

-static int cpufreq_offline(unsigned int cpu); - /** * cpufreq_add_dev - the cpufreq interface for a CPU device. * @dev: CPU device. @@ -1312,16 +1322,10 @@ static int cpufreq_add_dev(struct device *dev, struct subsys_interface *sif)

/* Create sysfs link on CPU registration */ policy = per_cpu(cpufreq_cpu_data, cpu); - if (!policy || cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(cpu, policy->real_cpus)) - return 0; + if (policy) + add_cpu_dev_symlink(policy, cpu);

- ret = add_cpu_dev_symlink(policy, dev); - if (ret) { - cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, policy->real_cpus); - cpufreq_offline(cpu); - } - - return ret; + return 0; }

static int cpufreq_offline(unsigned int cpu)

From: Ladi Prosek lprosek@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 9646b26e85896ef0256e66649f7937f774dc18a6 ]

The virtio balloon driver contained a not-so-obvious invariant that update_balloon_stats has to update exactly VIRTIO_BALLOON_S_NR counters in order to send valid stats to the host. This commit fixes it by having update_balloon_stats return the actual number of counters, and its callers use it when pushing buffers to the stats virtqueue.

Note that it is still out of spec to change the number of counters at run-time. "Driver MUST supply the same subset of statistics in all buffers submitted to the statsq."

Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek lprosek@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin mst@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c index 2c2e6792f7e0..07b07b12ef90 100644 --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c @@ -241,11 +241,11 @@ static inline void update_stat(struct virtio_balloon *vb, int idx,

#define pages_to_bytes(x) ((u64)(x) << PAGE_SHIFT)

-static void update_balloon_stats(struct virtio_balloon *vb) +static unsigned int update_balloon_stats(struct virtio_balloon *vb) { unsigned long events[NR_VM_EVENT_ITEMS]; struct sysinfo i; - int idx = 0; + unsigned int idx = 0; long available;

all_vm_events(events); @@ -265,6 +265,8 @@ static void update_balloon_stats(struct virtio_balloon *vb) pages_to_bytes(i.totalram)); update_stat(vb, idx++, VIRTIO_BALLOON_S_AVAIL, pages_to_bytes(available)); + + return idx; }

/* @@ -290,14 +292,14 @@ static void stats_handle_request(struct virtio_balloon *vb) { struct virtqueue *vq; struct scatterlist sg; - unsigned int len; + unsigned int len, num_stats;

- update_balloon_stats(vb); + num_stats = update_balloon_stats(vb);

vq = vb->stats_vq; if (!virtqueue_get_buf(vq, &len)) return; - sg_init_one(&sg, vb->stats, sizeof(vb->stats)); + sg_init_one(&sg, vb->stats, sizeof(vb->stats[0]) * num_stats); virtqueue_add_outbuf(vq, &sg, 1, vb, GFP_KERNEL); virtqueue_kick(vq); } @@ -421,15 +423,16 @@ static int init_vqs(struct virtio_balloon *vb) vb->deflate_vq = vqs[1]; if (virtio_has_feature(vb->vdev, VIRTIO_BALLOON_F_STATS_VQ)) { struct scatterlist sg; + unsigned int num_stats; vb->stats_vq = vqs[2];

/* * Prime this virtqueue with one buffer so the hypervisor can * use it to signal us later (it can't be broken yet!). */ - update_balloon_stats(vb); + num_stats = update_balloon_stats(vb);

- sg_init_one(&sg, vb->stats, sizeof vb->stats); + sg_init_one(&sg, vb->stats, sizeof(vb->stats[0]) * num_stats); if (virtqueue_add_outbuf(vb->stats_vq, &sg, 1, vb, GFP_KERNEL) < 0) BUG();

From: "Herongguang (Stephen)" herongguang.he@huawei.com

[ Upstream commit 0292e169b2d9c8377a168778f0b16eadb1f578fd ]

or VM memory are not put thus leaked in kvm_iommu_unmap_memslots() when destroy VM.

This is consistent with current vfio implementation.

Signed-off-by: herongguang herongguang.he@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c index f4c6d4f6d2e8..1d6eaef20493 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c @@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, * changes) is disallowed above, so any other attribute changes getting * here can be skipped. */ - if ((change == KVM_MR_CREATE) || (change == KVM_MR_MOVE)) { + if (as_id == 0 && (change == KVM_MR_CREATE || change == KVM_MR_MOVE)) { r = kvm_iommu_map_pages(kvm, &new); return r; }

From: Liping Zhang zlpnobody@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 77c1c03c5b8ef28e55bb0aff29b1e006037ca645 ]

We must call security_release_secctx to free the memory returned by security_secid_to_secctx, otherwise memory may be leaked forever.

Fixes: ef493bd930ae ("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: add security context information") Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang zlpnobody@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c index af832c526048..5efb40291ac3 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c @@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, skb = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!skb) { skb_tx_error(entskb); - return NULL; + goto nlmsg_failure; }

nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, 0, 0, @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, if (!nlh) { skb_tx_error(entskb); kfree_skb(skb); - return NULL; + goto nlmsg_failure; } nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh); nfmsg->nfgen_family = entry->state.pf; @@ -598,12 +598,17 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, }

nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len; + if (seclen) + security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen); return skb;

nla_put_failure: skb_tx_error(entskb); kfree_skb(skb); net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n"); +nlmsg_failure: + if (seclen) + security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen); return NULL; }

From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit 457ae7268b29c33dee1c0feb143a15f6029d177b ]

This isn't super serious because you need CAP_ADMIN to run this code.

