From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net
commit 073815b756c51ba9d8384d924c5d1c03ca3d1ae4 upstream.
Move the bounds check in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() into a small helper named sanitize_check_bounds() in order to simplify the former a bit.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Reviewed-by: John Fastabend john.fastabend@gmail.com Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org [fllinden@amazon.com: backport to 5.4] Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden fllinden@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait ovidiu.panait@windriver.com --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 473b59126f61..faa2a4c3467d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2911,6 +2911,41 @@ static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return -EACCES; }
+static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_insn *insn, + const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) +{ + u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; + + /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds + * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. + */ + if (env->allow_ptr_leaks) + return 0; + + switch (dst_reg->type) { + case PTR_TO_STACK: + if (check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off + + dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) { + verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " + "prohibited for !root\n", dst); + return -EACCES; + } + break; + case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: + if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) { + verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " + "prohibited for !root\n", dst); + return -EACCES; + } + break; + default: + break; + } + + return 0; +} + /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a @@ -3118,23 +3153,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
- /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds - * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. - */ - if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { - if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && - check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) { - verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " - "prohibited for !root\n", dst); - return -EACCES; - } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK && - check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off + - dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) { - verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " - "prohibited for !root\n", dst); - return -EACCES; - } - } + if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) + return -EACCES;
return 0; }