6.11-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Xu Kuohai xukuohai@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit 28ead3eaabc16ecc907cfb71876da028080f6356 ]
bpf progs can be attached to kernel functions, and the attached functions can take different parameters or return different return values. If prog attached to one kernel function tail calls prog attached to another kernel function, the ctx access or return value verification could be bypassed.
For example, if prog1 is attached to func1 which takes only 1 parameter and prog2 is attached to func2 which takes two parameters. Since verifier assumes the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed based on func2's prototype, verifier allows prog2 to access the second parameter from the bpf ctx passed to it. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1 from passing its bpf ctx to prog2 via tail call. In this case, the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed from func1 instead of func2, that is, the assumption for ctx access verification is bypassed.
Another example, if BPF LSM prog1 is attached to hook file_alloc_security, and BPF LSM prog2 is attached to hook bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known. Verifier knows the return value rules for these two hooks, e.g. it is legal for bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known to return positive number 1, and it is illegal for file_alloc_security to return positive number. So verifier allows prog2 to return positive number 1, but does not allow prog1 to return positive number. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1 from calling prog2 via tail call. In this case, prog2's return value 1 will be used as the return value for prog1's hook file_alloc_security. That is, the return value rule is bypassed.
This patch adds restriction for tail call to prevent such bypasses.
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai xukuohai@huawei.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719110059.797546-4-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/linux/bpf.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/core.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index 70fa4ffc3879f..f3e5ce397b8ef 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ struct bpf_map { * same prog type, JITed flag and xdp_has_frags flag. */ struct { + const struct btf_type *attach_func_proto; spinlock_t lock; enum bpf_prog_type type; bool jited; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 7ee62e38faf0e..4e07cc057d6f2 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -2302,6 +2302,7 @@ bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map, { enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(fp); bool ret; + struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = fp->aux;
if (fp->kprobe_override) return false; @@ -2311,7 +2312,7 @@ bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map, * in the case of devmap and cpumap). Until device checks * are implemented, prohibit adding dev-bound programs to program maps. */ - if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(fp->aux)) + if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(aux)) return false;
spin_lock(&map->owner.lock); @@ -2321,12 +2322,26 @@ bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map, */ map->owner.type = prog_type; map->owner.jited = fp->jited; - map->owner.xdp_has_frags = fp->aux->xdp_has_frags; + map->owner.xdp_has_frags = aux->xdp_has_frags; + map->owner.attach_func_proto = aux->attach_func_proto; ret = true; } else { ret = map->owner.type == prog_type && map->owner.jited == fp->jited && - map->owner.xdp_has_frags == fp->aux->xdp_has_frags; + map->owner.xdp_has_frags == aux->xdp_has_frags; + if (ret && + map->owner.attach_func_proto != aux->attach_func_proto) { + switch (prog_type) { + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: + ret = false; + break; + default: + break; + } + } } spin_unlock(&map->owner.lock);