6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Paul Chaignon paul.chaignon@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit c4327229948879814229b46aa26a750718888503 ]
When bpf_redirect_peer is used to redirect packets to a device in another network namespace, the skb isn't scrubbed. That can lead skb information from one namespace to be "misused" in another namespace.
As one example, this is causing Cilium to drop traffic when using bpf_redirect_peer to redirect packets that just went through IPsec decryption to a container namespace. The following pwru trace shows (1) the packet path from the host's XFRM layer to the container's XFRM layer where it's dropped and (2) the number of active skb extensions at each function.
NETNS MARK IFACE TUPLE FUNC 4026533547 d00 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 xfrm_rcv_cb .active_extensions = (__u8)2, 4026533547 d00 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 xfrm4_rcv_cb .active_extensions = (__u8)2, 4026533547 d00 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 gro_cells_receive .active_extensions = (__u8)2, [...] 4026533547 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 skb_do_redirect .active_extensions = (__u8)2, 4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 ip_rcv .active_extensions = (__u8)2, 4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 ip_rcv_core .active_extensions = (__u8)2, [...] 4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb .active_extensions = (__u8)2, 4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 __xfrm_policy_check .active_extensions = (__u8)2, 4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 __xfrm_decode_session .active_extensions = (__u8)2, 4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 security_xfrm_decode_session .active_extensions = (__u8)2, 4026534999 0 eth0 10.244.3.124:35473->10.244.2.158:53 kfree_skb_reason(SKB_DROP_REASON_XFRM_POLICY) .active_extensions = (__u8)2,
In this case, there are no XFRM policies in the container's network namespace so the drop is unexpected. When we decrypt the IPsec packet, the XFRM state used for decryption is set in the skb extensions. This information is preserved across the netns switch. When we reach the XFRM policy check in the container's netns, __xfrm_policy_check drops the packet with LINUX_MIB_XFRMINNOPOLS because a (container-side) XFRM policy can't be found that matches the (host-side) XFRM state used for decryption.
This patch fixes this by scrubbing the packet when using bpf_redirect_peer, as is done on typical netns switches via veth devices except skb->mark and skb->tstamp are not zeroed.
Fixes: 9aa1206e8f482 ("bpf: Add redirect_peer helper") Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon paul.chaignon@gmail.com Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau martin.lau@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1728ead5e0fe45e7a6542c36bd4e3ca07a73b7d6.1746460653... Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/core/filter.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 066277b91a1be..5143c8a9e52ca 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -2507,6 +2507,7 @@ int skb_do_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb) goto out_drop; skb->dev = dev; dev_sw_netstats_rx_add(dev, skb->len); + skb_scrub_packet(skb, false); return -EAGAIN; } return flags & BPF_F_NEIGH ?