I added this integer overflow check last year but apparently I am rubbish at writing integer overflow checks... There are two issues. First, access_ok() works on unsigned long type and not u64 so on 32 bit systems the access_ok() could be checking a truncated size. The other issue is that we should be using a stricter limit so we don't overflow the kzalloc() setting ctx->clone_roots later in the function after the access_ok():

alloc_size = sizeof(struct clone_root) * (arg->clone_sources_count + 1); sctx->clone_roots = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);

Fixes: f5ecec3ce21f ("btrfs: send: silence an integer overflow warning") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Reviewed-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com [ added comment ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- fs/btrfs/send.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c index 77f9efc1f7aa..9a47b5598df7 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/send.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c @@ -6196,8 +6196,13 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_file, void __user *arg_) goto out; }

+ /* + * Check that we don't overflow at later allocations, we request + * clone_sources_count + 1 items, and compare to unsigned long inside + * access_ok. + */ if (arg->clone_sources_count > - ULLONG_MAX / sizeof(*arg->clone_sources)) { + ULONG_MAX / sizeof(struct clone_root) - 1) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; }

From: Vaidyanathan Srinivasan svaidy@linux.vnet.ibm.com

[ Upstream commit 293d264f13cbde328d5477f49e3103edbc1dc191 ]

drv->cpumask defaults to cpu_possible_mask in __cpuidle_driver_init(). On PowerNV platform cpu_present could be less than cpu_possible in cases where firmware detects the cpu, but it is not available to the OS. When CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU=n, such cpus are not hotplugable at runtime and hence we skip creating cpu_device.

This breaks cpuidle on powernv where register_cpu() is not called for cpus in cpu_possible_mask that cannot be hot-added at runtime.

Trying cpuidle_register_device() on cpu without cpu_device will cause crash like this:

cpu 0xf: Vector: 380 (Data SLB Access) at [c000000ff1503490] pc: c00000000022c8bc: string+0x34/0x60 lr: c00000000022ed78: vsnprintf+0x284/0x42c sp: c000000ff1503710 msr: 9000000000009033 dar: 6000000060000000 current = 0xc000000ff1480000 paca = 0xc00000000fe82d00 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01 pid = 1, comm = swapper/8 Linux version 4.11.0-rc2 (sv@sagarika) (gcc version 4.9.4 (Buildroot 2017.02-00004-gc28573e) ) #15 SMP Fri Mar 17 19:32:02 IST 2017 enter ? for help [link register ] c00000000022ed78 vsnprintf+0x284/0x42c [c000000ff1503710] c00000000022ebb8 vsnprintf+0xc4/0x42c (unreliable) [c000000ff1503800] c00000000022ef40 vscnprintf+0x20/0x44 [c000000ff1503830] c0000000000ab61c vprintk_emit+0x94/0x2cc [c000000ff15038a0] c0000000000acc9c vprintk_func+0x60/0x74 [c000000ff15038c0] c000000000619694 printk+0x38/0x4c [c000000ff15038e0] c000000000224950 kobject_get+0x40/0x60 [c000000ff1503950] c00000000022507c kobject_add_internal+0x60/0x2c4 [c000000ff15039e0] c000000000225350 kobject_init_and_add+0x70/0x78 [c000000ff1503a60] c00000000053c288 cpuidle_add_sysfs+0x9c/0xe0 [c000000ff1503ae0] c00000000053aeac cpuidle_register_device+0xd4/0x12c [c000000ff1503b30] c00000000053b108 cpuidle_register+0x98/0xcc [c000000ff1503bc0] c00000000085eaf0 powernv_processor_idle_init+0x140/0x1e0 [c000000ff1503c60] c00000000000cd60 do_one_initcall+0xc0/0x15c [c000000ff1503d20] c000000000833e84 kernel_init_freeable+0x1a0/0x25c [c000000ff1503dc0] c00000000000d478 kernel_init+0x24/0x12c [c000000ff1503e30] c00000000000b564 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x78

This patch fixes the bug by passing correct cpumask from powernv-cpuidle driver.

Signed-off-by: Vaidyanathan Srinivasan svaidy@linux.vnet.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Gautham R. Shenoy ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com Acked-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au [ rjw: Comment massage ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle-powernv.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle-powernv.c b/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle-powernv.c index 7fe442ca38f4..854a56781100 100644 --- a/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle-powernv.c +++ b/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle-powernv.c @@ -164,6 +164,24 @@ static int powernv_cpuidle_driver_init(void) drv->state_count += 1; }

+ /* + * On the PowerNV platform cpu_present may be less than cpu_possible in + * cases when firmware detects the CPU, but it is not available to the + * OS. If CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU=n, then such CPUs are not hotplugable at + * run time and hence cpu_devices are not created for those CPUs by the + * generic topology_init(). + * + * drv->cpumask defaults to cpu_possible_mask in + * __cpuidle_driver_init(). This breaks cpuidle on PowerNV where + * cpu_devices are not created for CPUs in cpu_possible_mask that + * cannot be hot-added later at run time. + * + * Trying cpuidle_register_device() on a CPU without a cpu_device is + * incorrect, so pass a correct CPU mask to the generic cpuidle driver. + */ + + drv->cpumask = (struct cpumask *)cpu_present_mask; + return 0; }

From: Derek Basehore dbasehore@chromium.org

[ Upstream commit 5d0c49acebc9488e37db95f1d4a55644e545ffe7 ]

This fixes an overflow condition that can happen with high max brightness and period values in compute_duty_cycle. This fixes it by using a 64 bit variable for computing the duty cycle.

