6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Thomas Weißschuh thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de
[ Upstream commit 2caa6b88e0ba0231fb4ff0ba8e73cedd5fb81fc8 ]
In the past %pK was preferable to %p as it would not leak raw pointer values into the kernel log. Since commit ad67b74d2469 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p") the regular %p has been improved to avoid this issue. Furthermore, restricted pointers ("%pK") were never meant to be used through printk(). They can still unintentionally leak raw pointers or acquire sleeping locks in atomic contexts.
Switch to the regular pointer formatting which is safer and easier to reason about.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko andrii@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250811-restricted-pointers-bpf-v1-1-a1d7cc3cb9... Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/linux/filter.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index adf65eacade06..4ffea87e6fb64 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ void bpf_jit_prog_release_other(struct bpf_prog *fp, struct bpf_prog *fp_other); static inline void bpf_jit_dump(unsigned int flen, unsigned int proglen, u32 pass, void *image) { - pr_err("flen=%u proglen=%u pass=%u image=%pK from=%s pid=%d\n", flen, + pr_err("flen=%u proglen=%u pass=%u image=%p from=%s pid=%d\n", flen, proglen, pass, image, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
if (image)