4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Andrea Arcangeli aarcange@redhat.com
commit 5b51072e97d587186c2f5390c8c9c1fb7e179505 upstream.
Userfaultfd did not create private memory when UFFDIO_COPY was invoked on a MAP_PRIVATE shmem mapping. Instead it wrote to the shmem file, even when that had not been opened for writing. Though, fortunately, that could only happen where there was a hole in the file.
Fix the shmem-backed implementation of UFFDIO_COPY to create private memory for MAP_PRIVATE mappings. The hugetlbfs-backed implementation was already correct.
This change is visible to userland, if userfaultfd has been used in unintended ways: so it introduces a small risk of incompatibility, but is necessary in order to respect file permissions.
An app that uses UFFDIO_COPY for anything like postcopy live migration won't notice the difference, and in fact it'll run faster because there will be no copy-on-write and memory waste in the tmpfs pagecache anymore.
Userfaults on MAP_PRIVATE shmem keep triggering only on file holes like before.
The real zeropage can also be built on a MAP_PRIVATE shmem mapping through UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE and that's safe because the zeropage pte is never dirty, in turn even an mprotect upgrading the vma permission from PROT_READ to PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE won't make the zeropage pte writable.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-3-aarcange@redhat.com Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support") Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli aarcange@redhat.com Reported-by: Mike Rapoport rppt@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins hughd@google.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" dgilbert@redhat.com Cc: Jann Horn jannh@google.com Cc: Mike Kravetz mike.kravetz@oracle.com Cc: Peter Xu peterx@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- mm/userfaultfd.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/userfaultfd.c +++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c @@ -381,7 +381,17 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_ato { ssize_t err;
- if (vma_is_anonymous(dst_vma)) { + /* + * The normal page fault path for a shmem will invoke the + * fault, fill the hole in the file and COW it right away. The + * result generates plain anonymous memory. So when we are + * asked to fill an hole in a MAP_PRIVATE shmem mapping, we'll + * generate anonymous memory directly without actually filling + * the hole. For the MAP_PRIVATE case the robustness check + * only happens in the pagetable (to verify it's still none) + * and not in the radix tree. + */ + if (!(dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) { if (!zeropage) err = mcopy_atomic_pte(dst_mm, dst_pmd, dst_vma, dst_addr, src_addr, page); @@ -486,7 +496,8 @@ retry: * dst_vma. */ err = -ENOMEM; - if (vma_is_anonymous(dst_vma) && unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(dst_vma))) + if (!(dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && + unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(dst_vma))) goto out_unlock;
while (src_addr < src_start + len) {