Signed-off-by: Derek Basehore dbasehore@chromium.org Acked-by: Thierry Reding thierry.reding@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Brian Norris briannorris@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones lee.jones@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/video/backlight/pwm_bl.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/video/backlight/pwm_bl.c b/drivers/video/backlight/pwm_bl.c index 12614006211e..d95ae092f154 100644 --- a/drivers/video/backlight/pwm_bl.c +++ b/drivers/video/backlight/pwm_bl.c @@ -79,14 +79,17 @@ static void pwm_backlight_power_off(struct pwm_bl_data *pb) static int compute_duty_cycle(struct pwm_bl_data *pb, int brightness) { unsigned int lth = pb->lth_brightness; - int duty_cycle; + u64 duty_cycle;

if (pb->levels) duty_cycle = pb->levels[brightness]; else duty_cycle = brightness;

- return (duty_cycle * (pb->period - lth) / pb->scale) + lth; + duty_cycle *= pb->period - lth; + do_div(duty_cycle, pb->scale); + + return duty_cycle + lth; }

static int pwm_backlight_update_status(struct backlight_device *bl)

From: LEROY Christophe christophe.leroy@c-s.fr

[ Upstream commit 70d355ccea899dad47dc22d3a4406998f55143fd ]

ctr-aes-talitos test fails as follows on SEC2

[ 0.837427] alg: skcipher: Test 1 failed (invalid result) on encryption for ctr-aes-talitos [ 0.845763] 00000000: 16 36 d5 ee 34 f8 06 25 d7 7f 8e 56 ca 88 43 45 [ 0.852345] 00000010: f9 3f f7 17 2a b2 12 23 30 43 09 15 82 dd e1 97 [ 0.858940] 00000020: a7 f7 32 b5 eb 25 06 13 9a ec f5 29 25 f8 4d 66 [ 0.865366] 00000030: b0 03 5b 8e aa 9a 42 b6 19 33 8a e2 9d 65 96 95

This patch fixes the descriptor type which is special for CTR AES

Fixes: 5e75ae1b3cef6 ("crypto: talitos - add new crypto modes") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy christophe.leroy@c-s.fr Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index e2d323fa2437..2df4bca4fb7f 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -2614,7 +2614,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, } }, - .desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU | + .desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_AESU_CTR_NONSNOOP | DESC_HDR_SEL0_AESU | DESC_HDR_MODE0_AESU_CTR, },

From: LEROY Christophe christophe.leroy@c-s.fr

[ Upstream commit e04a61bebc5da1535b6f194b464295b8d558e2fc ]

On SEC2, when using the old descriptors type (hmac snoop no afeu) for doing IPsec, the CICV out pointeur points out of the allocated memory.

