6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Johannes Thumshirn johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com
commit 05b36b04d74a517d6675bf2f90829ff1ac7e28dc upstream.
Shinichiro reported the following use-after free that sometimes is happening in our CI system when running fstests' btrfs/284 on a TCMU runner device:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x708/0x780 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888106a83f18 by task kworker/u80:6/219
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 219 Comm: kworker/u80:6 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-kts+ #15 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020 Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 print_report+0x174/0x505 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x410 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 kasan_report+0xda/0x1b0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __wake_up+0x44/0x60 lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x60 __wake_up+0x44/0x60 btrfs_encoded_read_endio+0x14b/0x190 [btrfs] btrfs_check_read_bio+0x8d9/0x1360 [btrfs] ? lock_release+0x1b0/0x780 ? trace_lock_acquire+0x12f/0x1a0 ? __pfx_btrfs_check_read_bio+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 ? lock_acquire+0x31/0xc0 ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 process_one_work+0x85c/0x1460 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240 worker_thread+0x5e6/0xfc0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK>
Allocated by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x16c/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 __kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70 kfree+0x143/0x490 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x531/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106a83f00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-07-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of freed 96-byte region [ffff888106a83f00, ffff888106a83f60)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106a83800 pfn:0x106a83 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff888100053680 ffffea0004917200 0000000000000004 raw: ffff888106a83800 0000000080200019 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888106a83e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a83e80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff888106a83f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
^ ffff888106a83f80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a84000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ==================================================================
Further analyzing the trace and the crash dump's vmcore file shows that the wake_up() call in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is calling wake_up() on the wait_queue that is in the private data passed to the end_io handler.
Commit 4ff47df40447 ("btrfs: move priv off stack in btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages()") moved 'struct btrfs_encoded_read_private' off the stack.
Before that commit one can see a corruption of the private data when analyzing the vmcore after a crash:
*(struct btrfs_encoded_read_private *)0xffff88815626eec8 = { .wait = (wait_queue_head_t){ .lock = (spinlock_t){ .rlock = (struct raw_spinlock){ .raw_lock = (arch_spinlock_t){ .val = (atomic_t){ .counter = (int)-2005885696, }, .locked = (u8)0, .pending = (u8)157, .locked_pending = (u16)40192, .tail = (u16)34928, }, .magic = (unsigned int)536325682, .owner_cpu = (unsigned int)29, .owner = (void *)__SCT__tp_func_btrfs_transaction_commit+0x0 = 0x0, .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){ .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c, .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 }, .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "", .wait_type_outer = (u8)37, .wait_type_inner = (u8)178, .lock_type = (u8)154, }, }, .__padding = (u8 [24]){ 0, 157, 112, 136, 50, 174, 247, 31, 29 }, .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){ .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c, .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 }, .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "", .wait_type_outer = (u8)37, .wait_type_inner = (u8)178, .lock_type = (u8)154, }, }, .head = (struct list_head){ .next = (struct list_head *)0x112cca, .prev = (struct list_head *)0x47, }, }, .pending = (atomic_t){ .counter = (int)-1491499288, }, .status = (blk_status_t)130, }
Here we can see several indicators of in-memory data corruption, e.g. the large negative atomic values of ->pending or ->wait->lock->rlock->raw_lock->val, as well as the bogus spinlock magic 0x1ff7ae32 (decimal 536325682 above) instead of 0xdead4ead or the bogus pointer values for ->wait->head.
To fix this, change atomic_dec_return() to atomic_dec_and_test() to fix the corruption, as atomic_dec_return() is defined as two instructions on x86_64, whereas atomic_dec_and_test() is defined as a single atomic operation. This can lead to a situation where counter value is already decremented but the if statement in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is not completely processed, i.e. the 0 test has not completed. If another thread continues executing btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages() the atomic_dec_return() there can see an already updated ->pending counter and continues by freeing the private data. Continuing in the endio handler the test for 0 succeeds and the wait_queue is woken up, resulting in a use-after-free.
Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com Suggested-by: Damien Le Moal Damien.LeMoal@wdc.com Fixes: 1881fba89bd5 ("btrfs: add BTRFS_IOC_ENCODED_READ ioctl") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana fdmanana@suse.com Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo wqu@suse.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com Reviewed-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Alva Lan alvalan9@foxmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -10469,7 +10469,7 @@ static void btrfs_encoded_read_endio(str */ WRITE_ONCE(priv->status, status); } - if (!atomic_dec_return(&priv->pending)) + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&priv->pending)) wake_up(&priv->wait); btrfs_bio_free_csum(bbio); bio_put(&bbio->bio);