The patch titled Subject: pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------ From: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com Subject: pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits
pipe-user-pages-hard and pipe-user-pages-soft are only supposed to apply to unprivileged users, as documented in both Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt and the pipe(7) man page.
However, the capabilities are actually only checked when increasing a pipe's size using F_SETPIPE_SZ, not when creating a new pipe. Therefore, if pipe-user-pages-hard has been set, the root user can run into it and be unable to create pipes. Similarly, if pipe-user-pages-soft has been set, the root user can run into it and have their pipes limited to 1 page each.
Fix this by allowing the privileged override in both cases.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-4-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: 759c01142a5d ("pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com Acked-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Acked-by: Joe Lawrence joe.lawrence@redhat.com Cc: Alexander Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" mcgrof@kernel.org Cc: Michael Kerrisk mtk.manpages@gmail.com Cc: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com Cc: Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org ---
fs/pipe.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff -puN fs/pipe.c~pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits fs/pipe.c --- a/fs/pipe.c~pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits +++ a/fs/pipe.c @@ -613,6 +613,11 @@ static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(u return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_hard; }
+static bool is_unprivileged_user(void) +{ + return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void) { struct pipe_inode_info *pipe; @@ -629,12 +634,12 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(
user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs);
- if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) { + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) { user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 1); pipe_bufs = 1; }
- if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs)) + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) goto out_revert_acct;
pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer), @@ -1065,7 +1070,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_in if (nr_pages > pipe->buffers && (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) || too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + is_unprivileged_user()) { ret = -EPERM; goto out_revert_acct; } _
Patches currently in -mm which might be from ebiggers@google.com are