4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Michal Hocko mhocko@suse.com
commit 5b5e4d623ec8a34689df98e42d038a3b594d2ff9 upstream.
Swap storage is restricted to max_swapfile_size (~16TB on x86_64) whenever the system is deemed affected by L1TF vulnerability. Even though the limit is quite high for most deployments it seems to be too restrictive for deployments which are willing to live with the mitigation disabled.
We have a customer to deploy 8x 6,4TB PCIe/NVMe SSD swap devices which is clearly out of the limit.
Drop the swap restriction when l1tf=off is specified. It also doesn't make much sense to warn about too much memory for the l1tf mitigation when it is forcefully disabled by the administrator.
[ tglx: Folded the documentation delta change ]
Fixes: 377eeaa8e11f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2") Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko mhocko@suse.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin pasha.tatashin@soleen.com Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen ak@linux.intel.com Acked-by: Jiri Kosina jkosina@suse.cz Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@intel.com Cc: Andi Kleen ak@linux.intel.com Cc: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181113184910.26697-1-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +++ Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst | 6 +++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2073,6 +2073,9 @@ off Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any warnings. + It also drops the swap size and available + RAM limit restriction on both hypervisor and + bare metal.
Default is 'flush'.
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst @@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ time with the option "l1tf=". The valid
off Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any warnings. + It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions + on both hypervisor and bare metal. + ============ =============================================================
The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`. @@ -576,7 +579,8 @@ Default mitigations The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
- PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done - unconditionally and cannot be controlled. + unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited + to ~16TB.
- L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for a guest. --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1000,7 +1000,8 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigatio #endif
half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT; - if (e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) { + if (l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF && + e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) { pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n"); pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n", half_pa); --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c @@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ unsigned long max_swapfile_size(void)
pages = generic_max_swapfile_size();
- if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) { + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) && l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF) { /* Limit the swap file size to MAX_PA/2 for L1TF workaround */ unsigned long long l1tf_limit = l1tf_pfn_limit(); /*