[ 2.502554] ============================================================================= [ 2.510740] BUG dma-kmalloc-256 (Not tainted): Redzone overwritten [ 2.516907] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 2.516907] [ 2.526535] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 2.531845] INFO: 0xde858108-0xde85810b. First byte 0xf8 instead of 0xcc [ 2.538549] INFO: Allocated in 0x806181a9 age=0 cpu=0 pid=58 [ 2.544229] __kmalloc+0x374/0x564 [ 2.547649] talitos_edesc_alloc+0x17c/0x48c [ 2.551929] aead_edesc_alloc+0x80/0x154 [ 2.555863] aead_encrypt+0x30/0xe0 [ 2.559368] __test_aead+0x5a0/0x1f3c [ 2.563042] test_aead+0x2c/0x110 [ 2.566371] alg_test_aead+0x5c/0xf4 [ 2.569958] alg_test+0x1dc/0x5a0 [ 2.573305] cryptomgr_test+0x50/0x70 [ 2.576984] kthread+0xd8/0x134 [ 2.580155] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 [ 2.584534] INFO: Freed in ipsec_esp_encrypt_done+0x130/0x240 age=6 cpu=0 pid=0 [ 2.591839] ipsec_esp_encrypt_done+0x130/0x240 [ 2.596395] flush_channel+0x1dc/0x488 [ 2.600161] talitos2_done_4ch+0x30/0x200 [ 2.604185] tasklet_action+0xa0/0x13c [ 2.607948] __do_softirq+0x148/0x6cc [ 2.611623] irq_exit+0xc0/0x124 [ 2.614869] call_do_irq+0x24/0x3c [ 2.618292] do_IRQ+0x78/0x108 [ 2.621369] ret_from_except+0x0/0x14 [ 2.625055] finish_task_switch+0x58/0x350 [ 2.629165] schedule+0x80/0x134 [ 2.632409] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x38/0xc8 [ 2.637042] cpu_startup_entry+0xe4/0x190 [ 2.641074] start_kernel+0x3f4/0x408 [ 2.644741] 0x3438 [ 2.646857] INFO: Slab 0xdffbdb00 objects=9 used=1 fp=0xde8581c0 flags=0x0080 [ 2.653978] INFO: Object 0xde858008 @offset=8 fp=0xca4395df [ 2.653978] [ 2.661032] Redzone de858000: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........ [ 2.669029] Object de858008: 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 02 00 6b 6b 6b 1e 83 ea 28 .........kkk...( [ 2.677628] Object de858018: 00 00 00 70 1e 85 80 64 ff 73 1d 21 6b 6b 6b 6b ...p...d.s.!kkkk [ 2.686228] Object de858028: 00 20 00 00 1e 84 17 24 00 10 00 00 1e 85 70 00 . .....$......p. [ 2.694829] Object de858038: 00 18 00 00 1e 84 17 44 00 08 00 00 1e 83 ea 28 .......D.......( [ 2.703430] Object de858048: 00 80 00 00 1e 84 f0 00 00 80 00 00 1e 85 70 10 ..............p. [ 2.712030] Object de858058: 00 20 6b 00 1e 85 80 f4 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 80 02 00 . k.....kkkk.... [ 2.720629] Object de858068: 1e 84 f0 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b ....kkkkkkkkkkkk [ 2.729230] Object de858078: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk [ 2.737830] Object de858088: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk [ 2.746429] Object de858098: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk [ 2.755029] Object de8580a8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk [ 2.763628] Object de8580b8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk [ 2.772229] Object de8580c8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk [ 2.780829] Object de8580d8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk [ 2.789430] Object de8580e8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 73 b0 ea 9f kkkkkkkkkkkks... [ 2.798030] Object de8580f8: e8 18 80 d6 56 38 44 c0 db e3 4f 71 f7 ce d1 d3 ....V8D...Oq.... [ 2.806629] Redzone de858108: f8 bd 3e 4f ..>O [ 2.814279] Padding de8581b0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ [ 2.822283] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Tainted: G B 4.9.50-g995be12679 #179 [ 2.831819] Call Trace: [ 2.834301] [dffefd20] [c01aa9a8] check_bytes_and_report+0x100/0x194 (unreliable) [ 2.841801] [dffefd50] [c01aac3c] check_object+0x200/0x530 [ 2.847306] [dffefd80] [c01ae584] free_debug_processing+0x290/0x690 [ 2.853585] [dffefde0] [c01aec8c] __slab_free+0x308/0x628 [ 2.859000] [dffefe80] [c05057f4] ipsec_esp_encrypt_done+0x130/0x240 [ 2.865378] [dffefeb0] [c05002c4] flush_channel+0x1dc/0x488 [ 2.870968] [dffeff10] [c05007a8] talitos2_done_4ch+0x30/0x200 [ 2.876814] [dffeff30] [c002fe38] tasklet_action+0xa0/0x13c [ 2.882399] [dffeff60] [c002f118] __do_softirq+0x148/0x6cc [ 2.887896] [dffeffd0] [c002f954] irq_exit+0xc0/0x124 [ 2.892968] [dffefff0] [c0013adc] call_do_irq+0x24/0x3c [ 2.898213] [c0d4be00] [c000757c] do_IRQ+0x78/0x108 [ 2.903113] [c0d4be30] [c0015c08] ret_from_except+0x0/0x14 [ 2.908634] --- interrupt: 501 at finish_task_switch+0x70/0x350 [ 2.908634] LR = finish_task_switch+0x58/0x350 [ 2.919327] [c0d4bf20] [c085e1d4] schedule+0x80/0x134 [ 2.924398] [c0d4bf50] [c085e2c0] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x38/0xc8 [ 2.930853] [c0d4bf60] [c007f064] cpu_startup_entry+0xe4/0x190 [ 2.936707] [c0d4bfb0] [c096c434] start_kernel+0x3f4/0x408 [ 2.942198] [c0d4bff0] [00003438] 0x3438 [ 2.946137] FIX dma-kmalloc-256: Restoring 0xde858108-0xde85810b=0xcc [ 2.946137] [ 2.954158] FIX dma-kmalloc-256: Object at 0xde858008 not freed

This patch reworks the handling of the CICV out in order to properly handle all cases.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy christophe.leroy@c-s.fr Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index a546ce39e168..74920088ecca 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -1247,14 +1247,15 @@ static int ipsec_esp(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, struct aead_request *areq, dma_map_sg(dev, areq->dst, sg_count, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); }

- sg_count = talitos_sg_map(dev, areq->dst, cryptlen, edesc, - &desc->ptr[5], sg_count, areq->assoclen, - tbl_off); + ret = talitos_sg_map(dev, areq->dst, cryptlen, edesc, &desc->ptr[5], + sg_count, areq->assoclen, tbl_off);

if (desc->hdr & DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP) to_talitos_ptr_ext_or(&desc->ptr[5], authsize, is_sec1);

- if (sg_count > 1) { + /* ICV data */ + if (ret > 1) { + tbl_off += ret; edesc->icv_ool = true; sync_needed = true;

@@ -1264,9 +1265,7 @@ static int ipsec_esp(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, struct aead_request *areq, sizeof(struct talitos_ptr) + authsize;

/* Add an entry to the link table for ICV data */ - tbl_ptr += sg_count - 1; - to_talitos_ptr_ext_set(tbl_ptr, 0, is_sec1); - tbl_ptr++; + to_talitos_ptr_ext_set(tbl_ptr - 1, 0, is_sec1); to_talitos_ptr_ext_set(tbl_ptr, DESC_PTR_LNKTBL_RETURN, is_sec1); to_talitos_ptr_len(tbl_ptr, authsize, is_sec1); @@ -1274,18 +1273,33 @@ static int ipsec_esp(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, struct aead_request *areq, /* icv data follows link tables */ to_talitos_ptr(tbl_ptr, edesc->dma_link_tbl + offset, is_sec1); + } else { + dma_addr_t addr = edesc->dma_link_tbl; + + if (is_sec1) + addr += areq->assoclen + cryptlen; + else + addr += sizeof(struct talitos_ptr) * tbl_off; + + to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[6], addr, is_sec1); + to_talitos_ptr_len(&desc->ptr[6], authsize, is_sec1); + } + } else if (!(desc->hdr & DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP)) { + ret = talitos_sg_map(dev, areq->dst, authsize, edesc, + &desc->ptr[6], sg_count, areq->assoclen + + cryptlen, + tbl_off); + if (ret > 1) { + tbl_off += ret; + edesc->icv_ool = true; + sync_needed = true; + } else { + edesc->icv_ool = false; } } else { edesc->icv_ool = false; }

- /* ICV data */ - if (!(desc->hdr & DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP)) { - to_talitos_ptr_len(&desc->ptr[6], authsize, is_sec1); - to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[6], edesc->dma_link_tbl + - areq->assoclen + cryptlen, is_sec1); - } - /* iv out */ if (desc->hdr & DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP) map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[6], ivsize, ctx->iv,

From: Dan Murphy dmurphy@ti.com

[ Upstream commit fc7556877d1748ac00958822a0a3bba1d4bd9e0d ]

Change the return error code to EINVAL if the MAC address is not valid in the set_wol function.

Signed-off-by: Dan Murphy dmurphy@ti.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/net/phy/at803x.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/at803x.c b/drivers/net/phy/at803x.c index a52b560e428b..3603eec7217f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/at803x.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/at803x.c @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static int at803x_set_wol(struct phy_device *phydev, mac = (const u8 *) ndev->dev_addr;

if (!is_valid_ether_addr(mac)) - return -EFAULT; + return -EINVAL;

for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { phy_write(phydev, AT803X_MMD_ACCESS_CONTROL,

From: Shakeel Butt shakeelb@google.com

[ Upstream commit 46bea48ac241fe0b413805952dda74dd0c09ba8b ]

The kvm slabs can consume a significant amount of system memory and indeed in our production environment we have observed that a lot of machines are spending significant amount of memory that can not be left as system memory overhead. Also the allocations from these slabs can be triggered directly by user space applications which has access to kvm and thus a buggy application can leak such memory. So, these caches should be accounted to kmemcg.

Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt shakeelb@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 4 ++-- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c index d29c745f10ad..0a324e120942 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c @@ -5052,13 +5052,13 @@ int kvm_mmu_module_init(void) { pte_list_desc_cache = kmem_cache_create("pte_list_desc", sizeof(struct pte_list_desc), - 0, 0, NULL); + 0, SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL); if (!pte_list_desc_cache) goto nomem;

mmu_page_header_cache = kmem_cache_create("kvm_mmu_page_header", sizeof(struct kvm_mmu_page), - 0, 0, NULL); + 0, SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL); if (!mmu_page_header_cache) goto nomem;

diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c index 1d6eaef20493..468f02d5d2a3 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c @@ -3896,7 +3896,7 @@ int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align, if (!vcpu_align) vcpu_align = __alignof__(struct kvm_vcpu); kvm_vcpu_cache = kmem_cache_create("kvm_vcpu", vcpu_size, vcpu_align, - 0, NULL); + SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL); if (!kvm_vcpu_cache) { r = -ENOMEM; goto out_free_3;

From: Sreekanth Reddy sreekanth.reddy@broadcom.com

[ Upstream commit 2ce9a3645299ba1752873d333d73f67620f4550b ]

Whenever an I/O for a RAID volume fails with IOCStatus MPI2_IOCSTATUS_SCSI_IOC_TERMINATED and SCSIStatus equal to (MPI2_SCSI_STATE_TERMINATED | MPI2_SCSI_STATE_NO_SCSI_STATUS) then return the I/O to SCSI midlayer with "DID_RESET" (i.e. retry the IO infinite times) set in the host byte.

Previously, the driver was completing the I/O with "DID_SOFT_ERROR" which causes the I/O to be quickly retried. However, firmware needed more time and hence I/Os were failing.

Signed-off-by: Sreekanth Reddy Sreekanth.Reddy@broadcom.com Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl thenzl@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c index 289374cbcb47..468acab04d3d 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c @@ -4770,6 +4770,11 @@ _scsih_io_done(struct MPT3SAS_ADAPTER *ioc, u16 smid, u8 msix_index, u32 reply) } else if (log_info == VIRTUAL_IO_FAILED_RETRY) { scmd->result = DID_RESET << 16; break; + } else if ((scmd->device->channel == RAID_CHANNEL) && + (scsi_state == (MPI2_SCSI_STATE_TERMINATED | + MPI2_SCSI_STATE_NO_SCSI_STATUS))) { + scmd->result = DID_RESET << 16; + break; } scmd->result = DID_SOFT_ERROR << 16; break;

From: Stuart Hayes stuart.w.hayes@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 27d6162944b9b34c32cd5841acd21786637ee743 ]

When creating virtual functions, create the "virtfn%u" and "physfn" links in sysfs *before* attaching the driver instead of after. When we attach the driver to the new virtual network interface first, there is a race when the driver attaches to the new sends out an "add" udev event, and the network interface naming software (biosdevname or systemd, for example) tries to look at these links.

Signed-off-by: Stuart Hayes stuart.w.hayes@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas bhelgaas@google.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/pci/iov.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/iov.c b/drivers/pci/iov.c index 47227820406d..1d32fe2d97aa 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/iov.c +++ b/drivers/pci/iov.c @@ -164,7 +164,6 @@ int pci_iov_add_virtfn(struct pci_dev *dev, int id, int reset) pci_device_add(virtfn, virtfn->bus); mutex_unlock(&iov->dev->sriov->lock);

- pci_bus_add_device(virtfn); sprintf(buf, "virtfn%u", id); rc = sysfs_create_link(&dev->dev.kobj, &virtfn->dev.kobj, buf); if (rc) @@ -175,6 +174,8 @@ int pci_iov_add_virtfn(struct pci_dev *dev, int id, int reset)

kobject_uevent(&virtfn->dev.kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE);

+ pci_bus_add_device(virtfn); + return 0;

failed2:

From: Colin Ian King colin.king@canonical.com

[ Upstream commit 4831ca9e4a8e48cb27e0a792f73250390827a228 ]

The allocation for elem may fail (especially because we're using GFP_ATOMIC) so best to check for a null return. This fixes a potential null pointer dereference when assigning elem->pool.

Detected by CoverityScan CID#1357507 ("Dereference null return value")

Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King colin.king@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford dledford@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_pool.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_pool.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_pool.c index ee26a1b1b4ed..1c4e5b2e6835 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_pool.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_pool.c @@ -412,6 +412,8 @@ void *rxe_alloc(struct rxe_pool *pool) elem = kmem_cache_zalloc(pool_cache(pool), (pool->flags & RXE_POOL_ATOMIC) ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_KERNEL); + if (!elem) + return NULL;

elem->pool = pool; kref_init(&elem->ref_cnt);

From: Christophe JAILLET christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr

[ Upstream commit 18eb86362a52f0af933cc0fd5e37027317eb2d1c ]

Check memory allocation failures and return -ENOMEM in such cases, as already done for other memory allocations in this function.

This avoids NULL pointers dereference.

Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Tested-by: Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com Acked-by: PJ Waskiewicz peter.waskiewicz.jr@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c index 16839600fb78..ca54f7684668 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c @@ -3102,6 +3102,8 @@ static int igb_sw_init(struct igb_adapter *adapter) /* Setup and initialize a copy of the hw vlan table array */ adapter->shadow_vfta = kcalloc(E1000_VLAN_FILTER_TBL_SIZE, sizeof(u32), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!adapter->shadow_vfta) + return -ENOMEM;

/* This call may decrease the number of queues */ if (igb_init_interrupt_scheme(adapter, true)) {

From: Ed Blake ed.blake@sondrel.com

[ Upstream commit c70458890ff15d858bd347fa9f563818bcd6e457 ]

Add pm_runtime_get_sync and pm_runtime_put calls to set_fmt callback function. This fixes a bus error during boot when CONFIG_SUSPEND is defined when this function gets called while the device is runtime disabled and device registers are accessed while the clock is disabled.

Signed-off-by: Ed Blake ed.blake@sondrel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- sound/soc/img/img-parallel-out.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sound/soc/img/img-parallel-out.c b/sound/soc/img/img-parallel-out.c index c1610a054d65..3cf522d66755 100644 --- a/sound/soc/img/img-parallel-out.c +++ b/sound/soc/img/img-parallel-out.c @@ -166,9 +166,11 @@ static int img_prl_out_set_fmt(struct snd_soc_dai *dai, unsigned int fmt) return -EINVAL; }

+ pm_runtime_get_sync(prl->dev); reg = img_prl_out_readl(prl, IMG_PRL_OUT_CTL); reg = (reg & ~IMG_PRL_OUT_CTL_EDGE_MASK) | control_set; img_prl_out_writel(prl, reg, IMG_PRL_OUT_CTL); + pm_runtime_put(prl->dev);

return 0; }

From: Nicholas Piggin npiggin@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 064996d62a33ffe10264b5af5dca92d54f60f806 ]

The SMP hardlockup watchdog cross-checks other CPUs for lockups, which causes xmon headaches because it's assuming interrupts hard disabled means no watchdog troubles. Try to improve that by calling touch_nmi_watchdog() in obvious places where secondaries are spinning.

