4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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[ commit ceefbc96fa5c5b975d87bf8e89ba8416f6b764d9 upstream ]
malicious bpf program may try to force the verifier to remember a lot of distinct verifier states. Put a limit to number of per-insn 'struct bpf_verifier_state'. Note that hitting the limit doesn't reject the program. It potentially makes the verifier do more steps to analyze the program. It means that malicious programs will hit BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS sooner instead of spending cpu time walking long link list.
The limit of BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES==64 affects cilium progs with slight increase in number of "steps" it takes to successfully verify the programs: before after bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1940 1940 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3089 3089 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1065 1065 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 28052 | 28162 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 35487 | 35541 bpf_netdev.o 10864 10864 bpf_overlay.o 6643 6643 bpf_lcx_jit.o 38437 38437
But it also makes malicious program to be rejected in 0.4 seconds vs 6.5 Hence apply this limit to unprivileged programs only.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Acked-by: Edward Cree ecree@solarflare.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 3d093003c723..2bbb98535b70 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 131072 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024 +#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64
#define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \ @@ -4735,7 +4736,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; - int i, j, err; + int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0;
sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx]; if (!sl) @@ -4762,8 +4763,12 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) return 1; } sl = sl->next; + states_cnt++; }
+ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) + return 0; + /* there were no equivalent states, remember current one. * technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe)