5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Peter Collingbourne pcc@google.com
[ Upstream commit 758cabae312d3aded781aacc6d0c946b299c52df ]
With HW tag-based KASAN, error checks are performed implicitly by the load and store instructions in the memcpy implementation. A failed check results in tag checks being disabled and execution will keep going. As a result, under HW tag-based KASAN, prior to commit 1b0668be62cf ("kasan: test: disable kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size for HW_TAGS"), this memcpy would end up corrupting memory until it hits an inaccessible page and causes a kernel panic.
This is a pre-existing issue that was revealed by commit 285133040e6c ("arm64: Import latest memcpy()/memmove() implementation") which changed the memcpy implementation from using signed comparisons (incorrectly, resulting in the memcpy being terminated early for negative sizes) to using unsigned comparisons.
It is unclear how this could be handled by memcpy itself in a reasonable way. One possibility would be to add an exception handler that would force memcpy to return if a tag check fault is detected -- this would make the behavior roughly similar to generic and SW tag-based KASAN. However, this wouldn't solve the problem for asynchronous mode and also makes memcpy behavior inconsistent with manually copying data.
This test was added as a part of a series that taught KASAN to detect negative sizes in memory operations, see commit 8cceeff48f23 ("kasan: detect negative size in memory operation function"). Therefore we should keep testing for negative sizes with generic and SW tag-based KASAN. But there is some value in testing small memcpy overflows, so let's add another test with memcpy that does not destabilize the kernel by performing out-of-bounds writes, and run it in all modes.
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I048d1e6a9aff766c4a53f989fb0c83de68... Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210910211356.3603758-1-pcc@google.com Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne pcc@google.com Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov andreyknvl@gmail.com Acked-by: Marco Elver elver@google.com Cc: Robin Murphy robin.murphy@arm.com Cc: Will Deacon will@kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Cc: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Cc: Evgenii Stepanov eugenis@google.com Cc: Alexander Potapenko glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Stable-dep-of: e10aea105e9e ("kasan/test: avoid gcc warning for intentional overflow") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- lib/test_kasan.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c index 89f444cabd4a8..f0b8b05ccf194 100644 --- a/lib/test_kasan.c +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c @@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static void kmalloc_oob_in_memset(struct kunit *test) kfree(ptr); }
-static void kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size(struct kunit *test) +static void kmalloc_memmove_negative_size(struct kunit *test) { char *ptr; size_t size = 64; @@ -522,6 +522,21 @@ static void kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size(struct kunit *test) kfree(ptr); }
+static void kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size(struct kunit *test) +{ + char *ptr; + size_t size = 64; + volatile size_t invalid_size = size; + + ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr); + + memset((char *)ptr, 0, 64); + KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, + memmove((char *)ptr, (char *)ptr + 4, invalid_size)); + kfree(ptr); +} + static void kmalloc_uaf(struct kunit *test) { char *ptr; @@ -1139,6 +1154,7 @@ static struct kunit_case kasan_kunit_test_cases[] = { KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_memset_4), KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_memset_8), KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_memset_16), + KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_memmove_negative_size), KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size), KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_uaf), KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_uaf_memset),