The patch below does not apply to the 5.17-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to stable@vger.kernel.org.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 527a9867af29ff89f278d037db704e0ed50fb666 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Varho jan.varho@gmail.com Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 19:42:30 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness()
add_hwgenerator_randomness() tries to only use the required amount of input for fast init, but credits all the entropy, rather than a fraction of it. Since it's hard to determine how much entropy is left over out of a non-unformly random sample, either give it all to fast init or credit it, but don't attempt to do both. In the process, we can clean up the injection code to no longer need to return a value.
Signed-off-by: Jan Varho jan.varho@gmail.com [Jason: expanded commit message] Fixes: 73c7733f122e ("random: do not throw away excess input to crng_fast_load") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.17+, requires af704c856e88 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 1d8242969751..ee3ad2ba0942 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -437,11 +437,8 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS], * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(), * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be * unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at all). - * - * Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded - * by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true. */ -static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) +static void crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) { static int crng_init_cnt = 0; struct blake2s_state hash; @@ -452,18 +449,15 @@ static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account) spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); if (crng_init != 0) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); - return 0; + return; }
- if (account) - len = min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); - blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); blake2s_update(&hash, input, len); blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);
if (account) { - crng_init_cnt += len; + crng_init_cnt += min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { ++base_crng.generation; crng_init = 1; @@ -474,8 +468,6 @@ static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account)
if (crng_init == 1) pr_notice("fast init done\n"); - - return len; }
static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes) @@ -1141,12 +1133,9 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) { if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy < POOL_MIN_BITS)) { - size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true); - mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret); - count -= ret; - buffer += ret; - if (!count || crng_init == 0) - return; + crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true); + mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count); + return; }
/*