From: Daniele Alessandrelli daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com
[ Upstream commit a53ab94eb6850c3657392e2d2ce9b38c387a2633 ]
The length ('len' parameter) passed to crypto_ecdh_decode_key() is never checked against the length encoded in the passed buffer ('buf' parameter). This could lead to an out-of-bounds access when the passed length is less than the encoded length.
Add a check to prevent that.
Fixes: 3c4b23901a0c7 ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support") Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- crypto/ecdh_helper.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/ecdh_helper.c b/crypto/ecdh_helper.c index f05bea5fd257a..ae33c01311b1d 100644 --- a/crypto/ecdh_helper.c +++ b/crypto/ecdh_helper.c @@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ int crypto_ecdh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, if (secret.type != CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_ECDH) return -EINVAL;
+ if (unlikely(len < secret.len)) + return -EINVAL; + ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(¶ms->curve_id, ptr, sizeof(params->curve_id)); ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(¶ms->key_size, ptr, sizeof(params->key_size)); if (secret.len != crypto_ecdh_key_len(params))