The quilt patch titled Subject: mm/gup: fix FOLL_FORCE COW security issue and remove FOLL_COW has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was mm-gup-fix-foll_force-cow-security-issue-and-remove-foll_cow.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------ From: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com Subject: mm/gup: fix FOLL_FORCE COW security issue and remove FOLL_COW Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 22:56:40 +0200
Ever since the Dirty COW (CVE-2016-5195) security issue happened, we know that FOLL_FORCE can be possibly dangerous, especially if there are races that can be exploited by user space.
Right now, it would be sufficient to have some code that sets a PTE of a R/O-mapped shared page dirty, in order for it to erroneously become writable by FOLL_FORCE. The implications of setting a write-protected PTE dirty might not be immediately obvious to everyone.
And in fact ever since commit 9ae0f87d009c ("mm/shmem: unconditionally set pte dirty in mfill_atomic_install_pte"), we can use UFFDIO_CONTINUE to map a shmem page R/O while marking the pte dirty. This can be used by unprivileged user space to modify tmpfs/shmem file content even if the user does not have write permissions to the file, and to bypass memfd write sealing -- Dirty COW restricted to tmpfs/shmem (CVE-2022-2590).
To fix such security issues for good, the insight is that we really only need that fancy retry logic (FOLL_COW) for COW mappings that are not writable (!VM_WRITE). And in a COW mapping, we really only broke COW if we have an exclusive anonymous page mapped. If we have something else mapped, or the mapped anonymous page might be shared (!PageAnonExclusive), we have to trigger a write fault to break COW. If we don't find an exclusive anonymous page when we retry, we have to trigger COW breaking once again because something intervened.
Let's move away from this mandatory-retry + dirty handling and rely on our PageAnonExclusive() flag for making a similar decision, to use the same COW logic as in other kernel parts here as well. In case we stumble over a PTE in a COW mapping that does not map an exclusive anonymous page, COW was not properly broken and we have to trigger a fake write-fault to break COW.
Just like we do in can_change_pte_writable() added via commit 64fe24a3e05e ("mm/mprotect: try avoiding write faults for exclusive anonymous pages when changing protection") and commit 76aefad628aa ("mm/mprotect: fix soft-dirty check in can_change_pte_writable()"), take care of softdirty and uffd-wp manually.
For example, a write() via /proc/self/mem to a uffd-wp-protected range has to fail instead of silently granting write access and bypassing the userspace fault handler. Note that FOLL_FORCE is not only used for debug access, but also triggered by applications without debug intentions, for example, when pinning pages via RDMA.
This fixes CVE-2022-2590. Note that only x86_64 and aarch64 are affected, because only those support CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR.
Fortunately, FOLL_COW is no longer required to handle FOLL_FORCE. So let's just get rid of it.
Thanks to Nadav Amit for pointing out that the pte_dirty() check in FOLL_FORCE code is problematic and might be exploitable.
Note 1: We don't check for the PTE being dirty because it doesn't matter for making a "was COWed" decision anymore, and whoever modifies the page has to set the page dirty either way.
Note 2: Kernels before extended uffd-wp support and before PageAnonExclusive (< 5.19) can simply revert the problematic commit instead and be safe regarding UFFDIO_CONTINUE. A backport to v5.19 requires minor adjustments due to lack of vma_soft_dirty_enabled().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220809205640.70916-1-david@redhat.com Fixes: 9ae0f87d009c ("mm/shmem: unconditionally set pte dirty in mfill_atomic_install_pte") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Axel Rasmussen axelrasmussen@google.com Cc: Nadav Amit nadav.amit@gmail.com Cc: Peter Xu peterx@redhat.com Cc: Hugh Dickins hughd@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli aarcange@redhat.com Cc: Matthew Wilcox willy@infradead.org Cc: Vlastimil Babka vbabka@suse.cz Cc: John Hubbard jhubbard@nvidia.com Cc: Jason Gunthorpe jgg@nvidia.com Cc: David Laight David.Laight@ACULAB.COM Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [5.16] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org ---
include/linux/mm.h | 1 mm/gup.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- mm/huge_memory.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/mm.h~mm-gup-fix-foll_force-cow-security-issue-and-remove-foll_cow +++ a/include/linux/mm.h @@ -2884,7 +2884,6 @@ struct page *follow_page(struct vm_area_ #define FOLL_MIGRATION 0x400 /* wait for page to replace migration entry */ #define FOLL_TRIED 0x800 /* a retry, previous pass started an IO */ #define FOLL_REMOTE 0x2000 /* we are working on non-current tsk/mm */ -#define FOLL_COW 0x4000 /* internal GUP flag */ #define FOLL_ANON 0x8000 /* don't do file mappings */ #define FOLL_LONGTERM 0x10000 /* mapping lifetime is indefinite: see below */ #define FOLL_SPLIT_PMD 0x20000 /* split huge pmd before returning */ --- a/mm/gup.c~mm-gup-fix-foll_force-cow-security-issue-and-remove-foll_cow +++ a/mm/gup.c @@ -478,14 +478,42 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area return -EEXIST; }
