6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com
commit 99485c4c026f024e7cb82da84c7951dbe3deb584 upstream.
There are few uses of CoCo that don't rely on working cryptography and hence a working RNG. Unfortunately, the CoCo threat model means that the VM host cannot be trusted and may actively work against guests to extract secrets or manipulate computation. Since a malicious host can modify or observe nearly all inputs to guests, the only remaining source of entropy for CoCo guests is RDRAND.
If RDRAND is broken -- due to CPU hardware fault -- the RNG as a whole is meant to gracefully continue on gathering entropy from other sources, but since there aren't other sources on CoCo, this is catastrophic. This is mostly a concern at boot time when initially seeding the RNG, as after that the consequences of a broken RDRAND are much more theoretical.
So, try at boot to seed the RNG using 256 bits of RDRAND output. If this fails, panic(). This will also trigger if the system is booted without RDRAND, as RDRAND is essential for a safe CoCo boot.
Add this deliberately to be "just a CoCo x86 driver feature" and not part of the RNG itself. Many device drivers and platforms have some desire to contribute something to the RNG, and add_device_randomness() is specifically meant for this purpose.
Any driver can call it with seed data of any quality, or even garbage quality, and it can only possibly make the quality of the RNG better or have no effect, but can never make it worse.
Rather than trying to build something into the core of the RNG, consider the particular CoCo issue just a CoCo issue, and therefore separate it all out into driver (well, arch/platform) code.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) bp@alien8.de Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova elena.reshetova@intel.com Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326160735.73531-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c @@ -3,13 +3,17 @@ * Confidential Computing Platform Capability checks * * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2024 Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com. All Rights Reserved. * * Author: Tom Lendacky thomas.lendacky@amd.com */
#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/cc_platform.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <asm/archrandom.h> #include <asm/coco.h> #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -128,3 +132,40 @@ u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val) } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cc_mkdec); + +__init void cc_random_init(void) +{ + /* + * The seed is 32 bytes (in units of longs), which is 256 bits, which + * is the security level that the RNG is targeting. + */ + unsigned long rng_seed[32 / sizeof(long)]; + size_t i, longs; + + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + return; + + /* + * Since the CoCo threat model includes the host, the only reliable + * source of entropy that can be neither observed nor manipulated is + * RDRAND. Usually, RDRAND failure is considered tolerable, but since + * CoCo guests have no other unobservable source of entropy, it's + * important to at least ensure the RNG gets some initial random seeds. + */ + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rng_seed); i += longs) { + longs = arch_get_random_longs(&rng_seed[i], ARRAY_SIZE(rng_seed) - i); + + /* + * A zero return value means that the guest doesn't have RDRAND + * or the CPU is physically broken, and in both cases that + * means most crypto inside of the CoCo instance will be + * broken, defeating the purpose of CoCo in the first place. So + * just panic here because it's absolutely unsafe to continue + * executing. + */ + if (longs == 0) + panic("RDRAND is defective."); + } + add_device_randomness(rng_seed, sizeof(rng_seed)); + memzero_explicit(rng_seed, sizeof(rng_seed)); +} --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static inline void cc_set_mask(u64 mask)
u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val); u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val); +void cc_random_init(void); #else static inline u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val) { @@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ static inline u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val) { return val; } +static inline void cc_random_init(void) { } #endif
#endif /* _ASM_X86_COCO_H */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include <asm/numa.h> #include <asm/bios_ebda.h> #include <asm/bugs.h> +#include <asm/coco.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/efi.h> #include <asm/gart.h> @@ -1132,6 +1133,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) * memory size. */ sev_setup_arch(); + cc_random_init();
efi_fake_memmap(); efi_find_mirror();