6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz luiz.von.dentz@intel.com
[ Upstream commit 7af8479d9eb4319b4ba7b47a8c4d2c55af1c31e1 ]
l2cap_check_enc_key_size shall check the security level of the l2cap_chan rather than the hci_conn since for incoming connection request that may be different as hci_conn may already been encrypted using a different security level.
Fixes: 522e9ed157e3 ("Bluetooth: l2cap: Check encryption key size on incoming connection") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz luiz.von.dentz@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 222105e24d2d8..cb9b1edfcea2a 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -1561,7 +1561,8 @@ static void l2cap_request_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn) sizeof(req), &req); }
-static bool l2cap_check_enc_key_size(struct hci_conn *hcon) +static bool l2cap_check_enc_key_size(struct hci_conn *hcon, + struct l2cap_chan *chan) { /* The minimum encryption key size needs to be enforced by the * host stack before establishing any L2CAP connections. The @@ -1575,7 +1576,7 @@ static bool l2cap_check_enc_key_size(struct hci_conn *hcon) int min_key_size = hcon->hdev->min_enc_key_size;
/* On FIPS security level, key size must be 16 bytes */ - if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) + if (chan->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) min_key_size = 16;
return (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) || @@ -1603,7 +1604,7 @@ static void l2cap_do_start(struct l2cap_chan *chan) !__l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) return;
- if (l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon)) + if (l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon, chan)) l2cap_start_connection(chan); else __set_chan_timer(chan, L2CAP_DISC_TIMEOUT); @@ -1685,7 +1686,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn) continue; }
- if (l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon)) + if (l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon, chan)) l2cap_start_connection(chan); else l2cap_chan_close(chan, ECONNREFUSED); @@ -4187,7 +4188,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn, /* Check if the ACL is secure enough (if not SDP) */ if (psm != cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_PSM_SDP) && (!hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn->hcon) || - !l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon))) { + !l2cap_check_enc_key_size(conn->hcon, pchan))) { conn->disc_reason = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE; result = L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK; goto response; @@ -8418,7 +8419,7 @@ static void l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt) }
if (chan->state == BT_CONNECT) { - if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon)) + if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon, chan)) l2cap_start_connection(chan); else __set_chan_timer(chan, L2CAP_DISC_TIMEOUT); @@ -8428,7 +8429,7 @@ static void l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt) struct l2cap_conn_rsp rsp; __u16 res, stat;
- if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon)) { + if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon, chan)) { if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) { res = L2CAP_CR_PEND; stat = L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND;