The patch titled Subject: mm: reinstate ability to map write-sealed memfd mappings read-only has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-reinstate-ability-to-map-write-sealed-memfd-mappings-read-only.patch
This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patches...
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
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------------------------------------------------------ From: Lorenzo Stoakes lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com Subject: mm: reinstate ability to map write-sealed memfd mappings read-only Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 15:06:17 +0000
Patch series "mm: reinstate ability to map write-sealed memfd mappings read-only".
In commit 158978945f31 ("mm: perform the mapping_map_writable() check after call_mmap()") (and preceding changes in the same series) it became possible to mmap() F_SEAL_WRITE sealed memfd mappings read-only.
Commit 5de195060b2e ("mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour") unintentionally undid this logic by moving the mapping_map_writable() check before the shmem_mmap() hook is invoked, thereby regressing this change.
This series reworks how we both permit write-sealed mappings being mapped read-only and disallow mprotect() from undoing the write-seal, fixing this regression.
We also add a regression test to ensure that we do not accidentally regress this in future.
Thanks to Julian Orth for reporting this regression.
This patch (of 2):
In commit 158978945f31 ("mm: perform the mapping_map_writable() check after call_mmap()") (and preceding changes in the same series) it became possible to mmap() F_SEAL_WRITE sealed memfd mappings read-only.
This was previously unnecessarily disallowed, despite the man page documentation indicating that it would be, thereby limiting the usefulness of F_SEAL_WRITE logic.
We fixed this by adapting logic that existed for the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal (one which disallows future writes to the memfd) to also be used for F_SEAL_WRITE.
For background - the F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal clears VM_MAYWRITE for a read-only mapping to disallow mprotect() from overriding the seal - an operation performed by seal_check_write(), invoked from shmem_mmap(), the f_op->mmap() hook used by shmem mappings.
By extending this to F_SEAL_WRITE and critically - checking mapping_map_writable() to determine if we may map the memfd AFTER we invoke shmem_mmap() - the desired logic becomes possible. This is because mapping_map_writable() explicitly checks for VM_MAYWRITE, which we will have cleared.
Commit 5de195060b2e ("mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour") unintentionally undid this logic by moving the mapping_map_writable() check before the shmem_mmap() hook is invoked, thereby regressing this change.
We reinstate this functionality by moving the check out of shmem_mmap() and instead performing it in do_mmap() at the point at which VMA flags are being determined, which seems in any case to be a more appropriate place in which to make this determination.
In order to achieve this we rework memfd seal logic to allow us access to this information using existing logic and eliminate the clearing of VM_MAYWRITE from seal_check_write() which we are performing in do_mmap() instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/99fc35d2c62bd2e05571cf60d9f8b843c56069e0.173280477... Fixes: 5de195060b2e ("mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com Reported-by: Julian Orth ju.orth@gmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHijbEUMhvJTN9Xw1GmbM266FXXv=U7s4L_Jem5x3AaPZxr... Cc: Jann Horn jannh@google.com Cc: Liam R. Howlett Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Shuah Khan shuah@kernel.org Cc: Vlastimil Babka vbabka@suse.cz Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org ---
include/linux/memfd.h | 14 +++++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- mm/memfd.c | 2 - mm/mmap.c | 4 ++ 4 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/memfd.h~mm-reinstate-ability-to-map-write-sealed-memfd-mappings-read-only +++ a/include/linux/memfd.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE extern long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned int arg); struct folio *memfd_alloc_folio(struct file *memfd, pgoff_t idx); +unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr(struct file *file); #else static inline long memfd_fcntl(struct file *f, unsigned int c, unsigned int a) { @@ -16,6 +17,19 @@ static inline struct folio *memfd_alloc_ { return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } + +static inline unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr(struct file *file) +{ + return NULL; +} #endif
+/* Retrieve memfd seals associated with the file, if any. */ +static inline unsigned int memfd_file_seals(struct file *file) +{ + unsigned int *sealsp = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file); + + return sealsp ? *sealsp : 0; +} + #endif /* __LINUX_MEMFD_H */ --- a/include/linux/mm.h~mm-reinstate-ability-to-map-write-sealed-memfd-mappings-read-only +++ a/include/linux/mm.h @@ -4091,6 +4091,37 @@ void mem_dump_obj(void *object); static inline void mem_dump_obj(void *object) {} #endif
+static inline bool is_write_sealed(int seals) +{ + return seals & (F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE); +} + +/** + * is_readonly_sealed - Checks whether write-sealed but mapped read-only, + * in which case writes should be disallowing moving + * forwards. + * @seals: the seals to check + * @vm_flags: the VMA flags to check + * + * Returns whether readonly sealed, in which case writess should be disallowed + * going forward. + */ +static inline bool is_readonly_sealed(int seals, vm_flags_t vm_flags) +{ + /* + * Since an F_SEAL_[FUTURE_]WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as + * MAP_SHARED and read-only, take care to not allow mprotect to + * revert protections on such mappings. Do this only for shared + * mappings. For private mappings, don't need to mask + * VM_MAYWRITE as we still want them to be COW-writable. + */ + if (is_write_sealed(seals) && + ((vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_WRITE)) == VM_SHARED)) + return true; + + return false; +} + /** * seal_check_write - Check for F_SEAL_WRITE or F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE flags and * handle them. @@ -4102,24 +4133,15 @@ static inline void mem_dump_obj(void *ob */ static inline int seal_check_write(int seals, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { - if (seals & (F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE)) { - /* - * New PROT_WRITE and MAP_SHARED mmaps are not allowed when - * write seals are active. - */ - if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) - return -EPERM; - - /* - * Since an F_SEAL_[FUTURE_]WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as - * MAP_SHARED and read-only, take care to not allow mprotect to - * revert protections on such mappings. Do this only for shared - * mappings. For private mappings, don't need to mask - * VM_MAYWRITE as we still want them to be COW-writable. - */ - if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) - vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_MAYWRITE); - } + if (!is_write_sealed(seals)) + return 0; + + /* + * New PROT_WRITE and MAP_SHARED mmaps are not allowed when + * write seals are active. + */ + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) + return -EPERM;
return 0; } --- a/mm/memfd.c~mm-reinstate-ability-to-map-write-sealed-memfd-mappings-read-only +++ a/mm/memfd.c @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static int memfd_wait_for_pins(struct ad return error; }
-static unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr(struct file *file) +unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_ptr(struct file *file) { if (shmem_file(file)) return &SHMEM_I(file_inode(file))->seals; --- a/mm/mmap.c~mm-reinstate-ability-to-map-write-sealed-memfd-mappings-read-only +++ a/mm/mmap.c @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ #include <linux/oom.h> #include <linux/sched/mm.h> #include <linux/ksm.h> +#include <linux/memfd.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h> @@ -368,6 +369,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
if (file) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + unsigned int seals = memfd_file_seals(file); unsigned long flags_mask;
if (!file_mmap_ok(file, inode, pgoff, len)) @@ -408,6 +410,8 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, vm_flags |= VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE; if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE | VM_SHARED); + else if (is_readonly_sealed(seals, vm_flags)) + vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE; fallthrough; case MAP_PRIVATE: if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) _
Patches currently in -mm which might be from lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com are
mm-reinstate-ability-to-map-write-sealed-memfd-mappings-read-only.patch selftests-memfd-add-test-for-mapping-write-sealed-memfd-read-only.patch docs-mm-add-vma-locks-documentation.patch docs-mm-add-vma-locks-documentation-v3.patch docs-mm-add-vma-locks-documentation-fix.patch