On (24/11/29 19:04), Andrew Morton wrote:
[ 52.073080 ] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 52.073511 ] Modules linked in: [ 52.074094 ] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3825 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.12.0-07749-g28eb75e178d3-dirty #3 [ 52.074672 ] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 52.075128 ] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 52.075619 ] pc : obj_malloc+0x5c/0x160 [ 52.076402 ] lr : zs_malloc+0x200/0x570 [ 52.076630 ] sp : ffff80008dd335f0 [ 52.076797 ] x29: ffff80008dd335f0 x28: ffff000004104a00 x27: ffff000004dfc400 [ 52.077319 ] x26: 000000000000ca18 x25: ffff00003fcaf0e0 x24: ffff000006925cf0 [ 52.077785 ] x23: 0000000000000c0a x22: ffff0000032ee780 x21: ffff000006925cf0 [ 52.078257 ] x20: 0000000000088000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000fffc18 [ 52.078701 ] x17: 00000000fffffffd x16: 0000000000000803 x15: 00000000fffffffe [ 52.079203 ] x14: 000000001824429d x13: ffff000006e84000 x12: ffff000006e83fec [ 52.079711 ] x11: ffff000006e83000 x10: 00000000000002a5 x9 : ffff000006e83ff3 [ 52.080269 ] x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 0000000017e80000 x6 : 0000000000017e80 [ 52.080724 ] x5 : 0000000000000003 x4 : ffff00000402a5e8 x3 : 0000000000000066 [ 52.081081 ] x2 : ffff000006925cf0 x1 : ffff00000402a5e8 x0 : ffff000004104a00 [ 52.081595 ] Call trace: [ 52.081925 ] obj_malloc+0x5c/0x160 (P) [ 52.082220 ] zs_malloc+0x200/0x570 (L) [ 52.082504 ] zs_malloc+0x200/0x570 [ 52.082716 ] zram_submit_bio+0x788/0x9e8 [ 52.083017 ] __submit_bio+0x1c4/0x338 [ 52.083343 ] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x128/0x2c0 [ 52.083518 ] submit_bio_noacct+0x1c8/0x308 [ 52.083722 ] submit_bio+0xa8/0x14c [ 52.083942 ] submit_bh_wbc+0x140/0x1bc [ 52.084088 ] __block_write_full_folio+0x23c/0x5f0 [ 52.084232 ] block_write_full_folio+0x134/0x21c [ 52.084524 ] write_cache_pages+0x64/0xd4 [ 52.084778 ] blkdev_writepages+0x50/0x8c [ 52.085040 ] do_writepages+0x80/0x2b0 [ 52.085292 ] filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x6c/0x90 [ 52.085597 ] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x64/0x94 [ 52.085900 ] filemap_fdatawrite+0x1c/0x28 [ 52.086158 ] sync_bdevs+0x170/0x17c [ 52.086374 ] ksys_sync+0x6c/0xb8 [ 52.086597 ] __arm64_sys_sync+0x10/0x20 [ 52.086847 ] invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100 [ 52.087230 ] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 [ 52.087550 ] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 52.087690 ] el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 [ 52.087818 ] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc [ 52.088046 ] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c [ 52.088500 ] Code: 110004a5 6b0500df f9401273 54000160 (f9401664) [ 52.089097 ] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
When using ext4 on zram, the following panic occasionally occurs under high memory usage
The reason is that when the handle is obtained using the slow path, it will be re-compressed. If the data in the page changes, the compressed length may exceed the previous one. Overflow occurred when writing to zs_object, which then caused the panic.
Comment the fast path and force the slow path. Adding a large number of read and write file systems can quickly reproduce it.
The solution is to re-obtain the handle after re-compression if the length is different from the previous one.
Andrew, I'm leaning toward asking you to drop this patch. zram cannot (nor should probably) do anything about upper layer modifying the page data during write(). It's a bug in the upper layer which zram should not hide.