4.20-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" gustavo@embeddedor.com
[ Upstream commit 50d5258634aee2e62832aa086d2fb0de00e72b91 ]
flen is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/core/filter.c:1101 bpf_check_classic() warn: potential spectre issue 'filter' [w]
Fix this by sanitizing flen before using it to index filter at line 1101:
switch (filter[flen - 1].code) {
and through pc at line 1040:
const struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc];
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavo@embeddedor.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/core/filter.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ #include <linux/seg6_local.h> #include <net/seg6.h> #include <net/seg6_local.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
/** * sk_filter_trim_cap - run a packet through a socket filter @@ -1038,6 +1039,7 @@ static int bpf_check_classic(const struc bool anc_found; int pc;
+ flen = array_index_nospec(flen, BPF_MAXINSNS + 1); /* Check the filter code now */ for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) { const struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc];