6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Stefan Berger stefanb@linux.ibm.com
[ Upstream commit 703ca5cda1ea04735e48882a7cccff97d57656c3 ]
In cases where 'keylen' was referring to the size of the buffer used by a curve's digits, it does not reflect the purpose of the variable anymore once NIST P521 is used. What it refers to then is the size of the buffer, which may be a few bytes larger than the size a coordinate of a key. Therefore, rename keylen to bufsize where appropriate.
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner lukas@wunner.de Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger stefanb@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Stable-dep-of: 3b0565c70350 ("crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decoding") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- crypto/ecdsa.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa.c b/crypto/ecdsa.c index e819d0983bd3..142bed98fa97 100644 --- a/crypto/ecdsa.c +++ b/crypto/ecdsa.c @@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ struct ecdsa_signature_ctx { static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, const void *value, size_t vlen, unsigned int ndigits) { - size_t keylen = ndigits * sizeof(u64); - ssize_t diff = vlen - keylen; + size_t bufsize = ndigits * sizeof(u64); + ssize_t diff = vlen - bufsize; const char *d = value; u8 rs[ECC_MAX_BYTES];
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, if (diff) return -EINVAL; } - if (-diff >= keylen) + if (-diff >= bufsize) return -EINVAL;
if (diff) { @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static int ecdsa_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) { struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req); struct ecc_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm); - size_t keylen = ctx->curve->g.ndigits * sizeof(u64); + size_t bufsize = ctx->curve->g.ndigits * sizeof(u64); struct ecdsa_signature_ctx sig_ctx = { .curve = ctx->curve, }; @@ -165,14 +165,14 @@ static int ecdsa_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) goto error;
/* if the hash is shorter then we will add leading zeros to fit to ndigits */ - diff = keylen - req->dst_len; + diff = bufsize - req->dst_len; if (diff >= 0) { if (diff) memset(rawhash, 0, diff); memcpy(&rawhash[diff], buffer + req->src_len, req->dst_len); } else if (diff < 0) { /* given hash is longer, we take the left-most bytes */ - memcpy(&rawhash, buffer + req->src_len, keylen); + memcpy(&rawhash, buffer + req->src_len, bufsize); }
ecc_swap_digits((u64 *)rawhash, hash, ctx->curve->g.ndigits);