3.16.56-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de
commit a89f040fa34ec9cd682aed98b8f04e3c47d998bd upstream.
Many x86 CPUs leak information to user space due to missing isolation of user space and kernel space page tables. There are many well documented ways to exploit that.
The upcoming software migitation of isolating the user and kernel space page tables needs a misfeature flag so code can be made runtime conditional.
Add the BUG bits which indicates that the CPU is affected and add a feature bit which indicates that the software migitation is enabled.
Assume for now that _ALL_ x86 CPUs are affected by this. Exceptions can be made later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org Cc: Boris Ostrovsky boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: Borislav Petkov bp@alien8.de Cc: Brian Gerst brgerst@gmail.com Cc: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: David Laight David.Laight@aculab.com Cc: Denys Vlasenko dvlasenk@redhat.com Cc: Eduardo Valentin eduval@amazon.com Cc: Greg KH gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: H. Peter Anvin hpa@zytor.com Cc: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com Cc: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: assign the first available bug number] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ #define X86_BUG_COMA X86_BUG(2) /* Cyrix 6x86 coma */ #define X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH X86_BUG(3) /* AMD Erratum 383 */ #define X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E X86_BUG(4) /* AMD Erratum 400 */ +#define X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE X86_BUG(5) /* CPU is insecure and needs kernel page table isolation */
#if defined(__KERNEL__) && !defined(__ASSEMBLY__)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -804,6 +804,9 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st this_cpu->c_bsp_init(c);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); + + /* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */ + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE); }
void __init early_cpu_init(void)