Also annotate these spin loops with spin_begin/end calls.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin npiggin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c b/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c index 760545519a0b..05751c9e7f53 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c @@ -496,14 +496,19 @@ static int xmon_core(struct pt_regs *regs, int fromipi)

waiting: secondary = 1; + spin_begin(); while (secondary && !xmon_gate) { if (in_xmon == 0) { - if (fromipi) + if (fromipi) { + spin_end(); goto leave; + } secondary = test_and_set_bit(0, &in_xmon); } - barrier(); + spin_cpu_relax(); + touch_nmi_watchdog(); } + spin_end();

if (!secondary && !xmon_gate) { /* we are the first cpu to come in */ @@ -530,21 +535,25 @@ static int xmon_core(struct pt_regs *regs, int fromipi) mb(); xmon_gate = 1; barrier(); + touch_nmi_watchdog(); }

cmdloop: while (in_xmon) { if (secondary) { + spin_begin(); if (cpu == xmon_owner) { if (!test_and_set_bit(0, &xmon_taken)) { secondary = 0; + spin_end(); continue; } /* missed it */ while (cpu == xmon_owner) - barrier(); + spin_cpu_relax(); } - barrier(); + spin_cpu_relax(); + touch_nmi_watchdog(); } else { cmd = cmds(regs); if (cmd != 0) {

From: Dick Kennedy dick.kennedy@broadcom.com

[ Upstream commit 184fc2b9a8bcbda9c14d0a1e7fbecfc028c7702e ]

Firmware update fails with: status x17 add_status x56 on the final write

If multiple DMA buffers are used for the download, some firmware revs have difficulty with signatures and crcs split across the dma buffer boundaries. Resolve by making all writes be a single 4k page in length.

Signed-off-by: Dick Kennedy dick.kennedy@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: James Smart james.smart@broadcom.com Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw4.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw4.h b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw4.h index 55faa94637a9..2a436dff1589 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw4.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hw4.h @@ -3232,7 +3232,7 @@ struct lpfc_mbx_get_port_name { #define MB_CEQ_STATUS_QUEUE_FLUSHING 0x4 #define MB_CQE_STATUS_DMA_FAILED 0x5

-#define LPFC_MBX_WR_CONFIG_MAX_BDE 8 +#define LPFC_MBX_WR_CONFIG_MAX_BDE 1 struct lpfc_mbx_wr_object { struct mbox_header header; union {

From: Jacob Keller jacob.e.keller@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 3e256ac5b1ec307e5dd5a4c99fbdbc651446c738 ]

We've had support for setting both a minimum and maximum bandwidth via .ndo_set_vf_bw since commit 883a9ccbae56 ("fm10k: Add support for SR-IOV to driver", 2014-09-20).

Likely because we do not support minimum rates, the declaration mis-ordered the "unused" parameter, which causes warnings when analyzed with cppcheck.

Fix this warning by properly declaring the min_rate and max_rate variables in the declaration and definition (rather than using "unused"). Also rename "rate" to max_rate so as to clarify that we only support setting the maximum rate.

Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller jacob.e.keller@intel.com Tested-by: Krishneil Singh krishneil.k.singh@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k.h | 4 ++-- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k_iov.c | 9 +++++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k.h index 4d19e46f7c55..3693ae104c2a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k.h @@ -508,8 +508,8 @@ s32 fm10k_iov_update_pvid(struct fm10k_intfc *interface, u16 glort, u16 pvid); int fm10k_ndo_set_vf_mac(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_idx, u8 *mac); int fm10k_ndo_set_vf_vlan(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_idx, u16 vid, u8 qos, __be16 vlan_proto); -int fm10k_ndo_set_vf_bw(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_idx, int rate, - int unused); +int fm10k_ndo_set_vf_bw(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_idx, + int __always_unused min_rate, int max_rate); int fm10k_ndo_get_vf_config(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_idx, struct ifla_vf_info *ivi);

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k_iov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k_iov.c index 5f4dac0d36ef..f919199944a0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k_iov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/fm10k/fm10k_iov.c @@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ int fm10k_ndo_set_vf_vlan(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_idx, u16 vid, }

int fm10k_ndo_set_vf_bw(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_idx, - int __always_unused unused, int rate) + int __always_unused min_rate, int max_rate) { struct fm10k_intfc *interface = netdev_priv(netdev); struct fm10k_iov_data *iov_data = interface->iov_data; @@ -493,14 +493,15 @@ int fm10k_ndo_set_vf_bw(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_idx, return -EINVAL;

/* rate limit cannot be less than 10Mbs or greater than link speed */ - if (rate && ((rate < FM10K_VF_TC_MIN) || rate > FM10K_VF_TC_MAX)) + if (max_rate && + (max_rate < FM10K_VF_TC_MIN || max_rate > FM10K_VF_TC_MAX)) return -EINVAL;

/* store values */ - iov_data->vf_info[vf_idx].rate = rate; + iov_data->vf_info[vf_idx].rate = max_rate;

/* update hardware configuration */ - hw->iov.ops.configure_tc(hw, vf_idx, rate); + hw->iov.ops.configure_tc(hw, vf_idx, max_rate);

return 0; }

From: Mike Manning mmanning@brocade.com

[ Upstream commit 1f372c7bfb23286d2bf4ce0423ab488e86b74bb2 ]

The NS for DAD are sent on admin up as long as a valid qdisc is found. A race condition exists by which these packets will not egress the interface if the operational state of the lower device is not yet up. The solution is to delay DAD until the link is operationally up according to RFC2863. Rather than only doing this, follow the existing code checks by deferring IPv6 device initialization altogether. The fix allows DAD on devices like tunnels that are controlled by userspace control plane. The fix has no impact on regular deployments, but means that there is no IPv6 connectivity until the port has been opened in the case of port-based network access control, which should be desirable.

