From: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com
commit 4971c268b85e1c7a734a61622fc0813c86e2362e upstream.
Commit 98de59bfe4b2f ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper") moved the code to update prot, to be the actual protections applied to the kernel, to a new helper called mmap_prot().
However, while without the helper ima_file_mmap() was getting the updated prot, with the helper ima_file_mmap() gets the original prot, which contains the protections requested by the application.
A possible consequence of this change is that, if an application calls mmap() with only PROT_READ, and the kernel applies PROT_EXEC in addition, that application would have access to executable memory without having this event recorded in the IMA measurement list. This situation would occur for example if the application, before mmap(), calls the personality() system call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument.
Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with those of the mmap_file LSM hook, so that IMA can receive both the requested prot and the final prot. Since the requested protections are stored in a new variable, and the final protections are stored in the existing variable, this effectively restores the original behavior of the MMAP_CHECK hook.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 98de59bfe4b2 ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger stefanb@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 7 ++++--- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ extern int ima_file_check(struct file *f extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode); extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); -extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); +extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags); extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot); extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, @@ -91,7 +92,8 @@ static inline void ima_file_free(struct return; }
-static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) +static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { return 0; } --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -395,7 +395,9 @@ out: /** * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL) - * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. + * @reqprot: protection requested by the application + * @prot: protection that will be applied by the kernel + * @flags: operational flags * * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure() * policy decision. @@ -403,7 +405,8 @@ out: * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) +int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { u32 secid;
--- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1592,12 +1592,13 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(st int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { + unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); int ret; - ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, - mmap_prot(file, prot), flags); + + ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); if (ret) return ret; - return ima_file_mmap(file, prot); + return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); }
int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)