4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com
commit ab57b33525c3221afaebd391458fa0cbcd56903d upstream.
Convert the bcm crypto driver to use crypto_authenc_extractkeys() so that it picks up the fix for broken validation of rtattr::rta_len.
This also fixes the DES weak key check to actually be done on the right key. (It was checking the authentication key, not the encryption key...)
Fixes: 9d12ba86f818 ("crypto: brcm - Add Broadcom SPU driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/crypto/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c | 44 +++++++++++++------------------------------- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig @@ -679,6 +679,7 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_BCM_SPU depends on ARCH_BCM_IPROC depends on MAILBOX default m + select CRYPTO_AUTHENC select CRYPTO_DES select CRYPTO_MD5 select CRYPTO_SHA1 --- a/drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c @@ -2846,44 +2846,28 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct cr struct spu_hw *spu = &iproc_priv.spu; struct iproc_ctx_s *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(cipher); struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(cipher); - struct rtattr *rta = (void *)key; - struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param; - const u8 *origkey = key; - const unsigned int origkeylen = keylen; - - int ret = 0; + struct crypto_authenc_keys keys; + int ret;
flow_log("%s() aead:%p key:%p keylen:%u\n", __func__, cipher, key, keylen); flow_dump(" key: ", key, keylen);
- if (!RTA_OK(rta, keylen)) - goto badkey; - if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM) + ret = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen); + if (ret) goto badkey; - if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param)) - goto badkey; - - param = RTA_DATA(rta); - ctx->enckeylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);
- key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len); - keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len); - - if (keylen < ctx->enckeylen) - goto badkey; - if (ctx->enckeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) + if (keys.enckeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE || + keys.authkeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) goto badkey;
- ctx->authkeylen = keylen - ctx->enckeylen; - - if (ctx->authkeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) - goto badkey; + ctx->enckeylen = keys.enckeylen; + ctx->authkeylen = keys.authkeylen;
- memcpy(ctx->enckey, key + ctx->authkeylen, ctx->enckeylen); + memcpy(ctx->enckey, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen); /* May end up padding auth key. So make sure it's zeroed. */ memset(ctx->authkey, 0, sizeof(ctx->authkey)); - memcpy(ctx->authkey, key, ctx->authkeylen); + memcpy(ctx->authkey, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen);
switch (ctx->alg->cipher_info.alg) { case CIPHER_ALG_DES: @@ -2891,7 +2875,7 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct cr u32 tmp[DES_EXPKEY_WORDS]; u32 flags = CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY;
- if (des_ekey(tmp, key) == 0) { + if (des_ekey(tmp, keys.enckey) == 0) { if (crypto_aead_get_flags(cipher) & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY) { crypto_aead_set_flags(cipher, flags); @@ -2906,7 +2890,7 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct cr break; case CIPHER_ALG_3DES: if (ctx->enckeylen == (DES_KEY_SIZE * 3)) { - const u32 *K = (const u32 *)key; + const u32 *K = (const u32 *)keys.enckey; u32 flags = CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_SCHED;
if (!((K[0] ^ K[2]) | (K[1] ^ K[3])) || @@ -2957,9 +2941,7 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct cr ctx->fallback_cipher->base.crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK; ctx->fallback_cipher->base.crt_flags |= tfm->crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK; - ret = - crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->fallback_cipher, origkey, - origkeylen); + ret = crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->fallback_cipher, key, keylen); if (ret) { flow_log(" fallback setkey() returned:%d\n", ret); tfm->crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;