Signed-off-by: Mike Manning mmanning@brocade.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index a4fb90c4819f..1594d9fc9c92 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -286,10 +286,10 @@ static struct ipv6_devconf ipv6_devconf_dflt __read_mostly = { .keep_addr_on_down = 0, };

-/* Check if a valid qdisc is available */ -static inline bool addrconf_qdisc_ok(const struct net_device *dev) +/* Check if link is ready: is it up and is a valid qdisc available */ +static inline bool addrconf_link_ready(const struct net_device *dev) { - return !qdisc_tx_is_noop(dev); + return netif_oper_up(dev) && !qdisc_tx_is_noop(dev); }

static void addrconf_del_rs_timer(struct inet6_dev *idev) @@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static struct inet6_dev *ipv6_add_dev(struct net_device *dev)

ndev->token = in6addr_any;

- if (netif_running(dev) && addrconf_qdisc_ok(dev)) + if (netif_running(dev) && addrconf_link_ready(dev)) ndev->if_flags |= IF_READY;

ipv6_mc_init_dev(ndev); @@ -3368,7 +3368,7 @@ static int addrconf_notify(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, /* restore routes for permanent addresses */ addrconf_permanent_addr(dev);

- if (!addrconf_qdisc_ok(dev)) { + if (!addrconf_link_ready(dev)) { /* device is not ready yet. */ pr_info("ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): %s: link is not ready\n", dev->name); @@ -3383,7 +3383,7 @@ static int addrconf_notify(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, run_pending = 1; } } else if (event == NETDEV_CHANGE) { - if (!addrconf_qdisc_ok(dev)) { + if (!addrconf_link_ready(dev)) { /* device is still not ready. */ break; }

From: Chen-Yu Tsai wens@csie.org

[ Upstream commit 7f3ed79188f2f094d0ee366fa858857fb7f511ba ]

The HDMI DDC clock found in the CCU is the parent of the actual DDC clock within the HDMI controller. That clock is also named "hdmi-ddc".

Rename the one in the CCU to "ddc". This makes more sense than renaming the one in the HDMI controller to something else.

Fixes: c6e6c96d8fa6 ("clk: sunxi-ng: Add A31/A31s clocks") Signed-off-by: Chen-Yu Tsai wens@csie.org Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard maxime.ripard@free-electrons.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun6i-a31.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun6i-a31.c b/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun6i-a31.c index df97e25aec76..9fe0939c1273 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun6i-a31.c +++ b/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun6i-a31.c @@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ static SUNXI_CCU_M_WITH_MUX_GATE(hdmi_clk, "hdmi", lcd_ch1_parents, 0x150, 0, 4, 24, 2, BIT(31), CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT);

-static SUNXI_CCU_GATE(hdmi_ddc_clk, "hdmi-ddc", "osc24M", 0x150, BIT(30), 0); +static SUNXI_CCU_GATE(hdmi_ddc_clk, "ddc", "osc24M", 0x150, BIT(30), 0);

static SUNXI_CCU_GATE(ps_clk, "ps", "lcd1-ch1", 0x140, BIT(31), 0);

From: Nicholas Piggin npiggin@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit f187851b9b4a76952b1158b86434563dd2031103 ]

When failing to enter broadcast timer mode for an idle state that requires it, a new state is selected that does not require broadcast, but the broadcast variable remains set. This causes tick_broadcast_exit to be called despite not having entered broadcast mode.

This causes the WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled()) to trigger in some cases. It does not appear to cause problems for code today, but seems to violate the interface so should be fixed.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin npiggin@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c b/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c index c73207abb5a4..35237c8d5206 100644 --- a/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c +++ b/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c @@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int cpuidle_enter_state(struct cpuidle_device *dev, struct cpuidle_driver *drv, return -EBUSY; } target_state = &drv->states[index]; + broadcast = false; }

/* Take note of the planned idle state. */

From: Hoang Tran tranviethoang.vn@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit cf5d74b85ef40c202c76d90959db4d850f301b95 ]

With the commit 76174004a0f19785 (tcp: do not slow start when cwnd equals ssthresh), the comparison to the reduced cwnd in tcp_vegas_ssthresh() would under-evaluate the ssthresh.

Signed-off-by: Hoang Tran hoang.tran@uclouvain.be Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@verizon.com --- net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c index 4c4bac1b5eab..3ecb61ee42fb 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_vegas_cwnd_event);

static inline u32 tcp_vegas_ssthresh(struct tcp_sock *tp) { - return min(tp->snd_ssthresh, tp->snd_cwnd-1); + return min(tp->snd_ssthresh, tp->snd_cwnd); }

static void tcp_vegas_cong_avoid(struct sock *sk, u32 ack, u32 acked)