From: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
From: Joerg Roedel jroedel@suse.de
commit 545ac14c16b5dbd909d5a90ddf5b5a629a40fa94 upstream.
The code in the NMI handler to adjust the #VC handler IST stack is needed in case an NMI hits when the #VC handler is still using its IST stack.
But the check for this condition also needs to look if the regs->sp value is trusted, meaning it was not set by user-space. Extend the check to not use regs->sp when the NMI interrupted user-space code or the SYSCALL gap.
Fixes: 315562c9af3d5 ("x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler") Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel jroedel@suse.de Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210303141716.29223-3-joro@8bytes.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c @@ -121,8 +121,18 @@ static void __init setup_vc_stacks(int c cea_set_pte((void *)vaddr, pa, PAGE_KERNEL); }
-static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(unsigned long sp) +static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs) { + unsigned long sp = regs->sp; + + /* User-mode RSP is not trusted */ + if (user_mode(regs)) + return false; + + /* SYSCALL gap still has user-mode RSP */ + if (ip_within_syscall_gap(regs)) + return false; + return ((sp >= __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(VC)) && (sp < __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC))); }
@@ -144,7 +154,7 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct p old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
/* Make room on the IST stack */ - if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp)) + if (on_vc_stack(regs)) new_ist = ALIGN_DOWN(regs->sp, 8) - sizeof(old_ist); else new_ist = old_ist - sizeof(old_ist);