From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@linaro.org
[ Upstream commit 8ede3db5061bb1fe28e2c9683329aafa89d2b1b4 ]
The "controllen" variable is type size_t (unsigned long). Casting it to int could lead to an integer underflow.
The check_add_overflow() function considers the type of the destination which is type int. If we add two positive values and the result cannot fit in an integer then that's counted as an overflow.
However, if we cast "controllen" to an int and it turns negative, then negative values *can* fit into an int type so there is no overflow.
Good: 100 + (unsigned long)-4 = 96 <-- overflow Bad: 100 + (int)-4 = 96 <-- no overflow
I deleted the cast of the sizeof() as well. That's not a bug but the cast is unnecessary.
Fixes: 9b0fc3c054ff ("io_uring: fix types in io_recvmsg_multishot_overflow") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@linaro.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/138bd2e2-ede8-4bcc-aa7b-f3d9de167a37@moroto.mounta... Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- io_uring/net.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/io_uring/net.c b/io_uring/net.c index 1d9bfde71809a..058e04ea68c04 100644 --- a/io_uring/net.c +++ b/io_uring/net.c @@ -544,10 +544,10 @@ static int io_recvmsg_mshot_prep(struct io_kiocb *req,
if (unlikely(namelen < 0)) return -EOVERFLOW; - if (check_add_overflow((int)sizeof(struct io_uring_recvmsg_out), + if (check_add_overflow(sizeof(struct io_uring_recvmsg_out), namelen, &hdr)) return -EOVERFLOW; - if (check_add_overflow(hdr, (int)controllen, &hdr)) + if (check_add_overflow(hdr, controllen, &hdr)) return -EOVERFLOW;
iomsg->namelen = namelen;