From: Maxim Mikityanskiy maximmi@nvidia.com
[ Upstream commit ba91c49dedbde758ba0b72f57ac90b06ddf8e548 ]
The TCP option parser in cake qdisc (cake_get_tcpopt and cake_tcph_may_drop) could read one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds the length of 1.
This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options.").
v2 changes:
Added doff validation in cake_get_tcphdr to avoid parsing garbage as TCP header. Although it wasn't strictly an out-of-bounds access (memory was allocated), garbage values could be read where CAKE expected the TCP header if doff was smaller than 5.
Cc: Young Xiao 92siuyang@gmail.com Fixes: 8b7138814f29 ("sch_cake: Add optional ACK filter") Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy maximmi@nvidia.com Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen toke@toke.dk Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/sched/sch_cake.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_cake.c b/net/sched/sch_cake.c index 896c0562cb42..e8eebe40e0ae 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_cake.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_cake.c @@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ static struct tcphdr *cake_get_tcphdr(const struct sk_buff *skb, }
tcph = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); - if (!tcph) + if (!tcph || tcph->doff < 5) return NULL;
return skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, @@ -931,6 +931,8 @@ static const void *cake_get_tcpopt(const struct tcphdr *tcph, length--; continue; } + if (length < 2) + break; opsize = *ptr++; if (opsize < 2 || opsize > length) break; @@ -1068,6 +1070,8 @@ static bool cake_tcph_may_drop(const struct tcphdr *tcph, length--; continue; } + if (length < 2) + break; opsize = *ptr++; if (opsize < 2 || opsize > length) break;