From: Kotresh HR khiremat@redhat.com
[ Upstream commit 22c73d52a6d05c5a2053385c0d6cd9984732799d ]
The mds auth caps check should also validate the fsname along with the associated caps. Not doing so would result in applying the mds auth caps of one fs on to the other fs in a multifs ceph cluster. The bug causes multiple issues w.r.t user authentication, following is one such example.
Steps to Reproduce (on vstart cluster): 1. Create two file systems in a cluster, say 'fsname1' and 'fsname2' 2. Authorize read only permission to the user 'client.usr' on fs 'fsname1' $ceph fs authorize fsname1 client.usr / r 3. Authorize read and write permission to the same user 'client.usr' on fs 'fsname2' $ceph fs authorize fsname2 client.usr / rw 4. Update the keyring $ceph auth get client.usr >> ./keyring
With above permssions for the user 'client.usr', following is the expectation. a. The 'client.usr' should be able to only read the contents and not allowed to create or delete files on file system 'fsname1'. b. The 'client.usr' should be able to read/write on file system 'fsname2'.
But, with this bug, the 'client.usr' is allowed to read/write on file system 'fsname1'. See below.
5. Mount the file system 'fsname1' with the user 'client.usr' $sudo bin/mount.ceph usr@.fsname1=/ /kmnt_fsname1_usr/ 6. Try creating a file on file system 'fsname1' with user 'client.usr'. This should fail but passes with this bug. $touch /kmnt_fsname1_usr/file1 7. Mount the file system 'fsname1' with the user 'client.admin' and create a file. $sudo bin/mount.ceph admin@.fsname1=/ /kmnt_fsname1_admin $echo "data" > /kmnt_fsname1_admin/admin_file1 8. Try removing an existing file on file system 'fsname1' with the user 'client.usr'. This shoudn't succeed but succeeds with the bug. $rm -f /kmnt_fsname1_usr/admin_file1
For more information, please take a look at the corresponding mds/fuse patch and tests added by looking into the tracker mentioned below.
v2: Fix a possible null dereference in doutc v3: Don't store fsname from mdsmap, validate against ceph_mount_options's fsname and use it v4: Code refactor, better warning message and fix possible compiler warning
[ Slava.Dubeyko: "fsname check failed" -> "fsname mismatch" ]
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/72167 Signed-off-by: Kotresh HR khiremat@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org ---
LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus:
YES – this patch plugs a real permissions hole in CephFS multi-FS deployments with a contained, low-risk change.
- `fs/ceph/mds_client.c:5658-5669` now refuses an auth-cap entry when its `match.fs_name` differs from the mounted namespace; without this guard the client can borrow read/write caps from another filesystem and escalate privileges exactly as shown in the repro. - `fs/ceph/mdsmap.c:355-371` rejects an incoming MDS map whose `fs_name` does not match the selected namespace, preventing the client from ever switching to the wrong filesystem context before the cap check runs. - `fs/ceph/super.h:107-118` just moves the existing `namespace_equals()` helper so it can be reused; there’s no behavioral change beyond sharing the check.
The fix is tightly scoped to the Ceph client, doesn’t introduce new APIs, and gracefully falls back when older servers omit `fs_name` (the compare is skipped). The only new failure mode is refusing to mount/use the wrong filesystem, which is precisely what we want. This is a security-relevant bug fix that meets the stable tree criteria; backporting is advisable. Recommended follow-up after backport: run the multi-filesystem auth-cap scenario from the tracker to confirm the regression is gone.
fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 8 ++++++++ fs/ceph/mdsmap.c | 14 +++++++++++++- fs/ceph/super.c | 14 -------------- fs/ceph/super.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 3bc72b47fe4d4..3efbc11596e00 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -5649,11 +5649,19 @@ static int ceph_mds_auth_match(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, u32 caller_uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid); u32 caller_gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid); struct ceph_client *cl = mdsc->fsc->client; + const char *fs_name = mdsc->fsc->mount_options->mds_namespace; const char *spath = mdsc->fsc->mount_options->server_path; bool gid_matched = false; u32 gid, tlen, len; int i, j;
+ doutc(cl, "fsname check fs_name=%s match.fs_name=%s\n", + fs_name, auth->match.fs_name ? auth->match.fs_name : ""); + if (auth->match.fs_name && strcmp(auth->match.fs_name, fs_name)) { + /* fsname mismatch, try next one */ + return 0; + } + doutc(cl, "match.uid %lld\n", auth->match.uid); if (auth->match.uid != MDS_AUTH_UID_ANY) { if (auth->match.uid != caller_uid) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c b/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c index 8109aba66e023..2c7b151a7c95c 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c @@ -353,10 +353,22 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, void **p, __decode_and_drop_type(p, end, u8, bad_ext); } if (mdsmap_ev >= 8) { + u32 fsname_len; /* enabled */ ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, m->m_enabled, bad_ext); /* fs_name */ - ceph_decode_skip_string(p, end, bad_ext); + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, fsname_len, bad_ext); + + /* validate fsname against mds_namespace */ + if (!namespace_equals(mdsc->fsc->mount_options, *p, + fsname_len)) { + pr_warn_client(cl, "fsname %*pE doesn't match mds_namespace %s\n", + (int)fsname_len, (char *)*p, + mdsc->fsc->mount_options->mds_namespace); + goto bad; + } + /* skip fsname after validation */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, fsname_len, bad); } /* damaged */ if (mdsmap_ev >= 9) { diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.c b/fs/ceph/super.c index c3eb651862c55..ebef5244ae25a 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.c +++ b/fs/ceph/super.c @@ -246,20 +246,6 @@ static void canonicalize_path(char *path) path[j] = '\0'; }
-/* - * Check if the mds namespace in ceph_mount_options matches - * the passed in namespace string. First time match (when - * ->mds_namespace is NULL) is treated specially, since - * ->mds_namespace needs to be initialized by the caller. - */ -static int namespace_equals(struct ceph_mount_options *fsopt, - const char *namespace, size_t len) -{ - return !(fsopt->mds_namespace && - (strlen(fsopt->mds_namespace) != len || - strncmp(fsopt->mds_namespace, namespace, len))); -} - static int ceph_parse_old_source(const char *dev_name, const char *dev_name_end, struct fs_context *fc) { diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h index cf176aab0f823..4ac6561285b18 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.h +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h @@ -104,6 +104,20 @@ struct ceph_mount_options { struct fscrypt_dummy_policy dummy_enc_policy; };
+/* + * Check if the mds namespace in ceph_mount_options matches + * the passed in namespace string. First time match (when + * ->mds_namespace is NULL) is treated specially, since + * ->mds_namespace needs to be initialized by the caller. + */ +static inline int namespace_equals(struct ceph_mount_options *fsopt, + const char *namespace, size_t len) +{ + return !(fsopt->mds_namespace && + (strlen(fsopt->mds_namespace) != len || + strncmp(fsopt->mds_namespace, namespace, len))); +} + /* mount state */ enum { CEPH_MOUNT_MOUNTING,