5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@linaro.org
[ Upstream commit aab98e2dbd648510f8f51b83fbf4721206ccae45 ]
On 32bit systems the addition operations in ipc_msg_alloc() can potentially overflow leading to memory corruption. Add bounds checking using KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD to avoid overflow.
Fixes: 0626e6641f6b ("cifsd: add server handler for central processing and tranport layers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon linkinjeon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French stfrench@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c b/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c index d62ebbff1e0f4..0d096a11ba30e 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c @@ -566,6 +566,9 @@ ksmbd_ipc_spnego_authen_request(const char *spnego_blob, int blob_len) struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_request *req; struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response *resp;
+ if (blob_len > KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD) + return NULL; + msg = ipc_msg_alloc(sizeof(struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_request) + blob_len + 1); if (!msg) @@ -745,6 +748,9 @@ struct ksmbd_rpc_command *ksmbd_rpc_write(struct ksmbd_session *sess, int handle struct ksmbd_rpc_command *req; struct ksmbd_rpc_command *resp;
+ if (payload_sz > KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD) + return NULL; + msg = ipc_msg_alloc(sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + payload_sz + 1); if (!msg) return NULL; @@ -793,6 +799,9 @@ struct ksmbd_rpc_command *ksmbd_rpc_ioctl(struct ksmbd_session *sess, int handle struct ksmbd_rpc_command *req; struct ksmbd_rpc_command *resp;
+ if (payload_sz > KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD) + return NULL; + msg = ipc_msg_alloc(sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + payload_sz + 1); if (!msg) return NULL;