-/* - * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only - * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty. - */ -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags) +/* FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable PTEs in COW mappings. */ +static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, struct page *page, + struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned int flags) { - return pte_write(pte) || - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte)); + /* If the pte is writable, we can write to the page. */ + if (pte_write(pte)) + return true; + + /* Maybe FOLL_FORCE is set to override it? */ + if (!(flags & FOLL_FORCE)) + return false; + + /* But FOLL_FORCE has no effect on shared mappings */ + if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_MAYSHARE | VM_SHARED)) + return false; + + /* ... or read-only private ones */ + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE)) + return false; + + /* ... or already writable ones that just need to take a write fault */ + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) + return false; + + /* + * See can_change_pte_writable(): we broke COW and could map the page + * writable if we have an exclusive anonymous page ... + */ + if (!page || !PageAnon(page) || !PageAnonExclusive(page)) + return false; + + /* ... and a write-fault isn't required for other reasons. */ + if (vma_soft_dirty_enabled(vma) && !pte_soft_dirty(pte)) + return false; + return !userfaultfd_pte_wp(vma, pte); }
static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, @@ -528,12 +556,19 @@ retry: } if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte)) goto no_page; - if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) { - pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl); - return NULL; - }
page = vm_normal_page(vma, address, pte); + + /* + * We only care about anon pages in can_follow_write_pte() and don't + * have to worry about pte_devmap() because they are never anon. + */ + if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && + !can_follow_write_pte(pte, page, vma, flags)) { + page = NULL; + goto out; + } + if (!page && pte_devmap(pte) && (flags & (FOLL_GET | FOLL_PIN))) { /* * Only return device mapping pages in the FOLL_GET or FOLL_PIN @@ -986,17 +1021,6 @@ static int faultin_page(struct vm_area_s return -EBUSY; }
- /* - * The VM_FAULT_WRITE bit tells us that do_wp_page has broken COW when - * necessary, even if maybe_mkwrite decided not to set pte_write. We - * can thus safely do subsequent page lookups as if they were reads. - * But only do so when looping for pte_write is futile: in some cases - * userspace may also be wanting to write to the gotten user page, - * which a read fault here might prevent (a readonly page might get - * reCOWed by userspace write). - */ - if ((ret & VM_FAULT_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) - *flags |= FOLL_COW; return 0; }
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c~mm-gup-fix-foll_force-cow-security-issue-and-remove-foll_cow +++ a/mm/huge_memory.c @@ -1040,12 +1040,6 @@ struct page *follow_devmap_pmd(struct vm
assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
- /* - * When we COW a devmap PMD entry, we split it into PTEs, so we should - * not be in this function with `flags & FOLL_COW` set. - */ - WARN_ONCE(flags & FOLL_COW, "mm: In follow_devmap_pmd with FOLL_COW set"); - /* FOLL_GET and FOLL_PIN are mutually exclusive. */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE((flags & (FOLL_PIN | FOLL_GET)) == (FOLL_PIN | FOLL_GET))) @@ -1395,14 +1389,42 @@ fallback: return VM_FAULT_FALLBACK; }
-/* - * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only - * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty. - */ -static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags) +/* FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable PMDs in COW mappings. */ +static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, struct page *page, + struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned int flags) { - return pmd_write(pmd) || - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd)); + /* If the pmd is writable, we can write to the page. */ + if (pmd_write(pmd)) + return true; + + /* Maybe FOLL_FORCE is set to override it? */ + if (!(flags & FOLL_FORCE)) + return false; + + /* But FOLL_FORCE has no effect on shared mappings */ + if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_MAYSHARE | VM_SHARED)) + return false; + + /* ... or read-only private ones */ + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE)) + return false; + + /* ... or already writable ones that just need to take a write fault */ + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) + return false; + + /* + * See can_change_pte_writable(): we broke COW and could map the page + * writable if we have an exclusive anonymous page ... + */ + if (!page || !PageAnon(page) || !PageAnonExclusive(page)) + return false; + + /* ... and a write-fault isn't required for other reasons. */ + if (vma_soft_dirty_enabled(vma) && !pmd_soft_dirty(pmd)) + return false; + return !userfaultfd_huge_pmd_wp(vma, pmd); }
struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, @@ -1411,12 +1433,16 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struc unsigned int flags) { struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; - struct page *page = NULL; + struct page *page;
assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
- if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags)) - goto out; + page = pmd_page(*pmd); + VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHead(page) && !is_zone_device_page(page), page); + + if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && + !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, page, vma, flags)) + return NULL;
/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */ if ((flags & FOLL_DUMP) && is_huge_zero_pmd(*pmd)) @@ -1424,10 +1450,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struc
/* Full NUMA hinting faults to serialise migration in fault paths */ if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pmd_protnone(*pmd)) - goto out; - - page = pmd_page(*pmd); - VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHead(page) && !is_zone_device_page(page), page); + return NULL;
if (!pmd_write(*pmd) && gup_must_unshare(flags, page)) return ERR_PTR(-EMLINK); @@ -1444,7 +1467,6 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struc page += (addr & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT; VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageCompound(page) && !is_zone_device_page(page), page);
-out: return page; }
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from david@redhat.com are