From: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit c3d03e8e35e005e1a614e51bb59053eeb5857f76 ]
Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the linear mapping area.
However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs adjacent pages.
Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ Suggested-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com Tested-by: Stefan Berger stefanb@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index e5fae4e838c06..2d57b0b3f9a4a 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -255,9 +255,10 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, struct crypto_wait cwait; struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; struct akcipher_request *req; - struct scatterlist src_sg[2]; + struct scatterlist src_sg; char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; - char *key, *ptr; + char *buf, *ptr; + size_t buf_len; int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); @@ -281,28 +282,31 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, if (!req) goto error_free_tfm;
- key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!key) + buf_len = max_t(size_t, pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen, + sig->s_size + sig->digest_size); + + buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) goto error_free_req;
- memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen); - ptr = key + pkey->keylen; + memcpy(buf, pkey->key, pkey->keylen); + ptr = buf + pkey->keylen; ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo); ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen); memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
if (pkey->key_is_private) - ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); + ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, buf, pkey->keylen); else - ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); + ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, buf, pkey->keylen); if (ret) - goto error_free_key; + goto error_free_buf;
- sg_init_table(src_sg, 2); - sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size); - sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); - akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, + memcpy(buf, sig->s, sig->s_size); + memcpy(buf + sig->s_size, sig->digest, sig->digest_size); + + sg_init_one(&src_sg, buf, sig->s_size + sig->digest_size); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, sig->digest_size); crypto_init_wait(&cwait); akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | @@ -310,8 +314,8 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, crypto_req_done, &cwait); ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait);
-error_free_key: - kfree(key); +error_free_buf: + kfree(buf); error_free_req: akcipher_request_free(req); error_free_tfm: